

STUDIA THEOLOGICA VARSAVIENSIA

redakcja
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Szymon Krzysztof Ciećko

50 Years
of Theological Thought
in Faculty of Theology
in ACT/CSWU in Warsaw



Wydawnictwo Naukowe
Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego

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• 2019

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Wydawnictwo Naukowe
Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego
w Warszawie

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Preface

The editors are handing over a unique publication to the Reader.

Its creation encompasses two important aspects. The first one is expressed in the title itself, which in Polish sounds *50 lat teologicznej myśli na Wydziale Teologicznym Akademii Teologii Teologicznej/Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie* [Eng.: *50 years of theological thought at the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Theological Theology / Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw*]. The second refers to the most recent history, or rather to the apology of what actually defends itself. The Warsaw centre in the post-war (ATK) and contemporary (UKSW) theological panorama of Poland has always played an important role. It is here, together with the academics of the Catholic University of Lublin, that the foundations of Polish pre and post-conciliar thought were developed. But it is also in this centre and thanks to the Studies that the formation of the scientific staff of theologians in Poland was significantly contributed. It is therefore surprising that scientific journals rooted in the history of theological thought must defend their position in the context of the new list of scoring journals. Let the reader, given these two contexts, judge the role, contribution and place of the semi-annual journal of Polish theologians for over half a century. The place of a given journal in the scientific panorama of the discipline is not determined by a top-down framework, but by the real scientific contribution that the journal represents.

Analysing the scientific achievements of the *Studia Theologica Varsaviensia* and considering the direction in which the collaborating authors should go, we have come to the conclusion that the best summary and a point where one could start again would be to collect, within the framework of monographs, those texts which, in the opinion of the Editors, are the most valuable or which, to some extent, represent milestones on the map of over 50-year history of the *Studia*.

Around 50 publications have been translated into English. This decision was justified by the desire to increase the international impact of the Journal.

In the elaborated texts we also indicate the place of the original publication, so that the Reader can easily find each of them.

The submitted monograph is not limited to native authors, studying, or working at the Academy of Catholic Theology or Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw.

For methodological reasons, the work was divided into five substantive chapters, presenting original studies on: anthropology, biblicism, dogmatic theology, morality, and teaching of the Second Vatican Council. Finally, there is the *Varia* section with texts not so much less original or unrelated to anything broadly defined above, but rather not directly within any of the above sections of what we could call systematic theology.

In each chapter we sought to arrange the texts as to present the actual development of the theological reflection presented in the previous publications of *Studia Theologica Varsaviensia*.

Let us briefly outline the basic theological ideas discussed in each of the aforementioned chapters.

Anthropology has been an important element of theological reflection since St Irenaeus of Lyon. It is man, the living man, who has been, is and will remain the essential path of the Church's mission in the world. This is also reflected in the recent document of the Pontifical Biblical Commission of 2019, which is entirely devoted to theological anthropology, with its fundamental question: Who is man? In this section, the reader will receive a thorough proposal for reflection on the foundations and hermeneutics of Christian anthropology. Obviously, it is not man who is the measure of omniscience. The dignity of man comes from the fact of creation and redemption. Redemption is not an element of improving or mastering man's condition, but it is first and foremost man's salvation from death. This is why such an important subject as Man in the context of Redemption is addressed in the *Studia*. The central point and, at the same time, the most difficult borderline situation is human death. There is no full anthropology without reference to this "theological cross". Man is not only a being, a person, an individual. In the theological context man is above all a mystery. A mystery which combines what is visible with what is invisible. Hence there is no full understanding of the mystery, without a proper reference to the problem of the body, which crowns the anthropological part of this publication.

In the biblical section we begin our reflection by outlining the issue of anthropological dualism. It is also in theology that man as *coincidentia oppositorum* is reflected. However, in order to be able to draw the right conclusions from biblical reflection, it is necessary to have a proper understanding of what biblical interpretation is. The theme of man also returns, with a special biblical

place of its foundation, which is Psalm 8. It is only by understanding who man is in God's perspective that we can look anew at love in a double dimension: to God and to man. However, the starting point remains the fact of creation in the image and likeness of God. Only from these theological foundations can the moral principles of human life be derived.

Dogmatic theology belongs to the fundamental canon of the Church's teaching. Christ, who through the Incarnation inhabits the human world, leaves to him his special presence in the Eucharist. It is Eucharistic piety and its proper theological foundation that constitute an essential element of the Catholic Church's identity. Dogmata, however, is not something that cannot be interpreted. Interpretation, basically, makes it possible to see in dogmatic judgments what is permanent and what necessarily arises as the result of an interpretation that takes account of historical and cultural contexts, and must therefore take these contexts into account when interpreting dogmatic judgments today, preserving from them what is permanent and unchanging in the Church's teaching. This is why, the dogmatic theology cannot escape the current problems of faith and devotion. The communion of children has been one such problem in the history of recent decades. The essential theological axis, however, always remains the question of salvation in Christ. Starting from the fundamental truths of faith, the Church also believes that it is a community which, in the spirit of *sensus fidei*, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, is able to decode the signs of the times given to man in a creative and fruitful way.

While it is important to ask fundamental questions about why people believe, why they need redemption, it is equally important to ask how to realize it in life practice. This is what Christian morality serves. It is a reflection on a complex and dynamic reality, and therefore its inclusion in this publication even follows the prior embedding of theological reflection in Holy Scripture and the dogmas of the Church. Christian morality is the task of the believer. It is therefore impossible to develop moral reflection without its reference to the place and role of the laity in the Church. Morality is simply expression of a specific sense of theological pulse. One of such pulsating problems is undoubtedly the question of organ donation. In order to fully understand the moral obligations incumbent on man, it is necessary to show him as the "subject" and "place" of morality. After all, it is not about a globalised or even more "widespread" morality. It is about a universal morality which takes into account everyone and the whole person. The mystery of man is also the mystery of iniquity, and in this context the broad issue of Christian penance. This issue is presented in the Catholic and Protestant juxtaposition.

Describing fifty years of theological reflection of a given journal, it is impossible to interrogate the place of the Second Vatican Council in this reflection. We begin this section with an issue that became the most perceptible point of the ecclesiastical reform, namely the liturgical reform. The Council's thought is also full of themes related to morality, with a particular emphasis on embedding biblical reflection on the one hand, and the search for an appropriate methodology for its practice on the other. In this context, there is also a call to return to the sources in Christian education. The Council considers also the question of the role of the laity in the Church and the redefinition of the apostolate. Man is the path of the Church, hence, on the one hand, an important reflection on man as a new creature, and, on the other hand, a consideration of the nature of the Church in the Council's dogmatic constitution on the Church.

This theological reflection concerns the whole life of man of faith in relation to the world and the Church. Accordingly, there are certain issues that cannot be directly attributed to a given theological sub-discipline, which are best described as the *Varia* following the tradition of the *Studia*. There is room for a closer look at the role of the Academy of Catholic Theology as a dynamic place for scientific reflection on the faith. The significance and contribution of the Warsaw School of Apologetic Studies cannot be ignored. In recent years, a document which undoubtedly aroused great discussion was the encyclical "Veritatis splendor". This publication addresses three essential elements of the dispute: freedom, truth and conscience. It also presents an idea of following Christ which was not recognized in earlier theological thought. It is impossible not to notice the dispute of recent years about the understanding of the authority of the Church, also in the ecumenical context. The culmination are two texts showing, on the one hand, the rediscovery of the personalistic aspect of theology, and on the other hand, the reinterpretation of the theology of the body in clash with the broadly understood teachings about man.

Let us return once again to the question about the role and place of the semi-annual scholar journal of *Studia Theologica Varsaviensia*, and leave the reader with the final assessment of the presented output. May this be a gift and a message about man for man in an interdisciplinary scientific struggle. May man also remain the ultimate path and reference for STV's future reflections.

Part I –
Anthropological Issue

The Issue Of Christian Anthropology*

(I). I: Why the Issue of Christian Anthropology?

1.1. Preliminary explanations

As far as can be gathered, the first textbook on dogmatic theology, in which a volume is devoted to the supernaturalism of man was entitled *Anthropologia supernaturalis* by P. Parente, first published in 1943.

Karl Rahner dealt with the subject of Christian anthropology many times, treating it at first as the basis for a philosophy of religion, then as part of fundamental theology, and finally showing a tendency to identify the area of anthropology with dogmatic theology¹.

Many authors raised the problem of Christian anthropology in relation to the modern approach to pastoral theology, noting rightly that the one presented by F.X. Arnold's divine-human principle of pastoral theology and the entire pastoral ministry of the Church (understood as "self-realisation in the present") implies anthropological structure as the basic structure². In connection with the indicated interests of theologians, many different approaches to Christian anthropology or theological anthropology have been developed. Since we will not be classifying and typologising these positions herein, it is enough to say that they lie between two extremes: identification with dogmatic theology (Rahner) or recognition as a department of dogmatic theology (Parente) – treating Christian anthropology as a new department of theology in its structure and function, most often practical or pastoral. Therefore we

* STV 9(1971)2.

¹ First perspective: K. Rahner, *Hörer des Wortes*, München 1963, second perspective: *Christliche (theologische) Anthropologie*, LThK; third approach: *Teologia a antropologia*, "Znak" 186.

² This is how it is understood in *Handbuch der Pastoraltheologie*, F.X. Arnold, F. Klostermann, K. Rahner, V. Schurr, L.M. Weber (ed.), esp. in vol. 1, Freiburg 1965 and in vol. 2, 1966.

state that Christian anthropology must be taught separately as a theological discipline especially necessary for pastoral studies³.

The information given in a nutshell is enough for us to notice the existence of the issue of Christian anthropology in the contemporary theologian's workshop. In Polish theological literature A. Nossol has recently addressed this issue in an interesting way in his article *Teologia człowieka w rozwoju*⁴. This article will neither be a repetition of the work undertaken by Nossol, nor will it be a polemic with his approach. The author is interested in the whole anthropological issue, or at least theological anthropology as an issue to be developed in contemporary theology. I would like to draw attention to one aspect of this issue, which in my opinion is decisive: what is the "Christianity" of anthropology. I deliberately write "Christianity" and not of its theological character because as we will find out, this is where I see the essence of the matter.

1.2. What are we not dealing with in this problem?

The author of this article is of the opinion that the time has not yet come to decide what place Christian anthropology occupies or should occupy in the structure of the whole of theology. This structure is currently undergoing such a thorough overhaul that a discussion on these topics can only concern specific issues. As a consequence, the statements by K. Rahner are premature⁵.

There is no doubt that the problem of human origin belongs to Christian anthropology. It has become customary to call this issue the problem of hominisation. This does not mean that this problem should cease to be a subject of interest of biblical theologians, dogmaticians or apologists. The problem of hominisation is simply a special point of view on Christian anthropology, which I would like to set out hereom. Therefore, I will not deal with the issue of hominisation.

I will also ignore the confrontation of the basic principles of Christian anthropology with the dogmatic analysis of God's grace in the present reflections. This confrontation will undoubtedly have to be made, but it is precisely after the basic assumptions have been established, which is what this article is all about.

³ This is the meaning of the article by K. Rahner, *Grundentwurf einer theologischen Anthropologie*, in: *Handbuch...*, op. cit., vol. 2.

⁴ A. Nossol, *Teologia człowieka w rozwoju*, "Ateneum Kapłańskie" 62(1970)2, 163-174.

⁵ Esp. in the fourth article from *LThK*.

According to K. Rahner's suggestions, I will also omit the detailed confrontation of the foundations of Christian anthropology with trinitarian theology, with Christology, and with the carefully considered history of salvation⁶. All these matters will have to be tackled, but only in connection with the search for an answer to the fundamental question of this article, which, as I have already written, is: what is the "Christianity" of the anthropology that we are dealing with.

The problem, which will also not be addressed in detail, will be the analysis of the most anthropological document of the Second Vatican Council, *the Pastoral Constitution*, although we will make many allusions to its approaches.

1.3. What do we deal with in this article?

The basic answer is already known to us: the "Christianity" of our anthropology. However, a few clarifications are needed.

The first explanation must concern the belonging of Christian anthropology to the field of theology. There are long discussions about the existence and meaning of Christian philosophy. If we were to take the position of the existence of a Christian philosophy, not only because of the historical connection with the Christian environment, but also because of the specific internal structure of this philosophy, we could imagine the existence of a section of Christian philosophy that would be called Christian anthropology. The position represented in this article is to recognise Christian anthropology as a strictly theological field.

This does not mean, however, that theologically-understood Christian anthropology does not have numerous and important links with philosophy. On the contrary, it seems that from the very beginning of the Christian concept of man, i.e. from the time of writing the four Gospels and apostolic letters, especially St. Paul's letters, there has been an ongoing dialogue with what could be called the philosophical views of the Jewish community and with Hellenistic philosophy in its various forms. I do not mention the future of this dialogue, it is too well known. For this reason, the second part of the article will be devoted entirely to the problem of the following relations: theology – philosophy in the formation of Christian anthropology.

The problem of dialogue between theology and philosophy will be the central and methodologically decisive element of the article. It ties the historical remarks of the first part with the last part.

The first part of the article is historical in the sense that it refers to personal experiences connected with writing a book about Christian anthropology,

a book that has not been completed yet, and to the many years of experience (strictly speaking: fifteen years!)⁶ of lectures on Christian anthropology. The description of these experiences will not only have the character of personal confessions, thus something significant for the very fate of Christian anthropology in contemporary reflections and in contemporary lectures. The writer managed, at least in part, to keep a diary of his own struggle with the subject in lectures and attempts to write a book. These materials will be used in the first part of the article. The point of adding of these remarks, as we have called them, will be the question of the balance between the theological and philosophical point of view, which will be a transition to the second part.

The last part of the article deals with the fundamental issue of the proper, in my opinion, approach to Christian anthropology, namely, the question of the transcendence of the person. This is an issue that is well known and widely discussed today. What I would like to contribute from myself to the discussion on this subject comes down to the problem of the end of the transcendence of the individual. The end of this is another person or, more generally, the interpersonal community. I consider the person and the community to be one and the same considered only from different points of view. In the conjugated view of persons and communities, I see the most contemporary and radical perspective of the human paradox and this is on the basis of Christian anthropology. Therefore, if this matter can be clarified as clearly as possible, then at the same time, in my opinion, the most basic assumption of contemporary Christian anthropology will be established, which is what this article is all about.

(II.) 2. From the Experience of a Writer of a Book on Christian Anthropology

2.1. Difficulty in raising the issue

In the notes from the initial stage of teaching Christian anthropology, already understood theologically, I find a proposal according to which I tried to include the issue: either in the model “nature-history” or “man in the history of salvation.” It soon appeared that both of these models, if they were to deal with theological issues, contain the same proposal, that is, a reference to the history of salvation. Christian anthropology, however, could not be transformed, as I have already written, into a lecture on the history of salvation.

⁶ Ibid.

It was necessary to maintain a reference to the history of salvation without a lecture on the history of salvation. This was achieved through suggestions made in *Gaudium et spes*. However I will write about this later. At the moment we are interested in the very way of presenting the lecture. It consisted in treating the problematic issues⁷ of man in the perspective of the final times, or rather the “middle of the times.”⁸ In this way the awareness of the entanglement of our knowledge of man and his structure in history is preserved without disturbing the systematic course of the lecture. This, of course, involves a far-reaching revision of the concept of human nature in terms of removing traces of the concept of “pure nature,” brought into Christian anthropology by certain forms of medieval Neoplatonism^{9 10}.

The most important difficulty in choosing the right point of view, which will be discussed further, which would enable a good attitude to the issue, was a good attitude of anthropology to Christology. It is known that Christ is a “new man”; at the same time it is known that he is the God-Man. The only way out of the difficulties could be entanglement in the Christological perspective again.

2.2. Difficulty in choosing the right point of view and material

As has already been written, the correct point of view in the lecture on Christian anthropology was to take into account the perspective of salvation history and the Christological perspective. Taking a proper point of view was therefore to treat the subject in such a way as to deal primarily and constantly with man in accordance with human experience, without losing sight of the fact that human experience and historical experience reveals its full meaning and is subject to a proper interpretation only when human history is treated as a history of salvation. The difficulty here is in the necessary methodological and stylistic mixture of the secular and religious points of view. Moreover, it was difficult to link the synchronous structure of the lecture with the diachronic

⁷ K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, Kraków, 1969.

⁸ It is a well-known approach to the theology of St. Luke by H. Conzelmann in his work *Die Mitte der Zeit...*, Tübingen, 1964; we wish to oppose the views that the history of salvation ended with the first coming of Christ.

⁹ We mean the idea of pure nature in *Metaphysics* by Avicenna.

¹⁰ Here we strictly distinguish between the secularisation of Christianity, which concerns cultural changes in the understanding of religiousness and does not have to be a religious negative phenomenon, and desacralisation, a tendency to remove everything that concerns the *sacrum* from culture and consciousness. The latter position is, of course, incompatible with Christianity.

structure of the understanding of the matter, i.e. to such a systematic contribution that would not stop treating the human being historically, and thus did not give the impression of a lecture on the eternal notions of a translating human being.

The Christological perspective once again demanded a constant dealing with Christ without talking about it all the time and without lecturing about the God-Man instead of man. As we can see, the problem of the lecture on Christian anthropology was connected in the consciousness of the lecturer who lectured constantly with the issue of the secularization of the Christian understanding of reality, which is typical of our times¹⁰. The subject of the lecture was to be simply the man we know, seeking self-knowledge, self-determination, trying to understand and interpret one's own aspirations: love and creativity. At the same time, it was to be a truly Christian lecture about man created and renewed in Christ in the image of God, a man whose history is the history of salvation leading up to the end of time.

The difficulty of choosing the right material was first of all related to the issues pointed out in 1.2. We do not deal with them because after more mature consideration it was appropriate to remove them from a contemporary lecture on anthropology.

I tried to give the rules of proper selection and arrangement of the material in the article answering a questionnaire, written together with A. Zuberbier. According to the principles in this article I started writing a book devoted to Christian anthropology. Here I came across further difficulties. The principle was to present Christian anthropology in its theological as well as philosophical aspect. I will write about this issue quite extensively. However, the theological part of the lecture itself posed new problems. It was necessary to constantly refer to biblical sources, which in the absence of competence in biblical theology had to lead to the choice of a method of giving signals and operating on a very limited range of biblical references. It was also required by the already presented secular style of the book.

Another difficulty I encountered was when I started to develop the second chapter of the book devoted to the individual. There were no particular difficulties in aligning the individual and social elements when it came to the image of God in man and human individuality because we were supposed to begin to discuss human actions and aspirations. However, it was precisely in the individual's problems that this difficulty appeared clearly. We will return to this issue in the last part of this article.

Finally, the very beginning of the lecture: the image of God in man. Should a Christian really begin his lecture on man "from Adam and Eve," that

is, from creation, whereas it is known that theologically speaking, we begin to understand creation only in the light of salvation¹¹.

2.3. The question of the balance between the theological and philosophical point of view

K. Rahner teaches that Christian anthropology should be practised without philosophical prejudices, or at least without philosophical positions previously taken. On the other hand, the same author draws attention to the obvious fact that we cannot free ourselves from existing historical human experience, which is largely of a philosophical nature¹². How can these two tasks be reconciled in order to maintain a truly Christian and truly human character of anthropology?

First of all, you have to stick to the advice of an excellent theologian. Christ and the history of salvation is the first anthropological principle. I write this on purpose: the fact of Christ's existence, for I want to remain as close as possible to reality, is historically unique. The interpretation of this fact, even an original one given in the theology of the synoptic gospels, is no longer free from philosophical interpretations. And the history of salvation? After all, the ways of presenting it always imply a specific historiosophical model, not free from philosophical ties, and are never a simple representation of the order of events. Nothing would have resulted from this, and if something had resulted from it, this would have been based on the principle of historiosophy entangled in the presentation of the order of facts.

What I have written is enough to realise that the pure fact of Christ existing and the pure, that is, history of salvation not entangled in any philosophy, is not given to us and is not available at all. There is also the history of human experience, understood as the history of philosophy. In turn is it completely free from religious and philosophical implications, even in the least religious forms of philosophising, which history registered? It would be easy to prove that it is not. So there is no problem of a "chemically pure" theology and equally a pure philosophy of man.

Therefore, the only thing that remains in our practice of Christian anthropology is to maintain a balance between its theological and philosophical elements. This means, above all, the primacy of fact and the primacy of the history

¹¹ L. Kuc, A. Zuberbier, *Response to a Survey on the Evidence of the Existence and Spirituality and Immortality of the Human Soul*, in: *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 25, Warsaw, 62-66.

¹² Art. cit. in *LThK*.

of salvation. There are methods developed by biblical theologians to maintain this primacy without losing the memory of an inevitable counterpoint of a theological and philosophical interpretation. With a theological interpretation, the matter is still quite simple, as long as it is only a reflection of fact and history, without resorting to any philosophical assumptions. However, is this phase of reflection at all experimentally tangible? Rather not. Philosophy enters “without asking, through the gate.” After all, it is the same as the human way of thinking shaped by history and current state of the community in which we live. After all, we must somehow understand the basic terms used in the transmission of the Gospel: man, life, light, freedom, love. This is a philosophy that is unknowing and immature. So let the inevitable at least be made aware.

So below is the result of the experience of the author of a book on Christian anthropology: philosophy cannot be avoided in the interpretation of the basic facts and the history of our salvation, so it is necessary to realise to oneself as precisely as possible when we refer to it. Conscious and critical reference to philosophy: this is the programme proposed here, and moreover critical study through the whole sequence of dealing with Christian anthropology, or by chance the concepts and philosophical theses, which we will make use of, do not falsify the biblical perspective and the fundamental line of the interpretation of the Bible in ecclesiastical teachings. This is how I understand the demand for balance. However, this is not enough. The question of a dialogue between theology and philosophy on the grounds of Christian anthropology will be discussed in more detail further in the article.

(III). 3. DOES A CHRISTIAN NEED A HUMAN PHILOSOPHY?

3.1. Extreme position: unnecessary

Unnecessary, because Christ and his work, and in it the doctrine, says everything that man should know about himself. It is not a new attitude. However, we are interested in the contemporary form of such a position, which is based on a misunderstanding. The Gospel itself, without any philosophy, is a programme that can be heard. This programme and attitude may be more primitive and non-reflective. Of course, we are interested in its more perfect and reflective form, which includes a philosophical programme, but is in a way minimalistic¹³. Man against patterns, in search of the closest possible contact with the Gospel, learning about

¹³ A. Grzegorzcyk, *Schematy i człowiek*, Warsaw 1963, 17-141 *passim*.

himself, and what is necessary to act in accordance with the Gospel rather than reflecting on the question of who I am. If there is a philosophy, it is an analytical one, describing human actions in order to include as much as possible in the evangelical programme in a secular language or to show the relationship between the Gospel and mankind's social aspirations for unity, justice and peace.

This last point of view questioning the need for philosophy for Christians seems to be the mildest because at least it implies a reflection on the main concerns of the human family of our time and initiates anthropological contemplation and thus, in a sense, theological contemplation. However, even in the mildest form, we are dealing with anthropological irrationalism in the name of a holistic, under a sign of unity and simplicity, dealing with man. Irrational contemplation or contemplation against rationalism? There seems to be a deep misunderstanding here. What is it all about?

3.2. Danger of "overphilosophing"

In the modern version, this danger is first felt as a threat to detach life from the Gospel through excessive and useless thinking. Then, as the use of thinking is too distinctive in man and it distinguishes between fields and elements, both in the individual man and in the human community, we do not need modern rational structures, but rather simple formulas to encourage unity among ourselves in the spirit of the Gospel.

Indeed, the philosophy of man practised by Christians can sometimes detach individuals from the concrete tasks of reforming themselves and their own community in the name of a subtle analysis of human structures. Does not modern theology give us examples? Some facts with salvific sarcasm were unmasked by Pascal in *Prowincjalki*. Others we can see looking back into the pre-conciliar era. Let us remain with the generalities – there is currently no historical study of the anthropological distortions of Christianity. Our perspective today does not allow us to separate human theory from practice: man checks himself and contemplates his riches in historical action.

However, it is necessary to note with particular attention the reluctance and fear of today's people to apply distinctions in the analysis of human reality, which supposedly obscures the consciousness of one in its functional structure of the stream of life. Maritain's "distinguer pour unir" programme is not popular today. This expresses, among other things, the distrust of the man of the technical era in the face of the dismemberment of our conscious reflection. The analysis of complex "underlying" structures is more likely to be left to the detailed sciences, especially the natural sciences, as well as to the social sciences.

3.3. Dialogue between theology and philosophy

Nevertheless, we are witnessing an increased dialogue between theology and philosophy in Christian anthropology.

The basis for dialogue is the search in the Bible for a full vision of man. Theological analysis of biblical data inevitably leads to a search for philosophical content entangled in biblical approaches. The question of biblical anthropology boils down to the question: what results from the relation between the Judaic mentality with various oriental philosophies, from the relation with Hellenistic philosophies, and finally what constitutes an indigenous biblical vision of a philosophical nature? The first issue to be mentioned is the issue of immortality. It is rather unquestionable that the formation of thoughts about the resurrection and immortality of man in later books of the Old Testament took place not without the influence of Hellenism¹⁴.

Typically Hellenistic inspirations can be found in some biblical approaches concerning the problem of the soul and its relation to the body^{15 16}. As we know, the basic vision of man in the Bible is not dualistic. The terms “body” and “soul” are most commonly used in the Book interchangeably, from different points of view, but in their entirety. However, the further fate of the Christian concept of man has been different. Generally towards a sharp acceptance of the dualism of the soul and body, of course in favour of the soul. It is also known that this was mainly due to Platonic or Neoplatonic inspiration. St. Augustine was the crown witness of this process. There was an evolution in his views as he read the Bible. In the last version of the commentary to the book of Genesis, Augustine expresses a view of the positive value of the body created by God and constituting, together with the soul, a whole destined for resurrection.

It is commonly believed that St. Thomas Aquinas overcame duality in Christian anthropology. In his writings, the human soul is not opposed to the body as to something worse or hindering the soul in its free action. On the contrary, the action of the human soul in its highest forms requires the functional cooperation of bodily organs. It is certain that St. Thomas Aquinas himself did not overcome all the consequences of dualism, but we will leave this issue out of the reach of the present reflections¹⁶. In any case, since the times of Thomas

¹⁴ W. Marchel, *De resurrectione et de retributione secundum 2 Mach et 4 Mach*, in: *Verbum Domini* 34 (1956), 327-341; K. Romaniuk, *Księga Mądrości*, Poznań 1969, 56-63.

¹⁵ Ecc. 12, 1; 2 Macc 6, 30; L. Stachowiak, *Biblijna koncepcja człowieka*, in: *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 2, Warsaw 1968, 209-226.

¹⁶ M. Gogacz, *Egzystencjalne rozumienie duszy ludzkiej*, “*Studia Philosophiae Christianae*” 6(1970)2, 5-27.

Aquinas, one can no longer treat a human being with impunity as a soul living in the flesh for punishment and to one's loss. Although for theologian, as Thomas Aquinas says, man is of an interest "from the side of the soul"¹⁷, however, the phrase itself is significant. It implies treating man as a whole composed in reality of the soul and body, but essentially indivisible.

Modern philosophy cannot claim the merit of overcoming all the consequences of a dualistic understanding of man. After all, along with Descartes, it returned to such extreme dualism as Christian thought had not known before. The merit of modern philosophy in terms of understanding the Gospel seems rather to overcome cosmocentrism or treating man as one of many beings, one of many things in this world. Kant said the decisive word on this subject, although Descartes, and especially the English empiricists, already had elements preparing this point of view. By placing all emphasis on human consciousness as a constitutive of man in his uniqueness, subjective philosophy has overcome, if not *explicite*, then at least the *implicite* Aristotelian burden: treating man as a rational animal with the accent placed on the animal. Since then, man can no longer be analysed on the same plane as other living beings and the rest of the cosmos.

Contemporary Christian theological anthropology undoubtedly refers to the achievements of subjective and reflective philosophy^{18 19}. We disregard the discussion on this subject with individual representatives of Christian anthropology practised today. We simply want to highlight what we personally consider to be a problem of Christian anthropology. In order not to confuse human cognition with human existence, while rightly considering human consciousness as constitutive of man in his uniqueness²⁰. In the writer's opinion, it is helpful to distinguish clearly between human existence and the act of human existence²¹. By existence I mean the historically-shaped structure of a concrete person that can be analysed through reflection, and by the act of existence, the basic element that makes man come true, which makes him a being. Through analysis and existential reflection, we never get directly to the act of existence. In this way we study the existing structure.

¹⁷ ST, 1 q. 75, *proem*.

¹⁸ J.B. Metz, *Christliche Anthropozentrik*, München, 1962, 43-51.

¹⁹ We are thinking primarily of the works of K. Rahner and his disciples.

²⁰ That would be a mistake of epistemology. Cf. M. Gogacz, art. cit. and *Problem teorii osoby*, "Studia Philosophiae Christianae" 7(1971)2, in print.

²¹ The Polish language allows one to consistently maintain this distinction.

At least since the middle of the 19th century, the next form of the human paradox has been very clearly visible. If we managed to take a position on the opposition of the soul-body, man-cosmos, the opposition of the individual-society remains to be overcome. Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* is a groundbreaking document of human experience, requiring confrontation with the Gospel. The history of this confrontation from *Rerum novarum* to *Mater et magistra* and *Pacem in terris* is well known. In my opinion, a theological analysis is demanded above all by the principle of the common good, which has been referred to so many times and in various meanings in the teaching of the Church and in the work of theologians. A proper understanding and development of this principle allows us to overcome the opposition of the individual – society, or rather (we will stick to this terminology) – the person-community^{22 23}. The last part of this article is devoted to this topic.

(IV). 4. TRANSCENDENCE OF A PERSON

4.1. Contemporary wording of the human paradox

One of the sources of the contemporary formulation of the human paradox in relation to the issue of the person-community is research in the field of theology and the philosophy of human language and, more generally, human expression. It was possible to detect a mistake in the definition of the traditional matter of the dependence or independence of language and thinking. It appeared that we are dealing here with an apparent issue because human consciousness in its entirety is an interpersonal fact: not only do we speak, but we always think to someone, so human thinking and human expression are a conjugated reality.

Going further, it must be said that if we intend to consistently apply the achievements of subjective and reflective philosophy, the person and the community in general is a conjugated reality. We recognise ourselves as true and good, and consequently, as a unity, an integration and as an individual we recognise ourselves in interpersonal relationships. Firstly, I get to know another person and discover in him or her the common properties mentioned above as being, and only then, by analogy and reflection, do I learn about myself. Truth and human goodness, unity and human existence, are the basic common good understood in an analogous way, cognisable in interpersonal relationships. At

²² CCC 25-26; M.A. Krapiec, *Jednostka i społeczeństwo*, "Znak" 180.

²³ This concerns the specially constructed meaning of the word conjugation.

the same time it appears that by getting to know other people I get to know myself and vice versa, by deepening my own existential experience, I know increasingly more about all that is similar and analogically similar, one can say, common to me and other people.

4.2. Conjugation: person – community

In view of what has already been explained, I put forward the thesis that the individual and the community is a conjugated reality, that is, it is one and the same reality considered from a different point of view. Of course, I have no intention of proclaiming a thesis on the substance of the human community. I repeat, each human person remains an independent and unique reality. Rather, I would like to say that the human community, which, considered from the outside, is a relational entity in the sense of accidental relations, connecting people with each other on various grounds, exists in fact, personally and substantially in individuals as their common good by analogy. By the very fact that the role played in discovering oneself and in judging ourselves properly, other people live in us forever, they begin to be our truth, our goodness. They determine our unity or personal integration, by creating our existence and shaping our historical existence. By resorting to the traditional language of philosophy, they develop our existence as secondary causes.

The theme of the dialogue structure of the individual expressed in the me-you structure, the topic of living in each other's people, is well known to contemporary theology and the philosophy of man. All this together amounts to a thesis about the transcendence of the individual in interpersonal relationships. The aim of this article is to dot the "i" in this regard. The proper place for the full existence of the human community is the individual and therefore we say that community and person is a conjugated reality, that is, one and the same reality. We wish to treat our thesis as theological, recalling the evangelical statements about Christ's dwelling in us and us in him, about the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in us. In St. Paul's letters there is no lack of words about how the addressees of the letters live in the heart of the Apostle, and they are not merely pictorial and metaphorical statements.

Recent remarks allow us to outline a proposal for a new interpretation of the theological human act of existence. The name of God in the Old Testament was "He who is." In the New: "Our Lord's Father and our Father" or simply "Love." The creative act of existence given to man is therefore a creative act of love. In the sense in which man possesses him and is constituted by him, it is, of course, an act of created love, the full realisation of which, in a mysterious

way connected with the uncreated existence and love of the divine person, is the man Jesus Christ. God dwells in me because He loves me as my Creator and Father. People live in me because they love me and as secondary causes they work together with God to shape my existence and my being, that is, God's love for me. I carry within me those who love me and those whom I love, and this is the most real communion with God and people, bearing fruit in many ways on a daily basis: "faith as a result of love."

My existence is turned entirely to God; for this love created, which creates and makes me his son. It is also directed entirely to the people, those on whom the shaping of my historical existence depended to the highest degree. I do not hesitate to speak in this case, expanding somewhat the traditional meaning of this expression, about the transcendental relationships that bind me to God present in me through "the love poured out in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us" and with people, the most important in my life. God and the people closest to me are my true home, a community that is internalised, and thus exists in me in the most real way because it identifies itself with my person.

This is a sketch. The proposal contains many uncertainties and understatements, but it seems that Christian anthropology should go in this direction.

4.3. Conclusion: theological suggestions of the Pastoral Constitution

The text of *Gaudium et spes* has not yet become the basis for a systematic analysis from the point of view of Christian anthropology²⁴. We shall not conduct a systematic analysis at the end of this article. We will only mention a few issues that are particularly important in our opinion. The first issue is the very arrangement of the first chapter of the Constitutions. It speaks firstly of the dignity of the individual, then of the human community, and only then does it move on to the discussion of human activity in the world and the tasks of the Church in the modern world. The anthropological concept of the text can be seen from the very layout of the chapters of the first part.

The idea is that the concept of the presence of the Church in the contemporary world, that is, the concept of the Church as a sign, that is, a modern concept of pastoral ministry with the whole Church as a subject, depends on the right attitude and resolution of the question of who I am and who I – man – become. This is the basic premise of an anthropological structure, expressed in questions about the dignity of the person and the human community.

²⁴ A. Nossol does it to some extent, art. cit.

Are these two questions or one? In Article 25 of the CCC we read, in the editorial subtitle, about *interdependentia* – the interdependence of person and community. The Latin term expresses even more than the word Polish “interdependencja” (interdependence). It corresponds rather to a word that we have used several times, namely, the word *conjugation*, which we in turn interpreted simply as one.

The text of Article 25 itself proclaims: “*Ex sociali hominis Índole apparet humanas personae profectum et ipsius societatis incrementum ab invicem pendere.*” I pay attention to the expression “ab invicem pendere,” which is undoubtedly referred to, again, to what I call conjugation. It is simply an attempt to express this term in classical Latin.

In this article we encounter other formulations which seem to confirm our interpretation. Above all, it proclaims that the very nature of the individual results in the necessity of a social life for which the person is, as the text says, a *principium, subiectum et finis*. I pay attention to the expressions *subiectum* and *finis*. The first confirms all that I wrote about the one real way of existence of the community, which is its interiorisation in the person. The second expression *finis*, goal, insofar as it is significant here because it places the goal of the community in itself as existing in its subject of interiorisation, i.e. in the person. It has not yet been noticed that on this occasion of Church teaching and theological reflection an evolution of the concept of purpose has taken place. It is no longer just an external cause in relation to the reality to which it relates, but lies within it.

We have already omitted the interpretation of the last part of Article 25 of the CCC, although there are also interesting formulations about the non-marginal character of the community in relation to the person, in order to draw attention to the need for an in-depth interpretation of Article 26. This is where the idea of the common good develops. At first glance, it is in the sense of objectivity rather than in the sense of a community of persons. After all, a deeper reading indicates something else. We will not deal with this topic anymore. It is time for a conclusion of all our deliberations.

We understand the problem of Christian anthropology and have tried to show it as a problem of confronting the Gospel with human experience. If human experience shows us more and more deeply and clearly in its history the paradox of man, it is in the Gospel that we seek a solution to what seems unresolvable: the human paradox.

Contribution To The Construction Of The Subject Of Theological Anthropology*

Metaphysical Elements In Theological Anthropology

In this article it is assumed that the task of theological anthropology, as opposed to philosophical anthropology, which deals with the ontical analysis of man from the structural and causal perspective, is to study the axiology of human relations. This issue is explained further in another text¹. However, since metaphysical issues cannot be excluded from the field of theological anthropology, it is appropriate to try to explain their presence and role in the investigations of a theologian dealing with anthropology.

The subject of the article is the issue of the construction of theological anthropology. According to the requirements of the hermeneutics of theological anthropology, Christ is the main methodological category of this discipline². It is necessary to agree with K. Rahner's reservation that the Christology which constitutes the basis and norm of anthropology should, as far as possible, be free from metaphysical and cultural presuppositions, alien to biblical texts and the fundamental findings of the Church's teaching in this regard³. However, in the construction of the theological subject matter of anthropology, metaphysical leitmotifs were usually present. We would like to ask whether this is a legitimate situation and, if so, what would be the status of metaphysics in the field of theological anthropology.

* STV 12(1974)1.

¹ Christian anthropology. Lectures at the Academy of Catholic Theology (now Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University) in the academic year 1972/73. A manuscript given privately to students to help them prepare for an exam.

² This is a statement commonly proclaimed by theologians dealing with anthropology. In the classical form it can be found in the K. Rahner's *Theologische Anthropologie*, from LThK², later published several more times in unchanged versions. In the latest version in: *Herders theologisches Taschenlexikon*, Freiburg i. Br. 1972, vol. 1, 135f.

³ Ibid.

A fascinating question would be the historical question: why metaphysical thoughts were present in numerous approaches to theological anthropology and what role they played there. However, we are putting this question off to another opportunity to deal with it⁴. The answer to our question about the contemporary construction of theological anthropology comes down to two elements.

a) When we read the Bible and the basic documents of Tradition today, when we listen to the teaching of the Church today, our reception of the message of faith implies our own human experience in a scientifically developed form – metaphysics. The reception of the most appropriate hermeneutics of revealed statements about man, both as to the reality they mean and as to the content they mean for us today, depends on it⁵.

b) The analysis of the ontic structure of the human being is inevitably and closely related to the axiology of the human being. Perhaps it would be necessary to put it the other way around: the study of value, that is, of the good contained in personal, interpersonal, and people with God, depends necessarily on the understanding of personal relationships themselves, in which the competences between metaphysics and theology have not yet been completely clearly separated, but in which it is known that they certainly also, or perhaps even above all, belong to the field of metaphysics⁶.

Metaphysical elements in the theme of theological anthropology probably⁷ do not determine the very structure of this theme, but because of the reasons presented, they undoubtedly enter it in order to emphasise the ontological sense of personal relations, the axiology of which is dealt with by theology. Metaphysical elements, which will be analysed later in the article, are selected from this point of view, and from this point of view their order and interdependence are determined, which is the main point of this article.

⁴ In preparation: an article under the working title *Układ tematyki antropologii teologicznej*.

⁵ We refer to the concept of two hermeneutics, selected as a result of a scientific session at the Academy of Catholic Theology on 15 and 16 February 1973, devoted to the hermeneutics of theological anthropology. See the materials of the Session, published in this issue of STV p. 283-287.

⁶ This issue is intensively addressed by M. Gogacz. Cf. in this issue, in the materials of the hermeneutical session, entitled *Antropologia filozoficzna a teologia*.

⁷ There is doubt here. The history of theological anthropology has been different. There were parts in which the order of metaphysical issues imposed the order of theological issues. It seems that the Sum of theology of Thomas Aquinas is not free from it. The movement of return to the sources, repeated many times in the history of Christianity, and now for many decades shaping the consciousness of Christian theologians, forced them to rethink this issue many times. We address this issue in an article we are preparing, announced in footnote 4.

Methodological Category Of “Paradox”

By paradox we usually mean such sentences that seem contradictory and are also proclaimed to be the same. In today’s language we like to talk about the paradox or the paradoxicality of a certain situation, in a more casual sense. We are aware that statements that look contradictory, are not contradictory, they only capture reality from such a completely different view that they seem irreconcilable with each other. Let us now skip the logical analysis of paradox. It is also known that there are many different logical relations here.

We are aware of the increasingly inconsistent nature of human fate. We eagerly call human existence paradoxical, or even a paradox. It seems that in Christian anthropology, it is more convenient to talk about the human paradox or various human paradoxes from the perspectives that we have today, instead of talking about human nature. First of all because the word paradox used in the described, rather general sense, expresses well the basic axiological situation in which we consciously live our existence. If this word is used in the sense discussed here, having par excellence content, it is not logical, but precisely axiological. Moreover, all that is important to the theologian in the content of the word “nature” remains hidden in the word “paradox”: it is what is constantly and inevitably connected with the existence and fate of man, whatever his historical and cultural conditions may be.

This is the reason why metaphysical (in this article and not only the metaphysical elements of theological anthropology) are being discussed here using a methodological category entitled: human paradoxes, or human paradoxes. We are aware that this is not a precise category but it is quite capacious for the purpose of preliminary deliberations.

Human Historicity

The inspiration for treating human historicity as a metaphysical problem is a comment made by K. Rahner, according to which the historicity of man results, among other things, from his physicality⁸. In this case it means as much

⁸ “Von der Geschichtlichkeit des Hörens des Wortes Gottes her liesse sich die Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen selbst als theologische Aussage in ihrem vollen Inhalt und Gewicht aufweisen: seine Umweltheitigkeit, seine Leiblichkeit, die Geschlechtsgemeinschaft der einen Menschheit, in der er steht, seine Geschlechtlichkeit, seine Angelegtheit auf Gemeinschaft (Familie, Staat und Kirche), der agonale Charakter seines Daseins, die geschichtliche Bedingtheit und

as the following: while experiencing our historicity we become convinced of our physicality, so the result here concerns the order in the process of cognition⁹.

Regardless of Rahner's position, it seems right to make a metaphysical reflection on human physicality under the heading: historicism. Historicity means the fact that specific situations follow each other, or more precisely, the systems of relationships in which human existence takes place, and are thus shaped. The emphasis is on the expression "specific relations." The details of the categories of space and time determine how important the stories of childhood and family home are for each of us and each human group, all school arrangements for teachers and colleagues, everything that happens to us afterwards and to this day. When asked why we have become what we are, we are eager to answer by referring to numerous (in our opinion) and in a way symbolic anecdotes from the distant and closer past. What is more, the "Game for Tomorrow," given to each of us in a group of people and individually, is designed with reference to detailed events from the past. In this case it is difficult to talk about the present, since there is no present moment that can be stopped, *nunc stans!*

The details of past events, blocking the imagination and hindering the intellectual design of the future – since we know that we are not able to design the future in detail – this is not only human experience, but also the living situation of a human being. We are detailed entities. If it is true that the categories of time and space cease to play a role in the natural sciences, especially in physics¹⁰,

Unverfügbarkeit seiner Situation und vor allem der unverfügbare Pluralismus seines Wesens, in dem er, obwohl ursprünglich einer und nicht nachträgliche Summe, doch diese seine Einheit nicht konkret verwaltet, sondern immer neu um die je ihm aufgegebenen Gestalt seines Daseins ringen muss." K. Rahner, art. cit., 134.

⁹ Rahner's text cited in the previous footnote contains much more content than was necessary to document the statement made in the article. Rahner writes about pluralism and at the same time about the unity of the human being, but the way he does this points to the direction of reasoning, characteristic of this author, from the way of cognition to the way of existence. It is therefore of interest to us simply to link human physicality with history. It is not the manner of cognition that determines, in our interpretation, the way of existence, but the cognition itself, in this case the cognition of human existence as historical, which allows us to conclude on the detailed, or bodily, way of existence.

¹⁰ "It is known that the list of attributes of matter evolved together with physics. Perhaps we will soon have to make new amendments to it. If the views of physicists such as Chew, Chyliński, Zimmermann turn out to be correct, time and space will have to be erased from the list of attributes of matter (according to these authors time and space is a feature of macroscopic objects, which is not assigned to microscopic objects). If space-time was a definite feature of matter, it would have to be considered that macroscopic material objects consist of microscopic non-material objects." J. Misiek, *O pojęciu materii*, "Studia Filozoficzne" 88(1973)3, 185. We will not

they will not cease to have meaning, naturally in a completely different sense, in metaphysics, and thus in the interpretation of the theory we feed and the experience we gain about our existence, that is, in further and final analysis, in the interpretation of human existence itself: existence not only limited by the being, but also specified by this human capacity, for which the human being is an act. This is what we call physicality in metaphysics.

In theological anthropology, human physicality is certainly one of the guiding principles¹¹. If we decide to introduce this thought, in its strictly metaphysical approach, under the name of historicalism, it is because:

1) this makes it easier for us to interpret the salvific truth, which appears on the basis of the source of revelation, above all, as the history of salvation. In a metaphysical interpretation, this is because we are physical.

2) This makes it easier for us to interpret the salvific fact that salvation concerns an individual human being because it concerns the People of God. The basic justification for our human belonging to the People is our specificity, or physicality. Human individuality is determined by this in the possessive character of our being, what we call physicality.

We will write more about the salvific fact of the People of God, in which we become children and friends of God, when discussing human transcendence. Here, however, we wanted to point out that the very reality of opening up people to other people in a positive way is caused by a multitude of people who are profoundly diverse in their details and history.

Human Transcendence

The word “transcendence” has traditionally been used in philosophy and theology to refer to God. In Latin it means that God goes beyond all that we know

enter into a discussion with the author of the article who, of course, uses a completely different notion of matter than the one that exists (if we agree that it is a concept, and not only the name of the element of the detailed being that cannot be the name of the notion due to the impossibility of giving its positive content, but only the possibility to indicate its functioning in being containing in its structure what we call matter) in our article. It is only worth pointing out the extremely insightful attention of the quoted author when it comes to difficulties in formulating the ontological concept of matter in Marxist philosophy.

¹¹ Not only in the sense of considering the so-called bodily values, but also in the sense of constantly dealing with the fact of physicality that demands the metaphysical analysis that we are referring to in this article. The prevalence of this metaphysical, though is not always a well formulated issue that can be seen in any book devoted to theological anthropology.

about the reality given to us in experience. For if we speak of God as the first cause, even if we guess the possibility of man's personal contact with God, then in any case God remains somebody completely different from the beings we know, than ourselves, and cannot be put in any categories of thought created to capture the reality we have available to us.

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed an anthropological breakthrough in philosophy and theology, which is yet to be written about at the end of the article. As a result of this upheaval, we started to also talk about human transcendence. What does this mean?

According to E. L. Mascall, for many centuries man was under the rule of nature, but at the same time under its protection. Various primitive forms of religion were to be used to gain protection from natural forces. They were supposed to make rain, snow, floods and other meteorological phenomena controllable, at least in human consciousness, and treated as essentially positive, in spite of all the dangers that they contain. However, we have entered a time when man, thanks to an ever more precise and detailed knowledge of the natural world, as well as himself, to the extent in which he belongs to the natural world, is able to make radical changes in the cosmos and in himself¹². In this example, we can, at least initially, understand what we are talking about when we use the expression "human transcendence". Already in primitive forms of magic and religion, we observe human effort going beyond the very existence of man, especially lost in his singularity¹³, while the development of natural sciences and technology is a testimony to an ambivalent transcendence: man's going out towards other people, and thanks to mutual understanding and joint efforts, going out towards the natural world in order to make him a human, increasingly more a homeland of people. Against this background we can and must speak of human transcendence in one more (and most important) dimension. Man goes beyond himself, turning to God. A more detailed discussion of man's personal relations with God from the point of view of their salvific character for man, and thus from the point of view of man's development, which takes place in this way, is already a matter of strictly theological areas of anthropology. As long as we are dealing with metaphysical elements in theological anthropology, it is possible and necessary to deal only with the existential possibility and structure of such relations.

¹² E.L. Mascall, *Teologia a przyszłość*, transl. J. Marzęcki, Warsaw 1970, ending with *Teologia spraw świeckich*, see 174-176.179-184.

¹³ See, for example, the classic treatises on this subject of B. Malinowski about magic and religion, published in Polish in the volume *Szkice z teorii kultury*, Warsaw.

The transcendence of man, his going beyond his own individuality towards other people, towards the natural world, towards God, is, to sum up, a question of community inherent in the very structure of the individual because he is a person. It is a question of opening man¹⁴ to other people, to the cosmos and to God.

We will not be proving at the moment why the key problem of human transcendence is an issue of the community of persons¹⁵. We just wish to point out that this issue is one of the central metaphysical guiding principles in theological anthropology. It is already entangled in the previously mentioned problem of historicalism, which we interpreted as a problem of physicality. The Judaeo-Christian religions brings up a rather unusual concept in relation to other religions accepting the cyclicity of the cosmos, i.e. the eternal return of the same, from parts of the day and seasons of year, through the seasons of human life, to the individual reincarnation and repetition of historical epochs. It would be a closed time, a prison for people. Judaeo-Christian religion brings the idea of open time, the one-time nature of events, the one-time nature of human meetings. "Nothing happens twice..."¹⁸

People-to-people meetings are the most important thing in life. Thanks to deeper theological analysis, they turn out to be something even greater. In the Bible, in the poem about the creation of man, in the mutual discovery of the first two people there is a transcendent third. God is present as if at the bottom of the encounter between man and man, as someone who caused this encounter, who causes it all the time, and who wants man to have a worthy partner.

Recently outlined perspectives belong to the strictly theological anthropological problem, as we have noticed. We have made reference to them in order to give a deeper indication of the need to place the metaphysics of encounter and community in the very centre of philosophical interests of theological anthropology.

We can even go further and treat the metaphysics of the human community as the basic metaphysical category present in theological anthropology from the point of view of the subject matter. We choose this rather than the dialectic of unity and multiplicity in man proposed by K. Rahner. Both perspectives have a lot in common, but seem to touch human existence more concretely. We will

¹⁴ We consciously construct our own understanding of human transcendence. For other perspectives, see e.g. J. Molier, *Człowiek w świecie*, translated by: M. Kaczmarkowski, Paris 1969, 113-123 and literature quoted there.

¹⁵ See, among others, the statement of L. Kuc during panel II, in the materials of the session on *Hermeneutyka antropologii teologicznej*, printed in this issue of STV 228ff.

have the opportunity to return to the argumentation on this subject in the end of the article. We interpret the transcendence of man as a human community, believing the other aspects of the word “transcendence” that are present in the world, are best manifested by treating the transcendence as a community.

Communication Between People And Spirituality

As has already been pointed out, an anthropological breakthrough took place in the philosophy and theology of the nineteenth and twentieth century. It is important to note that the breakthrough that took place in the decades after the Second World War. Let us call it a communication breakthrough. This is not only a matter of citing examples herein: the phenomenon is known to us. It is important for us that there is a clear new quality in today’s culture: human relations¹⁶ and the media in them are included in an information model: sender, recipient, channel, message. Instead of message, we often talk about ‘text’. It is not about the verbal differences in the approach to long known issues. The new terminology is the result and expression of a new way of approaching interpersonal relations, precisely as communication, that is to say, as sharing one’s own achievements, thus becoming a common good. We have made a transition from the perspective of communication to the field of metaphysics. At the same time, we expressed the view that interpersonal relations (expressed nowadays in the language of information theory) are from a metaphysical point of view the realisation of the common good with a view to (moving into a theological plane) human development.

We do not intend to describe the characteristics of the communication era. We deal with the metaphysical elements of theological anthropology. For this purpose it is important to note that the interpersonal relations described in the language of information and communication theory are testimony to the openness of man towards man, and not only towards man, whom K. Rahner did not hesitate to call infinite, unlimited openness¹⁷. Rahner interprets this openly

¹⁶ Cf. M. Eliade, *Sacrum, mit, historia*, translated by: A. Tatarkiewicz, Warsaw 1970, esp. 56-58.125-131.226-283. Cf. also J. Pasierb, *Czas otwarty*, Poznań 1972.

¹⁷ “(Die Kreatürlichkeit des Menschen), Freilich wäre dabei die subjekthaite Kreatürlichkeit primär zu sehen (...): die unendliche Offenheit für Gott in dem, der nicht Gott ist, als zugleich positive und negative Bestimmung, die in beidem gleichermaßen vor dem unvergleichlichen Gott wächst.” K. Rahner, art. cit., 133. Although the author deals with the infinite openness of man to God implying the ability of supernatural exaltation, there is no doubt, however, that

in a sense corresponding to the traditional approach to human spirituality. The third metaphysical guiding principle of theological anthropology, which we intend to discuss in this article, is of course mentioned here.

Not exactly following Rahner's thought, but borrowing an expression from him: infinite, unrestricted openness, we wish to point to the possibility of formulating an old metaphysical argument on human spirituality based on the principle of *operari sequitur esse*, and then to discuss the dependence of this argumentation on this guiding thought, which we considered to be central in the metaphysical equipment of theological anthropology.

The infinite or unlimited nature of human openness in the act of communication can be evidenced both by the very nature of the relationship called bilateral communication, as well as the structure of the message.

The two-sided interpersonal relationship contains, in a metaphysical analysis, two elements. First of all, it is built on the basis of the very existence of both partners. This foundation, which is the same as the persons in question, includes countless opportunities for meeting and understanding in a variety of objects and objectives, thus allowing for an unlimited variety of interpersonal relationships.

Secondly, this foundation, regardless of the variety of objects and objectives, because it identifies itself with persons, allows and induces these relationships, whatever the objects and whatever the objectives, to be transcendent in relation to these objects and specific objectives, because in the final analysis the reason and purpose of the relationship itself is the other person with his or her radical individuality, but also a deep analogy with the other person. Hence the apparent truism: personal relationships basically concern people themselves. A person becomes a target for a person, because cognitive and personal aspirations called love are not limited to objects and specific actions, but concern the whole of the personal being as a good, so their being as a relation is not of a specific nature, that is, a bodily one¹⁸.

The subject matter of any interpersonal communication, potentially or currently is devoid of a detailed, bodily character. In this way we would like to formulate today's metaphysical argument in a necessary way for the spiritual character of the individual.

As one can easily see, the path indicated here to re-establish the argument for the spirituality of the individual is closely connected with interpersonal

the fundamental implication, allowing for the partnership of man with God, is the spirituality of man.

¹⁸ Cf. E. Cassirer, *Esej o człowieku*, Warsaw 1971, 66-71.

communication, in other words, metaphysically speaking, with the great theme of the ontical situation of the human community. We do not think that outside this context it is possible to build an argument that is of interest to us now. This great metaphysical theme boils down to the cognitive recognition of man as a person, naturally in relation, meeting and communication with him.

The communal-communicative way to justify human spirituality is a new quality in metaphysics, which is currently being re-invented as a philosophy of existing being. Of course, the human being exists basically as an individual, a separate person. However, the concept of an individual, a substance, a separate being, in the case of a person, needs to be rethought. In order to renew our understanding of these matters, the ontical world of ailments requires appreciation, and among them, especially the area of relations. We remember that in the classic approach to metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas, we distinguish between ailments that are necessarily related to the existence of a self-contained being in existence: the so-called properties, and ailments that are rather temporary and, for historical and detailed reasons, related to a given substance unit. It will be necessary to consider how far personal relationships, or at least certain variations of them, belong to the characteristics of human beings and not only to their specific historical situation.

The resolution of this question to allows us to make the necessary link between the argument of human spirituality and the communal character of a person's existence, as suggested here¹⁹. If the property of every human being is real, or at least the potential establishment of certain (or at present we do not decide what) personal relationships, then the personal existence of a human being is characterised by unrestricted openness to other persons, by its very personal structure and by virtue of its properties. The individual is a spiritual entity, i.e. not limited by the detail of historically tangible situations. The fundamental rationale for this is, let us repeat, the relational orientation of the whole individual towards other persons, and therefore the basis for the conviction of the spiritual character of the individual is the analysis of the communal orientation of man in his ontical structure. Thus, in our opinion, we have pointed out the necessary connection of the guiding thought about human spirituality with another, even more fundamental, in our opinion, metaphysical guiding thought of theological anthropology on the communal orientation of the structure of the individual.

¹⁹ Cf. M. Gogacz, in the already quoted article *Antropologia filozoficzna a teologia*, printed in this issue of STV.

The communicative structure of interpersonal relations, if subjected to metaphysical analysis, opens up new perspectives not only individually, but also in the interrelation of metaphysical elements occurring in a way and in a character appropriate to theological anthropology. Meanwhile, we decided that the basic metaphysical element here is the communitarian character of the human structure, in which the direct source is the way of understanding culture that characterises today's communication culture. We also established, even though we dealt with this matter for the sake of clarity of the lecture at the beginning, that the proper understanding of the historical character of man, i.e. his physicality, depends on the aforementioned main thesis²⁰. Finally, at the end, we attempted to outline a new approach to the arguments concerning human spirituality in the community and communications structure. In this way, we pointed to the most important conclusions resulting from the thesis on human transcendence presented in the previous paragraph. At the end, we will also comment on the methodology of metaphysical considerations occurring in the theological anthropology.

Conclusion: Comments On The Transcendental Method

The anthropological upheaval in theology is connected with certain changes in the way of practising philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Of course, Kant's revolution was of fundamental importance. With regard to the theological anthropology of K. Rahner's situation, it can be described as follows: "...this is a critical reflection, which does not pass to the agenda over Kant's 'Copernican revolution,' but draws attention to the creative role of the subject in the process of cognition. A phenomenological reflection left its mark on Rahner, from which he took over the conviction that we perceive existence only through consciousness, more precisely: we learn about the structures of existence through the analysis of the given consciousness. So here is the source of the transcendental character of Rahnerian anthropology. It is simply a reflection on man at the level of *a priori* conditions, anticipating external experience. This is not necessarily a chronological order, but certainly a logical one, since every philosophical question about the external existence contains a hidden question about the sense of human existence."²¹

²⁰ Ultimately, therefore, the order of leading metaphysical thoughts present in the theological anthropology would be as follows: person-community, historicity or physicality, transcendence or spirituality.

²¹ K. Rahner, *Teologia a antropologia*, Znak 186 (1969). We quote a text from the introduction by translator A. Kłoczowski, 1534.

The transcendental method of Rahnerian anthropology is connected with the meaning of the word transcendental as determined by Kant: the question of human existence is a form of thinking, a category that includes all questions asked by man, since all of them concern the data of human consciousness²². In such an interpretation, the transcendental method, although widespread in contemporary philosophical and theological anthropology, seems absolutely unacceptable according to the views represented in this article. We stand in the position clearly represented by Thomas Aquinas, that the first object, the effect of our sensual and mental cognition, his *obiectum quod* is not the given consciousness – *species* – but the reality itself.

However, the problem remains. In the methodology of anthropology, both philosophical²³ and theological, one has to take into account the subjective conditions of the cognitive subject. We are not currently dealing with philosophical anthropology, but with philosophical, metaphysical elements in the field of theological anthropology. The comments we will make relate to the methodology of these elements belonging to the whole theological anthropology. Since theological anthropology concerns the revealed axiology of human relations, the subjectivity of the subject must be taken into account in its deliberations in a fundamental way, although at the moment we do not decide how. The metaphysical elements of theological anthropology are inquiries, which must fully take into account the requirements of the philosophy of existence, i.e. the requirements of direct realism in the cognition and interpretation of reality. In this respect, the metaphysical parts belonging to theological anthropology are not modified because of this belonging.

They are subject to modifications due to their functioning in a new whole. They serve as a basis for considering the goodness and values of human relationships, about which, thanks to metaphysics, we understand exactly.

²² “Transcendental issues ask about the conditions in the subject necessary for it to be able to learn and act. This question assumes that a subject is not simply a ‘thing’ among other things that could be turned into an object of adjudication alongside other objects. It does not appear as an adjudicator, even *implicite*, in judgements adjudicating on objects other than its own. If I am talking about Australia, I am not talking about Java, even *implicite*. But in this judgement (understood as content and as a fact) I said something *implicite* about man as the subject of this judgement (to the extent that this judgement, if possible, presupposes, as a necessary condition, diversity in man); I judged jointly, through a subjective implication.” K. Rahner, article cited in the previous footnote, 1536.

²³ This issue is tackled in an extremely interesting way by B. Dembowski in the article *Zagadnienie egzystencjalistycznego punktu wyjścia w metafizyce*, “*Studia Philosophiae Christianae*” 1(1974), in print.

Considerations based on consciousness, experience and human experiences are not the basis for metaphysical considerations, but on the contrary, thanks to a thorough metaphysical analysis, they can only be carried out in a correct way²⁴. Only then does the analysis of the data of consciousness, the analysis of human experiences concerning the relations in which man lives and develops, not threaten to become closed in a purely cognitive circle, in epistemology. Correctly analysed existence is the key to understanding experiences and not the other way around. That is the reason why we consider this relationship of persons in the community to be the basic philosophical structure of theological anthropology, and not, as K. Rahner wants, the dilemmas of unity and greatness given to us in the “regionalism” of experiencing our being.

²⁴ In the article mentioned in the previous footnote, B. Dembowski writes as follows: “The recognition of the importance of the moment of personal direct subjective experience and the recognition of its role in the starting point of metaphysics can be called an Augustinian element in classical philosophy. The importance of this element was recognised by Jacques Maritain when he conducted reflections on the nature of the intellect and human will, which he called ‘the VI way,’ and which, like the existentialists’ reflections on ‘anxiety and fear,’ are a statement of own ontical insufficiency. There are already known attempts to prove that the metaphysics of St. Thomas (although apparently subjective), and especially his ‘ways,’ also contains internal, psychological and existential, subjective implications of the Augustinian type.” (in paragraph 5. Conclusion – perspectives). By the stand of B. Dembowski, we are forced to question the thesis about the direct nature of subjective experience and its importance at the starting point of metaphysics, although in another publication on the theological subject matter of anthropology, we will have an opportunity to agree with the thesis about the importance of the anthropological personal, subjective moment.

Hermeneutics of Theological Anthropology

Hermeneutics is well known to theologians for its use in the Holy Bible. The set of principles guiding its interpretation is called biblical hermeneutics. However, nowadays there is also talk of theological hermeneutics, and even theology as a whole is understood as a specific kind of hermeneutics.

It is well known that in addition to the text of the Bible, theology has to deal with numerous other texts, the meaning of which it has to explain. These are the patristic, theological and especially doctrinal texts of the Church. In a similar way to the Bible, all these texts need to be interpreted in light of historical and cultural circumstances, in the context of theological tradition and faith. This is the undeniable task of theology, which, starting with biblical themes, is to show “what the Fathers of the Church of the East and the West have contributed to the faithful transmission and explanation of the individual truths of revelation, as well as to the further history of dogma, taking into account its relationship to the general history of the Church.”¹

However, theological hermeneutics can be described in another sense, namely, as the inclusion of ourselves in the theological work i.e. the man of today who, in a concrete cultural and existential situation, examines God’s revelation: he asks him questions and awaits the answers. One could say that theological hermeneutics understood in this way requires the consideration of another “text” or rather a whole series of different texts, namely those that speak of ourselves and our existential situation.

Theological hermeneutics understood in this way derives from contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, which is practiced by M. Heidegger and H.-G. Gadamer.²

¹ OT, 16.

² M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen 1963, H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, Tübingen 1965.

Heidegger begins from the fact that a human being is born as Dasein, the existence, as a man in the world. He states that the historicity of man (des Daseins) does not constitute a limitation of his cognition and does not threaten the objectivity of this cognition. However, the very situation of a human being in the world, the very historicity of the human being, and thus all that concerns the subject of cognition, should be taken into account and carefully disclosed.

Moreover, the theological hermeneutics we are talking about is based to a certain extent on Bultmann's views³. He preached the need to demythologize the Bible in order to reach, through its mythological layer, the salvific event of the encounter of an ever-living man with the Word of God.

Catholic theology cannot ignore this hermeneutical problem, which is the inclusion of the subject itself and its conditions in cognition. On the contrary, work on such theological hermeneutics is considered a necessity which cannot be overestimated.⁴

The Word of God i.e. revelation has, we believe, permanent meaning. It is a living word, always up to date, always salvific. However, it does not identify with any theological statement, with any dogmatic term, and even the Bible is already its interpretation. We are therefore dealing with a whole series of historical interpretations of the Word of God which are a function not only of understanding the Bible and Tradition, but also of the understanding of oneself and one's own culture, which a human being had in different times. Theology is not only about determining the meaning of the biblical text, or any subsequent historical interpretation of it. We would then be dealing with biblical theology or with the history of theology. The theologian should seek to understand the Word of God itself, which implies a knowledge not only of the meaning of the Bible, later theological and doctrinal statements, but also of own cultural situation. "The understanding of faith and the interpretation of oneself are inseparable. The history of salvation can only be interpreted in a living interpretation of oneself as a historical being, situated in tradition and in a particular culture."⁵

I do not think it is reasonable to doubt that theology always fulfils this role in some way. This is where the differences we point to come from, e.g. between theology in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages or Modernity, although, of course, each time and culture could be characterised by the characteristics

³ R. Bultmann, *Neues Testament und Mythologie*, Tübingen 1941; *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen 1961; *Glauben und Verstehen*, 4 vol., Tübingen 1933-1965; *Kerygma und Mythos*, H. W. Bartsch, 4 vol., Hamburg 1948.

⁴ K. Lehmann, *Heimeneutik*, in: *Sacramentum Mundi*, vol. 2, 683.

⁵ C. Geffre, *Un nouvelle âge de la theologie*, Paris 1972, 60f.

of the theology practised at that time. Today, however, we are more aware of the hermeneutical nature of our inquiries and their facts, just as we are more aware of the complexity of the Bible as a historical and literary work and, above all, of the relationship between the biblical text and the divine revelation expressed in it; how more we are aware of what is termed *Sitz im Leben* of every dogmatic term.

We do not have of course ready-made worked-out theological hermeneutics. Individual theologians only try to define it or to delineate its individual elements. K. Rahner focuses primarily on subjective conditions, treating theology as transcendental anthropology.⁶ P. Ricoeur analyses the language of religion in its original layer, which is a symbolic language. This language says something about a human being living in a world of certain values and making constant choices. Through this symbolic religious language, Transcendence appeals to a human being⁷. Each epoch has its own ability to express faith (*le croyable disponible*).⁸ Pannenberg, Moltmann, Metz put greater emphasis on the historical and social context of understanding the message of the gospel, taking into account the forward-looking and eschatological attitude of human existence and history.⁹ E. Schillebeeckx is convinced that the fundamental hermeneutical question is not: what is the attitude of the past (Tradition, the Bible) to the present, but: what is the connection between theory and practice. Only “a practical reinterpretation judging the old practice in the light of the promise of the future. It corresponds to the real situation today, because it not only explains the past kindly, but also really transforms it,” says Schoof¹⁰.

The hermeneutical problem expresses its proper methodological reflection in today's theology.

The actuality of hermeneutics in theology is connected with the pressure of various tasks and decisions that Christians and Christian churches are facing

⁶ K. Rahner, *Teologia a antropologia*, Znak 21 (1969), 1535-1551.

⁷ P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interpretations. Essais d'hermeneutique*, Paris 1969.

⁸ *Ibid*, *Taches de la communaute ecclesiale dans le monde moderne*, in: *La theologie da renouveau* (sous la dir. de L.K. Shook, G.M. Bertrand), Montreal-Paris 1968, vol. 2, 51-57.

⁹ W. Pannenberg, *Grundiragen systematischer Theologie*, Göttingen 1967, 91-158; J. Moltmann, *Theologie der Hoffnung*, München 1964; *Id.*, *Perspektiven der Theologie*, München 1969; J. B. Metz, *Zur Theologie der Welt*, Mainz-München 1968; *Id.*, *Politische Theologie*, in: *Sacramentum Mundi*, vol. 3., 1232-1240.

¹⁰ M. Schoof, *Przełom w teologii katolickiej*, Kraków 1972, 276-281. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, *O katolickie zastosowanie hermeneutyki*, Znak 20 (1968), 978-1010; *Z hermeneutycznych rozważań nad eschatologią*, Concilium 15 (1969), 3141; *Intelligence de la foi et interpretation de soi*, in: *herologie d'aujourd'hui et de demain*, Paris 1967, 121-137.

today. There is almost no area of human life in which there are no new facts and the consequent need to interpret them and make moral decisions. Changes in the world are followed by changes in the Church. There is probably no area of ecclesiastical life and there are no formulations of faith and so established ways of acting that do not require new analyses, formulations, and new solutions.

Such problems always appeared in Christian life, in theology, and in the Church. It has not always been easy to confront them with the message of revelation. Sometimes it led to serious conflicts. It took a long time to properly define the position of the Church and theology on the Copernican upheaval, on the theory of evolution, or workers' problem. At the same time, it is not easy to realise all the factors that led to one or another solution. Undoubtedly, the theoretical and theological considerations, research on sources and interpretation of faith to date played a role here, as did the developing beliefs of believers and the authority of ecclesiastical power, the development of secular sciences and culture in general, and so on. However, what role the various factors played, what considerations influenced the final direction of the development of faith and ecclesiastical teaching, is difficult to determine even today, in retrospect.

The situation today is characterised by several new features in this respect.

First of all, changes in human life take place incomparably increasingly more often and more rapidly than before. History teaches us that in the past Christians waited too long with the reform of ecclesiastical institutions, theology, with an open attitude to the changes taking place in the world. The present times, going faster, do not allow us to delay in solving growing problems and answering emerging questions.

Secondly, the development of humanities and anthropological sciences, as well as the organisation of science allow for a much more insightful and comprehensive interpretation of texts and cultural research than in the past. The development of theology and ecumenism makes it possible to take more fully into account certain elements of faith that have remained in the shadows so far, such as the eschatological dimension of human life, the communal character of the Church, etc.

Thirdly and finally, and this is related to the previous point, in every area of human life we encounter not only a passive interpretation of the past today but also forecasting and planning the future. We can talk about the desire to control and direct the development of culture, which until now was relatively spontaneous.

All this means the possibility, need and real development of theological hermeneutics. It is not only about interpreting old texts in the light of past, contemporary cultural texts, but also to interpret today's world, our culture,

current events, in order to enable Christians and Christian Churches, in their confrontation with faith and revelation, to find solutions to problems facing them, that is, from the point of view of the Word of God, to understand the meaning of the Word of God in our existence. This understanding, even if outlined in general and incomplete terms, without the total certainty of a faith that matures gradually, will allow for a specific orientation of Christian action, for the involvement of Christians in the pressing problems of the world in which they live and which they are to build together with all their brothers and sisters; it will allow them to plan together the paths of development of the world with others in the hope of the Kingdom of God that they are expecting.

Theological hermeneutics necessarily brings in anthropological problems: being aware of the subjective conditions in theological cognition, examining the structure of the language of religion, reflecting on the phenomena of contemporary culture, confronting questions to which we seek answers in the texts we interpret, we turn around in the circle of anthropological issues.

Also taking into account the content of the texts that theology deals with when examining the subject of theology, we always face the problem of a human being in the end. Theology is about God, but about a God who salvages the human being. Revelation shows God, the Saviour and at the same time the salvaged man.

I would like to present here some formulations by E. Schillebeeckx concerning the basic approach to hermeneutical theological anthropology.

Schillebeeckx tries to make the most fundamental confrontation of the meaning of biblical texts and other testimonies of revelation with all that man knows about himself and his culture from elsewhere. It is probably difficult to get to know the author's thoughts comprehensively from a short fragment, but I think it is interesting to see even a partial performance of it. "The object of revelation is God's love for the world. The Bible teaches neither anthropology nor cosmology. It simply tells us that a man in the world is loved by God in God's way. What is man in the world must be explained by human experience, and therefore by history... Christianity does not teach us anything detailed in anthropology except that man has been introduced into the mystery of God's grace, or rather that man's mystery is, in its deepest layers, the mystery of God himself. In the course of history, man discovers the slow dimensions of his existence. Every new stage of this self-understanding must be illuminated by the only content of revelation, and in this new Dimension man must live a love for others, a love that draws its radical character from God's absolute and free love for man. Thus "Anthropology" is developed or discovered in its formal structures through the earthly experience of all people, whether Christians or

non-Christians, and Revelation calls us to implant love at every stage of this anthropology”¹¹.

I do not comment on the subject matter of the cited text. I refer to it because it is an excellent example of a hermeneutical approach to anthropological issues in theology. This is the role of theology: to interpret the biblical text expressing God’s revelation and to confront its meaning with the understanding with which it has been read throughout history and its successive reinterpretations; with the understanding of man throughout history and with the present anthropology which is represented by today’s human experience and by today’s teachings about man and culture. This is why we asked not only theologians, but also Biblicists, philosophers and specialists in various “secular” sciences to participate in our session. We do not believe that theology should refer only to philosophy, although cooperation with this particular science has the longest tradition and it is difficult to think about theology without it. Today, after all, it is believed that theological work requires cooperation between all peoples, and theological anthropology, as I presented it, seems to be an excellent example of this.

From the whole of theological anthropology we can distinguish some specific issues which have always been of interest in theology and which have not lost their relevance even today. It is enough to mention such issues as the beginning of mankind and man, the structure of man, death, the final fate, the resurrection, in order not to enter the area of moral issues. As the subject of our session, we have chosen an issue that is somehow related to the context of human existence. These are matters with a very wide range of issues: man in the world of history and culture, man in relation to other people, and – as a result – the issue of man’s relation to God.

In such a definition of the subject matter of our meeting, we were driven by the directions of thinking about man, characteristic, it seems, for contemporary culture and philosophy. The existence of man in his world, among others and in relation to God, is today, without the need to be proven, the privileged subject matter of the various sciences that deal with man and therefore also theological anthropology.

The topic of the first discussion is therefore a man in the world, i.e., in the world of history and culture. How are history and culture interpreted as texts testifying to man in today’s cultural sciences?

¹¹ E. Schillebeeckx, *La mission de l’Eglise* (Approches théologiques IV), Bruxelles 1969, 72.

The second discussion will be about the community of people. What are inter-personal relationships? To what extent do they determine the structure of the human individual? How should we understand the human community, which is so often talked about today and which is so greatly sought after? At the same time, we can talk about community at different levels: living, historical, awareness. On the simply human community and on concrete communities.

Finally, the third discussion will be devoted to the issue of the relationship between man and God. It seems obvious today that there is a need to involve man in the face of other people, in the face of a self-created culture and the future. How to discover in all of this the right place for the relationship between man and God? How to overcome alleged competition from a so-called horizontal and vertical point of view?

We are aware of the fact that such a broad topic of discussion and participation of specialists from various disciplines conceals the danger of raising many different issues in a way parallel to each other, without being able to obtain a certain number of issues. However, in the course of this session we do not want to come up with a specific solution to the problems raised, or not even to outline the entirety of the issues indicated in the topics of the discussion. This is not possible. The aim of the discussion, as well as of the whole session, is a fragmentary orientation in border issues: theological anthropology and various sciences about man and culture, the aim of perceiving the field for theological hermeneutics procedures is to become more clearly aware of what theological anthropology treated as hermeneutics is. We hope to take this out of the session.

Anthropological Aspects of Problem Of God, Faith and Grace*

Theology speaks of God, faith and grace on the basis of Revelation. This is the interpretation of the data contained in Scripture and in Tradition. The theologian does not invent new truths, but instead he interprets those, with regard to which he is convinced that they are coming from God. Historical Revelation, however, should not be understood only as a message dictated by God to man. It has become true among people through deeds and words intrinsically connected with each other. Much of its content is available to human reason, and man can learn it easily, with certainty, without any risk of error¹. Moreover, in some cases Revelation only explicitly states what man knows from his own experience. Hence, for the transmission of faith, a strictly theological argument, explaining the deposit of Revelation, as well as a lecture at the frontier of theology, indicating that the truths revealed are rooted in issues concerning man is of great importance.

This method was used in the Catholic Church less or more clearly in explaining the *raison d'être* of Christianity. For example, many Fathers of Catholic Church regarded pagan religions as prerequisite for the development of Gospel², and Tertullian directly formulated the thesis that the human soul is Christian by its very nature³. This method was used by St. Thomas Aquinas, who often quoted the sentence of Saint Ambrose *Omne verum, quocumque dicatur, et*

* STV 14(1976)1.

¹ DV 2-6.

² L. Bouyer, *Mensch und Ritus*, Mainz 1964, 9.

³ The sentence *O testimonium animae naturaliter christianae* is in the seventeenth chapter of the work *Apologeticus* (PL I, 257-536). It is also the main thesis of a separate work by Tertullian (PL I, 609-618). The last one was discussed by S. Szydelski in the article *Testimonium animae naturaliter christianae*, CT 25 (1954), 178-193.

Spiritu Sancto est, and Saint Bonaventure, when he tried to prove that man is a creature open to God's light⁴.

This method also appears in the dissertations of Erasmus of Rotterdam⁵ and in the modernists' arguments, who however unfortunately tend to draw extreme conclusions on this basis⁶. Eventually, it is present in the Encyclicals of John XXIII *Mater et Magistra* and *Pacem in Terris* and in *Gaudium et spes*.

Contemporary Catholic theology is characterized by an anthropological attitude, based on the assumptions that every question about God is both a question about man and that in the study of structures of being, analysis of the data of consciousness plays a large role⁷. The arguments in this field in most cases consist in demonstrating how Revelation helps to better understand the man. It is as if a top-down approach deriving human truth from the truth of God. It seems, however, that it would be successful to assume the bottom up approach, i.e. deriving what God says about man from what man knows about himself. Certainly, you can consider the revealed content in isolation from the experience data. Since this would entail a risk of formal abstractionism. This statement applies to all theological truths, and in a special way to the problems of God, faith and grace.

The Problem of God as the Basis of Human Existence

Theology does not deal with proving the existence of God, but demonstrates the rationality of the attitude of faith in God. Hence, it is not without significance, from its point of view, what other fields of study state about God. The problem of the existence of God is even more important for the transmission of faith. Since, the fact of believing, which consists in the acceptance of the message of Christ, presupposes the prior acceptance of the truth that God exists and has manifested Himself in Christ.

Therefore, a significant role in the preaching of the Gospel is played by philosophical arguments for the existence of God, derived either from the

⁴ E. Gilson, *Duch filozofii średniowiecznej*, Warsaw 1958, 30; *Ib.*, *Historia filozofii chrześcijańskiej w wiekach średnich*, Warsaw 1966, 326.

⁵ E. Gilson, *Duch...*, op. cit., 31.

⁶ The mistake of the modernists was not that they sought for the roots of the Christian religion in man, but that they wanted to deduce faith and Christianity from human nature in general. This was taken up by Pius X in the encyclical *Pascendi* (D 3475-3500).

⁷ Cf. K. Rahner, *Teologia a antropologia*, "Znak" 21 (1969), 1533-1551.

observation of the world (so-called *quinque viae*), or from the very concept of God (the so-called ontological proof of Saint Anselm) or from the analysis of the human phenomenon itself. It is also important to demonstrate that God exists not only as a Transcendent Being, that is, transcending all creation, but also as an Immanent Being, i.e. existing within us, within our being. Due to this fact, the problem of God becomes necessary for man and is an indispensable reference point with regard to the interpretation of significance of human existence. In turn, Revelation finds its anthropological legitimization in this respect.

The “Five proofs of St. Thomas Aquinas” and the ontological proof of Saint Anselm first and foremost emphasize God’s transcendence, His separation from the world and superiority over the world.

Indirectly, therefore, they only explain the existence of a man *implicite* in his relationship to God. On the other hand, religious studies speak more widely about these relations. The results obtained by them are extremely valuable material for confronting theological theses.

Religious studies confirm that having God’s idea at one’s disposal can be considered a common phenomenon in case of people. In general, all sound-minded people have the idea of God, however they refer to it in different ways, most often either they assume the existence of God or deny it. After all, accepting one or other attitude with regard to the idea of God is something secondary to the idea itself, because it is the result of more or less conscious reflection. Only some theoreticians of religion hold that the idea of God is a subjective concept of a man who has resorted to it either to satisfy certain ideological needs, or because of fear of natural phenomena, or to use it as a tool to restrain freedom and maintain order in class society⁸. It seems, however, that there is a confusion of circumstances with the cause in these explanations. Because the case that gave rise to the idea of God is something different than the circumstances, under which this idea was created. It is true that a man imagined God depending on the environment in which he lived, as well on the degree of culture and knowledge, but this does not determine the source of these ideas.

One question remains, however, unanswered, namely, why, for example, a man thought about God when he saw a clear sky, the power of a rock or the terror of a storm. What prompted him to look for a cause in the non-material, and not, for example, in the material sphere? Natural, sociological or

⁸ This topic is discussed extensively by Z. Czarnecki in the book entitled *Filozoficzny rodowód marksistowskiej teorii religii*, Warsaw 1971. Cf. E. Ozorowski, *Religia chrześcijańska w aspekcie aksjologicznym*, *Wiadomości kościelne archidiecezji w Białymstoku* 1(1975)2-3, 153-160 (149-174).

psychological phenomena are not capable of creating the idea of God in man, but only contribute to the fact, that man becomes aware of this idea. The idea of God – as H. de Lubac claims – appears in self-consciousness and imposes itself on the human mind with its very necessity⁹. The Catholic teaching about God also has a common foundation with the issues discussed by the general religious studies concerning *sacred*. This word (and the others similar to it, e.g. *sensus numinis*, *das Heilige*) has become, thanks to numerous recent religious studies, the key to a better understanding of man¹⁰.

The term *sacred* means first of all the moment of separation, isolation, existence different in its nature from the way that the world and man exists, which is the source of fear, horror of man, and which fascinates, attracts, captivates him, gives him satisfaction and makes him happy. This feeling flows from the depths of the soul, where external stimuli are only a condition of its occurrence and never its cause. *Sacred* is an a priori, non-moral category, independent of facts and history¹¹.

It is also important that man finds this otherness in himself and in the world around him and that he feels it regardless of the degree of culture or civilization in which he lives. This indicates a characteristic feature of human existence. Primitive people experienced the sacred on an elementary level, e.g. in atmospheric phenomena, objects (e.g., rock, tree), a distant, separate place. Similar manifestations of the *mysterium tremendum, augustum et fascinatum* are found in the Bible (e.g. Is 2: 21; 6:6-7; 26:9, Mt 17:4-8; Lk 5:8; Mk 9:5; Acts 17:1; 1Cor 3:22; 10:26). The same meaning of *sacred* is also characteristic of the thought of great Christian mystics, in whose works we find the description of God as the purifying fire, the all-powerful force, the desire and rest of the soul, joy and supreme happiness¹².

It would seem that contemporary man, mesmerised by the development of technology, lost his sacred dimension. However, this is not the case. For the same man still finds in himself an ahistorical aspect that does not lose itself

⁹ H. de Lubac, *Na drogach Bożych*, Paris 1970, 33f.

¹⁰ Particularly noteworthy are the following works: R. Otto, *Świętość. Elementy irracjonalne w pojęciu bóstwa i ich stosunek do elementów racjonalnych*, Warsaw 1968; M. Buber, *Ich und Du*, Leipzig 1922; Id., *God and Evil: Two Interpretations*, New York 1963; M. Eliade, *Traktat o historii religii*, Warsaw 1966; Id., *Sacrum, mit, historia*, Warsaw 1970; G. van der Leew, *Phänomenologie der Religion*, Tübingen 1956; M. Scheier, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, Berlin 1933.

¹¹ R. Otto, op. cit., 19.149. Basic information about the sacred in pagan religions and Christianity and the most important literature on the subject can also be found in the article by J. Splett, K. Hemmerle entitled *Das Heilige*, in: SM, vol. 2 col. 576-582.

¹² J. Danielou, *Bóg i my*, Kraków 1965, 90f.

in animality, which goes beyond what is fleeting and mortal, rising up toward a fuller and richer existence¹³. This thesis is confirmed, for example, by human desires, whose object – like the horizon – moves away from man, the more he tries to approach it. The animal satisfies its hunger with material food, while man does not content himself with material well-being, his desires go further. Scholars of religion explain that it is a longing for the lost paradise, the memory of universal sacred archetypes¹⁴. The church, however, explains that it is anxiety of the heart seeking rest in God¹⁵.

Otherness, which is a property of the sacred, is also revealed in what is called a talent or vocation, which a man experiences as something which belongs to him, and at the same time as something in relation to which he experiences numinotic feelings. He cannot, for example, drown out the inner voice, escape from it. He recognizes it as a compelling force, and at the same time he is always happy when he experiences it and follows it. Talent cannot be programmed, at most it can be developed. A vocation is an inner voice, with regard to which a person is aware, that following it is the only true way of living, for his betraying this vocation would surely lead to death¹⁶.

The sacred trace in man is finally present in the deepest part of man's existence, which distinguishes him from other people and makes him this unique particular man.

One does not need many experiences to conclude that a man, even if he was most similar to other people, and even most connected with them, always remains lonely in certain situations of his life. He feels the presence of this sacred sphere in himself, which is available only to him, a kind of taboo, unattainable to other people. Sometimes this untouchable aspect of himself becomes someone with whom a person begins to communicate. Considering this phenomenon superficially, we find that man talks to himself. And in many cases it is true. After all, a deeper analysis will suggest that the insight into our interiors sometimes becomes an entry into a separate sphere, characterized by a sacred character.

¹³ M. Eliade, *Sacrum...* op. cit., 33f.

¹⁴ "Russia of balalaikas, romantic East, cinematic Haiti, American millionaire, exotic prince, etc.; in the final analysis – longing for something quite different than the present moment, inaccessible or irrevocably lost, for 'paradise'." Ibid., 38f.

¹⁵ "The Church truly knows that God himself, whom it serves, responds to the deepest desire of the human heart, which fruits of the earth will never fully satisfy." GS 41.

¹⁶ "Rainer Maria Rilke told a young poet who sent him his poems asking for his opinion: Would you have died if you were not allowed to write? If so, continue writing. Otherwise, it's not worth it." B. Bro, *Człowiek i sakramenty*, Warsaw 1973, 6.

Theology teaches that this interiorization often becomes the act of discovering God, the experience of the one and only Being who is in power of calling people into existence¹⁷.

Modern man knows the world better than before. However, this awareness does not eliminate the *sacred*, at most it allows us to perceive it in different perspective. For example, modern *homo technicus* is not afraid of a storm, because he invented a lightning rod, he is not afraid of elements of nature, because he can tame them, but he has not got rid of the fear of the unknown, which he sometimes experiences in the most unexpected moments of his life such as a situation of danger. Today's man also knows more precisely the essence of beauty, but at the same time he realizes that beauty cannot be fully understood by means of rigid categories, that being surprising and unpredictable defines its very nature. In addition, man cannot live without religious rites. When he tries to eliminate them, at the same time he introduces the other ones, more or less similar to those of religious nature. On this basis, M. Eliade states that a man, regardless of the degree of desacralization, is not able to free himself from the religious attitude, and the symbols, myths and rituals he propagates always reveal the final situation, i.e. the one which he discovers, when realizing his proper place in the universe¹⁸. God, of whom Revelation speaks, is also God who is experienced by man within his own being and whose acceptance is necessary to understand the existence of man.

Anthropological Foundation of the Christian faith

In a similar context one should consider the Christian faith, which consists in the recognition of God's authority, total trust in Him and leading one's life in accordance with this new condition¹⁹. Theology explains that in the act of faith the mind, will and grace are involved, from which it follows that faith is a gift received from God as well as the decision of man himself. The rationality of faith is related to the question of whether a person behaves rationally when deciding on leading his life faithfully, whether there is room for faith in him and whether it helps him achieve a more complete dimension of humanity.

¹⁷ H. de Lubac, *Katolicyzm*, Kraków 1961, 310f.; R. Guardini, *Koniec czasów nowożytnych, świat i osoba, wolność, łaska, los*, Kraków 1969, 90; L. Bouyer, op. cit., 82-98.

¹⁸ M. Eliade, *Sacrum...*, op. cit., 51-63; L. Bouyer, op. cit., 82-98.

¹⁹ These elements are found in the definition of faith presented during the Second Vatican Council (D 3008). Also DV 5. paid attention to them.

The answer to the above questions is not simple, because it requires a certain knowledge of God's existence and an understanding of who a man is. The above mentioned arguments for the existence of God confirm the rationality of faith in the sense that they present the real existence of Being, to which man turns in his faith. However, this does not completely solve our problem. Indicating the reason for the existence of faith, it must be justified that it is necessary for man. In the latter case, it should be remembered that faith concerns a very specific sphere of human life. For example, faith is not necessary with regard to shopping or to scientific research. They are autonomic areas, governed by their own rules, while religious faith manifests itself on the occasion of posing the so-called existential questions: why do I exist? for what purpose do I exist? What is the meaning of my existence and the existence of the world? These questions are, moreover, posed by every sound-minded person, which would indicate that they belong to human nature, in the same way as the idea of God does.

Who in that case would be capable of answering these questions? The response will not be provided by the natural sciences that study a specific segment of the world, because such a response would go beyond their competence. However, philosophy may speak on this matter. The latter, however, builds its conclusions on the material provided by the empirical sciences. However, in order to fully answer the above questions, one would have to refer to the categories of infinity and eternity. These concepts are not however the subject of the empirical sciences. In addition, scientific knowledge has limits that it can never fully overcome²⁰. It follows that philosophical inference in the field of existential questions posed by man is very close to faith, which – as J. Ratzinger states – begins with the acceptance that reality is not exhausted in what is visible and tangible²¹. Faith understood in this way becomes a postulate of a man who, by his very nature, manages to transcend his cognitive limitations.

To oppose science to faith is a misunderstanding since both of them are characterized by their unique specificity. Admittedly science does not exclude faith, and faith does not eliminate science. Similarly, science cannot become faith, and faith cannot be turned into scientific knowledge, because it would imply the loss of specific being by each of them. Besides, faith is not just about filling the gaps of human ignorance. The believer cannot be clearly identified as the one who knows and the unbeliever as the one who does not know. By the fact that faith implies engagement of all spheres of human life,

²⁰ M. Heller, *Spotkania z nauką*, Kraków 1974, 10.

²¹ J. Ratzinger, *Wprowadzenie w chrześcijaństwo*, Kraków 1970, 15.

it is subject to the laws of crisis and growth. In addition, the Supreme Being as the object of faith is not available to the direct insight of man, hence the acceptance of the Supreme Being depends not only on the mind and will, but also on grace. As a result, man often finds himself in a situation of threat: the believer is exposed to the danger of unbelief, the unbeliever is exposed to the danger of faith²².

The anthropological foundation of faith is manifested in the fact that man confronts it as a necessary condition for understanding the world. This is, of course, a reflective understanding, in contrast to a technical one, which is based on quantitative relationships. We know that every being can be considered from these two points of view. Both will be true and equally legitimate. However, understanding, reduced only to grasping numerical proportions, does not exhaust the truth of being. For example, the truth of the table consists not only of the fact that it was made of such and such wood, in such and such style, but also that it can be a family table, gathering around people close to each other, strengthening the family atmosphere. Not only the structure of a given object, but also its creator, the one who made it with a specific intention and its recipient constitute its very truth. Therefore, one cannot achieve the full truth about the world without accepting the existence of the Supreme Being. It is a necessary condition to understand the world, it manifests itself as the necessity of scale, indispensable to be able to measure anything, the necessity of norm, indispensable to be able to evaluate anything and the necessity of point of support, indispensable to be able to make any classification²³.

Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et spes* mentions the following issues, to the comprehension of which faith is necessary: the problem of human nature, the evil existing in the world, death, responsibility, laws governing the human community²⁴. Of course, these are not all fields in which faith appears. It can interpret all human history with its tensions between freedom and necessity, immanence and transcendence²⁵.

The necessity of faith manifests itself especially clearly when a person is searching for the meaning of life. We know that the concept of the meaning of any instance of existence or any action implies the existence of the rational goal of that existence or action. Although this goal is present in the very nature

²² Ibid., 12.

²³ H. de Lubac, *Na drogach...*, op. cit., 39.163; J. Danielou, op. cit., 41.

²⁴ GS 11-23.31.41-42.57.

²⁵ K. Lehmann, *Gegenwart des Glaubens*, Mainz 1974, 29; Ph. Roqueplo, *O trudnościach wiary*, Warsaw 1974, 269.

of a given being, it always comes from someone from whom this given being is dependent in its existence, that is, the meaning of being depends on its creator, while man can be regarded as the one who gives meaning to human works.

On the other hand, only the Supreme Being, on whom man depends in his existence, can grant him the sense of his existence and activity. Hence the meaning of human life is not so much the result of knowledge but the result of faith. A man cannot come up with it. He can only accept it as the gift, which has been granted him by the Supreme Being²⁶. Faith in such cases becomes a source of meaning, and thus a foundation on which man can base his existence and through which he can survive. There is no selflessness that could stand against meaninglessness²⁷.

Information on what kind of meaning it is can be found in Revelation. Theology deals with it in detail. It must be added here that the latter, when teaching about eternal salvation, does not consider man in isolation from earthly affairs; on the contrary, it states that salvation should be achieved through the daily hardships. Therefore, the allegation that religion can lead to human alienation seems unfounded. Human's hope of heaven, properly understood, is the only thing capable of giving man full passion for earthly work, while faith, by providing man with a vision of a state of ideal living, can contribute to achieving by him a better view of his current condition and thus can prevent him from being uncritically satisfied with himself²⁸. However, satisfaction resulting from faith is not easy to achieve. The God of the Bible resists all endeavours of man to control Him and subordinate Him in order to achieve his own interests. He is God who comes to man in the least anticipated moment (Mt 24:43; 1Tess 5:2-3) and He remains distant when man resorts to magic and evades shaping history on his own. Properly conceived faith prescribes man to live in the dialectical tension between transcendence and incarnation, to experience every day in its uniqueness and to find eternity only in the burden of everyday life²⁹. Faith gives people a sense of security, but not in the form of a paralyzing illusion or blissful satisfaction, but in form of a certainty that stimulates a person to act³⁰.

²⁶ J. Ratzinger, op. cit., p. 34f.

²⁷ H. de Lubac, *Katolicyzm*, op. cit., 307.

²⁸ Ph. Roqueplo, *O trudnościach wiary*, 260-274; H. de Lubac, *Na drogach...*, op. cit., 166.

²⁹ J. M. Gonzalez-Ruiz discusses this topic in more detail in the article entitled *Duchowość na czasy niepewności*, Conc. 67(1966)1- 10, 525-532.

³⁰ H. de Lubac, *Na drogach...*, op. cit., 154.

Man as a Being Open to God's Grace

The problem of grace is closely connected with the problem of God, which was mentioned above, but cannot be completely identified with it. For, in the previous case we have only established that man finds in himself and in the world around him the presence of a Supreme Being. This Being is different from the world and a man himself, and this Supreme Being is called God. Here, however, the question whether there is a place in human being for God's free action should be considered. In other words, the problem of the sacred is tantamount to the problem of a human being in its existence, and the problem of grace can be regarded as the problem of a human being in its action.

It is obvious that we have knowledge about grace only on the basis of historical Revelation. We are, however, far from deriving Revelation from the world. Knowing, however, the revealed truths about grace, we discover with amazement their origins in the human being. The biblical concept of grace is closely connected with the question of original sin. The first man turned away from God through his disobedience. This resulted in the loss of those supernatural gifts granted him by God and in serious degradation of human nature. From now on humanity cannot return to God on its own. Thus, every action of God, where restores lost gifts to man, has since then been the effect of the grace. In the Scriptures it determines in the first place who God is with regard to people, then who man becomes, when he accepts the action of God, and finally it indicates the specific gifts, which have been granted man by God³¹. It is, therefore, about the condition of man after committing original sin and about everything that is happening in him, which is not due to his own nature or powers, nor to his obligations or his merits. This action is called supernatural in opposition to the natural one, which is necessary because it arises as a result of certain stimuli or established laws.

The observation of human life confirms that not everything happens in it on the basis of the natural course of things, that there are many unknowns in it that cannot be explained even by the fact of human freedom. Admittedly, there is room for external freedom, higher-order freedom in the social order, within the human being. This thesis is perfectly illustrated by R. Guardini, who sees the elements of grace in human relations based on authority, where the will of a sovereign may suspend the operation of law and in this way compensate for what cannot be predicted in life, then in inspiration and success, which states

³¹ J. Guillet, *Grace*, in: *Słownik teologii biblijnej*, Poznań 1973, 436-441.

come from as if from the outside, they lie outside of human nature and can only be explained in the context of the entirety of being, then in all kinds of real friendship or love meetings, which often happen as a twist of fate, because they cannot be planned in advance neither determined nor calculated, and finally at some moments of extreme euphoria, where one has the impression that the torn existence has achieved its harmony, as well as in experiencing happiness, which is always associated with his awareness of giving to others beyond the measure of his abilities³². Everywhere where a man experiences an external endowment, where something results not from a must, prior calculations and planning, but from total freedom, where generosity and magnanimity come to the fore, there are also elements of what is called grace in theology.

Thus, the presence of the grace, understood in such terms, in the world makes it an environment proper to human nature. For man can live to the fullest extent only when he has the power of creativity, when even in the most tragic situations he can count on the revelation of a higher order. Admittedly, the world that is completely determined would become unbearable. Human life, in which there would be no room for contingency would turn out to be a nightmare. There is even a paradox here that law and grace are as if directed towards each other. Law without grace becomes soulless, grace without law turns into a parody. The accused, for example, only then will feel the significance of pardon when he receives it in a situation of final judgment³³. The necessity of grace with regard to man can be also derived from the fact of who a man really is in relation to his ultimate goal. Phenomenology states that man lives on the verge of what is animal and what is peculiarly human and that he must constantly cross this boundary, otherwise he reduces himself to his animality, which is tantamount to his death³⁴. Existential tomism complements these conclusions, claiming that man in his true human existence always aims to achieve higher goals than he can achieve taking into account his human capabilities³⁵. It follows that human existence turns out to be a kind of paradox, which can only be understood when accepting the existence of the transcendent Being. Without the supernatural, human life becomes tragic. Grace is what overcomes this tragic dimension and allows man to achieve a goal that he is naturally directed at³⁶.

³² R. Guardini, op. cit., 301-314.

³³ Ibid., 302.

³⁴ R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Kraków 1973, 13-26.

³⁵ M. Gervais, *Nature et grâce chez saint Thomas d'Aquin*, LThPh 30 (1974), 333-348.

³⁶ Extensive comments in this regard are contained in the book by A. Zuberbier entitled *Relacja natura — nadprzyrodzoność w świetle badań teologii współczesnej*, Warsaw 1973, 89-127.

The awareness of the interrelationships between nature and the supernatural is alive in western theology in the problems of the *Paschal Mystery* of Christ, and in Eastern theology in the doctrine of theosis. According to the latter, grace can be considered in a sense semi-natural, while nature – theophoric³⁷.

The arguments presented here can be qualified as a part of the more extensive problem concerning relations between the Christian religion and human nature. We have only limited ourselves to paying attention to the essential components of the religious phenomenon³⁸. It seems, however, that in the context of all these theological theses and church rites, the question should be posed about how they arise from human existence as well as how they can serve it since only then would their fully anthropological value be fully manifested. What is more, one should refer to a religious phenomenon as such and consider Christianity in its context. Christian religion, in spite of its essential separateness from other religions, shares many common features with them. Christians, therefore consider important the philosophical question of whether religiousness defines man to the same extent as the category *homo sapiens, homo socialis, homo faber, etc.* does³⁹. The problem of the role that religion plays in human life is also significant. Many scholars, for example, emphasize the personality-forming role of religion and its role in maintaining man's mental health⁴⁰.

Man is then the point of reference when proving the *raison d'être* of the Christian religion. It is not enough to say that the Church comes from God, we must also justify that it is necessary for people.

Similarly, the problem of verification of the Christian religion does not only consist in proving that the present-day Church comes from Christ and that in its historical duration it remains faithful to the will of its founder, but also in justification of the thesis that it represents the value necessary for people.

³⁷ W. Hryniewicz, *Teologia prawosławna o przeobstwieciu człowieka*; W. Granat, *Ku człowiekowi i Bogu w Chrystusie*, Lublin 1972, 406-412.

³⁸ The essence of the religious phenomenon is determined by: a) transcendent reality to which man turns, b) attitude towards this reality and c) the effect of this attitude, that is, the active interference of transcendent reality into human life. The Christian religion speaks of God, faith and grace in this respect. Cf. Z.J. Zdybicka, *Człowiek i religia*, in: M.A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, Lublin 1974, 325.

³⁹ For example, Z.J. Zdybicka agrees that man is a religious being by his nature (article quoted, 315-362).

⁴⁰ Cf. A. Just, *Osobotwórcza funkcja religii*, STV 13(1975)1, 157-181.

Since according to the scholastic principle of *verum*, it can be considered *ens* and *bonum* at the same time. The latter is, however, an anthropological issue.

Also dogmatic and moral theology, not to mention practical theology and theology of internal life, which by their very nature deal with man, is characterized by an anthropological attitude. We have already mentioned that contemporary Catholic theology is strongly inclined towards anthropology. It must be added here that the interests of dogmatics and moral theologians should not be limited to the mere interpretation of revealed truths about man, but should also take into account the confrontation of these truths with the experience of a man about himself. Then the relevance and validity of dogmatic theorems will become clearer and indications of moral theology will become more convincing.

Man And Redemption*

The subject of this study has been formulated widely as the author's aim is to present mutual relations between the work of Redemption and man and his entire activity, and thus not only to indicate the impact of Redemption on the existential situation and man's possibilities of action, but also to emphasize the role of man's activity and its conditioning both in the work of Redemption itself and in the way it is understood. Presenting the relationship between Redemption and concrete human life and activity, this study will also shed some light on the problem of the relationship between Redemption and culture. Culture is, in fact, inseparable from the life and activity of every human being. Every man, as Pope John Paul II reminded, lives a truly human life thanks to the culture in which he expresses himself and finds his objectivization¹.

Various factors influencing the way of understanding and presenting the mystery of Redemption and the multiple connections between the work of Redemption and human life and activity will be demonstrated here based on the *Redemptor hominis* encyclical. It is the fullest and most official expression of the teaching of Pope John Paul II so far and undoubtedly sets out, to some extent, the direction of the Church's thoughts and activities for the near future. First, we will show the main points of support for the way in which the relationship between man and Redemption is understood in the Pope's teaching, then the essential features characterizing the encyclical work of Redemption in relation to man, and finally the conclusions of the Pope's teaching for the contemporary way of teaching the main message of the Treaty on Redemption.

* STV 20(1982)1.

¹ Cf. Speech of His Holiness Pope John Paul II during a visit to the office of the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO), June 2, 1980, 7-8.

Foundations of Teaching of John Paul II

As points of reference for the Pope's arguments about man and Redemption, one must mention the sociological and pastoral analysis of the concrete situation of modern man as well as the abundant use of the inspired scriptures of Saint Paul and Saint John and the Conciliar Constitutions *Lumen Gentium* and *Gaudium et Spes*, not only in terms of the content of the doctrine of Redemption but also with regard to the form of its formulation. The Pope at the beginning of the encyclical recalls the historical situation in which today the Church performs its saving mission, while deeply analyzing the contemporary situation of the redeemed man after presenting the mystery of Redemption, by restoring man's proper dignity and meaning of life, and before indicating specific tasks of the Church towards redeemed humanity. The Pope demonstrates that contemporary man feels increasingly more threatened despite attempts to secure himself a happy future on earth. These attempts are manifested, according to the Holy Father, in the material progress achieved in particular by the development of technology and the formulation and adoption of various declarations of human rights. Meanwhile, counting only on the development of technology and striving for material progress itself gave birth to a consumer civilization, whose basic criterion of success was a continuous increase of material goods, and in which man felt threatened by the products of his own work, became a slave to the processes of production and consumption; in the case of which the motto "to have more" and not "to be more" has become leading idea of his life. Apart from focusing on the problem of the accumulation of material goods, it should be also emphasized that the natural environment of man is becoming increasingly more polluted and the disproportion between the areas of luxury and areas of poverty is increasingly more increasing. Confining oneself to counting merely on the human rights declarations enacted and approved by various countries is also no guarantee. In many countries, we only have the acceptance of the "letter" of these declarations and not the implementation of their "spirit." Different totalitarian systems in the name of such or other ideologies actually limit human rights, especially the rights of freedom and this also happening in the domain of religion.² Thus, modern attempts to build a happy future of man in purely mundane dimensions has led to new dangers: new forms of alienation and new forms of enslavement. Assessing the contemporary situation of humanity in the light of the Scriptures, the Holy Father states that the enormous

² Cf. Encyclical *Redemptor hominis* (RH) 15-17.

progress in the mastering of the world by man reveals at the same time a multiple “submission to vanity”. The world of a new era, of the achievements of science and technology is at the same time a world that “groans and sighs” because it still “eagerly awaits the appearance of the sons of God.”³ Hence, in the Pope’s teaching, there is a great need for the Church’s salvific mission in the modern world, the need to include people in Christ’s salvific work, show them the necessity of Redemption for the true liberation of man and for restoring the right meaning and dignity to his action and his culture.

The doctrine of man and the Redemption itself is developed by the Holy Father on the basis of biblical texts, especially those of St. Paul and John, and the Constitutions of the Second Vatican Council. He often refers to the Gospel of Love by Saint John in his Encyclical, especially by quoting the text that “God so loved the world that he gave it his Only-begotten Son...”⁴ and stating that the Word Incarnate is the cause of creation and that Redemption undertaken by Jesus on the cross is a prominent event in human history⁵. Even more often, the Letters of Saint Paul are quoted, including in deep and beautiful arguments about God’s love which constitutes legitimacy of human existence⁶ and about Redemption in cosmic dimensions, about bringing everything to unity in Christ⁷. It can be said that the very manner of writing about the Redemption of man using the very personal style of teaching, the depth of reflection and also the ardent heart, concrete, existential approach, addressing almost directly each individual is something completely different from the older, more formal, abstract and purely objective, almost essentialist teachings of the Magisterium of the Church; rather, it seems very similar in its nature to the letters of Saint John or Paul, or of the original apostolic writings in general⁸.

The Pope also often refers to the main ideas expressed in the statements formulated in the two Council Constitutions on the Church, *Lumen Gentium* and *Gaudium et Spes*⁹. He states that the Council has expressed in many places the Church’s concern for making human life on earth worthy of man in every

³ Cf. Rom 8. The Pope quotes the statements of Saint Paul’s Letter to Rom 8:19-22.

⁴ J 3:16. Cf. RH 1.8.10.22. Cf. also R. Rogowski, *Chrystus i człowiek. Refleksje nad teologiczną antropologią “Redemptor hominis”*, HD 48 (1979), 169.

⁵ Cf. J. Chmiel, *Biblijne podstawy encykliki Jana Pawła II w “Redemptor hominis”*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, Kraków 1980, 73.

⁶ Cf., among others, RH 9. Cf. also R. Rogowski, art. cit., 170.

⁷ Cf. J. Chmiel, art. cit., 73.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 72.

⁹ The first Constitution is quoted by him 17 times and the second 16 times.

respect, to make it increasingly more human¹⁰. To justify this, the Pope quotes a significant statement from *Gaudium et Spes* that man is “the only creature on earth whose existence God wanted just for himself”¹¹. Following the teaching of the Council, the Pope also emphasizes repeatedly the idea of the communion of Christ with man. At the same time, he develops the meaning of the significant statement of the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* that “the Son of God, through his Incarnation, has somehow united himself with every human being.”¹² He argues that Christ is somehow united with every human being without exception, even if man does not realize it. The Pope thus takes over and develops in his teaching about Redemption a method of presenting theological issues – developed at the Council – not as they appear in themselves, in their essence, but in terms of their salvific function, their meaning for every human being, their impact on human life and action, for all human culture.

Features that characterize the work of Redemption in relation to man

After a deeper analysis of the doctrine of man and Redemption presented in the *Redemptor Hominis* encyclical, we can probably say that Redemption, in the Pope’s view, is a work of divine and human love, inscribed in a concrete story and covering the whole of human existence. Very clearly and comprehensively, the Pope presents Redemption as a work of love. At the same time, he seems to combine in one harmonious synthesis the Eastern and Western concepts of Redemption, expressly disregarding a legal-social view of Redemption, which adopted its classic form in the Satisfaction theory of atonement of Anselm of Canterbury. He regards Redemption as God’s initiative, the result of which is granting man the priceless gift of forgiveness and divination and as a collaboration of man with God’s grace leading to full humanization, or as an action of a Father’s and forgiving love of God, which grants man anew the grace of divine filiation and as an expression of a living, sacrificial human love that gives him ultimate dignity and meaning to the whole of human life. The Pope emphasizes that the work of the Redemption is the expression and fruit of love

¹⁰ The Pope refers to GS 91.38. Cf. RH 13.

¹¹ GS 24. Cf. RH 13. Cf. also S. Grzybek, *Kerygmaticzne wartości encykliki Jana Pawła II “Redemptor hominis”*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, 67; M. Jaworski, *Anthropology for God*, *ibid.*, 13; Rev. R. Rogowski, *art. cit.*, 170-171.

¹² GS 22. Cf. RH 13. Cf. also R. Rogowski, *art. cit.*, 172.

as an attitude and action that is something most appropriate for each person and that creates a real community bond between people. On the one hand, God's fatherly love is manifested here, striving to bestow man with the grace of being a child of God, and on the other human love that is the answer to God's love and which grants the whole life of man ultimate dignity and meaning¹³. Divine and human love has found a concrete personal expression in Christ, our Redeemer. It is by his very example that on the one hand, God's saving action towards all people was revealed in the most complete and effective way, and on the other, the highest ideal of the saved man. In this way, according to the Pope's arguments, the very mystery of Christ turns out to be the best justification and guarantor of human dignity, freedom and development.

The Pope then presents the mystery of Redemption as a historical work¹⁴. He presents the great drama of the Redemption of mankind, as a multi-dimensional work of the Father's love of God towards people, manifested and implemented over the centuries in the form of historical events. God's love for man was manifested immediately with the act of creation, by granting man the grace of being a child of God, yet it was then rejected by the breaking of the first covenant in paradise by Adam and further covenants known from Old Testament history and it was only recently accepted anew on behalf of humanity in the human heart of the Son of God, boundlessly subjected to the Will of the Father in the mystery of the Cross¹⁵. The whole work of the Redemption is a gradual realization of the divine plans for the salvation of mankind through the whole of history, from creation and the original fall to its renewal in Christ. It is the renewal of the act of creation, which was announced in the Old Testament and realized in Christ, the restoration of goodness originally attributed to him and violated by the disorder of sin, especially the restoration of the dignity of the image of God – which was depraved by sin – in man himself¹⁶. Overcoming the sinful state of man, his weakness and moral misery was accomplished through the Incarnation and

¹³ Cf., among others, W. Hryniewicz, *Obcować z głębią Odkupienia. Z rozważań nad soteriologią encykliki Redemptor hominis*, Znak 31 (1979), 1255; A. Zuberbier, *Pierwsza encyklika Jana Pawła II*, AK 94 (1980), 33.

¹⁴ Cf., among others, M. Jaworski, art. cit., 135; C. Niezgoda, *Refleksje nad "starym" i "nowym" w encyklice "Redemptor hominis"*, HD 49 (1980), 7.

¹⁵ Cf. RH 9. Cf. also W. Łydka, *Nauka o Odkupieniu w encyklice "Redemptor hominis"*, KFD 45 (1979), 283-284; Cz. Rychlicki, *Człowiek współczesny wobec tajemnicy Odkupienia*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, 147-148; S. Włodarczyk, *Odkupiciel człowieka Jezus Chrystus ośrodkiem wszechświata i historii*, *ibid.*, 120-121.

¹⁶ Cf. RH 8. Cf. also W. Łydka, art. cit., 282-283; B. Sikorski, *Odkupienie jako nowe stworzenie*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, 106-109.

sacrifice of the Son of God. The Holy Father reminds us that “Christ, the new Adam (...) fully reveals man to man himself,” reaffirms him and shows him his proper dignity¹⁷. Christ as the incarnate Son of God, living in a specific time and place, among particular nations and its culture and is the cause and origin of the salvation of every man, and at the same time an existential and personal model of the entire realization of a renewed humanity. At the same time, the Pope emphasizes not only the Incarnation and sacrifice of Christ crucified, but the entire life of Christ. Speaking of the unification of Christ with every human being through the Incarnation, following the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, the Holy Father states that the Incarnated Son of God worked with human hands, he thought with the human mind, acted with human will, he loved with a human heart, born of the Virgin Mary, he truly became one of us, he was similar to us in all things except sin¹⁸. Christ’s whole life and every word appeals to many people, even non-believers. Not only the divinity – as the Pope writes – of Christ but also His humanity appeals to them, His faithfulness to the truth, His love for all, and finally His death on the cross, an amazing depth of suffering and devotion¹⁹.

Thus, the mystery of man’s Redemption finds its expression in the Pope’s teaching not in the form of a purely abstract truth, but as an event taking place through a particular story, especially through the concrete life and action of Jesus Christ; not only the Mystery of the Incarnation and the culminating events of the Passion and resurrection, but also the whole life of Christ, all his actions and words, behaviors and attitudes in various situations and conditions, have a salvific value for man, the value of the cause and pattern for the renewal of human life²⁰. The mystery of the Redemption is finally presented by the Pope as a work concerning all of humanity and all the dimensions of human existence. The Holy Father stresses very firmly that the Son of God – already through the Incarnation – is united in some way with every man without any exceptions²¹. Hence, every human being is covered by the mystery of Christ’s Redemption. Every man was from the beginning wanted by God for himself²².

¹⁷ Cf. RH 8.10. Cf. also M. Jaworski, art. cit., 131-134.

¹⁸ RH 8. Cf. GS 22.

¹⁹ Cf. RH 7.

²⁰ Cf. A. Nossol, *Chrystologia encykliki “Redemptor hominis”*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, 97-103.

²¹ Cf. RH 13. Cf. also GS 22.

²² Cf. RH 13. Cf. also W. Łydka, art. cit., 288; S. Nowak, *Duchowość Odkupienia środkiem odnowy Kościoła według encykliki “Redemptor hominis”*, in: *Redemptor hominis. Text and commentary*, 167-168; A. Zuberbier, art. cit., 37.

Everyone is personally called by God by one's individual name, he is created as a picture of God and hence has been granted eternal dignity and inalienable rights. In the light of the mystery of the Redemption, therefore, there are no people or situations more or less important or privileged.

The Pope further explains that Redemption always concerns a concrete man, considered in his unique "existential" situation, in specific socio-historical conditions. Therefore, it is not about humanity in general, but about every individual, considered not in isolation from their socio-historical conditions, but in a concrete *hic et nunc*. Ultimately, the Holy Father finally emphasizes that Redemption concerns every person in their entirety, in his spiritual and physical structure, individual and social life, natural and supernatural plane, religious and secular activities, in temporality and in eternity. In this way, the Redemption of man is tantamount also to his authentic humanization. Thanks to Redemption, the gift of divinization, participation in God's life postulates a voluntary response of man, and enables this answer, making man able to effectively join the work of salvation, the work of restoring the highest dignity and full personal development to every human being. Considering both the possibility of becoming a child of God and enabling him to act freely and responsibly throughout life, we can define the salvation of man resulting from the Redemption as a "supernatural inner liberation, enabling man to undertake mature and responsible action in all areas of individual and social life, which is the space of human freedom."²³ The entire teaching of the Pope on Redemption prompts concern for full development and happiness, teaches respect for human dignity and freedom, justifies comprehensively the conviction of the special significance of human affairs and thus shows the deepest foundations of true and full humanism. The Pope also explicitly states that deep amazement over the value and dignity of man who in the mystery of Redemption has been reaffirmed and who has deserved such a powerful Redeemer, is called the Gospel and Christianity and constitutes the mission of the Church in the world²⁴.

The Holy Father is deeply concerned not only about the final deliverance and happiness of the redeemed man, but about all concrete human matters²⁵. He indicates the proper hierarchy of values, proclaiming the primacy of ethics over technology, the person over material things, spirit over matter. He emphasizes that man cannot give up himself or his place in the visible world, he

²³ Cf. J. Krucina, "Redemptor hominis" – inauguracyjna encyklika Jana Pawla II, ChS 12(1980)2, 18-20.

²⁴ Cf. RH 10. Cf. also S. Nowak, art. cit., 167; A. Zuberbier, art. cit., 33.

²⁵ Cf. RH 13.

cannot become a slave of things, economic relations, production or his own products; a materialist-oriented civilization imposes such a bondage upon man. He points out that the various instincts of interest, struggle and domination must be captured, directed and controlled by the deeper forces inherent in man, which constitute the true culture of nations. It is necessary to adopt, establish and deepen the sense of moral responsibility that must be undertaken by a human being²⁶. The Pope gives priority to what is spiritual and what in the life of humanity is expressed through religion and in turn through morality, affecting the whole of culture. He states that the deepest pursuit of the human spirit, which is expressed in searching for God and thus in seeking the full dimension of humanity, the full sense of human life, proceeds in one direction, though manifested in various ways²⁷. He also states that the basic task of the Catholic Church is to make human life more human, more worthy of human²⁸. The church is the guardian of the great treasure, which is humanity expressed in the eternal and creative anxiety of the spirit: in seeking truth, in need of good, in the hunger for freedom, in longing for beauty, the voice of conscience. Considering this treasure of humanity, deepened additionally by the grace of being sons in the Only-Begotten Son of God, the Church becomes able to serve man, that is to fulfill the task commissioned by Christ²⁹.

Conclusion

What conclusions of the Pope's doctrine are significant for our way of teaching the treaty on Redemption?

1) The lecture should include an analysis of the concrete existential situation of today's individual, our nation and all modern humanity. Awareness of the contemporary existential situation and contemporary conditions should be both a starting point in the considerations on the Redemption, their relevance and indispensability, as does political theology or liberation theology in their own way, and the basis which makes it possible that lectures on Redemption would demonstrate its significance for today's man and teach people effective concern for specific matters of existence of Others. When talking about the effects of Redemption, one should ask what is its significance today for human

²⁶ Cf. RH 16.

²⁷ Cf. RH 11.

²⁸ Cf. RH 13.

²⁹ Cf. RH 18.

existence, for example in the burning matter of human dignity and rights, or in the field of the Church's tasks in the world. Thus, both the starting point and effects of the Redemption should be presented in a concrete way, in relation to the current socio-historical situation, based on current experience.

2) All teaching on the Redemption should be based on biblical sources, obviously interpreted in light of the last Council and entire Christian Tradition. Referring – to a greater extent – to the content and statements presented in the Bible, may help to overcome the abstractness and the one-sidedness of traditional soteriological treaties, which consider Redemption only in terms of substitute compensation, the most perfect sacrifice and individualistic and ethical participation in the atonement and merits of Christ.

3) It is necessary to harmoniously combine – as the Pope does in his Encyclical – various aspects of the doctrine of the Redemption, often interpreted separately in earlier theological treaties. In the spirit of such a harmonious synthesis, it is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between the work of Redemption and the work of creation, between the Incarnation and the Passover of Christ, between man's Redemption and the Redemption of the whole world, between moral liberation from sin and social liberation from all forms of oppression, the concern for eternal salvation and for authentic humanism in earthy life.

4) Among many biblical categories that provide a closer view on the mystery of Redemption, it is especially important to present the category of love, not only in order to overcome the narrow, legal and social approach to Redemption in terms of satisfaction and merit, but above all because love is a preeminent category in the theory of Christian revelation, the attitude and action most appropriate for God and for every human being, and the source or bond of true and full communion between people and God.

5) One should teach about the Redemption using a concrete language, and not the abstract one. When analyzing the biblical texts it is necessary to explain that the revelation of the mystery of the Redemption took place gradually, within the framework of history, in the context of certain cultural categories, that people were redeemed from the situation of sin through concrete events, carried out by God throughout history, especially through life, death and resurrection of Christ.

The Christ who lived in a certain place and in a certain time carried out the Redemption by restoring the broken covenant of mankind with God, and today He allows us to enjoy the effects of the Redemption. Through meeting and uniting with Him in faith and love, confirmed and strengthened in the sacraments, each person regains the highest dignity and the possibility of full development. Thus, the teaching on Redemption using a concrete language

will be thus also tantamount to emphasizing the historical, Christocentric and personalist character of Redemption.

6) Finally, following the biblical approach, one should refrain from confining oneself to recognize the mystery of the Redemption in a purely objective and essentializing manner – which was common in earlier textbooks – from carrying out considerations about its essence in isolation from man and his situation, but instead one should try to recognize this mystery in terms of its role in human life and humanity, its significance for specific human history, its influence on human activity and human culture.

Man as Image of God and Theological Implications of that Expression*

(Thoughts on theological anthropology)

Introduction

The subject of “Man as *imago Dei*” has long been considered *crux interpretum*. In the course of time, exegetes and dogmatists proposed quite diverse interpretations of it. At times, the subject was not even discussed at all. Today, however, the interest in this subject is on the increase, probably because theology is increasingly expected to provide answers to a number of anthropological questions.

The concept of *imago Dei* is not identical in the Old and New Testaments. However, a close relationship exists.

Man as *Imago Dei* in the Book of Genesis

Vital elements of Old Testament theology of similarities are to be found in the Book of Genesis 1:26ff—in a fragment originating in the priestly source (P). In the younger Story of Creation (Gen 1:1—2:4a), the basis of which is the scheme of seven days (ritual rules!), on the sixth day man (Adam) is created: “God said, ‘Let us make man in our own image (*selera*), in the likeness of ourselves (*demut*), and let them be masters of the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, all the wild animals and all the creatures that creep along the ground.’ God created man in the image (*selem*) of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them” (Gen 1:26ff).

* STV 27(1989)1.

For understanding and capturing the theological-anthropological relevance of man's *imago Dei* an analysis of the expressions of "selem" and "demut" is not sufficient, as theories of an image can be numerous. Only by considering the context can we arrive at a viable exegesis.

a) The entire text of the Book of Genesis 1:1—2:4a is a theology of creation and attempts to provide an answer to the question of the beginning: Where does everything that exists come from? The answer is: Everything was created by the God of Israel. Because, in accordance with the priestly source, He is the God of any ritual rules and the source of religious shaping of history, therefore, in the same orderly manner He will act as the Creator of the world. Man becomes created on the sixth day as "the crowning and completion" of God's act of creation.

b) The value of the human being is reemphasised by the Creator's will to make human beings in His image (*selem*). The concept of "image" consists of a certain relationship. That human being is an image of God implies his peculiar relationship to God, a connection with Him. To avoid any erroneous interpretations, the author adds "demut," that is, "after our likeness," not the same—as man is a creature and never will be God (Gen 3).

c) "Selem" is closely associated with the task of governing. A human being, as a creature remaining in a peculiar relationship to the Creator, dominates all other creatures—the relationship to other living creatures assigned to him is to dominate them. Because this task entrusted to man is based solely on his likeness (that is his relationship to God—the Lord of all creation), he may not rule autonomously. That likeness is realised in fulfilling the role in the world.

d) Gen 1:27ff provides yet another idea related to the likeness to God: "being male and female." Dominating other creatures shall be creative and life-giving. By the same token, what is expressed in human likeness to God is God's domination and creativity—and that is what constitutes the basis of human dignity. The Book of Genesis 5:1—2 confirms conclusions of this exegesis by the same context ("he created them male and female"). The idea of *imago Dei* in man as a relationship to God, which determines the relationship to other living creatures, is what constitutes the basis of human dignity and is an obligation for respect towards human life: "...And I shall demand account of your life-blood, too. I shall demand it of every animal, and of man. Of man as regards his fellow-man, I shall demand account for human life. He who sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God was man created" (Gen 9:5c—6).

Summing up, we may conclude that in the Old Testament, man's *imago Dei* is understood not as a static definition of a human being, but rather as an expression of his "significant relationships," whereby the "relationship towards God" is the primary relationship determining in turn his "relationship to the world."

Revolution in Paul's Thinking

Excerpts from the Book of Genesis originating in the priestly source and concerning *imago Dei* were interpreted in various ways in the Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament and subsequently by Philo of Alexandria and Gnostics. Some of those interpretations differ from others quite significantly. The concept of *imago Dei* is continued in the New Testament in Paul's literature. It consists of so extremely diverse traditions, however, that it is virtually impossible to talk about a coherent and consistent teaching of St. Paul on *imago Dei*. Yet, clearly, for the most part the apostle develops the idea of *imago Dei* in the context of Christology and the history of salvation. And what is the result of that?

1. For Paul, it is not as much man-Adam, as Jesus Christ who is the image and likeness of God. Two excerpts shall be evoked here, namely 2Cor 4:4 and Col 1:15—as important, though, is also Heb 1:3.

a) In 2 Cor 4:4 Paul concludes with sorrow that not everyone to whom he preaches, “saw the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God”. (... *ton fōtismom euagge-liou tēs doxēs tou Christou, hos estin eikōn tou Theou*); as “the god of this age has blinded the minds of the unbelievers.” The gospel is the news of the *doxa* of God and glorified Lord. The *doxa* of God himself shone in Him and manifests itself in the world as God's *eikōn*. Both concepts explain the Christological epiphany. What it means for our cognition filled with faith is: those who get to know Christ are watching, “the image of God” and “the glory of God” in Him.

b) According to Col 1:15, Christ is “the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation” (...*eikōn tou Theou tou aoratou, prōtotokos pasēs ktiseōs*). In the entire hymn of Col 1:15—20 highly interesting is the accumulation of God's creative and redemptive action in Jesus Christ; He is the Cosmocrator and the Redeemer. God is present in Him in all His fullness (line 19). This is why the “fullness of the invisible God” is manifested in Christ, so He is for us a viable “image of God” and “as the Firstborn of all creation” holds the power over that creation. Christ represents God in the creation. The community shall realize they are not forced to rely on some cosmic powers but that God is acting (creatively and redemptively) in and by His “*eikōn*—Christ” and holds the entire world in His hand. As “the Firstborn of all creation,” Imago-Christ points to resurrection and announces new, eternal existence and life for all creation.

c) This same *eikonic* Christology is shown in Heb 1:3, although the very word *eikōn* does not appear there per se: “in these last days, he spoke to us through a son, whom he made heir of all things and through whom he created the universe” (line 2). The next sentence illustrates why this “Revelation in the

Son” exceeds all prophetic revelations: “The Son who is the refulgence of his glory (*apaugasma tēs doxēs*) and the very imprint of his being (*charaktēr tēs hupostaseōs*)...” The terms *charaktēr* and *apaugasma* are substantial parallels and ultimately replace *eikōn*.

Jesus Christ is the intercessor of the creative and redemptive actions of God—as is illustrated in all evoked excerpts. His gospel is viable because in Him the shining of God’s “doxa” is revealed (2Cor 4:4; Heb 1:3) and in the “image” he makes the “invisible God” (Col 1:15) visible. These Christological predicates explain the theology of Revelation. Christ reveals to us the “image” of God. This is why Christ’s “being-the-image-of-God” can be understood only as an expression of His “redemptive function”: Christ as “the image of God” remains in an personal relationship to God and this is why His relationship to the world is a redemptive intermediation.

2. Alongside the aforementioned excerpts, there are also texts pertaining to the *imago Dei* of man: Col 3:10; Rom 8:29; 1Cor 15:49.

a) According to Col 3:1, those baptized with Christ “raised from death” to a new life. The annunciation of Redemption is followed by an imperative of Col 3:1ff to live in accordance with the new redemptive situation. Man baptised in Christ became a new man who is bound by new rules of behaviour, for example: lying to one another is reprehensible, “since you have taken off the old self with its practices and have put on the new self...” (Col 3:9—10a). That new self “is being renewed, for knowledge (of God), in the image (*kat’eikona*) of its creator” (3:10b). The baptised one is renewed through Christ. A crucial difference shall be noted here, though: Christ is *eikōn tou Theou* (2Cor 4:4), whereas the baptised ones are and will be renewed *kat’eikona* (Col 3:10, also Eph 4:24). They become “an image of the image.”

b) Apart from the parenthetic-ethical context, in Paul’s literature we encounter also the eschatological context: Christ’s resurrection marks the beginning of fulfilling our salvation and grants us hope for rising from the death (1Cor 15:35ff). Naturally, we are still wearing the “image of the earthly (man),” Adam, however, we are to be granted the “image of the heavenly (man)” (1Cor 15:49). To clarify this, in the Letter to the Romans Paul adds: “For those he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (*summorfus tēs eikonos tou huiou autou*), so that he might be the firstborn among many brothers” (Rom 8:29).

c) Transformation into a new man occurs “as from the Lord who is the Spirit” (2Cor 3:18). Now, thanks to “turning to the Lord” the veil is removed for those who are baptised (2Cor 3:16). “All of us, gazing with unveiled face on the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from glory

to glory, as from the Lord who is the Spirit” (2Cor 3:18). In “the ministry of the Spirit” (2Cor 3:8) a hope is given (2Cor 3:12), so that in the future, in the eschatological, ultimate sense, we shall “be conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). Then the “image of the heavenly (man) shall definitively overshadow the image of the earthly (man)” (1Cor 15:49). The Spirit of the Lord stimulates the process of transformation into the image of Christ; the same Spirit leads to the eschatological final when in resurrection the somatic man will be transformed as well. This is the Spirit “who raised Jesus from the dead,” now dwells in us and “will give life to your mortal bodies also” (Rom 8:11; Eph 1:17–20). Which is why the body in its ideal is *sōma pneumatikon* (1Cor 15:44ff).

3. I would like to add three comments to the above insights to the New Testament: 1) What I have outlined here does not constitute a complete exegesis, rather is a summary of its most vital conclusions. 2) In this overview, first I presented a Christological and then anthropological-ethical and eschatological dimensions of the teaching on *imago*, whereas in fact they are inseparable. In particular, separating the ethical regulation from the eschatological perspective is not in accordance with Paul’s teaching on *imago Dei*. Unravelling this tangle on the exegetical grounds is impossible. 3) Both contexts, the Christological one as well as the anthropological-ethical one, are found in the young Church. Quite remarkable here is the pneumatological curiosity: the Holy Spirit, who stimulates the transformation of man “in the likeness of the image (...) of the Son” is described as “a perfect image of the perfect Son”—for the first time by St. Gregory Thaumaturgus. Later on, Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria will accept that pneumatological version of the teaching on *imago*.

One-Sided Interpretation—Simplifications

In tradition, the *imago Dei* of man remains an important subject in theology and preaching. In particular, one should evoke here an expression from the New Testament: Christ is a true image of God and man is, or shall become, “an image of the image” of Christ. For many Church Fathers, Logos is the perfect image of God in its divinity, not as *verbum incarnatum*. Therefore, we encounter here a new anthropological concept: it is not the bodily-spiritual wholeness of man, but only the “higher man”, i.e. his *nous—mens* that is shaped in the image of Christ. *Imago Dei* radiates to the body and everything that is somehow body-related in an indirect manner at best. “Spiritualization” in the sense of “dematerializing” the *imago* in man gains an enormous influence on medieval theology. Even theologians of the modern era are not always able to face this tendency. Modern exegetes, however, tend to agree that the division of a human

being into “two static parts”—spirit and body—is not in accordance with the biblical priestly source.

In the history of theology one more one-sided interpretation was developed. In the theology of *imago* one can clearly sense a scholastic thinking in terms of “static beings and substances”. Such a line of thinking makes us face a peculiar question: Did man lose *imago Dei* through sin or did he not? This question triggered a heated discussion between protestant and catholic theologians. The scholastic theology described *imago Dei* as an “innate attribute,” unalienable and grounded in the “essence of a human being”. By contrast, protestant theologians insisted that sin erased *imago Dei* from man or left only some “remnants” of it—as *imago Dei* as a “supernatural” grace is an “addition” to the “nature” and “essence” of man. Such disputes were overly one-sided. In the course of time, the “innate-supernatural” scheme proved too static, as it did not allow for capturing the essence of the biblical expression of “man as the image of God”. The assumption made in Gen 1:26ff as well as in the Christological-historical-redemptive excerpts from the New Testament is that of man as a dynamic operator who as such remains in relationships in which he “perfects his essence and lives in conformity with it.”

Theological Significance

Dogmatics therefore faces an interesting task. Based on the category of “relationship” and the concept of “dynamic subjectivity and personality” it is possible to develop teaching on *imago Dei* prolific for Christology and theological anthropology, as well as for other dogmatic treatises.

Man as a “being in a relationship”

Exegetes decisively focus on the relationship between man and God. This *coram Deo* denotes a personal relationship. Wherever man is perfecting his essence as a person, he thinks, plans, acts—he does it all “in front of God”. From the point of view of the theology of creation it must therefore mean the following: man is created by God as a “partner of a dialogue”. In other words: God summons man and expects from him a reply in behaviour (Gen 1:26ff).

The theological category of “likeness to God” expresses “relational being” of man. As a creature, man is introduced into the world and defined by a dual relationship—to God and to the world. This is why a human being shall be defined

as a “being in a relationship”. If man in the philosophical manner is defined as a “static and self-contained being,” the relationship to God can only be understood as accidental. In my view, such ontology cannot be accepted in theology as it endangers the theology of creation in its very core. From the theological point of view, man is what he is primarily because of the relationship of dependence on God the Creator. As a *coram Deo* creature, he remains in a relationship to the world and in terms of this relationship he is to be understood. In other words: the tie of man to his environment is essentially linked with the dependency of man as a creature on God. The phrase “man is the image of God” refers to this inextricable unity of the relationship towards God and the world. Man “puts God as the image” to the world and in the world, as he understands his acting in the world as a task entrusted by God and this is why he adopts this relationship towards God as his criterion.

Sin as a Negation of *imago Dei*

In fact, man commits a sin at the very moment of creating himself as an absolute subject of his relationship to the world and breaks the personal unity of his relationship to God and to the world. In result, he becomes a sinner and his action in and in relation to the world becomes a sin. Neither the creative-ontological relationship of dependence on God, nor the relationship to the world cease to exist, however an option and actions of man become contradictory to them. “The absolute subject” remains contradictory to the unity of the relationship either by negating or regulating and defining his relationship to God on his own. The premise for this absolutisation, from the theological point of view, is that of “an illusory ontology” and false understanding of oneself.

The result of the “absolutisation of oneself” is an absolute autonomy in behaviour: man sets the norms and rules of his actions all by himself. This is why he cannot relay to the world the “image and reflection of God” but only the “image and reflection of himself”. The human footprints he leaves lose the potentiality of transcendence and *imago Dei*. Sin is a permanent attempt of substituting *imago Dei* with *imago hominis*. In other words: sin is oriented at “being a human without God,” splitting what in fact is connected, namely being a human and relation to God.

From these considerations we move towards a positive conclusion: being truly a human comprises a relation to God, which means that being truly a human is “being *coram Deo*”—never its negation. Therefore, if man in action assumes such an understanding of himself, he puts the world in relation to “the image of God” and *eo ipso* to “the image of being truly man.”

God's incarnation in Jesus Christ as the principle of *imago Dei*

Paul, aware of the contradictory with a sense effect of sin (Rom 1:18ff), does not say: man is “an image of God;” it is Christ who is His viable image (2Cor 4:4; Col 1:15; Heb 1:3). Incarnation as *intensivum* of the Revelation unites being God and being human (*unio hypostatica!*) and unites them in one *eikōn tou Theou*. As the Word incarnated and the essence of God, Jesus Christ is also the new Adam (Rom 5:15)—the man in whom “the image of God” is present in an undistorted manner and in whom the “relationship to God” became an absolute measure of being human.

Christ embodies the pre-image of God in man. Through baptism we are renewed by the grace of Christ (*indikativus*) and in a dynamic process we become related to Christ. Yes, we become the image of God as so much as we answer Christ's calling and subject ourselves to His gravity. Faith and following Christ is the process of “shaping the image of God in ourselves”—a process located in time and space guided by the Holy Spirit of Jesus Christ, entrusted to us, however, as our everyday calling—meaning permanent “taking off the old self with its practices” and “putting on the new self” (Col 3:9).

The Theology of *imago* as a Rationale for Ethics

The imperative for zealous imitating the *imago Dei* in Christ refers to the earthly life. In the light of the process of shaping in human that *imago*, we can justify Christian ethics—ethics that in principle excludes the ethics of achievements and successes only. Human action is seriously demanded, the aim, however, is not reached by “the success of human achievements”. A renovation and transformation into *imago Dei* is an eschatological expression and a gift from God (Rom 8:29). “As from the Lord who is the Spirit” (2Cor 3:18) we become alike to the image of God in Christ—but later we shall be transformed into existence in accordance with the image of Christ resurrected.

Hope and the eschatological perspective are for ethics—the premise of which constitutes the theology of *imago*—an integral element of the foundation of the ethics itself. A deep meaning is revealed in putting together Paul's texts on *imago* of which it is parenthetic-ethical and which is eschatological. In this way, Paul points to ethics which considers the perspective of an eschatological transformation. This is the “ethics of hope,” which by the power of the eternal meaning with all seriousness approaches the “Now” in this world.

St Augustine's Teaching on the Image of God in Man in the Mystery of Creation*

Introduction

The biblical statement about the creation of man in the image and likeness of God (Gen 1:26) indicates first of all God as the One who calls man into existence and gives life to all things. There is also something in this picture that directs our attention to the human being. The image and likeness of God, because we want to discuss them here, are two terms which define the mystery of our humanity. Man created in the image and likeness of God is not only the one who was conceived by God, but also the one who was the only creature that was called into existence in unimaginable closeness with his Creator. He is the only one who was invited to participate in God's life. We are now living in times when it is difficult for people to realize this truth.

The concept of the creation of man in the image and likeness of God is often narrowed down only to the case of the first parents. Meanwhile, this truth also applies to us. Reducing its meaning only to Adam and Eve, sometimes results in forgetting about this truth, and in consequence leads to the complete removal of it from the horizon of our thinking and life. The fact that this is a basic truth and the one, which is crucial for understanding the very nature of a human individual is, as emphasized by the participants of the last Vatican Council (GS 12). Much depends on the proper recognition of the essence of our humanity.

If his understanding is true, then it is much easier to discover the meaning of life assigned to man by the creative plan of God. The origins of the contemporary crisis affecting man himself and his relationship with others have their beginning somewhere in this place. Until we recognize ourselves

* STV 34(1996)2.

as God's creatures, we will be living in uncertainty and anxiety. Taking up the topic initiated by the Second Vatican Council, we want to take a closer look at the mystery of man created in the image and likeness of God. We want to base our investigations on the doctrine of one of the greatest Doctors of the Catholic Church, Saint Augustine of Hippo. We must, however, point out here that this subject investigated by the Bishop of Hippo, was previously undertaken by L. Krupa¹.

Considering however, that his latter research work concerned all the works of St Augustine, we decided to consider this topic again, significantly narrowing down the source material. The sources on the basis of which we intend to present the thoughts of the Bishop of Hippo regarding discussed subject, are his three comments on the Book of Genesis² and the treatise *On the Trinity*³. Our intention is to present the Augustinian teaching on the image of God in man in the mystery of Creation. We want to investigate the concept of the human who, among other creatures, is the most important creation of God. It is the creation of man in the image and likeness of God that constitutes his uniqueness⁴. First, we will present the Augustinian vision of man as the image of God, then we will take a closer look at the analogies drawn from the structure of the human soul, which according to Saint Augustine constitute the image of the Holy Trinity.

Man as the Image of God

The whole universe consists of different kinds of beings. They all owe their existence to God. This is because God is the supreme being. Only God, thanks to the fact that he has the reason of his existence in Himself, is able to create and sustain all beings in existence. Among them, man occupies a special place. Situated somewhere between two worlds, spiritual and material, he enjoys the special respect of God. As the only of God's creatures, he is the representation

¹ Cf. L. Krupa, *Obraz Boży w człowieku według nauki świętego Augustyna*, Lublin 1948.

² Augustine, *Exegetical writings against Manicheans*, PSP vol. 25, Warsaw 1980, (PL 34,173-486).

³ Augustine, *On the Trinity*, POK vol. 25, Poznań 1963, (PL 42,819-1098).

⁴ Before we begin to get to know the teaching of Augustine, concerning the creation of man in the image and likeness of God, it is recommended that one reads a good article which presents the achievements of patristic exegesis regarding this subject. Cf. R. Wilson, S. Andrews, *The Early History of Exegesis of Gen. 1,26.*, in: *Studia Patristica*, 1. Texte und Untersuchungen 63, 1957, 420-437.

of the living God. It is to this fact, namely the fact of him being created in the image and likeness of God, that man owes his honour and dignity⁵.

However, what legitimizes the elevation of man above the sphere of the animal world is not only the fact that he was created in the image of God, in what this fact finds its very expression. Saint Augustine emphasizes here one more feature that distinguishes man from other creatures, namely a slightly different way, in which human beings were created. Man, like other beings, is the creation of God. In this respect, he is equal to animals and the entire inanimate world. For everything that has been created by the Creator has been called into existence – “in the likeness” (*per similitudinem*)⁶. This similarity is the Only-begotten Son of God⁷. However, not everything was created – “in the likeness” (*ad similitudinem*). This way of having origin in the Creator, according to Saint Augustine is reserved exclusively for man: “Not all things, but only this intelligent being was created in the likeness.”⁸ In connection with the above, the question arises about the quality of God's image in man. If man is the only one created in the image of God and by the one who acts in the most perfect way, what can be said about the perfection of the image, which is present in him? Is it therefore equal to the perfection of the image which is in the Only-begotten Son of God?

The Bishop of Hippo responds to the problem formulated in this way as follows: “By sticking to His ideal and image, we too should not be distancing ourselves from God, because we too are an image of God, although an uneven image, because it was created by the Son in the image of the Father, not born like the Son of God.”⁹ This statement leaves no doubt about the issue that interests us. Augustine states firmly and clearly that there can be no equality here. Man, like the Son of God, is the image of God. However, the image of God in man does not match – in terms of perfection – the image of the Father in the Son. This inequality is based on the origin of Jesus directly from the Father, which is completely different from our origin from Him. In comparison with the Son begotten by the Father, man was only created by God¹⁰. The Bishop of Hippo

⁵ Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, XI, 16, 339.0

⁶ Cf. Augustine, *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis XVI*, 59, PSP vol. 25, Warsaw 1980, 110, (henceforth: *Unfinish.*).

⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, XVI, 58, 110; XVI, 61, 111-112.

⁸ *Ibid.*, XVI, 59, 111. At this point, we have slightly revised the translation by J. Sulowski. In the original, the sentence reads as follows: “Ad ipsam tamen similitudinem omnia non facta sunt, sed sola substantia rationalis.” PL 34,243.

⁹ Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII, III, 5, 245.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, VII, VI, 12, 256.

also adds that even the total sinlessness of a human being would not be able to eliminate this inequality¹¹.

In the course of further searching for the image of God in man, let us now take a closer look at human nature¹². St Augustine states that it too was created in the image of God: “And God created man, in the image of God he created him, he created a man and a woman, and blessed them. It is said here that human nature was created in the image of God complementary as both sexes, and the woman is not excluded from what is meant here by the image of God.”¹³

In this statement, the Bishop of Hippo cites the words of Genesis (1:27-28), which refer to the creation of man and woman in the image of God. Immediately, however, he refers to the words of the Apostle Paul (1Cor 11: 7), who seems to reserve the position of being the image of God only for the male part of the human race. Could there be any contradiction in the words of Scripture? The problem that arises here, is resolved by our Author as follows: “A woman with her husband is an image of God in such a way that all human nature constitutes one image. However, if a woman is considered to be an additional being, which aim is to serve man, which is a function attributed only to her, then in this sense she cannot be regarded as an image of God. While the image of God is so perfectly and fully represented in a man, in what is specific only to him, like when he and the woman are considered as one image of God.”¹⁴

By creating man, God created him as a man and a woman. Despite the diversity of sex in the entirety of human nature, man and woman constitute one human being. Augustine rightly notes that one cannot refuse to grant a woman the status of God’s image. Due to the fact of the unity of human nature, she constitutes, together with a man, one, complete image of God. According to the Bishop of Hippo, the right problem only arises when we begin to look at a woman in view of the function, which was granted to her by the creative plan of God. God created a woman as an additional being, whose aim it is to serve man. In this sense, according to the significance of the task that she was granted, she cannot be considered an image of God. This is because due to her pursuit

¹¹ Cf. *Unfinish*. XVI, 61, 112.

¹² This problem, i.e. human nature as a God’s image, is completely overlooked by L. Krupa. Cf. L. Krupa, op. cit.

¹³ Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, VII, 10, 335. Cf. also: Augustine, *Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis III*, 22 (34), PSP vol. 25, Warsaw 1980, 163-164, (henceforth: *Commentary*).

¹⁴ Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, VII, 10, 335.

of temporal matters there is a danger of paying attention by her to lower realities and not to the spiritual ones¹⁵.

The last sentence from the quoted above Augustinian statement also seems to suggest some ontological advantage of a man over a woman. For man is the image of God both when he and woman are one nature, and when he is considered through the prism of what is specific only to him. The final solution to this issue is found in the further part of the Augustinian argument. The Bishop of Hippo states there that "the contemplation of eternal ideas" is available to both men and women¹⁶. Thus a woman is not excluded from what seems to be the primary occupation of a man. In view of this statement, it would be unreasonable to accuse Saint Augustine of recognizing a woman as a worse or less perfect part of human nature.¹⁷ When considering the teaching of our Author from the perspective of a dozen or so centuries, we would just like to add that concern for the affairs of this earthy life can also happen to men. This remark in no way diminishes the role of a woman, from the Augustinian perspective, created like a man in the image of God. At this point, it is worth keeping our attention to the polemics of Saint Augustine with the Gnostics regarding the problem of the image of God¹⁸. The view emerged in Gnostic circles, according to which the family, i.e. husband, wife and child, should be regarded as an image of the Holy Trinity. In relation to the analysis of human nature as an image of God, carried out above, we would have to add a certain modification of discussed problem here. All this, among others due to the child's figure, which, as can be seen in this example, can cause a lot of trouble not only to parents but also to theologians. Although this opinion of the Gnostics seemed quite unbelievable to Augustine, in *De Trinitate* we find its exact representation: "According to that opinion, the husband would occupy in a sense the place of God the Father. A child, which has its origin in him by birth would represent the Son. And the third person, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, would be – as they say – a woman who comes from her husband, but is neither his son nor his daughter (Gen. 2:22), although she conceives and gives birth to their offspring."¹⁹

The inappropriateness of this manner of thinking can be demonstrated very easily. The greatest difficulty of this analogy is the lack of equality between the individual elements of the triad, which is formed by the father, mother and

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Cf. Ibid., XII, VII, 12, 337.

¹⁷ Ibid. XII, VIII, 13, 337.

¹⁸ This theme is also overlooked by L. Krupa. Cf. L. Krupa, op. cit.

¹⁹ Augustine, *On the Trinity*, XII, V, 5, 331.

their child. Our author proves this in the following words: “And because it is so, if we were to discover the image of the Trinity not in one human being, but in the following three persons: father, mother and son, then man would not be able to become the image of God before he did not marry his wife, and before the two of them would give birth to the child.”²⁰ The opinion of Gnostics also contradicts the statement of the Holy Scriptures, which, after all, clearly speaks of creating a single human being in the image of God. There is one more difficulty in all this analogy. For the Holy Spirit is representing the woman who is the wife of her husband and the mother of their son²¹. How then would the Holy Spirit become the mother of the Son of God and the Bride of the Father at the same time? However, it is not possible to explain it on the basis of Christian thought. Let us now turn to the Augustinian anthropology; its analysis will help us to understand the concept of man regarded as the image of God.

According to Saint Augustine, human nature consists of two essential elements: the body and the soul. An illustration of this division is the definition of the man we find in *De Trinitate*. The Bishop of Hippo states that: “Man is a rational substance composed of soul and body.”²² Among these two elements of human nature, the soul is what is the most perfect aspect of man. One should, therefore, look in it for the image of God²³. On the basis of only this statement one could accuse Saint Augustine of extreme Platonism and despising the body. However, this is not the case. The thesis on the creation of man in the image and likeness of God, discussed by us, clearly contradicts this hypothesis. In the thinking of the Bishop of Hippo, it also applies to the body. In three commentaries on the Book of Genesis, Augustine expresses it several times: “However, also our body was created to indicate that we are beings of a higher order than animals, and therefore we are similar to God. For the bodies of all animals, whether living in water or on earth or flying in the air, are inclined to the ground and their position is not upright, as is the body of man.”²⁴ In the light of the above observations, it can be seen that the upright posture of the human body naturally directs the human towards the sky, towards the spiritual. Thus, it indicates that also in terms of his body, man was created in the image

²⁰ Ibid., XII, VI, 8, 334.

²¹ The main reason for the formulation of this analogy was probably the fact that in the Semitic languages the word “spirit” is feminine.

²² Augustine, *On the Trinity*, XV, VII, 11, 417.

²³ Ibid., XIV, IV, 6, 384.

²⁴ Augustine, *On Genesis, Against the Manicheans* 1, XVII, 28, PSP XXV, Warsaw 1980, 39. Cf. also: *Commentary* VI, 12(22), 225.

of God²⁵. So while one can discern similarity to God in the human body, the concept of creation in the image of God refers, in fact, only to the soul. For man is an image of God: "...only in terms of the intelligent soul who can be a place of cognition of God."²⁶ Augustine refers to the concept of mind or reason when describing this intelligent soul²⁷. We must note here that in Augustinian anthropology reason has been granted two functions. The first is focused on dealing with temporal matters, while the second has eternal things as the object of its action²⁸. The duality that arises here is based, however, in another distinction that our Author made in relation to man. While maintaining the internal unity of man, Saint Augustine distinguished in him two aspects, namely the "outer man" and "inner man."²⁹ According to this division, "outer man" is the one who achieves knowledge of the material world. By contrast, the knowledge of eternal truths is attributed by the Bishop of Hippo to "the inner man." Thanks to these distinctions, we can now precisely define the concept of God's image. Following Saint Augustine one should state here that what constitutes it is the nature of the whole human soul. In the strict sense, however, one is legitimated to speak about God's image only in relation to this "part" of the soul, whose action concerns the contemplation of eternal things: "According to what we have previously said about the nature of the human soul, if the whole soul is engaged in the contemplation of the truth, then it can be – in its all entirety – considered the image of God. And when there is a division in it and some part of its attention is directed to the activity in the field of temporal matters, then it constitutes image of God only in the part that contemplates the truth, not in the one which is preoccupied with action and matters of lesser importance."³⁰

Analogical Image of the Holy Trinity in the Soul

Saint Augustine tried to look for manifestations of the Holy Trinity in all creation. However, strictly speaking, the most complete trace of the Trinity exists in man. Only man carries in himself the image of the living God. This image is the image of the Holy Trinity. It was this reality, the trinitarian character

²⁵ Cf. *Unfinish*. XVI, 60, p. 111.

²⁶ Augustine, *On the Trinity* XII, VII, 12, 336. Cf. also *Ibid.*, XIV, IV, 6, 384.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, XV, I, 1, 407.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, XII, III, 3, 330.

²⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, *On the Trinity*, XII, I, 1, p. 328.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, XII, VII, 10, 335. Cf. also *Ibid.*, XII, IV, 4, 331.

of God's image, which Augustine tried to emphasize through various analogies which he discovered in human nature. Therefore, following his idea, we now want to proceed investigation of the analogous image of the Holy Trinity in the soul.

I Triad: Soul, Knowledge, Love

The first triad proposed by the Bishop of Hippo is made up of: soul, knowledge and love³¹. The starting point for this analogy is the analysis of the idea of love, in which Augustine distinguished three realities. They are: 1) a loving subject, 2) the object of his love, 3) love³².

Our author is primarily interested only in the special instance of this process. It is about a situation in which a loving person loves him/herself. The one who loves is, therefore, identified with the object of his/her love. And if so, then it makes no sense to say that someone loves him/herself and is loved by him/herself, because these two realities can be reduced to one in this situation. All this reasoning of Saint Augustine sums up in the following way: "So there are two things when one loves him/herself: love and the object of his/her love. For then the loving subject and the object of his loves constitute one being. Thus, not always love must be accompanied by those three things."³³

After concluding this analysis, the Bishop of Hippo focuses his attention on the soul itself, in order to seek God's image in its depths. If the soul loves itself, then according to the above reasoning, we then have two things: soul and love. When we then assume that love is a spiritual substance, then we will also have to admit that along with the soul it constitutes certain unity: "So when they refer to each other, they are two of them; but when one make absolute statements about each of them individually, each of them is a spirit, and both are one spirit, and each is a soul, and both constitute also one soul."³⁴ The soul and love do not however create the triad only by themselves.

Augustine is, thus, forced to proceed further. In order to do that, he also analyzes the idea of love and notes that: "The soul cannot love itself if it does not know itself. Because how can you love without knowing what is the

³¹ At this point, it is worth noting that already in *Confessions* the notion of a triad occurs, which previously caught the attention of Saint Augustine, which is different than the one we present at present. It was a triad of being, cognition and will. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions* XIII, II, Warsaw 1987, 344.

³² Cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, IX, II, 2, 279.

³³ *Ibid.*, IX, II, 2, 279.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, IX, II, 2, 280.

object of who you love.”³⁵ We see, then, that the soul's love for itself depends on its self-knowledge. If the soul does not know itself, it also cannot love itself. Knowledge, therefore, appears here as a condition of love. In order to provide closer insight of the whole problem, Augustine analyzes the process of cognition, as he did earlier in the case of love. Here, too, he is primarily interested in the soul and in the way it is achieving knowledge of itself. Carefully carried out argument ends with the following conclusion: “So just as the soul through the senses of the body collects information about bodily things, it also collects information about non-corporeal things – through itself. Therefore, the soul recognizes itself through itself because it is immaterial.”³⁶ Now we can conclude that we have discovered the whole triad. It consists of: soul, cognition and love. “And so: the soul itself, its love and cognition are three things, and all three are one, and when they are perfect, they are equal.”³⁷

At this point of the analysis of Augustinian thought the problem of relations that occur between soul, cognition and love, already arises. According to Saint Augustine, these three elements are one. In addition, they can be equated with one another. Our author, however, makes such an option dependent on the perfection of each of these elements. However how should one understand the perfection to which Saint Augustine refers here? Well, in the view of Bishop of Hippo, perfection here consists in acting in accordance with the nature of a given being. Therefore, according to this approach, the soul should not love itself neither less nor more than it is implied by its nature. Its love will not be perfect if it loves herself, just as it loves its body. Nor should it love itself with love, which is reserved only for God³⁸. The same is the case with the cognition of the soul. It can be considered perfect only in case when the soul gets to know itself, i.e. when it is the only and complete object of its cognition. Only then is the concept of the soul equal to itself, i.e. it is neither lower nor higher than it³⁹.

However, we need to mention here a certain reservation that Saint Augustine himself expresses. All this reasoning becomes acceptable, when we carry out our investigations in ontological terms. Namely, this triad can be regarded as the image of the Holy Trinity only when we attribute the status of the substance both to cognition and love. Love and cognition are not the powers of the soul here, which would be rooted in it like in a subject. However, they

³⁵ Ibid., IX, III, 3, 280.

³⁶ Ibid., IX, III, 3, 280-281.

³⁷ Ibid., IX, IV, 4, 281.

³⁸ Cf. Ibid., IX, IV, 4, 281.

³⁹ Cf. Ibid.

exist substantially, just like the soul does⁴⁰. Nevertheless, with regard to this approach, a new problem immediately arises, which concerns the coexistence of these three elements. Is it possible to reconcile their separateness with their unity? Seemingly, it might seem that we have found ourselves in hopeless situation. However, it is not the case. The whole issue is self-resolved when Augustine notices that these three parts of our triad are of the same nature: “But I do not see why these three elements of the soul would not be of the same substance, since the soul loves itself and knows itself, this is also the nature of these three things, that the soul in no other way can be loved or known. So these three things must be one and the same nature. If they were a mixture, they would not be three things and they could not stay in relation to each other.”⁴¹

The aforementioned remark about the unity of nature: soul, cognition and love allows the Bishop of Hippo to proceed to further explanation of their mutual co-existence. Since our author states that each of these three realities: “...exists in itself, and yet they also exist in each other, each of them exists in its entirety in the other two and two of them in their entirety exist in each one individually. And so each of them exist in each other and in all of them.”⁴² These three elements thus remain a trinity without any confusion, although they also create certain unity. Admittedly, each of them is a substance, while taken together, they all are one substance and a being, because they are in a mutual relationship⁴³. In view of what we have said above, it can be stated that between the soul, its cognition and its love, assuming that they are perfect, there are relations of equality and mutual interpenetration.

II Triad: Memory, Intellect, Will

The next triad, in which one can discern the image of God, is constituted by: memory, intellect and will. Unlike the previous one, as the Bishop of Hippo notices later, this one is more distinctive in its nature⁴⁴. We need, however first, to indicate here, that this next triad does not constitute a completely abstract new concept in the whole thought of Saint Augustine. It is simply the result of a more thorough and insightful analysis of the very same issue⁴⁵. In the course

⁴⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, IX, IV, 5-6, 281-282.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, IX, IV, 7, 283.

⁴² *Ibid.*, IX, V, 8, 283.

⁴³ Cf. *Ibid.*, IX, V, 8, 284.

⁴⁴ Cf. *Ibid.*, XV, III, 5, 411.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, X, I, 1, 293.

of a closer analysis of this problem, it can be seen in the approach of Bishop of Hippo, the unique style of thinking about the Holy Trinity, which is characteristic of the thought of Western Church⁴⁶. Before our Author begins to discuss the individual powers of the soul, he first emphasizes their unity: "These three things" – memory, intellect, will – "are one, not three lives; they do not form three souls, but they are one soul; and so they are not three substances, but one substance."⁴⁷

So we can say, following Saint Augustine, that these three powers not only co-exist, but also contain each other, thanks to the equality between them: "And if they were not equal, not only individually among themselves, but also if each of them separately was not equal to all of them together, and if they all together were not equal to each one of them individually, then they could not contain each other. Because not only are they contained in each, but also all of them are contained in each one individually."⁴⁸ The essential component of this triad is memory, or more specifically, the soul's memory of itself ("memoria sui"). It is the basis for the entire process that takes place in the soul. It allows one not only to recall events that took place a long time ago. Thanks to the memory, the soul can also be present for itself. Thus, the memory of ourselves is what we would today call the sense of identity: "That is why, as in the case of past events, we define memory as the power to remember them and to recall them through a reminder. Analogically, when it comes to this presence of the soul for itself, one can, without falling into ridiculousness, call the memory power that allows the soul to be present for itself, so that it can understand itself with its own thought, and thanks to the love directed towards itself, connect the memory with understanding."⁴⁹

Thus, as we can see, memory concerns both past things and what is happening in the present. It allows the soul to have insight in itself. It is what shapes the sight of thoughts.⁵⁰ Because of it, "because the soul perceives itself in an intellectual way, it understands and recognizes itself, so it gives rise to understanding and self-cognition. Indeed, one perceives a non-corporeal reality

⁴⁶ Western theological reflection regarding the Holy Trinity, begins its investigations from considering one divine being, to finally conclude the considerations with the establishing the separation of the three divine Persons. Cf. J. Kelly, *The Origins of Christian Doctrine*, Warsaw 1988, 191-210.

⁴⁷ Augustine, *On the Trinity*, X, XI, 18, 307.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, X, XI, 18, 308.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, XIV, XI, 14, 394-395.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, XIV, VI, 8, 387.

by understanding it and one achieves its cognition by its understanding. Not in this way, however, the soul gives birth to the knowledge of itself, as if it were unknown to itself before. On the contrary, it already knew itself, just as there are known things present in memory, even when you do not, actually, think about them.”⁵¹ The cognition that Saint Augustine mentions here comes from memory. Thanks to it, the soul is aware of itself. It knows the fact that it is a soul and that is why it can seek to know itself. It does it with its entire being, because only the whole soul in its entirety can achieve knowledge of anything⁵².

Here the second constitutive element of the Augustinian triad appears: intelligence, which is defined by the Bishop of Hippo as follows: “By intelligence I mean in this case the actual cognition, this is the discovery of ideas present in the memory that the soul has not thought of before, thanks to which our thought takes a certain form.”⁵³ In this triad, which we present here, in contrast to the previous one, there is a certain dynamics. The second part of this analogy has its origin in soul.

Namely, as a result of thinking, the soul gives rise to knowledge of itself, its inner word⁵⁴. This knowledge is closely related to love: “When the soul knows and loves itself, then its word connects with it through love. And because it loves its own knowledge and it knows love, then the word is contained in love, and love is contained in the word, and both are contained in the soul who loves itself and expresses itself.”⁵⁵ In this way, together with the Bishop of Hippo, we have discovered in our souls another triad, which is the image of God. The two first components presented above are connected by a third, i.e. love, which is an expression of the activity of will. Therefore, the will is what unites the soul and the word that was created through it⁵⁶.

At this point, however, we must mention a key important remark by Saint Augustine. According to him, this triad of memory, intellect and will is the image of God, not because the soul can remember, understand and love itself. Admittedly, the basis of its being an image of God lies much deeper. Our author sees it in the fact that the soul can remember, understand and love the very creator who has placed life in it⁵⁷. If only the soul does it, then it becomes

⁵¹ Ibid., XIV, VI, 8, 387.

⁵² Cf. Ibid., X, IV, 6, 299.

⁵³ Ibid., XIV, VII, 10, 389.

⁵⁴ Cf. Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., IX, X, 15, 289.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ibid., XIV, VII, 10, 389.

⁵⁷ Ibid., XIV, XII, 15, 395.

wise. As we mentioned above, this triad is more dynamic than the first one, since it demonstrates a certain process that takes place in the soul. In these life activities that constitute this process one can see an analogy with the inner life of the Holy Trinity. In this way, the relation of memory to the intellect represents in this triad the image of the relation of the Father to the Son. On the other hand, by combining the relation of fatherhood and giving birth, the will, in this way, represents the very image of the Holy Spirit⁵⁸.

However, despite the similarity that can be seen here, Saint Augustine is aware of the great difference between the Holy Trinity and its created image⁵⁹. First of all, it should be said that these three elements of our triad are characterized by a distinctiveness of their action. However, this is not the case with regard to the Holy Trinity, since the three Persons of the Holy Trinity always act together. Their action is one⁶⁰. Next, it should be noted that the above mentioned three powers of man are a kind of human abilities. Though they are the best human qualities, they cannot be considered human per se. Again, we must admit that this is not the case with regard to the Holy Trinity. For the entire Trinity is nothing but one God. God is an infinitely simple being⁶¹. Eventually what clearly determines the difference between the Holy Trinity and its image is the number of persons. In the image of the Trinity, we have one Person, while in the Holy Trinity there are three Persons. In spite of this fact, there is greater inseparability in the Holy Trinity than in the triad constituting one human person⁶².

Conclusion

Three comments on the Book of Genesis and the treatise *On the Trinity* enabled us to become acquainted with the Augustinian teaching on the image of God in man in the mystery of Creation. Thanks to such a narrowing of the source material, we could more carefully and with greater prudence analyze the thoughts of the Bishop of Hippo. We hope that in this way we managed to avoid the risk of superficiality and we took into account all the statements of Saint Augustine regarding the problem posed. Unfortunately, L. Krupa did not prevent himself

⁵⁸ Ibid., XV, XXI, 40-41, 446-447; XV, XXIII, 43, 448-449.

⁵⁹ Cf. Ibid., XV, VII, 11-13, 417-420.

⁶⁰ Ibid., XV, VII, 12, 418.

⁶¹ Ibid., XV, XXIII, 43, 448-449.

⁶² Ibid.

from committing this mistake⁶³. He did not take up the subject of human nature as an image of God, and completely passed over in silence the polemics of the Bishop of Hippo with Gnostics, who regarded the human family as the image of the Holy Trinity. Based on the analysis carried out, we could see that according to Saint Augustine's image of God in man is to be sought in his soul, and in the strict sense, in this "part" of him, which is focused on the contemplation of eternal ideas. The essence of the image of God is expressed in the ability of the soul to participate in God's life. All this reflects, as Saint Augustine states, the true honour and dignity which man owes to his Creator. A characteristic feature of God's image, even a basic one – in view of the Augustinian approach – is its trinitarian character.

Saint Augustine tried to seek the traces of the Holy Trinity everywhere. This significant task was the passion of his life. Finally, he has found the image of the Holy Trinity in man. He tried to provide his readers with an insight into this reality through the trinitarian analogies, the source of which he discovered in the structure of the human soul. Considering the entirety of St. Augustine's teaching on the image of God in man in the mystery of Creation, the analogous images of the Holy Trinity in the soul seem to be the most interesting for us. On the other hand, like Saint Augustine, however, we are aware of their great limitations. For what is created, even in its most beautiful representation, in comparison with the Creator will always be in a vulnerable and poor condition.

⁶³ Cf. L. Krupa, *op. cit.*

The Old Order Of Captivity Of Sin And Death: A Man Before Coming Of Christ*

A Man Captivated By Powers Of Sin And Death (Introduction)

We can talk about a life of a man in many ways, about his current situation. A man experiences different captivations and restrictions. From the perspective of faith, we will be discussing the need of salvation, redemption and liberation of a man by Christ. It was true for people living before His coming and fulfilment of His paschal mystery. It remains true nowadays as well. And it is true for a man believing in Christ. Let us see what God himself says about his Revelation. We will not be able to entirely deal with this issue. The point of view, which we will attempt to present, deserves the attention. Due to, among others, its topicality for a contemporary man.

“Because everybody sinned and they are deprived of God’s grace, but they obtain justification for free, from His grace, by salvation, which is in Jesus Christ” (Rom 3:23-24). As it seems, this sentence perfectly reflects a situation of a man in temporality, that is in the current order of the economy of salvation. A man experiences here a peculiar ‘participation’ in the order, which actually and perfectly conditions his existence, his being. Despite all his efforts, he must eventually admit that he is not able to convert himself into an ideal being or his temporality in paradise. Despite his exceptional, inimitable positions, through his restriction a man remains like other created beings. He experiences a continual conflict in himself, a struggle between good and evil. What is more, by himself, that is being only stranded, he is not sure of victory over the latter. Sin unfolds its power over a man so many times. A man remains a successor of Adam, Abel and Cain. He experiences that his being is permeated by: order of spirit and order of matter, thoughts and desires absolutely noble but also

* STV 36(1998)2.

these lowest ones, gestures and deeds worthy of a hero and these appropriate for a coward. A man is such. Our world is such.

This is a mystery of a man and the world which co-exists with a mystery of Christ's presence. The latter permeates, transforms the former. In other words, we are not alone. We are not stranded to pessimism or mirages of self-sufficiency. Christ is with us¹. We cover in Christ, in Him and through Him the meanders of history, in which – just like in ourselves – there is already a current order of new heaven and new earth: if someone [is] in Christ, [he/she is] a new being, the old one has gone, the new one has become (2Cor 5:17; cf. 2P 3:13)². Those who were called to become the citizens of heaven (cf. Phil 3:20), do not leave their earthly homeland to itself with its difficulties and problems. They accept Divine decisions. Being aware of temporality and complexity of the situation at the current stage of the economy of salvation, they await with faith for the eventual realisation of God's plans. With love and hope, awaiting the return of the Saviour in glory, they answer in Christ, through Him and in Him, His call: they are to represent in the world, transfer a message of salvation and eternal life to others (cf. 2Cor 5:20). They are to transform and cure. In a nutshell, they are called to participate in God's mystery (cf. e.g. Eph 1:3ff).

We can reflect the current situation of a man in temporality by situating him with reference to sin and death. If we talk about the latter, then it is difficult not to mention the first man. In this way we face, e.g. the expression of this type "in death" (*en thanatô*) and "in Adam" (*en tô Adam*). In the temporal order of things good and evil can blend somehow and even permeate (cf. e.g. Rom 7:15nn). This paradox will be described e.g. by means of expression of this type "in body" (*en tô sômati, en sarki*) and "in law" / "in Law" (*en tô nomô*). Apparently, the provision of a more systemic vision or the synthesis of definite aspects corresponding to our life in temporality will not be possible at the selection and during the discussion of particular expressions. In such a case, it would be necessary to also analyse, on the one hand, other wordings encountered e.g. in *Corpus*

¹ Christ's presence overpowers everything. Cf. e.g. 1 Cor 8:6 and Cor 10:4. These texts describe the creation of the word and the Exodus of Egypt and the way to the Promised Land. These two are the main points for the act of salvation. As you may easily notice, they do not belong to the economy of the New Covenant.

² Let us return here, even if it does not concern *Corpus paulinum* directly, to the last gesture of Christ, that which is describes by St. Luke. The gesture is so precious, e.g. for the icons of the East or medieval cathedrals of the West. "He blessed them" (Greek: *en tô eulogein auton autous*, Lk 24:5). The Acts of the Apostles start from this gesture. The acts of Christians do not only begin from this gesture but progress permanently. This gesture is related to the beginning of a new stage of history. It takes place 'in' Christly "blessing" (cf. *en tô eulogein*).

paulinum in the so-called authentic epistles of St. Paul³. On the other hand, the very issues related to the afore-mentioned wordings, even if in view of the elements creating them, seems to be immensely broad and complicated. In the first and the second case we would have to exceed the scope of this paper. Most certainly, however, at least a short analysis of the wordings of such type “in death,” “in Adam,” “in body” (*en tô sômati, en sarki*) and “in law” / “in Law” (*en tô nomô*) will be interesting at least due to totality of panorama of our temporal life.

A Man – A Successor of Adam: the Wording “In Adam”

In the New Testament we will find the wording “in Adam” only once, and namely in 1Cor 15:22: “just like everybody dies in Adam, then everybody will be restored in Christ.” It should not be surprising, since the very word “Adam” is seen only 9 times in this collection of writing⁴. The meaning of the term discussed could not be overestimated, however, e.g. at least for the theology of the New Testament⁵.

It seems that diverse speculations concerning the person of Adam or the role he was supposed to act in the history of the world and humanity, constitute something enormously significant for the thought and Hebrew theology prior to and contemporary for St. Paul.⁶ To some extent the Apostle could take certain

³ Rom, 1-2Cor, Phil, 1 Thess and Philemon are believed in our considerations to be the so-called the authentic epistles of St. Paul. Cf. e.g. E.R. Martinez, *La vita cristiana e la spiritualità secondo san Paolo (ad usum studentii)*, Rome 1992, 4f on the issue of the division of particular documents included in *Corpus paulinum* into different groups (also including the issue of the so-called the authentic epistles of St. Paul). Certainly, the issue of the division of the documents constituting *Corpus paulinum* into groups (also including the problem of the so-called *the authentic epistles*) is not easy and the particular attempts of classifying the epistles included in *Corpus paulinum* is still a subject of discussion and research. Out of necessity, we confine ourselves to a selection of one of the solutions. In this article we will rely mostly on the texts copied from the so-called authentic epistles of Paul the Apostle.

⁴ Cf. Rom 5:14ab; 1Cor 15:22.45ab; 1 Tim 2:13.14 as well as Lk 3:38 and Jude 14. As for the word discussed, cf. e.g. L.J. Kreitzer, *Adam and Christ*, 9; J. Fitzmyer, *Pauline Theology*, in: *The New Jerome Biblical Commentary*, Edited by Raymond E. Brown etc., London 1992, 1385f; J. Jeremias, *Adam*, TWNT I, 141f and *Vocabulaire de théologie biblique publié sous la direction de Xavier Léon-Dufour* etc., Paris 1971, 18f.

⁵ We could pose a question here as well if the word “Adam” was a proper name or not for St. Paul the Apostle, cf. e.g. L.J. Kreitzer, op. cit., 9.

⁶ E.g. according to B. Rey, *Créés dans le Christ Jésus, La création nouvelle selon saint Paul*, Paris 1966, 75. In the times of the Apostle Adam was at the centre of a great deal of research:

elements here for his own vision of the history of salvation⁷. Let us observe here as well that it is possible that the wording “in Adam” (or alternatively similar expressions to this one if they existed) served for St. Paul to some extent, particularly theologically, for the model of the formulas of this type “in Christ.”⁸ Anyway, it is an indisputable fact that the antithesis – the juxtaposition between Adam and Christ is not least something unknown to the Apostle (cf. Rom 5:12-21; 1Cor 15:20-22.45-49)⁹. Adam and Christ mean two cardinal points as far as e.g. salvific work is concerned. We could even say about, with reference to their meaning, *about two beginnings of history*¹⁰. We have the first Adam and

people wanted to understand and respect him as the first man in history and in human destiny (as for St Paul the author sees references to such speculations, e.g. in Rom 5:14: “he is a type of The One, who was to come”). Cf. also H.H. Schade, *Apokalyptische Christologie bei Paulus. Studien zum Zusammenhang von Christologie und Eschatologie in den Paulusbriefen*, Göttingen 1981, 74: “Die Bestimmtheit der Menschen durch Adam ist eine im Judentum verbreitete Annahme: Adam bringt durch seine Sünde das Todsverhängnis und verantwortliche Tat über die Menschheit, wobei Auffassungen über die Sünde als Verhängnis und verantwortliche Tat, auch in derselben Schrift (4Esr; syBar), unausgeglichen nebeneinander stehen. Während das „in“ (1K 15,22) durch jüdische wie gnostische Parallelen abgedeckt wird, hat das “durch” (IK 15,21) nur in jüdischen, nicht aber in gnostischen Parallelen volle Entsprechung.”

⁷ H. Schlier, *Grundzüge einer paulinischer Theologie*, Freiburg 1978, 175.

⁸ Cf. e.g. *Ibid.*, also in G. Bornkamm, *Der Römerbrief als Testament des Paulus*, in: G. Bornkamm, *Geschichte und Glaube*. 2 Teil, München 1971, 133f.

⁹ According to F. Amiot, *Lire saint Paul*, Paris 1962, 50, by St. Paul “toutes les options, antithèses ou contradictions apparentes, se résolvent dans la considération du renouvellement apporté par le Christ et de l’obligation d’y collaborer, dans une vie dominée et constamment inspirée par la foi et par l’action de l’Esprit de Dieu” (cf. Rom 2:28-29; 1Cor 7:19; Gal 6:15), and different Pauline antitheses “se réfèrent r’une autre plus fondamentale dont elles sont les expressions partielles, l’antithèse entre les deux chefs de l’humanité, Adam et le Christ.” Cf. G. Eichholz, *Die Theologie des Paulus im Umriss*, Neukirchen 1972, 189: “Ich hebe noch einmal hervor; daß Paulus, wenn er das Evangelium verkündigt, ein Ereignis verkündigt. (...) So erzählt Paulus in Romand 5,12-21 die Geschichte des Handels Gottes in Jesus Christus in der Sprache der Adam-Christus-Typologie” (he also cites B. Pascal, *Pensées*, 523: “Toute la foi consiste en Jésus Christ et en Adam”). Cf. H. Schlier, *op. cit.*, 175. As for the antithesis – the juxtaposition of Adam / Christ and the expression of this type “with Christ” (son Christò), cf. W. Grundmann, *son etc.*, TWNT 7, 784f.

¹⁰ Cf. e. g., about Christ, 2Cor 5:17: “hence if someone [is] in Christ, [he/she is] a new being: [this what is] old has gone, and the new has become.” Cf. also E. Käsemann, *Leib und Leib Christi. Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit*, Tübingen 1933, 184: “Christus ist die Erfüllung der Zeiten und steht Adam gegenüber als die eschatologische Neuschöpfung. Das en Christò bedeutet als „im Geiste“ das Stehen in Gottes Neuschöpfung, das selber neue Schöpfung ist;” cf. H. Schwantes, *Schöpfung der Endzeit. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der Auferweckung bei Paulus*, Stuttgart 1963, 70f; U. Luz, *Das Geschichtsverständnis des Paulus*, München 1968, 307.194;

the last Adam (1Cor 15:45)¹¹, the first man and the last Man, the earthly man and the heavenly Man (1Cor 15:47f)¹².

1Cor 15:47-49 (cf. In 45-46 and Rom 5:12-21), also seems to follow this view, according to which we have two groups of people, which are led by Adam and Christ¹³:

what [a man taken] from earth	what [a man taken] from heaven
then [people taken] from earth as well	then [people taken] from heaven as well
how we were carrying we will be carrying	
the image of [a man taken from earth]	the image [of a man taken] from heaven

Since the coming of the Saviour a man can leave Adam's domain (everyone dies in Adam, 1Cor 15:22) and proceed to a domain, to Christ's kingdom (everyone will be animated in Christ, *ibid.*)¹⁴. Belonging to the first Adam means submission to the power of death and this – paradoxically – because of the one, who was to provide life for the entire humanity. Belonging to the second Adam, to Christ, is to possess a guarantee of endless life – thanks to the one, who was

H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater übersetzt und erklärt von Heinrich Schlier*, Göttingen 1971, 276; A. Oepke, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater Zweite, verbesserte Auflage*, Berlin 1960, 30 and G. Bornkamm, *Taufe und neues Leben bei Paulus*, 34f.

¹¹ According to F. Prat, *La théologie de saint Paul*, vol. 2, Paris 1933, 360, the way in which the formulas “in Christ” are constructed by St. Paul indicates that the Apostle “ne considère pas la personne individuelle de Jésus, mais sa fonction de Messie, sa qualité de second Adam, en un mot son caractère représentatif.” Cf. W. Grundmann, art. cit., 789.

¹² W. Grundmann, art. cit., 789, sees “incorporating people” in Adam and Christ (korporativen Personen), cf. also J. Jeremias, *Adam*, TWNT I, 141; J. Gnllka, *Der Brief an die Philipper: Auslegung von Joahim Gnllka*, Düsseldorf 1961, 81 (*Die Ausweitung des Christusschicksal auf die Menschen hat ihre Wurzeln in der biblischen Vorstellung von der korporativen Persönlichkeit*); R. Schnackenburg, *Die Taufe*, 459 and *Die Adam-Christus Typologie (Röm 5,12-21)*, 38; E. Larsson, *Christus als Vorbild*, 74f. According to H.H. Schade, *Apokalyptische*, 74f, the concept of ‘incorporating people’ (corporate personality) could allow a better understand of the meaning of formula ‘in Christ’ (in particular if we would like to include relations between the Apostle and a sapiential tradition), cf. also p. 83n and M.A. Seifrid, *In Christ*, in: *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters. Editors: Gerald E Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin. Associate Editor: Daniel G. Reid*, Downers Grove-Leicester 1993, 434 and 436; H. Schlier, *Grundzüge...*, op. cit., 175f; W. Thüsing, *Per Christum in Deum*, 66 and 74n; F. Froitzheim, *Christologie und Eschatologie bei Paulus*, Würzburg 1979, 193 and 210; P. Hoffmann, *Die Toten in Christus. Eine religions-geschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung zur paulinischen Eschatologie*, Münster 1966, 310; R. Schnackenburg, *Todes- und Lebensgemeinschaft mit Christus*, 379f.

¹³ Cf. G. Eichholz, op. cit., 172 and B. Rey, op. cit., 167.

¹⁴ H. Schlier, *Grundzüge...*, op. cit., 175. Cf. F. Prat, op. cit., vol. 2, 361 and vol. I, 160f. Cf. also e.g. Rom 6:8: “because if we died with Christ, [then] we believe that we will be living with Him.”

to die for people (cf. e.g. 1Cor 15:22 and Rom 5:10.17)¹⁵. Certainly, dependence, communion, solidarity “for life” in Christ compensates much more than dependence, solidarity “for death” in Adam (cf. e.g. Rom 5:12-21; 6:1-11)¹⁶. As for 1Cor 15:22, we can present the antithesis Adam – Christ in the following way:¹⁷

because if everybody dies in Adam¹⁸ then everyone will be animated in Christ

Because Adam incorporates, “comprises” the entire humanity in himself as its progenitor and the first head, because all people are his successors, hence the expression “in Adam” from 1Cor 15:22 may denote not only “because of Adam,” but also “belonging to Adam,” “remaining dependent on Adam,” “participating in his fate,” “as a result of community with him” (cf. Rom 5:12-21). Hence, we will be able to talk about a peculiar order of things, as the wording “in Adam” reflects. As it is demonstrated, at least, in 1Cor 15:22 this order is not indifferent to us at all. One of its basic features is that a man is subject to death: “everyone dies in Adam” (1Cor 15:22).

A Man – Submitted to Death: the Wording “In Death”

In the so-called authentic epistles of St. Paul, we observed the expressions of such a type “in death” only twice: in Rom 5:21 and in 2Cor 11-23¹⁹. Seeing that in the last of two pericopes the wording *often in danger of death* (*en thanatois pollakis*)

¹⁵ Cf. A. Deissmann, *Paulus. Eine kultur- und religionsgeschichtliche Skizze. Zweite völlig neubearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage*, Tübingen 1925, 140 and H. Schlier, *Grundzüge...*, op. cit., 175.

¹⁶ F. Amiot, *Les idées maîtresses de saint Paul*, Paris 1959, 222. Cf. P.H. Menoud, *Le sort des trépassés d'après le Nouveau Testament*, Neuchâtel-Paris 1945, 32 and H. Frankemölle, *Das Taufverständnis*, 36f.

¹⁷ According to F. Prat, op. cit., vol. 2, 361, the best remark to the formula “in Christ” is constituted by 1Cor 15:21-22.

¹⁸ Cf. B. Rey, op. cit., 49. The author emphasises the fact that “they die” is grammatically an indicative mood of the present tense. It means that the Apostle signifies the whole of humanity. In this context this author reminds us that the word *tagma* (“group”) recalls the idea, e.g. of belongingness to a specific, strictly hierarchised group (e.g. a military one), where we are under a particular chief, we are strictly dependent on him and share his fate. Hence the expression “in one’s order” / “in own group” from 1Cor 15:23 would indicate, according to this author that the people of all times are mentioned in Corinthians. According to A. Feuillet, *Mort du Christ et mort du chrétien*, 487.512, the wording “everyone dies in Adam” from 1Cor 15:22 corresponds to the truth, fundamental for the history of salvation and for the life of each man that we all dies in Christ on Calvary and in the sacrament of (cf. 2Cor 5:5; Rom 6:11; Gal 2:20 as well as 1 Thess 4:16 and 1Cor 15:18).

¹⁹ As for the New Testament, see also J 3:14 and Revelation 6:8.

refers only to the person of St. Paul and constitutes a part of the description of circumstances, in which he fulfils his apostolic service, we restrict here only to several remarks related to Rom 5:21.

The one, who was to provide life for the entire humanity, namely Adam, left his heritage of sin and death: *sin ruled in death* (Rom 5:21, cf. also e.g. Rom 5:12)²⁰. Sin stepped into the history of the world and reached all people with its power. In a sense it even started ruling in the world instead of God²¹, ruling such like death itself (cf. Rom 5:21, 14:17). The ruling of sin and death starts by Adams's crime²². Whereas by Christ those, who belong to Him, who are in Christ, experience salvation. They become liberated from the reign of sin and death. What is more, they will rule together with their Lord²³, with the One, in whom there is a gift and grace of eternal life: because the retaliation of sin is death, but grace given [from] God [is] eternal life in Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 6:23). We have, then, as if two eras, two orders, and they are of common importance, the First starts for the humanity (and for the whole world) with Adam's crime. His economy leads through sin to death²⁴. The second order opens before people together with Christ²⁵, through Him and in Him. His economy leads to eternal life:

sin	those who receive abundance of grace and a gift of justice
reigned	will rule
in death	in life ²⁶ .

²⁰ Rom 5:12: "therefore, so when a sin got through one man and into the world, and death through sin, and in this way, death transferred on all people, because they all sinned."

²¹ Cf. L. Cerfaux, *Le chrétien dans la théologie de saint Paul*, Paris 1962, 382.381, where the author writes on Rom 5:21 in the following way: Rz 5121: "Des deux couples antithétiques, c'est le second, "mort-vie", qui règle le mouvement de la pensée, l'usage du verbe "régner" l'indique sufisamment" (Rom 5:17.21).

²² Cf. e.g. Rom 5:15: But not in the same way as with crime but with the gift of grace; because of the crime of one person death was brought to all, and then how more abundant will the grace and gift of God affect everyone, graciously given by one Man, Jesus Christ. Cf. M. Zerwick, *Analysis philologica Novi Testamenli Graeci, Editio quarta (nova impressio)*, Rome 1984, 345.

²³ Cf. e.g. 1 Thess 4:17; 2 Tim 2:12; 1Cor 6:2-3, 4:8.

²⁴ Cf. e.g. J.J. Scott, *Life and Death*, 554; L. Morris, *Sin, Guilt*, 878; A. Bonora, *Morte*, in: *Nuovo dizionario di teologia biblica a cura di Pietro Rossano etc.*, Torino 1994, 1023 and also S. Virgulin, *Peccato*, in: *Nuovo dizionario di teologia biblica a cura di Pietro Rossano etc.*, Torino 1994, 1132.1137.

²⁵ Cf. e.g. R. Bultmann, *thanatos etc.*, TWNT 3, 18.

²⁶ Cf. Rom 5:21.17.

It is obvious that we still need a return of God in glory so that the second order could receive its ultimate dimension. However, even now, namely in temporality marked by a stigma of sin and death, those, who are in Christ, experience the result of a transfer from a domain of sin into a domain of grace²⁷, from a domain of death to a domain of life: “(1) now there is [no] condemnation yet for those [who are] in Jesus Christ: (2) because the right of the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ released you from the right of sin and death” (Rom 8:1-2, cf. also in 24: we are redeemed by hope).

A Man – Subject to Law: the Wording of the Type ‘In law’ / ‘In Law’

In *Corpus paulinum*, in the afore-mentioned authentic epistles, we encounter the wording of the type “in Law” / “*in law*” (Greek. *en nomō*) in the following texts²⁸: Rom 2:12 (“because those, who sinned without Law, will also die without Law, and those who sinned in Law, will be judged by Law”²⁹); Rom 2:20 (“the educator of the unskilled, the teacher of cavemen, having an expression of knowledge and truth in Law”); Rom 2:23 (“who boast in Law, by violating Law you insult God”); Rom 3:19 (“because we know that everything Law states, is applied to those, who are in Law, so that each mouth could quieten, and the entire world had to regard itself as sinful towards God”); Rom 7:23 (“in my body I notice other law, which fights with law of my mind and conquers me in captivity under this law [literally: in law] of a sin living in my body³⁰); Cor 9:9 (“because it is written in the Law of Moses”); 1Cor 14:21 (“it is written in Law”); Gal 3:11 (“and that in Law nobody reaches justification before God”); Gal 5:4 (“you broke relations with Christ, all, who seek justice in Law, fall from grace”); Phil 3:6 (“as for zeal a pursuer of the Church, as for justice, justice in law, I became impeccable”).

²⁷ Cf. e.g. in Rom 6:2 “if we died in sin, how shall we still live in it?”; 6:12 (may then a sin not rule in our deadly body submitting us to its lusts” and in 1Cor 15:17 “if Christ did not rise from the dead, our faith is in vain and you remain in your sins until now.”

²⁸ As for the New Testament, then the expressions of this kind are also found in the following texts: Mt 12:5; 22:36; Lk 2:23-24; 10:26; 24:44, Jude 1:45; 8:5.17; 10:34; 15:25; Acts 13:38, as for *Corpus paulinum*, we found the wordings discussed only in the so-called *authentic texts*.

²⁹ As for the expression “in Law” in Rom 2:12 cf. also the critical apparatus.

³⁰ As for the expression “in law of sin” in Rom 7:23, according to some witnesses of the text, there is lack of the particle *en* (“in”), cf. critical apparatus.

The group with the expressions “in Law” / “in law” could be categorised as follows: Rom 7:6 (“now Law lost its power over us, we died with this [literally: in this], which kept us on a leash, so that we can serve in novelty of the Spirit, but not according to [literally: in] an obsolete letter”); Rom 8:3 (“this, however, which was impossible for Law, because a body was making it powerless [literally: in which, namely in Law, it became powerless through a body], [it was done by God]. God sent his Son in a body similar to a sinful body and for [the removal] of a sin delivered a judgment in this body which condemned a sin”); Rom 10:5 (“because Moses writes about justice, this resulting from Law: a man who obeys them, will [literally: in them] live from them”); Gal 3:12: (“Law is not from faith, but who obeys them [that is regulations, commands of Law], then he will [literally: in them] live from them”)³¹.

All texts enumerated above can be divided into two groups. The first one comprises fragments, in which the wordings of the type: “in Law” / “in law” mean one or more books of the Old Testament. 1 Cor 9:9, 14,21 as well as probably Rom 2:20.23 and Phil 3:6 may be included here. The second group is constituted by the texts, in which the wordings of this kind: “in Law” / “in law” serve to reflect the ideas, as if we could say, of certain order or dependence on it (cf. e.g. Gal 5:4: “you were broken away from Christ, you, who are searching justice in Law, fell from grace”)³². In our case we need to include: Rom 2:12; 3:19; 7:23; Gal 3:11; 5:4 as well as Rom 2:20.23; Phil 3:6³³ and Rom 7:6; 8:3; 10:5; Gal 3:12 in the second group. Given the subject of our interests, we will confine here only to a short presentation of the texts comprising just the second group. It is also obvious that we will not be able to discuss the abundant, equally significant and complex at the same time, issue related to the term “Law” / “law” (nomos) at least in the epistles of Saint Paul the Apostle³⁴. The attempt to classify

³¹ Obviously, we need to remember that in two last texts “in them” is not a synonym of “in Law” in the strict meaning of the word. A more precise definition of what the wording “in them” reflects is beyond the scope of this paper.

³² Cf. also Rom 8:2.

³³ As was already outlined, the three last texts may also be included in the first group.

³⁴ On this issue cf. e.g. H. Kleinknecht, W. Gutbrod, *nomos* etc., TWNT 4, 1016n, F. Thielman, *Law*, 529f, T.R. Schreiner, *Law of Christ*, 542f, L. Morlandi, *Legge / diritto*, in: *Nuovo dizionario di teologia biblica a cura di Pietro Rossano* etc., Torino 1994, 788f, H. Cazelles, *Loi israélite*, SDB 5, 498n, *Vocabulaire de théologie biblique*, 667n, S. Lyonnet, *Liberté cristiane e legge dello Spirito secondo san Paolo*, in: I. de la Potterie — S. Lyonnet, *La vita secondo lo Spirito. Condizione del cristiano. Introduzione di Y.M.J. Congar. Seconda edizione*, Roma 1971, 203, F. Neugebauer, *In Christus. Eine Untersuchung zum paulinischen Glaubensverständnis*, Göttingen 1961, 72, A. Schweitzer, *La mystique de l'Apôtre Paul*, Paris 1962, 113.

the texts interesting for us in accordance with the key suggested above in two groups specified above, sufficiently demonstrates the problems related to the interpretation of the word mentioned (cf. e.g. Rom 7:23).

As the Apostle writes, even if a man takes delight in God's law (Rom 7:22, cf. 7:14f), then he simultaneously notices some other law in himself. The latter one underlies a continual conflict taking place in a man in our temporality: "in my body I notice other law, which fights with law of my mind and conquers me in captivity under the law of a sin living in my body" (Rom 7:23). There is then some law of sin, which captivates Adam's successors in a way, influences them. It is in them and they are in it ("which conquers me in captivity under the law of sin being in my body," Rom 7:23).

Those, who practise Judaism and refer to Law and its regulations, have "an expression of any knowledge and truth" in Law (Rom 2:20). They boast in Law (cf. Rom 2:23)³⁵. They are "under" Law (literally "in Law," cf. Rom 2:12: "those who are in Law"). They belong to the order of Law (cf. Rom 3:19: "because we know [that] what Law says, [it] says it to those being in Law") and that it is to such an extent that they will be judged by Law (*dia nomou*, Rom 2:12).

In this context we need to enumerate two interesting texts, which describe a peculiar relation between Law and life. The first of them is Rom 10:5: "because Moses writes about justice from [ec] of Law: a man who obeys them, will live in them." The second one is Gal 3:12: "because Law is not from [ec] of faith, but: who obeys them, will live in them" (cf. Phil 3:6, where St. Paul states about himself: "as for zeal a pursuer of the Church, as for justice, which [is] in Law, I became impeccable."³⁶

There is another group of texts. They describe the antithesis between Law and Christ, between order "in Law" and order "in Christ."³⁷ In Gal 3:11

³⁵ Cf. Romans 2:17: "if you proudly call yourself a Jew and you completely fall back on Law and boast in God." Cf. as for Christians, e.g. Romans 5:11 ("boasting in God by our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we obtained reconciliation now"), 1 Corinthians 1,31 ("who boasts oneself, may he boast in Lord"), 2 Corinthians 10:17 ("who boasts oneself, may he boast in Lord"); Galatians 6:14 ("as for me, may I not boast from something else but the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ"), Philippians 3:3 ("boasting in Jesus Christ and not behaving owing to bodies [literally: in body]") and Philippians 1:26 ("may your glory abound in Jesus Christ in me").

³⁶ Cf. also e.g. The Book of Leviticus 18:5: "you'll obey my laws and my judgments. A man who obeys them, lives thanks to them" (LXX: "in them," en autois).

³⁷ Cf. L. Cerfaux, *Le Christ dans la théologie de saint Paul*, Paris 1954, 376.373, H. Conzelmann, *Grundriß der Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen 1987, 234, E. Lohmeyer, *Grundlagen paulinischer Theologie*, Tübingen 1929, 142, F. Prat, op. cit., vol. 2, 478f. Cf. also F. Neugebauer, *In Christus*, 92: „Das Heil en Christô stand dem Heil en nomô gegenüber (...) Paulus hat eben

the Apostle writes: “and that in Law nobody reaches justification before God, the result from it is that the just will live from [ec] of faith” (cf. also the sources quoted above: Gal 3:12; Rom 10:5 and Phil 3:6). According to Saint Paul, if a Christian sought his justification in Law, then simultaneously he would break away from Christ and fell from grace (Gal 5:4: cf. Rom 7:6: “because now we became released from Law, having dies in it [en hô], which captivated us.”)³⁸

In conclusion, let us add one opinion, according to which the expressions of this type: “in Law” / “in law” could serve St. Paul as a sort of model for the formulas of this type: “in Christ” and their meaning and application. It would be related, for example, with multiple, strict relationships between the Old and the New Covenant (of such a type, e.g. chronological, linguistic, theological, etc.).³⁹

A Man – Physical Material Being: the Wording “In Body” (*EN SÔMATI* And *EN SARKI*)⁴⁰

As the title indicates, we will stop at present on the issue related to the expressions “in body” (*en sômati* and *en sarki*). In the context above we need to mention that according to some authors the formulas of the type: “in Christ,” which we come across in St. Paul the Apostle, are related to the Pauline concept of “body of Christ” (*sôma Christou*, cf. e.g. 1Cor 12:27)⁴¹.

nicht nur in Antithesen geredet, ging es ihm doch auch weniger um den Gegensatz, sondern darum, daß das eschatologische Heil in Christo Jesu geschehen ist, geschieht und geschehen wird.”

³⁸ Cf. also Romans 8:3 (“because this what was impossible for Law, in which helplessness through body, God [did it] by sending his Son in similarity to body of sin”) and e.g. Romans 3:24 (“the justified for nothing by His grace through redemption, which is in Jesus Christ”); 5:9 (all the more justified in His blood we will be redeemed by Him from wrath”), 1 Corinthians 5:4 (“rising in the name of Our Lord Jesus”).

³⁹ Cf. e.g. W. Schmauch, *In Christus. Eine Untersuchung zur Sprache und Theologie des Paulus*, Güthersloh 1935, 161f; E. Lohmeyer, *Grundlagen paulinischer Theologie*, 23 and 142n; A. Schweitzer, *La mystique de l'Apôtre Paul*, 113; F. Neugebauer, *In Christus*, 78 (*Diesen Sachverhalt, nämlich daß Christus das Ende des Gesetzes ist, bringt Paulus öfteren in präziser und explikativer Weise durch die Formel 'in Christo (Jesu)' zum Ausdruck*), cf. also p. 79f.

⁴⁰ The title of this section outlines a known and difficult problem in need of solving: how to interpret *sôma* and *sarx* in Polish? As this does not constitute our basic theme we will refer only outline this problem.

⁴¹ Cf. e.g. M.I. Alves, *Il cristiano in Cristo. La presenza del cristiano davanti a Dio secondo S. Paolo*, Braga 1980, 48f, J.F. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième épître de Paul aux Corinthiens. Étude exégétique de 2 Co 2,14—7,4*, Cambridge 1972, 55f and by the same author *L'épître de saint Paul aux Philippiens*, Genève [1987], 230; H.H. Schade, *Apokalyptische*, 147; E. Käsemann,

Previously we outlined the issue related to the expressions of this type: “in Adam,” “in death,” “in Law” / “in law.” At least grammatically they seem to be close to the expressions “in body” (*en sômati* and *en sarki*). In this way also, the latter ones may help us, e.g. to better explore the meaning of the wordings “in Christ” in the writing by St. Paul, also what the latter ones tell us about our temporal life as life in Christ⁴². Considering, e.g. the similarities and semantic relations between the terms *sôma* and *sarx* it seems justifiable to us to present the wordings “in body (*en sômati* and *en sarki*) together⁴³.

In *Corpus paulinum*, as for the so-called authentic epistles of St. Paul, we come across the expression of this type: ‘in body’ (*en sômati*) in the following texts⁴⁴: Rom 6:12 (“may a sin reign then in your deadly body so that you will not have to succumb to its passion”), Rom 12:4 (“because we have many parts in our body, and they all do not fulfil the same task”), 1Cor 6:20 (“then worship God in your body”) ⁴⁵, 1Cor 12:18 (“now while God created body parts, each of them in your body [just as] he wanted”), 1Cor 12:25 (“so that there was no tear in body, but so that particular parts cared about each other), 2Cor 4:10a (“we are continually carrying death of Jesus in our body”), 2Cor 4:10b (“may the life of Jesus revealed in our body”) ⁴⁶, 2Cor 5:6 (“having constant faith we

op. cit., 184; R. Schnackenburg, *Signoria e Regno di Dio. Uno studio di teologia biblica*, Bologna 1971, 308.

⁴² Cf. e.g. W. Elliger, *en*, in: *Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Herausgegeben von Horst Balz — Gerhard Schneider. Band 1 Aarôn Henoch*, Stuttgart Berlin — Köln — Mainz 1980, 1095; M.I. Alves, *Il cristiano in Cristo*, 48f; J.F. Collange, *Énigmes de la deuxième épître de Paul aux Corinthiens*, 55 and by the same author *L'épître de saint Paul aux Philippéens*, 230.

⁴³ Cf. e.g. the sentence by H. Mehl-Köhnlein, *L'homme selon l'apôtre Paul*, Neuchâtel — Paris 1951, 17: a man is a being marked by the past, he is, e.g. a successor of the sin committed by Adam; hence in ‘man-according to-nature’ (*“homme naturel”*), according to this author in the end a permeating of the aspects expressed by the words *sôma* and *sarx* takes place (cf. p. 12f and 36). It is obvious that we will not be able to devote appropriate attention to broad and complex issues related to the terms *sôma* oraz *sarx*; more on this issue: cf. e.g. E Neugebauer, *In Christus*, 53; *Vocabulaire de théologie biblique*, 146n, 210n, 213n; E. Schweizer, F. Baumgartel, *sôma* etc., TWNT7, 1024n; Kreitzer, *Body*, 71f; R.Y.K. Fung, *Body of Christ*, 77f; E. Schweizer, F. Baumgärtel, R. Meyer, *sarx* etc., TWNT 7, 98n; R.J. Erickson, *Flesh*, 303f; M. Lurker, *Carne*, in: M. Lurker, *Dizionario delle immagini e dei simboli biblici. Edizione italiana a cura di Gianfranco Ravasi*, Torino 1994, 38 and R. Cavado, *Corporeità*, in: *Nuovo dizionario di teologia biblica a cura di Pietro Rossano* etc., Torino 1994, 308f.

⁴⁴ As for the New Testament we also need to enumerate: Ephesians 2:16; Colossians 1:22; 3,15; To the Hebrews 13:3 and P 2:24.

⁴⁵ Cf. critical apparatus.

⁴⁶ As for the expression *en tō sômati* in the afore-mentioned line, cf. also critical apparatus.

know, remaining in body we remain far from Lord”), 2Cor 12:2 (“I know a man in Christ, who fourteen years ago, whether in body, I do not know, or out of body, I do not know, God knows, was kidnapped as far away as to the third heaven”), 2Cor 12:3 (“I know that this man, whether in body or out of it, I do not know, God knows it”), Gal 6:17 (“because I [literally: in] carry marks of Christ on my body”), Phil 1:20 (“Christ will be adored in my body”).

In Rom 12:4 and in 1Cor 12:18.25 the Apostle refers to the wording “in body” (*en sômati*) to talk about unity of Christ’s disciples. In body, which is one, as if we could say today “in an organism,” there are different parts, different limbs, which complement each other, fulfil different tasks and this is possibly the most important thing, one in favour of others (cf. Rom 12:4 and 1Cor 12:18.25). Similarly, Christ’s disciples, being so different, constituting, in the full meaning of this word, and with all consequence of this fact, separate people, create just one body in Christ (cf. e.g. Rom 12:25: “similarly numerous we are one body in Christ, one is the part of the other”).

Another group of texts, which should be distinguished here, is pericopes, where the term “body” (*sôma*) corresponds to our definition of “(human) body,” most probably becoming more and more almost a synonym of a word “person” in the contemporary meaning of this term⁴⁷. Christians, already nowadays, having died for sin live for God in Jesus Christ (cf. Rom 6:11)⁴⁸. It means that a sin cannot Reign in their body any longer – even if the latter is to experience the power of death (cf. Rom 6:12: “may then a sin not reign in your deadly body, so that [you] will not be succumbed to its lust,” cf. also 7: 14-24 and 1Cor 6:13-14). They should already worship God in their body (worship God in your body, 1Cor 6:20). Their body belongs to Lord (cf. 1Cor 6:13-14) and is the temple of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1Cor 6:19). St. Paul writes about himself, and possibly also about someone from his co-workers (cf. e.g. 2Cor 1:1) that he carries death of Jesus in his body (2Cor 4:10a), so that the life of Jesus could reveal *in our body* (1Cor 4:10a, cf. line 11). He carries marks (Greek: *ta stigmata*) of belongingness to Christ on his body (literally: “in”) (Gal 6:17). The Saviour will be adored “in the body” of Apostle: is it through life or through death (cf. Phil 1:20, cf. line 21).

The wording “in body” (*en sômati*) may also have a negative connotation. In this way, e.g. “remain in body” means for a Christian “to be far from Lord,”

⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. E. Käsemann, op. cit., 119; R. Bultmann, *Das Problem der Ethik bei Paulus*, ZNW 23(1924)137; M.I Alves, *Il cristiano in Cristo*, 217; H. Mehl Köhnlein, *L'homme selon l'apôtre Paul*, 9f and 36; F. Neugebauer, *In Christus*, 52f; U. Luz, op. cit., 227.

⁴⁸ Cf. also e.g. Romans 6:6: “then you should know that to destroy a body of sin, our old man was crucified with Him, so that we were not in the captivity of sin anymore.”

“not achieve one’s goal yet,” “to be a pilgrim” (cf. 2Cor 5:6: “remaining in body we remain far from Lord”).

Let us also state in this context 2Cor 12:2-3, where *à propos* received revelations and visions (line 1), the Apostle writes that “he was kidnapped to the third heaven.” St. Paul characterises this event, among others, by using two almost identical expressions. We could provide them in Polish – as for the aspect we are interested in – through: “whether in body I do not know, whether out of body – I do not know” (line 2 and 3).

The wordings “in body” (*en sarki*) in *Corpus paulinum*, in the so-called “authentic epistles of St. Paul” may be found in the following texts⁴⁹: Rom 2:28 (“either circumcision is not [it is which it is] visible on [literally: in] body”), 7:5 (“because when we were in body”), 7:18 (“I know that he does not live in me, that is in my body, good: because it is easy to want it, however I do not do something which is good”), 8:3 (“and for [the removal] of sin he gave a judgment in body, which condemned a sin”), 8:8 (“those who are in body, cannot be liked by God”), 8:9 (“you, however, are not in body, but in Spirit [or: in spirit]”); 2Cor 4:11 (“may also the life of Jesus reveal in our deadly body”), 10:3 (“when living in body we do not fight according to body”); Gal 2:2 (“I do not live anymore, Christ lives in me: although I still live in body, I live in faith of God’s Son, who loved me and gave himself for me”), 4:14 (“and you neither regard my attempt in body as anything nor you rejected it with disgust, but you took me over as God’s angel, as Jesus Christ”), 6:12 (“those who present well in body, who force you to circumcise, only not to be persecuted because of Christ’s cross”), Gal 6:13 (“to boast in your body”); Phil 1:22 (“if I live in body, it is fruitful work for me”), 1:24 (“to remain in body – it is more necessary for you”)⁵⁰, 3:3 (“when we are already circumcised, those who officiate liturgy with the Holy Spirit and we boast in Jesus Christ, and we do not behave according to body [literally: in body]), 3:4a (“although and I can place my trust also in body”), Phil 3:4b (“if somebody else thinks to place trust in body, I think more about it”), Philemon 16 (“not as a slave anymore, but more than a slave, adored brother, particularly for me, but much more for you in body and in Lord”).

Rom 8:3 may be alternatively included in the group above in its similarity to the body in sin.

⁴⁹ As for the New Testament, we need to also enumerate the following texts: Ephesians 2:11ab, Colossians 1:24; 2:1; 1 Timothy 3:16 as well as 1 Peter 4:2; 1 Jude 4:2 and 2 Jude 7.

⁵⁰ As for the wording “in body” (*en sarki*) in this text, cf. also critical apparatus.

In such texts as: Rom 2:28, Gal 4:14; 6:13, Phil 1:22.1:24 the term *sarx* may be translated into Polish as “body”⁵¹. The same may be understood by the word discussed also in 2Cor 4:11; 10:3; Phil 1:22; 3:4ab; Gal 6:12 and Philemon 16.

As for such pericopes as Rom 7:18 and probably 2Cor 4:11, the term *sarx* would probably correspond best to our definition of “person” (obviously in the contemporary meaning of this word)⁵².

On the other hand, in the texts, which will be enumerated by us now, the expression “body” (*sarx*) may serve the Apostle to reflect the idea of certain orders or even more of one’s belongingness to it⁵³. According to Rom 8:8 those, who are “in body,” cannot be liked by God. For St. Paul Christians are no longer “body,” but “in Spirit” – “in spirit”⁵⁴ (Rom 8:9; cf. also 2Cor 10:3). We would have to deal with two orders and opposite to each other (cf. e.g. “but”, Greek: *alla* in Rom 8:9). A man belongs to these orders in temporality as well. As for the first one, then a man experiences the captivity in it. Death is his end: „when we were in body, we were subject to sinful lusts existing in us and fed by Law and bringing fruit, which brought death” (Rom 7:5)⁵⁵. Gal 2:20 also allows for a similar interpretation of the wording “in body” (*en sarki*) in the sense of regime, which gave way (or is giving way) to new order introduced by Christ⁵⁶:

it is not me who lives anymore
although I live in body

Christ lives in me
I live in faith, [in faith] of God’s Son

For its part, Gal 2:20 somehow “comments” the texts from 2 Corinthians 10,3. According to the latter, in temporality Christians in a certain way still remain “in body”, they live in its order, developing in body, but not fighting according to body. The latter did not experience all the consequences of work

⁵¹ As was already outlined, we cannot deal with the broad and incredibly difficult task to reflect on the difference between the words *sarx* and *sōma* in Polish here. As far as it is reasonably possible, we will remain with their translation of ‘*ciało*’ (Eng. body).

⁵² Cf. H. Mehl-Köhnlein, *L’homme selon l’apôtre Paul*, 12-13 as well as P.H. Menoud, op. cit., 36.

⁵³ Cf. E. Käsemann, op. cit., 120.

⁵⁴ We deliberately provide the wordings ‘in Spirit’ – ‘in spirit’: in this way we may preserve the richness of the very text, not confining ourselves to the meaning of the expression: *en pneumatī* (‘in Spirit’ / ‘in spirit’) to one explanation.

⁵⁵ Cf. Romans 7:4.6: (4) *so and you, my brothers, thanks to body of Christ, died for Law, to be united with others – with the One, who rose from the dead, so that we could bring fruit to God.* (6) *Now Law lost its power over us, when we died for this, which kept us in captivity, so that we can fulfil our service in new Spirit, and not according to the obsolete letter.*

⁵⁶ Cf. H. Schlier, *Der Brief*, op. cit., 276 and G. Bornkamm, *Taufe...*, op. cit., 34f.

already done by Christ (cf. e.g. Phil 1:22.24 as well as 1Cor 15:35n.51n and Phil 3:21). However, a man is already, he already lives in the order of the reign of the Saviour.⁵⁷ And the last one is a decisive factor – although due to Divine disposition – the old regime does not totally belong yet to a domain of the past and it may still influence both a man and the fate of the world. This is how we may present what the Apostle writes about it in 2 Cor 10:3:

because in body not according to body
developing fighting

Christians do not put confidence in body anymore – even if it was possible⁵⁸ – but they boast in Jesus Christ: *because circumcision means us, who by means of the Holy Spirit officiate liturgy and boast in Jesus Christ and we do not put confidence in body* (Philippians 3:3; cf. also Galatians 6:13: *those want to present well in body, who force to circumcise, just not to be persecuted due to Christ's cross*). Those, who believe in Christ and belong to Him, pin their hope just in their Lord.⁵⁹ This hope does not only refer to the past. It is related to transitions, which complement before our eyes just now, that is in temporality. The following fact noticed by Saint Paul may be an example of this. For his lord, Philemon, a slave Onesimus becomes an adored brother and as a man and as a Christian, equally well in order of nature and in order of grace: *already as somewhat a slave, but more than a slave, an adored brother, particularly for me, even more for you, and in body and in Lord* (Philippians 16). Thus, in some way, temporality still remains itself. The old order in “body” (*en sarki*) is still present and important. It is not, however, something absolute. It is somewhat complemented by the new order “in Lord”. The latter surpasses the former, constitutes its goal and accomplishment.⁶⁰

The texts presented above present how the terms “body” (*sôma*) and “body” (*sarx*) may have different meanings and applications. They may serve for talking about something which is positive and about something which is negative. They

⁵⁷ Cf. e.g. Romans 7:5.18n and 8:8-9 as well as Romans 6:4; 8:4; 2 Corinthians 10:2. Cf. also E. Lohmeyer, *Probleme paulinischer Theologie*, Stuttgart 1955, 102-106 and 118, R. Penna, *Lo Spirito di Cristo. Cristologia e pneumatologia secondo un'originale formulazione paolina*, Brescia 1979, 249f; P.H. Menoud, op. cit., 33.

⁵⁸ Cf. Philippians 3:4a (*and I can put confidence in the body*) and 4b (*if someone else think that they may put confidence in the body, so I can do it even more*); cf. also 3:7n.

⁵⁹ Cf. Romans 14:14 (*I know, and I am convinced in Lord Jesus*); Galatians 5:10 (*I have confidence in Lord about you*); Philippians 1:14 (*and so more brothers emboldened in Lord by my chains dare more without fear to preach the word*); 2:24 (*I trust in God*).

⁶⁰ Cf. R. Penna, *Lo Spirito di Cristo*, 249f.

preserve great “*flexibility*” and many semantic “*nuances*” as far as e.g. the qualitative evaluation of a given aspect is concerned. Sometimes it is even difficult to declare for only one interpretation and conduct a clear-cut classification.

At least some outline texts with the wordings: “*in body*” (*en sômati*) and “*in body*” (*en sarki*) allow for talking about a certain order, regime, which is much more than different from the order of grace. We could talk here about opposition, conflict or even about mutual exclusion.⁶¹ As for the order of grace, we could call it “*order in Christ*”.⁶²

Conclusion

The wordings presented by us do not belong to the most popular either in the New Testament or in the afore-mentioned so-called authentic epistles of St. Paul the Apostle. It does not mean, however, that they do not have those meanings. God’s word, also by their assistance, tells us about our human life. At this current stage, we did not manage to possess this gift in full, which eternally stays with God, or eternal salvation. Simultaneously, we are aware, however, that together with the coming of Christ, our situation radically changed for the better. We are not slaves anymore of such powers as sin or death. It is true that our liberation is neither complete nor final yet. We cannot go to the other extreme, however, and not to admit that we do not belong to them, that Life stays behind us, that He is already an absolute Lord now and Lord of us, ourselves and of all this, which was created (cf. e.g. Philippians 3:21). In other words, following the Apostle of nations, we could describe our current situation in the following way. As Christians we are already in Christ (Greek: *en Christô*). In temporality, however, we are the successors of Adam: just as if our fates became “*closed*”, “*programmed*” in Adam. We remain beings limited by Death. We still and continually experience a frightening burden of its reign. Repeating the words of St. Paul we may reflect this aspect of our existence in temporality, reaching for the expression “*in death*” as we still belong in its zone. We also “*live*” in it in some way. However, this is not everything. Our temporal life also has other aspects. Thus, to reflect on them, the Apostle will refer to the mystery of law / Law and to the mystery of what is material, in particular in man himself, to the

⁶¹ Cf. e.g. E. Käsemann, *op. cit.*, 120; H. Mehl-Köhnlein, *L’homme selon l’apôtre Paul*, 14f.

⁶² Cf. W. Elliger, *en*, 1095; A. Schweitzer, *La mystique de l’apôtre Paul*, 116f and 122.

mystery of the body (Greek: *sôma* and *sarx*).⁶³ As we noticed, also the last three may be something negative, captivating a man, not least serving for his good. A man, waiting for his meeting with Christ, or already living with this meeting, is also a living being, also in a pejorative sense, in body (*en sômati* and *en sarki*). We can state the same about another of God's gifts, about law / Law, as well as about order, which the Apostle reflects on by the expression "in law" / "in Law".

As we noticed, such a defined image is not unanimously negative. A man living in a described situation has not lost his chance yet. He needs salvation and may obtain it. When it occurs, his situation changes. The transition is radical, although usually a given person gradually experiences it. It is often divided into their entire life. Most frequently the old order does not disappear at once. It becomes partially abolished, annihilated. It partially becomes transformed, cured. It partially influences us as well. Our temporality is such. And just as such, it constitutes time and place of salvific work of God and an integral part of the Divine economy. And it frequently outgrows our potential of understanding, reminding us at the same time about the place and role of faith, hope and love.

One of the aspects of the Pauline vision of salvific work could be presented in a great outline in this way. It is noticeable in a specific, interesting way in the wordings we come across in e.g. the so-called authentic epistles of St. Paul the Apostle. This, expressed by them, being God's Word, refers not only to people living in the Apostle's time. It concerns people of all times. It concerns us also.

⁶³ As was outlined above, we deliberately do not discuss the problem of the interpretation of such terms as: *nomos* ("Law" / "law"), *sôma* ("body") and *sarx* ("body"). The problem is broad and complex. It is easy to present simplifications, and as a result to deliberately impoverish the inspired text. In just this context we will refer to an interesting issue worthy of consideration, although directly referring to another issue, the opinion by L. Cerfaux (*Le Christ dans la théologie de saint Paul*, 223): "Il n'est pas toujours possible, ou il n'est d'aucune utilité, d'assigner la limite exacte d'un terme. Le mieux est d'entendre chaque formule avec l'imprécision qu'elle avait dans l'esprit de saint Paul. L'imprécision est signe de richesse et non de pauvreté: Paul envisageait en gros tout ce que comporte de virtualités les notions d'Esprit et de spirituel."

Anthropological Bases On The Path To the Sanctification Of Man*

The reality in which contemporary people live is a perfect space and as such it allows us to fulfill the everlasting inner desire to reach perfection. There is, however, a constant urge for answers regarding such matters as human nature, personality and subjectivity, and our relation to God, who is selfless Love. Other equally important aspects include the relation to other individuals, to ourselves and to the reality in which we live. These are the fundamental issues that influence the inner life of the human striving for perfection.

Human Nature

Touching upon the issue of the human pursuit of perfection, we face the question of the mere nature of humans and the nature of God with whom they wish to unite. Therefore, one of the fundamental matters of spiritual theology is the question: who is man? Any attempt to answer the question leads to multiple possibilities, because self-reflection is the object of constant examination¹.

The very same question was posed at the Second Vatican Council in regard to issues and opinions stemming from the grounds of history of philosophy and religion. As we read in one of the constitutions that followed the Second Vatican Council: "But what is man? About himself he has expressed, and continues to express, many divergent and even contradictory opinions. In these he often exalts himself as the absolute measure of all things or debases himself to the point of despair. The result is doubt and anxiety" (GS 12).

* STV 42(2004)1.

¹ Cf. A. Słomkowski, *Teologia życia duchowego*, Ząbki 2000, 32; L. Borie, *Giovanna della Croce*, B. Second, in: *Historia duchowości, Współczesność*, vol. 6, Kraków 1998, 353f.

To answer this complex question fully, one needs to examine the relation between humans and God, the Creator who brought us into existence. To reach definite conclusions, it is crucial to address the question of human nature, in which humans are understood as the subject of spiritual life. Even a brief observation leads to the conclusion that humans are beings brought to life directly by God the Creator, and hence cannot think of themselves as a perfect being, an equal to God. Man is not an ultimate and completely independent being, which results from the simple fact of creation — being brought into existence — that asks questions of causality and purpose. Therefore, we experience the necessity of constantly referring to the authority of the One who conditioned our origins². As Romano Guardini stated, the fact of humans originating from God does not threaten humans themselves in any way; on the contrary, it allows us to find the right image of the Creator and of ourselves³. This is how the process of putting human life in order happens. This means introducing harmony to our inner and outer life, a harmony that has been disturbed by sin (cf. GS 13).

Analysing human existence, we realize how complex it is. Apart from the material aspect of existence, a whole vast territory of spiritual life is called into question. Hence the constant attempts in the history of humankind to detach humans from identifying solely with the material world. One example of such an attempt is the Platonic system with its distrust towards the material world. Plato focused on detachment from materiality and his thought echoed in Saint Augustine's teachings, as well as in the early anthropological approach that developed within the Church in the first centuries AD⁴.

Throughout the history of this school of thought several opposing stances were formulated, pointing to empirical knowledge as the only source of truth⁵. Contemporary radical materialistic theories claim that matter, and that includes human, created the animate world in the process of development according to the rules of dialectics. According to these theories, the world is uniform, but matter is varied and divided into three categories: inanimate, animate and thinking matter. This explains why man is defined as thinking matter in Marxism. Therefore, it is materialistic monism⁶.

² Cf. A. Słomkowski, op. cit., 33.

³ Cf. R. Guardini, *Świat i osoba*, Kraków 1969, 108.

⁴ Z. Targoński, *Przesłanki antropologiczne duchowości*, in: *Teologia duchowości katolickiej*, ed. W. Słomka, M. Chmielewski, J. Misiurek, A. Nowak, Lublin 1993, 85.

⁵ Por. W. Granat, *Ku człowiekowi i Bogu w Chrystusie. Zarys dogmatyki katolickiej*, vol. 1, Lublin 1972, 69.

⁶ Cf. S. Kowalczyk, *Podstawy światopoglądu chrześcijańskiego*, Lublin 1993, 33-38.

Neither of the two gives a comprehensive answer to the question of human nature. They are partial descriptions, mere fragments that do not reflect man as a corporeal and spiritual being. The material and spiritual perspective places us in front of the subject of human's nature integrality⁷. The integrality of a human being was already reflected upon by Aristotle, who wrote about the relation between intelligence and human modality⁸. The matter was continued in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas who pointed to the direct correlation between the human soul and body⁹. What is important is that the name human itself incorporates a statement of our grand nature (*kataphasa*). Observations and experience points to human limitations (*apophasa*). Human nature constantly develops integrity in this area (*henozis*). It is materiality (*soma*) with all its limitations and spirituality (*psyche*) as something completely opposite, immaterial, non-corporeal¹⁰. Defining these two ranges of human existence is crucial for spirituality, because of the constant necessity of introducing harmony between the two. As Bartnik wrote: "Man is split not only into two realms: of matter and spirit, earth and heaven, time and eternity; but also into two themes: existence and death, being and nothingness, affirmation and negation, identity and dispersion, values and anti-values. And at the same time human beings strive to overcome this opposition of structure and subject matter. Thereby, dialectics is the source of becoming, historicity, inconceivable possibilities and chances, of self-transcendence."¹¹ This perspective on integrality of humans who are brought to existence in order to constantly overcome barriers of materiality creates a sort of third dimension of human life. Anthropology cannot be narrowed down to a phenomenological approach. The grandeur of human nature keeps slipping out of man's control. It is important to emphasize the tragedy and the insufficiency of reductionist efforts in anthropological hermeneutics. Such as: *man is an ape humanized by work* (Friedrich Engels); *an animal that builds tools* (Benjamin Franklin); *an animal with an erect walk*

⁷ Cf. Z. Targoński, op. cit., 85.

⁸ Cf. W. Granat, *Ku syntezie w definicji osoby*, ZN KUL 3(1960)4, 22.

⁹ Cf. W. Granat, *Personalizm chrześcijański. Teologia osoby ludzkiej*, Poznań 1982, 576.

¹⁰ Cf. Cz. Bartnik, *Dogmatyka katolicka*, Lublin 2000, 362; Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, in: *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, ed. T. Styczeń, W. Hudy, J. Gałkowski, A. Rodziński, A. Szostek, Lublin 1994, 227-228. In regard to the integrity of a person in the context of acts and actions, the author points to the condition of a human as a person. He states that no phenomenological statement can reflect this unity, whereas it is fully perceivable based on action revealing the transcendency of a person and the perfection of the complexity of human nature. Ibid.

¹¹ Cz. Bartnik, 362.

(Johann Gottfried Herder); *an animal suppressing its urges in pain* (Sigmund Freud); *a self-deluded animal* (P. Ernst); *a structural reflection of social awareness* (Claude Levi-Strauss); *existence that desires to become God* (Jean-Paul Sartre); *a being that finds itself in violence and blood* (Friedrich Nietzsche); *a conscious being towards death* (Martin Heidegger); *a creature of highest sexual deviancies* (A. Moravia, J. Genet)¹².

In reference to human nature, The Second Vatican Council affirms the third dimension, that is its integrality (cf. GS 14). One cannot underrate corporeality, because: “Though made of body and soul, man is one. Through his bodily composition he gathers to himself the elements of the material world; thus they reach their crown through him, and through him raise their voice in free praise of the Creator” (GS 14)¹³. At the same time, the constitution emphasizes that: “Now, man is not wrong when he regards himself as superior to bodily concerns, and as more than a speck of nature or a nameless constituent of the city of man” (GS 14). As the teachings of the Church assert, acknowledging mortality and spirituality of human soul elevates human beyond physical conditions. The spiritual dimension of human life allows individuals to reach the essence of themselves, as well as the essence of the realities around them¹⁴. Therefore, the concept of a man cannot be simply narrowed down to a sort of compilation of body and soul creating one substance.

When referring to the teachings of spiritual theologians, one needs to acknowledge that the soul is not limited in its reach to the concept of *anima*, that is animating the body. Instead, what is emphasized is its quality as *spiritus* — allowing us to go beyond corporeality and sensuality. The autonomy of the spirit results in a purpose of man that cannot be resolved within the limits of human corporeality, e.g. the pursuit of truth, the desire for absolute goodness, happiness, etc.¹⁵ The separation of body and spirit purposes results in their being contradictory to each other (cf.: Rom 8:5; 8:10; 1Cor 2:11; Ga 5:17; 1Tes 5:23). This opposition is affected both by the difference in purposes, as well as by the laws each of them is ruled by. Hence, work on the sanctification of humans is about the integration of these two aspects on the basis of cooperation with God. Human beings in their corporeal and spiritual structure are capable of having a God¹⁶.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Cf. Ibid., 393-394; Cf. K. Wojtyła, op. cit., 236-238.

¹⁴ Cf. GS 14.

¹⁵ Cf. A. Słomkowski, op. cit., 34.

¹⁶ Cf. Ibid., 35; A. Ruszała, *Ze świętym Janem od Krzyża ku zjednoczeniu z Bogiem*, Kraków 1999, 49.

For John of the Cross, the idea of “body and soul” is the key issue in discussing the path to perfection. In fact, the idea has multiple references and interpretations, but most often it denotes a person. It is possible to define the scope of the word “soul” in John of the Cross’s work that includes vegetal life and the seat of human desires. The notion of “spirit” means the rule of spiritual acts is not connected to the the vegetal aspect of life¹⁷. Another interpretation of “spirit” was given by Sanson, and according to him the notion can be understood in a threefold way:

1. It is part of soul where powers reside, and hence it is a communication centre;
2. It is the space of receiving impulses that reach the soul;
3. It is a space connected to the activity of God who resides there and the activity of the soul striving for God under the influence of the Holy Spirit¹⁸.

For Saint John of the Cross the “soul-spirit” is the space for communication between human and God, and thereby the base for spiritual powers to act, such as: intellect, will and memory¹⁹.

When discussing the integrity of the human being, one needs to refer to the act of creation, in which man came into existence in body and spirit. This fact (cf. Gen 1:26-27) should be analysed with regard to the unity that touches upon the ontic relation to God. One might say man is “a total relation – a reference to God, His Nature (Essence) and to His Inner Being – to the Persons of the Holy Trinity.”²⁰ The image of human nature only gains its right form in respect to the “prototype image” according to which man was brought into existence. The characteristics of this relation was referred to in writings on human nature by Saint Irenaeus, Saint Athanasius of Alexandria and especially Saint Augustine²¹.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 63.

¹⁸ H. Sanson, *El espíritu humano segun San Juan de la Cruz*, Madrid 1962, 145-146.

¹⁹ A. Ruszała, *op. cit.*, 64.

²⁰ Cz. Bartnik, 393; A. Ruszała, *op. cit.*, 49.

²¹ Cf. A. Słomkowski, *op. cit.*, 35; L.A. Krupa, *Obraz Boży w człowieku według nauki św. Augustyna*, Lublin 1948; cf. GS 12.

Brain-based Criteria of Human Death. Study of the Issue*

Legal Aspects of the Theory of so-called Brain Death

Until 1968, the legal definition of death, unchallenged by anyone, was used all over the world, and referred to two main symptoms: the cessation of heart functions and breathing. In American law death is defined as “(...) stopping blood circulation, and the associated cessation of vital functions such as breathing, heartbeat, etc.” It continues that “Death occurs when life is over and cannot be detected until the heart rate and breath have stopped. Death is not a continuous phenomenon, but takes place at some specific moment.”¹

However, the development of medical technology, including the use of respirators, has led to doubts as to the validity of such a definition of death. It was argued that the patient who has not regained consciousness for a long time despite a heartbeat and continuous (although usually assisted) breathing in reality is no longer alive and doctors' actions only mask this fact. A new legal definition of death, based on more appropriate medical criteria, was therefore proposed.

These conclusions were not without consequences. In 1968, a special committee established at Harvard University (Harvard Ad Hoc Committee) proposed that death of the entire brain should be regarded as a criterion for declaring a person dead. This criterion was first used in legislation in Kansas, USA in 1972. The definition of death adopted there made it possible to pronounce someone dead solely on the basis of a person's brain state. It reads as follows: “A person shall be considered to be dead from a medical and legal point of view if, in the opinion of a medical practitioner, based on recognised standards of medical art, the function of breathing and cardiac action is not established on its

* STV 42(2004)2.

¹ *Black's Law Dictionary*, 1951, 488.

own, either because of illness or because of factors which have caused, directly or indirectly, the cessation of these operations or because of the time from the cessation of these operations, any resuscitation effort shall be regarded as not giving rise to any hope; in this case death shall take place when these operations cease; or a Person will be considered to be dead from a medical and legal point of view if, in accordance with a medical opinion based on recognised standards of medical art, there is a lack of spontaneous brain function; and if, in accordance with recognised principles of medical art, during attempts to maintain or restore spontaneous circulation and breathing it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or support of bodily functions are unsuccessful, death will occur when these conditions occur for the first time. Death must be declared before any vital organ is removed for transplantation (...)”².

As we can see, the new legal and medical definition of death is alternative: on the basis of this definition, the doctor can rule on the death of the patient on the basis of both the criteria of previous ones, i.e. cessation of blood circulation and breathing, as well as new ones: cessation of brain functions. In most countries of the world, legislation modelled on that above-cited approach has been adopted. One detail should not escape our attention: the new definition of death refers for the first time to the procurement of organs for transplantation. One may therefore have the impression that this definition was introduced in order to legalise this practice. The authors who supported the efforts to change the law in this direction did not hide the fact that this was what they wanted.

These authors assumed that:

- (A) In the event of irreversible cessation of all brain functions, we are dealing with the death of a human being;
- (B) The cessation of any brain functions can be clearly demonstrated by appropriate medical tests;
- (C) There is a consensus on this issue in the healthcare communities and society as a whole.

Initially, it seemed that this new definition of death would not arouse more serious controversy. This was indeed the case until the 1990s. For some time now, however, opposing voices have started to appear increasingly more often. All three assumptions mentioned above, on which the new definition of death is based, are subject to criticism. Thus, it appears that:

² A.S. Moraczewski, J.S. Showalter, JD, MFS., *Determination of Death. The Theological, Medical and Ethical Issues*, St. Louis-Missouri 1982, 12.

Ad. (A) It is not certain that even a complete cessation of brain functions signifies the death of a human being;

Ad. (B) We cannot confirm the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain functions on the basis of tests which are designed for this purpose; moreover, the vast majority of patients with brain damage meeting the criteria of so-called brain death show signs of action of at least some parts of the brain;

Ad. (C) There is no consensus on the rightness or wrongness of the theory of so-called brain death in many different environments, especially among doctors.

Medical Aspects of the Theory of so-called Brain Death

It can be noticed that in medical circles the protest against the theory of brain death is strongest³. The criteria of cerebral death cannot be defended first of all from the medical point of view. The paradox is that 27% of those who procure the human heart for transplantation are convinced that they are murdering a still alive human being⁴. Why is that? We must come back to accusation B for a moment.

Many authors criticise the crushing medical criteria of cerebral death. In their opinion, they are superficial, inadequate and in no way does it inform us about the state of the whole brain. During the discussion on this subject even supporters of the theory of brain death admitted this fact⁵. In almost all patients with symptoms of so-called brain death, there are signs of activity of at least some parts of the brain. It includes:

- 1) The occurrence of cerebral body temperature control exercised by a temperature centre located in the hypothalamus, which is part of the brain;
- 2) The secretion of hormones by the pituitary gland, which protects the body against uncontrolled urine excretion⁶;
- 3) Positive EEG results in 20% of patients who underwent this examination using the classical method⁷ and in a much higher percentage of patients with an intraventricular electrode⁸;

³ M. Potts, P.A. Byrne, R. Nilges, *Beyond Brain Death. The Case Against Brain Based Criteria for Human Death*, Dordrecht 2001, 1-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 202.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 150. Evans is quoting Pallis, Harley, *ABC of Brain Stem Death*, 30.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 164.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 197.

- 4) Many patients, from whom a heart for transplantation has been procured react to a cut in the form of an accelerated heart rate, increased blood pressure and violent movement of the limbs⁹ (these symptoms are evidence of brainstem function and may indicate the person feels pain);
- 5) Due to the above described reactions in donors, there is a necessity of undergoing general anaesthesia as for “normal” surgery (routine practice in many countries)¹⁰
- 6) The possibility of a significant (even over one year) extension of life of patients diagnosed as dead according to cerebral death criteria, if appropriate drugs are used;
- 7) The fact that a pregnant woman, after falling into what is known as brain death, was able to give birth to a healthy baby some time later¹¹.

All these symptoms are ignored when assessing the health of a patient with a brain injury and, despite their presence, such a patient, after a superficial test, is considered a deceased person under the applicable law. For this reason, for so many doctors who are familiar with the problem, the theory of brain death is pure fiction.

This is the reason why so many doctors have protested in various countries. According to these doctors, the condition of patients classified as deceased due to the occurrence of “brain death” can at most be regarded as close to death (near death syndrome), but certainly not as a condition of death that has already occurred¹².

In addition, many of these patients respond positively to new types of treatment for brain damage. The use of therapy by lowering the temperature of the brain to 33°, in many cases allows the avoidance of the development of a condition defined as cerebral death in patients with a damaged brain. Therefore, the practice of implementing preparatory procedures for the removal of organs in patients still alive and refusing them appropriate treatment cannot be accepted. It should be remembered that some tests and examinations, e.g. intentional breath-holding or angiography in patients with damaged brains cause their condition to deteriorate and accelerate the onset of symptoms known as

⁹ Ibid., 188.

¹⁰ Ibid., 151.

¹¹ D.A. Shewmon, “Is it reasonable to use as a basis for diagnosis death the U.K. protocol for the clinical diagnosis of ‘brain stem death’? Presentation to the Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics 20th Anniversary International Conferences,” “Issues for Catholic Bioethics,” Queens’ College, Cambridge, July 1997.

¹² M. Potts, P.A. Byrne, R. Nilges, *op. cit.*, 197.

the state of cerebral death. Some critics of the theory of brain death therefore propose the withdrawal of the very concept of brain death and replace it with brain failure, which seems to be a proposal that is justified in all respects¹³. It is therefore impossible to conclude that argument (B) has a sufficiently strong scientific basis.

On the basis of these opinions, it is evident that there is no consensus among doctors themselves on the issue of brain death. Thus, argument (C) of the three mentioned above, on which the justification of so-called brain death is based, is also challenged. We have yet to consider argument (A). This argument is an example of a meeting of medical and philosophical problems with the predominance of the issue on the side of the latter.

Philosophical and Ethical Analysis of the Issue

Argument (A) is certainly the most interesting from a philosophical point of view. It cannot be unravelled by medical arguments alone, but requires the choice of an anthropological vision. In it we come to the question about the very nature of man. Prof. Seifert, one of the experts on the subject, stresses that the concept of death necessarily depends on the concept of human life, the human individual and the human mind¹⁴. In this sense, this issue cannot be regarded as the domain of empirical sciences, but as a philosophical issue. So if human life is considered to be the life of the whole human body understood as an integrated whole, then death means the end of physical life (the death of that particular bodily being). However if life is interpreted in terms of higher consciousness, thought, willingness to act, speech, and the suchlike we have to choose between two possibilities:

- (1) the ontological background of the human mind as a subject of higher human consciousness is the brain (or part of it),
- (2) the mind has the ability to exist on its own and the brain is only a necessary condition for the emergence of human consciousness, but not its main cause.

The proponents of (1) believe that the cerebral cortex is “the seat, source and subject of thought,” while those who consider (2) to be the true view claim that the human mind is different from matter and not accessible to matter. In the thinking of the proponents of view (1) Seifert notes an error, which he

¹³ Ibid., 192.

¹⁴ Ibid., 206-207.

calls *actuality*. This error consists in identifying the ability to act consciously, that is to say, some attribute and function of the human individual, with the subject of consciousness itself.

Seifert and other authors (e.g. D.A. Jones) also make a precise distinction between medicine as an empirical science and philosophy¹⁵. They stress the lack of a necessary link between the death of the brain and that of a human being. For such a relationship to be logically necessary, an additional assumption must be made that the existence of the human individual is necessarily linked to the existence of a functioning brain. However, this is a philosophical assumption, not an empirical truth, and as such, on the basis of the natural sciences, it is impossible to prove. In such a case, a doctor's competence is limited to determining the patient's brain condition and possible degree of damage to the organ, and does not entitle one to decide whether this means death or not. Even if the brain were to be completely destroyed, which, as we know, almost never happens in patients classified as deceased due to brain death, the doctor can only competently conclude that such a fact (total destruction of the brain) has taken place. Whether this means the death of a human being is a question beyond the reach of medicine as an empirical science.

Life itself provides us with important arguments for this discussion. Many authors dealing with the issue of brain death quote a shocking fact in their speeches. This is the case of a child who had his whole brain destroyed as a result of a history of meningitis¹⁶. The child, meeting all the criteria for cerebral death, survived fourteen years in this state. This fact is systematically ignored by proponents of the theory of brain death. It destroys the philosophical basis of this theory, which is based on the conviction that the organ integrating the body as a whole is the brain (or rather the brain stem) and if it can be shown that this organ has been destroyed, then such integration no longer takes place and that the body is dead.

However, some extremely important details should be noted here. The belief that the brain stem must function for the life of the body is an empirical issue, just like any other medical problem, and not an *a priori* theorem, as is presented by the proponents of the theory of brain death. It is only right to repeat after Jones that it is becoming increasingly apparent that damage, or even death of the whole brain, is not tantamount to death of the body as a whole¹⁷. Observational data concerning patients with cerebral death confirm

¹⁵ Ibid., 101.

¹⁶ Ibid., 98.

¹⁷ Ibid., 99-100.

this position. The bodies of these patients are undoubtedly integrated when they control their temperature, blood pressure, circulation, food assimilation processes, urine production and resistance to infections. Also, breathing, understood as a metabolic process, continues (the respirator only replaces the action of the diaphragm). A comprehensive, strong reaction to skin incisions, which even necessitates the use of general anaesthesia during heart procurement for transplantation, is further confirmation of the fact that we are dealing with integrated organisms, i.e. living organisms.

Jones rightly points out that the integration of the body is its work as a functioning whole, not the effect of a single organ, even if it is the brain. Therefore, the death of the body cannot be equated with the death of any single organ, but is the result of the destruction of whole systems, on which the functioning of the body depends. Let us reiterate that the bodies of people with cerebral death symptoms are alive, not dead.

However, can it not be legitimately claimed that the death of a human being must not be tantamount to the death of his body? This dualistic way of thinking is now common. It is said that the body is alive, but the human individual is no longer. This is the Cartesian separation of a person from his or her body, which, however, is not philosophically legitimate. The human individual cannot be identified with his thought or consciousness without falling into logical contradictions. Man discovers his existence and develops his consciousness and has a sense of his identity precisely (though not exclusively) because he has a body. Already the Boeotian definition of the person as an intelligent entity (*Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*) drew attention to the bodily aspect of the person as belonging to its nature. It does not seem possible for this aspect to be omitted in the description of the person. However, this is what all those who, despite the fact that the body of a sick person with a damaged brain being alive, claim that this does not mean the life of a human being, because the sick person will probably not regain consciousness any more.

To sum up, it must be said that in the thinking of various authors a certain characteristic mistake can often be observed, consisting in reducing the human being to his mind, and then to the brain itself (or even only a part of it) identified with thinking and consciousness. In short, the life of the human individual is reduced by them to the life and functioning of the brain. This is also often understood by believers, who place the soul, according to Descartes' thinking, only in the brain and not in the whole human body. However, we know that the philosophical tradition associated with Aristotle and St. Thomas of Aquinas solved the problem of the relationship between body and soul in a different way. According to this tradition, the soul is a form of the body and as such it

is bound first to the body as a whole and only secondarily to individual parts of the body, including the brain¹⁸. Thus, man cannot be considered as a mind functioning in a foreign, as it were for him, environment, which is the Cartesian body-machine, but should be understood as a particular being, in which the soul and body enter into a very deep relationship of mutual dependence, in which the soul fulfils the function of a substance form, and the body of matter.

The empirical data given above confirm the truth of this view. The human body does not die when its brain is damaged, if other organs are working properly. The human body can remain alive, even if it has lost consciousness, perhaps forever. If we assume that the death of a human being can precede the death of his body, on which the whole theory of cerebral death is based, then we will have to consider that a person dies twice:

- 1) when his death is pronounced on the basis of brain death criteria,
- 2) when his body dies.

After all, it is difficult to deny that the body of every human being, even one who has been found to be in the state of so-called brain death, is still a body of a representative of the *homo sapiens* species. So what does the death of this body mean in this situation? Can it be called something other than the death of this man? Does this fact not even show the artificiality of the whole concept of so-called brain death, which tries to separate the death of a human being from the death of his body?

The legal acceptance of the theory of brain death has also led to many contradictions and paradoxes. So we have a situation in which a person is alive according to the law of one country and deceased according to the law of another country. This is due to the fact that the criteria for determining brain death, adopted in individual countries, differ considerably¹⁹. In Japan, however, we deal with an extremely specific situation, since a person in the state of so-called brain death is considered to be alive or dead, depending on the record in his *Donor Card* (transplant donor card). So if this person agrees to be a donor, he or she is considered dead, and if not, Japanese law treats him or her as a living person²⁰. In addition, doctors who are obliged to make decisions about the condition of patients suffering from brain damage are under enormous pressure from

¹⁸ *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 76, art. 8: „(...) Tamen attendendum est quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo comparatur ad totum et ad partes: sed ad totum quidem primo et per se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum.”

¹⁹ M. Potts, P.A. Byrne, R. Nilges, 66.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 191.

transplantation teams to classify these patients as deceased. These problems at the legal level confirm the thesis that the theory of brain death inevitably leads to a dead end not only in medicine, but also in law, philosophy and morality.

For how can the concept of brain death be judged from the ethical side? Can it be defended? Supporters of this concept can be divided into two groups: (1) those who seek to demonstrate that a person really dies when a syndrome called brain death occurs, and (2) those who consider that a person in a state of so-called brain death, even if alive, can be treated as a donor of organs for transplantation because of the greater good that is achieved through this.

The (1) group includes defenders of the theory of brain death on the Catholic side. They believe that this theory has a sufficiently strong scientific basis for it to be considered valid. And the (2) group includes all those who recognise the utilitarian principle that says that an act is good if the sum of the good in the world is the result of this act increased. Since it is believed that people in a state of so-called brain death have no chance of survival, it is also believed that their death can be accelerated for the good of others. In fact, it is consent for the killing of a living, innocent person.

If, however, people in a state of so-called brain death are living, as shown by the arguments above, it is indisputable that the Catholic Church cannot accept the treatment of these people as donors of organs for transplantation. After all, the act of depriving each such person of his or her life is something worse, from a moral point of view, than euthanasia. Euthanasia, as we know, is justified by the good of the suffering person, who in this way is freed from suffering, and in the case of killing a person who lives in order to remove his organs for transplantation, there can be no talk of any good for that person resulting from such action.

Summary

In this article I first tried to demonstrate that the theory of so-called brain death is unsustainable from a scientific point of view. The data that the medical profession provides on this subject clearly contradicts such a theory. It is impossible to prove, on the basis of the knowledge available to this science that people who are in a state of cerebral death are really dead. The only thing that the doctor can say, without exceeding the limits of the discipline he represents, is that these people have a significant degree of brain damage. This does not mean, however, that the brain is so damaged that it has ceased to perform all

its functions. On the contrary, these patients usually show many symptoms of brain activity. Recognition of these sick people as dead, therefore, contradicts the principles of the medical art.

The acceptance of the theory of so-called brain death has also given rise to many problems from the legal point of view. Recognition as a living or deceased person depends on the criteria for brain death, which vary from country to country. The law has therefore become arbitrary in such an important area as human life and death.

The adoption of the theory of brain death on the basis of such un-robust scientific criteria has undoubtedly become possible only through the acceptance of certain philosophical assumptions that reduce the human to his or her consciousness. A permanent loss of consciousness was *de facto* considered to be evidence of human death. This position contradicts the achievements of Christian thought in the field of philosophical anthropology, which emphasises the unity of the individual and the importance of his or her bodily aspect. What is even more important, however, is the fact that modern man tends to think in terms of moral utilitarianism. Many people believe that it is possible to sacrifice the life of a person who is seriously ill and who has no hope of improvement (in this case, a person with cerebral death syndrome) for the benefit of other patients. This attitude explains the passivity of many circles and the failure to discuss such an important issue as the rightness or wrongness of the theory of so-called brain death. It is not without significance that there is a specific transplant lobby in individual countries, which puts moral pressure on entire societies to accept the removal of organs for transplantation from people who are in a state of so-called brain death, and suppresses the discussion of moral problems associated with it.

It is necessary for the Catholic Church to develop a clear position on this matter. This has not yet happened. There is even a surprising lack of consensus among various the authorities. However, some of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church have already spoken on this matter. These include Cardinal Meissner, Archbishop of Cologne, who clearly rejected the theory of brain death as incompatible with the principles of the Church's teaching²¹. Pope John Paul II also wrote in the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae*: "Nor can we remain silent about the existence of other, better camouflaged but no less dangerous forms of euthanasia. We would be dealing with them, for example, if, in order to obtain more

²¹ C. Pallis, *Returne to Elisinore*, "Journal of Medical Ethics" 16 (1990), 10-13.

organs for transplantation, we proceeded to collect these organs from donors before they were declared dead according to objective and adequate criteria.”

Although these words do not mention the concept of brain death, they refer to it indirectly. This paper was written in order to draw attention to just such a moral problem hidden in the concept of so-called brain death.

In conclusion, I would like to give the floor to one of the participants in the discussion on brain death, Dr Tomoko Abe. She wrote: “It is true that the latest developments in science and technology have brought many benefits. At the same time, however, they have brought unprecedented confusion in philosophy and culture to our societies. Due to the destructive tendencies of the present day, it is becoming increasingly important to establish social standards to protect the most vulnerable members of society, such as young children and unconscious patients who cannot defend themselves. We therefore conclude that the current diagnostic criteria for brain death should be abolished and that a worldwide ban on transplants from people with cerebral death syndrome should be introduced.”²²

Dr. Abe is not alone in a desire to overthrow the theory of so-called brain death and to consider its criteria as non-scientific. The same is demanded by many other authors. The voice of the Catholic Church in this matter is undoubtedly one of the most important. As the greatest authority in the world in matters of morality and human rights, it cannot fail to explain the issue of so-called brain death in its teaching.

²² M. Potts, P.A. Byrne, R. Nilges, 199.

Mystery of Man*

Man is the synthesis of the world of matter and spirit, finiteness and infinity, mortality and eternity, freedom and necessity. Man is both capable of heroism and crime, but is not designed to fail. Man is neither an angel nor a beast, the misfortune is that he who wants to play the angel plays the beast (B. Pascal). An angel never falls. The devil falls so low that he will never get up. Man falls down and rises. To be human is to be responsible but this is also a reason to be unhappy. In spite of this God calls man not only to humility but also to the courage to be and to build the world. Especially through suffering, because it makes man predictable and the world transparent. Suffering is an attempt at human humanity, an attempt at the inner truth of man. Suffering associated with the ethos of birth to the fullness of life is a temple in which God wants to be alone with man. That explains why whatever happens to man he should always rise and move forward, rise and move forward all his life. Therefore, a man who did not feel the taste of his tears will not become a real man. Surrendering to fate, he becomes a human wreck. Man is invited to talk to God from the very beginning. Christ is the explanation of the mystery of man.

Grace Inscribed in the Structure of Man

God's creative presence in man's nature is manifested in the oldest transmissions of the Bible.¹ The first man, Adam, has a life-giving breath of life (cf. Genesis 2, 7). The creation of man is a specific work of God, different from others. God communicates His qualities to the human like a father to a child (cf. Ps 139, 13-15). Man is shaped and woven by God and this shows his inalienable connection with his

* 43(2005)1.

¹ Cf. L. Koehler, *Die Grundstelle der Imago-Dei-Lehre, in: Der Mensch als Bild Gottes*, Darmstadt 1969, 3-9.

creation. At the same time, God knows that we are dust (Psalm 103:14) and that He has brought us out of nothingness through the womb. That is why man calls him "his God" (cf. Ps 22, 10-11). God is a friend, guardian, companion of human life. From the beginning, there has been a relationship between God and man through the dwelling of the Creator in the substance of the soul (cf. ZPM 4, 14)². It is basic and impossible to erase the image of God. From it will come, if man permits, an increasing resemblance to Christ as a source. Living in the substance of the soul lays the foundations for a personal relationship of love and walking sticks. According to the tradition of the Eastern Christianity, man is a body, soul and Holy Spirit. He is the living form and godliness of man. Man's resistance to his transforming love keeps the person tethered in the matter, concrete and the object³.

The mysterious presence of God in man is expressed by the word "the-lem" shadow. Shadow means that the person to whom it belongs is close, offering help and friendship. That is why Mary was shaded by the Holy Spirit (cf. Luke 1, 35). Before God appears in the lux beatifica in clarity the glory of the Saviour hides under the cover of a shadow that provokes a dynamic and organized response to reach the light from the darkness (cf. ZPM 3.13). On the other hand, "man as a shadow passes away" (Ps 39:5-7). It is like a cast shadow and exists in the shadow of a creature that is the shadow of future affairs: These are only shadows of future affairs, and reality belongs to Christ (Colossians 2, 17). By intensifying realization without the Creator, man hurts and becomes unhappy. He becomes a dangerous shadow for himself and his neighbours (cf. Ps 73.20), he is capable of crime.

The Gospel reveals Jesus Christ to us as an image of the Father (2 Colossians 4:4; Colossians 1:15). Jesus reveals the Father and he who wants to know the Father must contemplate the face of Christ. He "came in the body" (cf. 1 J 4, 2-3; 2J 7). It is a "reflection of invisible God" (Colossians 1, 15). He is the new Adam (cf. 1 Cor 15, 45-49). Following Christ is for man – "beings with deficiencies" – ascent sanctitas. Man can become the imago of Christ (cf. 2 Corinthians 4, 4; Colossians 1, 15; 1 Corinthians 15, 49; 2 Corinthians 3, 18)⁴. Human beings should be read from a Christological perspective. This can be expressed as follows: Jesus Christ Imago Dei Patrem (cf. 2 Cor 4, 4; Cor 1, 15); Imago Dei absconditus (cf. Ef 1, 3n). 2. Homo religiosus imago Dei. 3. Homo novus imago Filii Dei. (cf. (Romans 8:29; I Cor 15:45-49).

² The following abbreviations refer to the works of St. John of the Cross: ZPM= Living Flame; 1,2,3 D= Ascent of Mount Carmel; 1,2 N= Dark Night; PD= Spiritual Song.

³ Cf. T. Spidlik, I. Gargano, *Duchowość ojców greckich i wschodnich*, translation J. Dembska, Kraków 1997, 11.

⁴ Cf. K. L. Schmidt, *Homo imago Dei im Alten und Neuen Testamentem*, in: *Der Mensch als Bild Gottes*, Darmstadt 1969, 22-23.

St. Augustine god's image was noticed in the triad: mens (memoria), notitia (intelligence), amor (voluntas). Mens is the deepest depth of the soul responsible for contact with God. The bond of authority, the number of which corresponds to the Persons of the Holy Trinity, is love. According to St. Thomas the human body contains 'traces' of (vestigia) of God⁵. Master Eckhart calls the presence of God in the soul: image, likeness, mirror.⁶ The soul is a "spark": there is a power in it that separates all the inferior and unites with God; it is a spark of the soul.⁷ At the same time, man remains torn apart in himself and has two faces. Hence the imperative of transformation⁸. John of Ruusbroec speaks of a likeness to God (christiformis)⁹. In the life of St. John of the Cross God substantively supports the existence of every human being. He is present in his soul (cf. PD 8, 3). The centre of the soul is God, and when it comes to Him according to all possibilities of its essence and according to the strength of its actions and inclinations, it will reach its ultimate and deepest centre, God. In the new man, God dwells by grace and spiritual feeling as the core of mystical life (cf. 2D 5,4).

A man is a person. The definition of a person, Boethius states, as the person is an individual substance of a rational nature, needs to be completed. It should be remembered that the term person was given to us through the theological reflection on the mystery of the Holy Trinity.¹⁰ The Divine Persons remain in mutual devotion to the love of I – You – We. The term "God" for the new man means primarily: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Love is their nature, and only it opens the door to the coexistence of God and man. There is nothing else in the Most Holy Trinity but a Person. The Relation in the inner life of God in the Trinity alone is the Person.¹¹ The first man invited to participate in the deepest life of the Holy Trinity is Mary. The Logos has a mother who gave him the body. Mary's "Fiat" builds a divine and happy anthropology of dialogue and love¹². That is why the term "man" essentially includes the relationship between man and woman in a mutual mystical devotion to each other (K Barth). In incarnation

⁵ Cf. "Sum", I, q. 93, a. 5, 4.

⁶ Cf. J. Tauler, *Kazania*, translated W. Szymona, Poznań 1986, preaching 67 and 47, 381, 297.

⁷ Ibid., *Kazania*, 20a, p. 177.

⁸ Cf. P. P. Ogórek, *Mistrz Jan Eckhart a święty Jan od Krzyża*, Warszawa 1999, 157-164

⁹ Cf. Ruusbroec. *Dzie/n*, t. 1, translated M. Lew-Dylewski, Kraków 2000, 35-36.

¹⁰ Cf. W. Granat, *Osoba ludzka. Próba definicji*, Sandomierz 1961, 7-14.

¹¹ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Maryja w relacji do Trójcy Przenajświętszej*, in: *Signum Magnum – duchowość maryjna. Homo meditans XXIII*, ed. W. Słomka, A. J. Nowak, J. Misiurek, Lublin 2002, 91.

¹² Cf. A. Nowak, *Maryja jako Signum Magnum*, in: *Signum Magnum – duchowość maryjna*, 157-158.

anthropology, the body is the privileged place of God's experience¹³. In the mind of R Guardini, a person is a layer of characters, individuality, and personality with an inner centre. J. Maritain points to the spirit as an integrating principle of individuality and personality. He speaks of subconsciousness and spiritual unconsciousness¹⁴. E. Mounier defines a person in the context of personal and social activity and development. A person is a call (vocation) to flourish as an incarnate spirit (incarnation), to communion in the community (communion) and transcendence towards God. At the same time, it cannot exist in a "de-sexualised" way; it is not a statue or a static figure. The psyche is shaped by sexuality that demands a precise definition¹⁵. In both men and women, a disorder of self-relationship, anima or animus growth distorts and disrupts mental balance; a basic condition of sexual balance... masculinity of the spirit... is gender acceptance. Mounier states that creating values, desires, aspirations is a human attribute. A person cannot be replicated, is a movement towards something (etre-vers), he is not existence in himself and for himself, he is not a lonely, individual, monadic, but open being. "The person only finds himself when he loses himself", "is not even a social unit, but is the peak from which all the paths of the world depart". "We are members of each other" (Romans 12:5) – this way Mounier understands existence (co-existence, German *Mitsein*), l'existence avec autrui namely Marcel: l'etre c'est l'etre avec, l'etre est communion. The dominant feature of such a being is the divine spark contained in it as a process of dynamic expansion, intensification, and self-sacrifice in resignation from himself. This movement is a real maturation and metamorphosis of the person, i.e., 'mouvement de personnalisation' through 'l'engagement' (Scheler, Marcel, Jaspers). Involvement is not engaging someone in a game, entanglement, but rather a response by providing services and participating in life as a subject. Joining the divine, prolonging the original act of creation, and liberating oneself and giving freedom to others. This effort is not devoid of dramas and dilemmas, it becomes entangled in dramatic situations, despair, tragedy, psychosis, humiliation, and death. A person: can remedy this if he understands what the cause is. Understanding himself and others is a feature of the person, a therapy and allows to distinguish between despair and tragedy: despair is an individualistic feeling. .. It is a passion for negation, it results from emptiness and creates emptiness. Tragedism, on the contrary, is born of excess. A man who closes himself in despair as a result of the difficult grasping

¹³ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Osobowość sakramentalna*, Lublin 1997, 11.

¹⁴ Cf. J. Maritain, *Pisma filozoficzne*, translated J. Fenrychowa, Kraków 1988, 332, 335, 334, 394, 339.

¹⁵ Cf. E. Mounier, *Co to jest personalizm*, translated A. Krasieński, Kraków 1960, 9.

of the loss of his substance. A committed man enriches himself with the value of tragedy; it is the world in which he engages, it is a broken world... Moreover, whatever the experience of tragedy may be, it is an experience of the fullness and bleeding fullness that brings hope and the beginnings of final reconciliation.¹⁶

This does not imply that Christianity instilled a new Jansenism as an “active pessimism”, but rather a “tragic optimism” as a balance between “gloomy prophetism and the good humour of the sacristy.”¹⁷

The theories of development which treat man as a specific path and transition from image to likeness; from disbelief to faith; from religious man to the new; through baptism; in the ascetic path to holiness, in the final exodus and in the temporal reality through the purifying fire of the test of humanity through disintegration, the deeper and dramatic, the more integrating and divinizing they are, have the greatest value. The painful process of disintegration determines human participation in sanctitas of God. Disintegrating experience is a platform for the causal connection of somatic, mental and spiritual processes. Phenomena such as ageing, health and illness, freshness, fatigue, life and dying, a state of grace and sin fill the soul and give it a special colour. Living and not possessing gives colour to life and the determinant of a person's development is the ability to change (metanoia). Infinity and endlessness inscribed by the Creator in man is his appeal and cry, divinization of his creation in love and truth.

A Symbol – the Key to Understanding Man

The classic definition of Boethius seems to be discontinuous, incomplete.

The sum of questions about a person seems to grow faster than the sum of answers. Man simply remains a mystery expressed through transcendent symbols¹⁸. A person constantly exceeds the one-level reality in favour of a multi-level and multilateral reality. It is this symbol that makes it easier to cross borders and barriers to cognition and development by opening and closing, darkening and closing, repelling and pulling. It has two faces, combining the sensual, material and spiritual world into one whole. For example, the symbol of faith explains a lot, but also darkens and immerses reason in the darkness of faith. The symbol places the human being on the borderline between immanence and transcendence. Every stage of spiritual life and every cognition is imperfect, makeshift

¹⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 15. T. Terlecki, *Krytyka personali- styczna. Egzystencjalizm chrześcijański*, Warszawa 1987, 27-31.

¹⁷ Cf. E. Mounier, *Chrześcijaństwo i pojęcie postępu*, Warszawa 1968, 25.

¹⁸ Cf. P. Ricouer, *Symbolika zła*, Warszawa 2002, 15-25.

and time-consuming. It is a foreshadowing of the reality to come. Now, we see as if in a mirror, unclearly; and then [we will see] yourselves: Now I get to know in part, and then I will get to know as well as I was known (1 Cor 13:12). In the scene of the Annunciation (Lk 2:19), we learn about Mary considering the words of the angel. The Greek text reflects this activity with the word 'symballein'. Mary, therefore, tries to unite God's affairs with human affairs, the whole at the interface between reason and faith. Human development should be understood in the context of symbolic integration and disintegration, pros and cons until we all come together to the unity of faith and full knowledge of the Son of God, to the perfect man, to the measure of eternity according to the fullness of Christ (Ef 4, 13). It is conditioned by the human system of symbolisation.¹⁹ At the source of humanity lies the combination of dispersed elements of the divine-human world in love, finding inner harmony and freedom. The symbol is a synthesis, an expression of all areas of human life.²⁰ The symbol appears here as something that transcends, reaches beyond, strives for fulfilment, it acquires a figurative character and similarities, but never identity²¹. It covers the past, present and future: good and dark sides, heaven (moon and sun) and earth (animal and biological), time (night and day), space (time of struggle and rewards), what is masculine and feminine; love and hatred²². In the Song of Songs, Christ appears as life and light surrounded by symbols, nights, fiancé, garden, smells... Mystics eagerly refer to marital symbolism to express man's maturation until promises hidden in words and symbols reveal their faces. Behold, I will make them come and fall on their faces in front of your feet, and they will know that I have loved you (Ap 3, 9). At the base of the symbol lies its multifacetedness with its derived stages, degrees, planes, multiplying configurations and constellations, in order to possess oneself through successive modifications and transformations in the divine union of love. The symbol has a creative dimension of the transition from one posture to another.

Disorders of neurotic and psychotic development are conditioned by the non-transparency of cognition and the absolutization of mortality. Man, when he avoids the value of a symbol, falls into neurosis²³. The absolutization of the

¹⁹ Cf. E. Cassirer; *O człowieku*, translated A. Staniewska. Warszawa 1971, 66-70.68.

²⁰ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Symbol, znak, sygnał*, Lublin 2000, 41.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 42-45.

²² Cf. G. Wunderle, *Grundzuge der Religionsphilosophie*, Paderborn 1924, 214-215. A. Vergote. *Psychologie religieuse*, Bruxelles 1966, 46-48.

²³ Cf. H. Hark, *Religiöse Neurosen*, Stuttgart 1984, s. 22-25. Derjenige, bei dem stets alles beim alten bleibt und in dem sich kaum noch etwas bewegt, sollte sich fragen, ob er nicht an einer gestörten Symbol'funktiion leidet.

symbol, the omission of its multifacetedness, leads to systemic madness, extremism, intolerance, also to pathological disorders. Man then identifies the world with his “mental self”, losing the ability to act intentionally because there is no distance from himself. E. Cassirer states: We can extend and improve the classical definition of man... Instead of describing man as a ‘rationale animal’ we should describe him as a ‘animal symbolicus’²⁴. A. J. Nowak calls such an understanding of the symbol symbolic realism²⁵. In other words, human maturity will be manifested by the ability to integrate the content of truth and the person (even the most distant) through a system of symbolization. The higher the permeability of the symbol, the higher the degree of integration, the more concrete and impermeable, the threatened development. Fear, despair, illness, death, joy can be a necessary stage to overcome, beyond which we will discover peace, joy, freedom and life. Rejection of the symbol as a way of cognition and development for the sake of concretization leads to the absolutization of people, things and values. Therefore, let us “say goodbye to all hopes” whoever only places hope in this life (cf. I Cor 15, 19). Resignation from the hopes of symbolic realism threatens existential boredom, a sister of despair. Man, making a hopeless attempt to fulfill his being by the power of his own will and reason, condemns himself to dwarf and, as a consequence, spiritual death. The fact that despair is possible is the central element here... Central element for metaphysics, which is covered by such a definition of man as proposed by Thomism. What can be inventoried is an opportunity for despair (“I counted it, it is not enough for me”)²⁶. If symbols mean a combination, integration, binding of this diabolos (same core) means division, separation, splitting. Satan is fabricator fragmentorum²⁷. He gives an absolute value to the parts. The consequence of the mystery of the Incarnation is the continuity between the life of man and God (ex-sistence). The rejection of the Incarnation is alienation and a turn to oneself (in-sistence)²⁸. The discontinuity of the divine-human reality is the cause of despair and anxiety, error and fear of existence. The once unstable divine-human continuum implemented in the Incarnation gives bitter fruits. The idea of God replaces His living experience²⁹.

²⁴ E. Cassirer, *Esej o człowieku*, 70.

²⁵ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Symbol, znak, sygnał*, 53.

²⁶ Cf. G. Marcel, *Być i mieć*, translated D. Eska, Warszawa 2001, 150; 148.

²⁷ Cf. W. Granat, *Bóg Stwórca. Aniołowie – człowiek*, Lublin 1961, 182.

²⁸ Cf. J. Arnaud, *Wcielenie wiary*, translated W. Krzyżaniak, Warsaw 1970, 39-42.

²⁹ Cf. N. Wildiers, *Obraz świata a teologa*, translated. J. Doktor, Warszawa 1985, 7-15.

A. Ganoczy, *Stwórczy człowiek i Bóg stwórca*, translated P. Pachciarek. Warszawa 1982, 7-23.
M. Gogacz, *Istnieć i poznawać*, Warszawa 1976, 35.

The radical sin of refusing to love God and one's neighbour lies in the desire to remain in a purely human inner and outer environment³⁰. God remains an unrealisable idea, a thought construct³¹. With the "death" of God meanings and signs die.³² God is only a phenomenal figure³³. Human beings are placed between being and nothingness³⁴. Fear (Furcht) dominates and the world into which man is thrown is full of absurdity, nothingness, rebellion. "Life makes no sense, but it cannot have it", "the only way out is to forget", "death in nothingness"³⁵. E. Mounier speaks of Narcissus alienation, extreme alienation, or Heracles alienation "absorption of existence", "limitation to the realm of facts". This "hypnosis of facts" threatens to charm the unspeakable Mystery of God and man and to bring it down to the myth and legend (G. Marcel and L. Hexagonal). It is the Satanic refusal of a rebellious and self-confident individuality, opposing signs, opposing the call to which only Love could sensitize them – provided that this Love could be liberated from the delusions to which it comes down when it gives itself to reflections on itself instead of being realized.³⁶

Christoforming by Revealing the Mystery of Man

A world without Christ becomes a outline without a face that causes depression. Disturbed knowledge of the world causes emotional deficit, identity confusion, ideologization of minds³⁷. The world plunges into a crazy orgiastic dance designed to relieve a strong sense of guilt, into a paralysis of will in a sense of hopelessness, stimulating each other to newer and stronger births, but without worrying about the divine harmony of the staff and love³⁸. Chaos is nothing more than the result of a fundamental sin – disbelief in the Person of Jesus Christ. He remains the only and ultimate source of our knowledge of God and

³⁰ Cf. P. Schooneneberg, *Theologie der Siinde*, Einsiedeln-Zurich-Köln 1966, 104-105.

³¹ Cf. A. Ganoczy, *Stwórca człowiek i Bóg stwórca*, 77-84.

³² Cf. M. Buber, *Zaćmienie Boga*, Warszawa 1994, 59-60.

³³ Cf. M. Heidegger, *Fenomenologia życia religijnego*, translated G. Sowiński, Kraków 2002, 301-314; cf. *Ibid.*, *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć*, Warszawa 1977, 89; 165-166.

³⁴ Cf. K. Tarnowski, *Bóg fenomenologów*, Tarnów 2000, 81-84; 88-103.

³⁵ Cf. E. Cioran, *Na szczytach rozpacz*, translated I. Kania, Kraków 1992, 84, 150, 153.

³⁶ Cf. G. Marcel, *Homo viator*, Warszawa, 1959, 271. K. Tarnowski states: Heideggerian Ontology is essentially deprived of God, but in such a way that he does not know about this deprivation and does not want to know about it. *Bóg fenomenologów*, 70.

³⁷ Cf. E. H. Erikson, *Dzieciństwo i społeczeństwo*, translated P. Hejmej, Poznań 2000, 275.

³⁸ Cf. G. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, translated B. Banasiak, Warszawa 2000, 103.

the dignity and values of every human being. He is the Head of the Church (cf. Ef 1, 10, 22; Ef 4, 25; Kol 1, 18), through whom everything has happened and thanks to whom we too are (1 Cor 8:6; cf. Col 1, 17), is way and truth (J 14, 6) and resurrection and life (Jn 11:25); seeing him, we also see the Father (cf. J 14, 9). All treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Him (Col 2:3), the Church is his body (cf. Romans 12:5; 1 Cor 6:15; 1 Cor 10:17; 1 Cor 12:12, 27; Ef 1, 23; Ef 2, 16; Ef 4, 4; Col 1, 24; Col 3, 15). He is a form of our freedom because for a Christian there is no self-liberation. Freedom is a gift from Christ: So if the Son liberates you, then you will be truly free (J 8, 36). Liberation is the work of the Holy Spirit who comes from him (cf. J 14, 13) by the sacraments and faith. It is she who leads to a personal encounter with Christ. By faith, Christ dwells in our hearts (Eph 3, 17). The only proportional plane of an encounter with Him is faith animated by love (and not religious structures, knowledge, psychological axioms). Only it can embrace the infinity and sublimity of God. The sacraments, especially the Eucharist, are also the source and potential of “sanctification in Christ”. He is an appeal for us to become saints: but become saints in the whole course of your life, following the example of the Saint who called you, because it is written: Be holy because I am holy (1 P 1,15-16). In Christ, there was “given” holiness (cf. J 10, 36) and ‘acquired’ (cf. J 17, 19). That is why the Second Vatican Council speaks of a universal call to holiness (LG 39, 40). The mystery of man is explained in his dynamic crossing of the multi-plane and multi-layered reality of the spiritual biopsychic in relation to the Divine “You”. This strongly stressed thought can be found at Saint John of the Cross and K. Dąbrowskiego and Jozafat Nowak, OFM. St. John of the Cross sees the meaning of the spiritual man’s life in adapting to the “disposition of Christ”, that is to his way of existence, character, temperament, psyche, customs of his tastes and preferences³⁹. Whoever does not like you/ I will not recognize him/her as my/I like you/For the life of my life (Romanca VI, 2). Also, St. Teresa of Ávila encourages the sisters to grow zealously in the knowledge of character (condicion) The Divine Bridegroom and according to the Divine pattern shaped their own personality (Way of Excellence 22, 7)⁴⁰, on the sacramental path (cf. 2D 22, 9; 16). The Carmelite mystic does not diminish the importance of mental life through Christolorization; on the contrary, it is essential and gives value and merit to all external acts and pious

³⁹ F. Ruiz, *Święty Jan od Krzyża. Pisarz – pisma – nauka*, tum. J. E. Bielecki, Kraków 1998, 456.

⁴⁰ Cf. Teresa z Avila Kraków 1987, translated. H. P. Kossowski, 114, que condición tiene, cómo podré contentarle mejor, en que’ le hare’ placer, y estudiar cómo hare mi condición que conforme eon la suyal.

practices. Usually, God leads man to holiness hierarchically from the lowest to the highest matters (cf. 2D 17, 4). This causes spiritual conflicts, contributes to the emergence of strong psychological processes: anxiety, instability, destabilization, oscillation on the verge of hope and despair. It is only when subconsciousness and consciousness, body and spirit are completed in the integration of love in Christ does man achieve a new life. This process takes place through the mediation of a purifying night of senses and spirit, in which rest periods are short and are a precursor to higher integration. The night of purification and unification is a shocking test of humanity. God weakens the soul and exposes it... in order to put on it anew, uncovered and stripped of its old skin (2N 13, 11; ID 5, 7). The faster the dynamic of development, the greater the faith, hope, and love, the greater the degree of union and transformation into Christ. However When you stop over something, you stop striving for everything. In order to avoid any damage that a person could suffer while stopping on the way to God, he should always strive further, to the greatest depth of God.

What levels and states should be exceeded? St. John of the Cross points to a ten-degree scale of love instead of keeping to the beginner, progressive and perfect periods and ways. The path from step to step is connected with the breakdown of the previous one, pain, the apparent absence of God. Each step determines the stage of partial integration, which already contains the beginnings of new, higher and more perfect ways. The first phase is relative peace and spiritual silence, for man sees no vices and obstacles to God. The night of the senses is the first purification. It is followed by periodic integration and stabilisation. A night of spirit enters as an extreme and ruthless purification. Unity and cohesion with God is the fifth stage. The most important of these are transition periods, full of drama and tension. The night is of interest to St. John of the Cross as development potential. Flashes of light and full integration with the Betrothed are only flashes of glory to come. What should we be freed from in order to exceed the higher grades? The Saint lists the goods and values that can block accelerated development: temporal goods, natural (body and soul qualities, e.g. beauty and grace, clear reason and healthy judgement); sensual (falling under the senses); moral (virtues, good deeds); supernatural goods (gift of wisdom and knowledge, faith, grace of healing, gift of miracles, prophecy, recognition of spirits, gift of languages); spiritual (paintings of chapels, places and holy times). The fascination of mind, will, and memory for any value is fixation and paralysis of development.

K. Dąbrowski formulated a theory of development through positive disintegration. In other words, it identifies development with the dynamism of accelerated adolescence passing through crisis, neurosis, nervousness,

psychoneurosis⁴¹. There is a common belief that mental illness makes it impossible to develop, but already K. Jaspers stated that in order to penetrate the mystery of man it is necessary to first find out what are border experiences considered pathological. Dąbrowski captured the link between mental disorders and development. In the face of traditional ways of interpreting nervousness, anxiety, such neuroses as: hysteria, psychastenia, depression, obsession... The theory of positive disintegration is a new orientation⁴². It consists in understanding mental health and spiritual development as a dynamic and creative transcending the lower and achieving higher levels of integration in search of the personal ideal, individual and social essence. Neuroses and psychoneuroses are a developmental dynamism, provided that the person reads them as a code of life. Then he will discover in them a hierarchy of values and hidden dynamics: object-subject; "third factor", a high degree of self-awareness and empathy, the dynamics of self-development and self-psychotherapy. The 'third factor' is the synthesis of all autonomous and authentic factors⁴³. Theologically, we can interpret it as a factor of the staff acting in a human being. The formation of personality depends on the process of positive disintegration, on the accepted ideal, on the level of the disposition and management centre ("third factor"). So there are

⁴¹ Dąbrowski Kazimierz (1902-80), psychiatrist and psychologist; initiator of the mental hygiene movement in Poland, creator of the theory of positive disintegration, according to which the condition for the development of the personality is the disintegration of the primary structure of the psyche, an individual, leading – through internal conflicts, searches and acts of choice – to the integration of the psyche at a higher level; in this context, many mental disorders, especially neurotic type. Dąbrowski treated it not as a disease, but as a manifestation of a positive developmental crisis, linking mental health not with adaptation, but with development and its dynamics.

⁴² K. Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*. Warszawa 1979, 19. Heraclitus already speaks of repetitive transformations and contradictory processes of change. The terms integration, disintegration were already used by Descartes. Theory of K. Dąbrowski is analogous to the development of a child or society (C. Levi -Strauss). It is not new, but it inscribes new content into old concepts. I. Caruso strongly emphasizes development (progressive personalization) as to get to the higher organized forms through countless experiences. Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Homo religious*, Lublin 2003, 127; S. Arieti. Cf. T. Kobierzycki, *Filozofia osobowości*, Warszawa 2001, 213.

⁴³ K. Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*, 42. S. A. Kierkegaard called the mysterious "third factor" a "subjective individual experience", Heidegger – Dasein, A. Schopenhauer – "what one is", J. P. Sartre – "being for yourself", J. Moreno – "an expressive, creative and spontaneous basis". Cited: H. Romanowska-Łakomy, *Niektóre problemy psychoterapii*, in: „Zdrowie psychiczne”. Warszawa 1980, no. 4, 36.

“healthy neuroses” and “healing heresy”⁴⁴. Nervousness is not sin. However, it is always connected with life’s heresy, with mistakes, violates the rules of ethics and metaphysics (I Caruso). Dąbrowski creates a five-stage model of multi-level, multi-dimensional and hierarchical development. The transition from one to the other involves the experience of relaxation and disintegration, anxiety, depression, obsessions combined with an increasing capacity for empathy, reflection, and integration at a higher level. The starting point is primary integration based on drive consciousness (narrowed sensitivity, responsibility, egocentrism, lack of guilt). Its sound is negative. Second, third and fourth levels are disintegrating phenomena: negative and positive. The second level is one-level disintegration (ambivalence, ambitions, conflicts, beginnings of creative thinking). The third is multi-level spontaneous disintegration (ambivalence, guilt, sin consciousness, slow and conscious shaping of personality). The fourth level is multi-level disintegration organized and systematized (object-object differentiation, autonomy, healthy self-activity I and you). The fifth level is secondary integration, i.e. finding one’s own identity, love relations, responsibility on the “self” line, reintegration, giving a life full of meaning. Man then, on the altar of love and self-sacrifice, burns everything equally: sickness and suffering, joy and ecstasy.⁴⁵

The term “Christoformization” by A. Jozalat Nowak fully reflects the mystery of man understood as a dynamic process of “planting roots in Christ”⁴⁶. Maturation in Christ is the realization through the formation of a sacramental personality. Its essential content is the dialectic of death and resurrection, disintegration and reintegration by the sacramental grace of Christ in the Holy Church. The determinant of all actions is the living Christ⁴⁷. He gives a person the direction, meaning and purpose of personal and social life. Man achieves the existential essence of his own life in Christ, who opens up temporal and eschatological perspectives for man. Dialogue and love become the normal way to God and man. All self relationships are characterized by maturity, autonomy, authenticity, awareness, servant understanding of power, acceptance of responsibility, attitude of dialogue⁴⁸. Man keeps a distance from himself and freedom

⁴⁴ Cf. T. Kobierzycki, *Filozofia osobowości*, 215.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Kościół święty porządkiem łaski i kryterium normy*, in: *Kościół – na upadek i na powstanie wielu*. Homo meditans XVII, ed. J. Misiurek, A. J. Nowak, W. Słomka, Lublin 1996, 118.

⁴⁷ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Osobowość sakramentalna*, Lublin 1997, 81.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, *Dojrzałość chrześcijańska wyrazem wolności wewnętrznej*, in: *Dojrzałość chrześcijańska*, Lublin 1994, ed. A. J. Nowak, W. Słomka, 204-211.

from the bonds of human systems, groups, from matter. It has a brighter and more effective perception of reality. He is free from all despair and hopelessness (cf. Mt 13:5-9)⁴⁹.

The path to the full development of personality is based on a realistic symbolism of abandoning and reconnecting that which has been abandoned at an ever higher level of the personal ideal. Because it is Christ, the multiplicity of symbolic disintegration and integration is simply infinite: how many things can be discovered in Christ, who is like a huge mine and multiple layers of treasures, in which, no matter how deep they are, there will be no end to them. In every corner of these mysteries one can encounter here and there new deposits of new riches, as St. Paul points out, saying that all the treasures of wisdom are hidden in Christ (Col 2:3) (PD 37:4). The essence of christoforming is to free oneself from lower structures towards a higher one. There is a transition from heteronomy to autonomy, from passivity to activity, from a one-level reality to a multi-level reality (symbolic realism). Through the wilderness of fears and hopes, ambivalence and crises⁵⁰. Finally, Christianity has a paschal dimension, a transition from the religious to the sacramental plane, from exuberant individualism to communion of persons, from collectivism to the ecclesial sphere, from an attitude of “having” to “being”, from a heteronomic conscience to a sacramental conscience, from an attitude of alms giving to loving Christ in every human being, from seeking a sense of life in the hierarchy of values to finding it in Christ, with which the mystical integration that makes one’s head spinning crowns the work⁵¹.

Conclusion

So much depends on the concept of human nature. It determines the meaning and purpose of life. It determines what we should do, what we should stop doing, what we should fight for. The fundamental question is: Is there a “true” or “inborn” nature of man? Alternatively, maybe there is none. Perhaps man is a stream of economic, cultural and driving factors? If a society has created us, it is only society that determines our development. Today, the dangerous view that there are no objective values but only subjective concepts that find inhuman

⁴⁹ Ibid., 86.

⁵⁰ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Psychologiczny aspekt nadziei*, in: *Nadzieja w postawie ludzkiej Homo meditans VII*, ed. Słomka, Lublin 1992, pp. 82-83

⁵¹ Cf. A. J. Nowak, *Kościół święty porządkiem łaski i kryterium normy*, 120-127.

embodiment in social life is overcome. Only a coherent and dynamic human project, including the vision of the world, nature and condition of man with his transcendental openness to eternity and grace and a recipe for its perfection and development solves the problem of the mystery of a person. Thus, neither the Platonic rule of reason, nor the economic base of human nature, nor the Freudian unconscious structure of human nature, or Sartre radical freedom reveals the truth about the man but the Person – Jesus Christ.

The mystery of the human being really only becomes clear in the Mystery of the Incarnate Word (KDK 22). Man is destined for complete “divinization” by God in glory (cf. KKK 398) St. Maximus the Confessor, *Ambiguorum liber*: PG 91, 1156 C. What is at stake is the dignity of the human person whose development has been entrusted to man by God and of which we are debtors. No thought system, the most comprehensive shots, or any religion can gain true knowledge about man. The search for answers within reason and religion is insurmountable. The knowledge of man comes from outside with Revelation. A special intimacy with the Father, Son and Spirit is the richness of faith and its gift. St. Athanasius of Alexandria states: It is through the Spirit that we share in God. Through participation in the Spirit, we become participants of the Divine nature... That is why those in whom the Spirit dwells are divinized. In practice, we find that it is impossible to see two spheres in man: body and soul, because both have been called to participate in God’s life. Nothing stands in the way of a person realizing a project of life-based on Jesus Christ, and if he does not do so, he expresses the ignorance of his fact and mystery. In the theological language, we call this mystery “Christoforming”. (A. J. Nowak). For God’s will is your sanctification (1 Thessalonians 4:3, cf. Ef 1,4).

The Lord Jesus, the divine Teacher and model of all perfection, proclaimed to his disciples any state, altogether and each one individually, the holiness of life, of which he himself is the culprit and accomplisher: “Be perfect, then, as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). (LG 40). To attain this perfection, the faithful should turn their strength obtained according to the measure of the gift of Christ, so that they may follow in His footsteps and conform themselves to the pattern which He Himself is for them (*ibid.*). The individual and historical realization of conforming to the Model will be a purifying “spiritual night” (St. John of the Cross) called in psychological language “positive disintegration”. (K. Dąbrowski).

Christ urged continuous development and maturation, partial dying and resurrection, transcending symbolic integration towards mystical union with Him. If a person refuses, he sinks into darkness and despair, when he opens up, infinite horizons of happiness and fulfillment shine away from him.

The Combination Of Ethics And Aesthetics With Regard To The Representation Of The Body In Culture*

Human corporeality is present across the whole of history. Contemporary attitudes towards the body seems to be an important determiner of changes in mentality. The comparison between the affirmation of the body in the Catholic Church and contemporary signs of human degradation through corporeality are of interest. On the one hand, there is enslavement through consumerism and utilitarianism, and on the other hand the boosting of the body's confidence by means of constant reference to human corporeality.

The opinion that Christianity presents a negative attitude towards corporeality is a misunderstanding. This image could be influenced by medieval ascetic practices, which were supposed to form spiritual perfection by means of rigorism and internal discipline. Asceticism, practiced and highly valued up to this day in Christianity, is not a result of contempt and aversion towards the body, but of the experience that one of the paths towards God leads through spiritual development supported by giving up sensual experiences¹. *The Catechism of the Catholic Church* indicates several aspects of the truth concerning human corporeality and respect for the body in Christianity; the body takes part in the dignity of the image of God²; God himself became a human³; The Eucharist, as the body of Jesus Christ, became a symbol of salvation of man⁴; the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit, a sign of the beauty of God⁵; according

* STV 48(2010)1.

¹ Cf. *Apoftegmaty Ojców Pustyni*, PSP 33, vol. 1, 292, Warsaw 1986.

² KKK, 364.

³ KKK 457.

⁴ KKK 1333.

⁵ KKK 2519.

to the Biblical parable, a woman was created out of the body of man⁶; man can control his desires, particularly sensual pleasures⁷; man should control his desires also due to the dignity and freedom of other people⁸; we will rise from the dead in the same bodies⁹.

Corporeality In History

The first Christian heresies were connected with the rejection of human corporeality as a source of evil. Up until now, the gnostic spirit affirming only the spiritual sphere of man has been present in current philosophies and outlooks. Gnosticism (from Greek *gnosis* – having knowledge) was a very interesting compilation of Iranian, Persian, Egyptian, Judaist and Christian beliefs. The basic premise of gnostic philosophy is the necessity to break up everything in the world that is connected with the body because only the spirit is a sign of fulfilment and salvation. Due to this fact, the relationship between man and woman was dirty, and living in the body called for undertaking effort, liberating oneself from the body. According to Plato and Greek philosophy, the soul is a divine element and must be freed from the body. Gnostic cosmology was based on the opinion that there is dualism in the world: good-evil, light-darkness; the demiurge of *the Old Testament* was just, but not merciful, the creator of matter, the reason for everything which is impure in the world, and the God of the *New Testament*, the creator of everything that is spiritual. The early Christian

writers, such as Irenaeus of Lyon¹⁰, or Tertullian¹¹, had to deal with gnostic teachers in defence of the faith. They formulated the first teachings about the dualism of body and soul in man as two necessary elements which supplement each other in their writings, based on philosophy and logic.

The apologists were supported by the Greek love of art. Even though the great ancient philosophers called for liberation from the body, the then art showed that the beauty of the soul is represented by the body. Right up to this day, ancient sculpture and the manner of presenting figures constitutes a model for artists. The Greek admiration for the body which needs to pursue

⁶ KKK 371.

⁷ KKK 2536

⁸ KKK 2535.

⁹ KKK 990.

¹⁰ Cf. Irenaeus of Lyon, *Adversus Haereses*, vol. 1 – Sources Chretiennes 263.264.

¹¹ Cf. Tertullian, *Przeciw Marcjonowi*, PSP, vol. 58, Warsaw 1994.

perfection in order to represent the extraordinary character and beauty of the soul, was an inspiration for Christian art¹². What is more, the Church Fathers in their writings additionally emphasized the meaning of the creation of man (also as a corporeal person) in God's own image and likeness (Gen. 1:26). The body, which was underestimated, outside Judaism, started to participate in the dignity of God's image.

There is no place here for semantic deliberation connected with the Biblical understanding of the word "body". We should bear in mind that even Saint Paul explained the difference between *sarx*, body understood as corporeality, as a whole human and *soma* the physical body subject to desire¹³. The very fact of introducing such notions in Judaism and their adoption by the first Christians shows strong connotations between man and body.

The history of affirmation and degradation of the "body" is extremely rich and this topic was raised many times. In this paper, we will only analyse our age. The departure from metaphysics is a significant feature of the contemporary interest in the body. One of the first thinkers who radicalized thinking about the human body was F. Nietzsche¹⁴. He announced the death of God, satirized the soul and introduced the notion of the birth of super humanity. His opinions on the issue of corporeality are important, because as of that moment it was believed that man could fulfil himself by means of using the body. Nietzsche gives up metaphysics, belief in eternal life. He is liberated by nature. This is the characteristic opinion of some philosophers who think that the philosophy of Nietzsche began atheistic trend, as well as the utilitarian and consumerist vision of the man. According to Gabriel Marcel (and later more broadly to John Paul II) man starts to care more for "having" than "being"¹⁵.

To this day, the Christian concept reminds us of the fact that the body is a manner of representing human beings, that it is necessary, but not a sufficient rationale. The existence of a person is connected with an independent soul which cannot function apart from the body (waiting for the Last Judgment is a separate topic. The soul exists here without the body, but only in the perspective of the Resurrection. The body, on the other hand, as dust (Gen. 3:19), awaits a new life).

¹² Cf. E. Jastrzębowska, *Sztuka wczesnochrześcijańska*, Warsaw 1988; M.L. Bernhard, *Historia starożytnej sztuki greckiej*, 4 volumes, Warsaw 1993; Z. Abramowiczówna, *O sztuce starożytnej*, Toruń 2000; H.G. Gadamer, *Aktualność piękna: sztuka jako gra, symbol i święto*, Warsaw 1993; P. Evdokimov, *Sztuka ikony. Teologia piękna*, Warsaw 2006.

¹³ I. Mroczkowski, *Osoba i cielesność*, Płock 1994, 45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 23

¹⁵ G. Marcel, *Być i mieć*, Warsaw 1962. Cf. Jan Paweł II, *Evangelium vitae*, 98.

Karol Wojtyła developed a definition of a man. He wrote that a man is an entity not only by means of self-awareness and self-determination but also by means of his body which allows him to act. “The notion of ‘spirit’ and ‘spirituality’ is often, somewhat one-sidedly, identified with the denial of the purely material nature of man. By “spiritual” we indeed mean an immaterial factor which is inherently irreducible to matter. (...) Spirituality is open to intuition as well as to an unfolding analysis. This shape, the shape of transcendence, is concretely that of human existence: it is the shape of human life itself. Man both lives and fulfils himself within the perspective of his transcendence”¹⁶. This is a repetition of the definition of the soul already presented in the Middle Ages by Saint Thomas Aquinas who rebuilt this concept with Christianity in mind with the use of Aristotle’s beliefs, determining the soul as a form of the body. As a side note, the soul and body cannot exist separately, even though these are separate components because the existence of one element justifies the existence of the other. Therefore, death constitutes a split for the believers, which can only be fixed by the Resurrected Christ.

Contemporary Times

It seems that our contemporary time is the time of paradox. On the one hand, we witness the deification of the body, and its degradation on the other. The “body” is present in each dimension of a culture. It became a cultural mark. Effective diets, new clothes designs, plastic surgery, beauty and wellness salons, healthy food, water from natural sources is all supposed to serve the body, not man. It is supposed to improve his external image, because the body is an “advertisement” of a person. The body is a person for sale: advertising agencies, the media face of a TV presenter, a best-dressed politician or businesswoman. The perfect image is promoted nowadays, someone who is well-cared for, and a slim and athletic body is the key to success and the path to having a career. The body is being contradicted, people are fighting the body. Breasts are enlarged, noses are subject to surgery. We buy cream in order to fight wrinkles. The body now seems to be something strange for man, something ‘separate’ which needs to be fixed. Culture has always created some criteria for the canon of beauty, but nowadays it is strongly supported by TV and advertisements which are (seemingly) all about the improvement of human corporeality. The most important

¹⁶ K. Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, Lublin 1994, 190.

thing is that man should give up money (a part of himself), hard work, and time. Suffering, death, old age and sickness have been eliminated imperceptibly from the public sphere. We have hospices and retirement homes. The latter is however more of an enclave for elderly people who get separated from the world and their family and die alone. There are new health problems which were not termed disease before: hyperactivism, hyperactivity, depression and identity problems. Due to problems concerning sexuality, contemporary psychology has even created new concepts with the body considered a "stranger." The concept of *gender* was created and it describes a set of features and behaviours, gender roles and stereotypes ascribed to both men and women by society and culture where biological gender is not separated but is described as sex.

On the other hand, contemporary art becomes increasingly more provocative. The most frequent topic is breaking the taboo that is human nudity which was hidden throughout the centuries. Popular culture exploits the body as much as possible. Artists look for topics combining sex and the sacred. The sacred entity is lost in mass culture, and its place is taken not by the profane but by banality. Art looks for new means of expression, new techniques and artistic forms. However, the result can hardly be called beauty which inspires.

The Christian message on nudity is unambiguous. "Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves." (Gen. 3:7). Saint Augustine, Doctor of the Church, explained in the commentary to this fragment of the Holy Bible that nudity was not something disgraceful and that lust was controlled before original sin. Nudity was a symbol of purity and similarity to the Creator, a symbol of freedom and simplicity¹⁷. Looking at nudity was connected with the belief that we give ourselves to the other person, standing before the other person in truth, without mystery. To this day, nudity is a symbol of the state of human existence for Christians where everything is revealed and where we live in truth. The medieval spiritual rule went as following: strip oneself to the core which means pursuing the state before original sin. After the fall of the first parents, nudity was combined with sexuality, an unstructured desire. Due to this, the Church Fathers said that nudity was covered with the cloth of baptism and the tunic of resurrection¹⁸. The strict attitude towards nudity was not contradictory to the affirmation of the body. It was a result of an awareness of sin and indicated a lack of balance in nature. It seems that it was also a response

¹⁷ S. Kobielus, *Nagość jako symbol i wartość w kulturze średniowiecza*, "Communio" 64(1991)4, 106.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 108.

towards the excessive cult of the body in Greek and Roman art, especially when it came to nude sculptures of the gods. As far as Christian art is concerned, the image of nudity was frequently connected with the worshipped body: the nudity of the resurrected Christ, the nudity of man during the Final Judgement or the nudity in paradise.

The Biblical message shows that man looked for his identity as at the moment of his creation. His external appearance, his body, made him distinct from the world of other living creatures. Adam also noticed that he participated in the visibility of the created world by means of the body. The description of creation (Gen. 2,1:25) shows that the body played a crucial role during the first encounter between man and woman. Woman was bone of his bones, flesh of his flesh. It could also be said that man is able to define himself only at the sight of woman. He only finds himself during an encounter with another human being.

According to theologians, the Biblical “I heard you in the garden, and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid” (Gen. 3:10) is about the radical change in man after original sin. We need to understand this in order to explain the modern attitude of man towards the body. According to Catholicism, man is similar to God through the body. However, we lost the initial certainty of God’s image as expressed in the body¹⁹. Sexual and immanent shame emerges. Man ceased to identify with his body. Instead of being similar to God, by means of the gift for the other, he becomes similar to animals. He is subject to sexual desire and cannot control it.

Works of culture, especially works of art, provide “being the body” and experiencing the body with an over-material character. Contact with the body as a topic for art gains an aesthetic dimension. Contact with other human beings should always favour the aesthetic experience of purity. It should execute the subjective dimension of the gift. As far as ethics is concerned, the anonymity of the gift of the body in art is problematic. The human body, the naked body, (according to John Paul II) should always have the significance of a gift, a person for a person²⁰. The artistic objectification of the body is a kind of separation from this interpersonal gift system. Sculpture, painting and film is not able to keep this function of the gift of the body. It has common sense.

“Moving” the body to the public sphere goes above the concept of communion of the people, above original shame and the need for the intimacy of our own body. According to the pope, this truth should be reflected in the artistic

¹⁹ John Paul II, *Mężczyznę i niewiastę stworzył ich*, Vatican 1986, 115.

²⁰ John Paul II, *Etos ciała a dzieła kultury artystycznej*, in: *Mężczyznę...*, op. cit., 241.

order. This is the only way to avoid the objectification of the human being²¹. The culture of the body is a transformation of matter, that is the body in the female and male form. In his criticism of culture, John Paul II talks about working on one's own ethical and moral sensitivity. The artist must want to show the truth of man in his body, in his female and male character. Then, the audience needs to make an effort in order to read this intention. The artist needs to maintain contact with the audience. However, many contemporary pieces of art seem to be art for art's sake, thoughtless messages. We should create an atmosphere fostering purity so that every contact with the human body is appropriate for human dignity. "True and responsible artistic activity aims at overcoming the anonymity of the human body as an object 'without choice.' As has already been said, it seeks through creative effort such an artistic expression of the truth about man in his feminine and masculine corporeity, which is, so to speak, assigned as a task to the viewer and, in the wider range, to every recipient of the work"²².

However, contrary to the idealistic vision of the pope, consumer society creates a type of narcissistic culture, where the main concern for the human being is its healthy and beautiful appearance. The body is goods for sale. Women are convinced that a model is a media authority for them. Due to this fact, women (as a product of creation) should constantly be fixed and improved. "Put bluntly, the part that was not successfully fashioned by nature should be improved"²³. The narcissistic trend, hitherto reserved for the fairer sex, now also touches men. This fact only confirms the fear expressed by the pope that nowadays the body is only limited to an image offering success, self-fulfilment, and that man is limited to the functions of his own body. This trend is promoted as the most important value in life. People who lack this advantage will be placed outside society²⁴.

The Tasks Of Culture

The task of culture is to describe and show the beauty of human beings, reach the truth of his humanity. The works of culture, especially works of art, make the dimensions of "being the body," "experiencing the body" teach, inspire and

²¹ Ibid., 243.

²² Ibid., 251.

²³ P. Tyszka, *Kupuję nową twarz. O ciele idealnym.*, in: D. Czaja (ed.), *Metamorfozy ciała*, Warsaw 1999, 56.

²⁴ Ibid., 73.

suggest the answer to the following question: who is man? Due to this relationship, the body became a popular theme for literature, music, sculpture and painting. Every contact with such a work of art is an aesthetic experience for the recipient. Such a perspective, which provides human beings with reflection on his own existence, becomes a work of art. A work of art is always some kind of step towards perfection. A work of art is beautiful insofar as it awakes the good in the human being, and is aesthetic at the same time.

The task of culture is meeting with another person, a relationship based on creative dialogue. Talking about the body in culture requires the unity of the creator and the recipient, their mutual communication. The aesthetic experience, the experience of beauty is always something good arising out of the intention of the person explored, but also of the intentions of the artist who wants to show a positive value by means of his work of art – this is truly a work of art. The relationship between the creator and the recipient is mutual and leads to the enrichment of both entities.

The body or face, image or profile of a person is a form of particular expression of humanity.

The interesting concept of ‘face recognition’ as a meeting place was presented by Father Józef Tischner. The sources of his meeting philosophy²⁵, which is in other words can be called a dialogue, reach the notion of drama, where man and his life is the key. Man, as described by Tischner, takes part in the drama, where his life is a stage. By means of making contact with different people, we participate in different shows, where we constantly live our lives in a different manner. Man is inherently dramatic, which means that he naturally opens to the world — the stage. However, being a dramatic person is for Tischner something completely different than being man or woman, a child or an elderly person. It is the awareness that you are a subject for yourself and other people and that you bear the responsibility for “destruction or salvation” yourself²⁶, which is important. This means that a person may accept his character and that the drama will end in salvation. He can also reject his character and lose himself, leading to tragedy.

²⁵ Through contemporary philosophy, in criticising European rationalism and referring to the tradition of Judaism, he develops a dialogical vision of human philosophy; the following people are the authors of this philosophy: F. Rosenzweig, M. Buber and F. Ebner. The philosophy of dialogue was creatively developed in Poland by J. Tischner who created the philosophy of drama.

²⁶ J. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu*, Kraków 2006, 8.

Father Tischner uses notions developed by philosophers preceding him: Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas. He interprets their opinions in the context of the concept of drama. This is the way he reaches his idea on dialogical openness towards other human beings. The key notion in this drama is the face as an expression of the whole human being. The face is the core of meetings and the beginning of relationships with other human beings, as well as the beginning of human existence in culture at the same time.

“Another person is present in me — or near me — by means of the claim which he causes in me. (...) Another person is present near me by means of what I should do for him; I am present near him by means of what he should do for me”²⁷.

Making The Gift Of The Body Common In Art

The presence of a man, the message of a gift — the body — is executed by making the body common in culture. This should be a positive phenomenon. It is supposed to show beauty which should offer something positive for each recipient. According to Father Tischner, beauty is a property which cannot be appropriated. Therefore, talking about the man is always connected with talking about his character of a subject. According to Tischner, the meeting of people is at the same time a chance for experiencing the beauty of another human being. It is about the beauty which is a result of the value provided by the existence of another human being²⁸.

This issue is similarly understood by John Paul II. However, he directs his thoughts to the meeting of people as a means of contact with a piece of art, the fruit of culture. In order to talk about the body in culture, it is necessary (according to the pope) to make this a topic for a piece of art. Therefore, it will always be some kind of “objectification” of the body. He notices the body in film, painting, photography and sculpture usually becomes a model which is subject to processing. The level of such processing is dependent on the medium which creates the show. The negative value, which is noticed by the pope in artistic reproductions of the body, is the necessity of its objectification. As far as film production or the photographic act is concerned, the body becomes something anonymous. Direct contact with the human body and its elementary functions, that is being

²⁷ Ibid., 12-13.

²⁸ Ibid., 92.

“for” has been lost. When the body becomes a work of art it is deprived of its subjective function of telling us about man. It starts to be a carrier of another sense than the original one in the artistic form. In each of the dimensions of art performance, the body becomes a product of art, which is widely available for many recipients. That is why John Paul II asks the following questions: is it possible to present the body in such a manner that will preserve its original sense, the original message of giving? Is the presentation of a naked body aesthetic and ethical at the same time? Is it ethical to present the body anonymously, if this results in the risk of losing the whole sphere of meaning appropriate for the male and female body, as well as mutual relations between them?

It seems that similar questions are asked by Father Tischner. However, he does not deal directly with the means of presenting the body in culture. He speaks of the ontic relation, of cognition on the living level, which always constitutes the basis for culture. The analyses of Father Tischner are therefore something primal when it comes to the image of the body in art, which was already created. They reach issues which should be touched by each artist and creator in a more or less conscious manner.

The analyses of John Paul II reach the material reality in which we participate and in which the ontic questions of Father Tischner are present insofar as they are expressed in a form called the practical execution of this philosophy. In each of the dimensions of art, according to John Paul II, regardless of the level of their perfection and similarity to the original, the human body “loses that deeply subjective meaning of the gift. It becomes an object destined for the knowledge of many”²⁹.

According to Tischner and John Paul II, culture pursues the discovery of the nudity of man. As far as the nudity of the face is concerned, the face without a mask looks for the truth about “the other,” whom we meet, and at the same time is searching for one’s own identity, our self-determination in the world thanks to meeting “the other.” This issue is undertaken by the pope, but in a slightly different form. The pursuit of the presentation of nudity was something natural in primitive cultures. The pope looks at the current culture and makes the assessment that society has kept the memory of a betrothed nature of the body. It is visible even during an appointment with a doctor, when one has to get naked. The natural feeling of shame emerges, which is supposed to protect this gift. This shame reminds us of the fact that the naked body may be a gift only for one person. Even though John Paul II expresses his thoughts

²⁹ John Paul II, *Mężczyzna...*, op. cit., 242.

from the point of view of Christian anthropology, he seems to present the truth for all mankind.

The objection presented by Christian circles towards pornography and pornovision is a result of the fight for the preservation of the body as a gift “for.” The anonymous nudity of the body and different techniques of its reproduction aim for profits and material benefits gained from the humiliation of the body and reducing it to the role of an object. The correctness of the gift and giving the gift is no longer sensible. The body becomes public property in culture. That is why, according to John Paul II, it loses its function of interpersonal communication³⁰.

This issue is present (however, to a lesser degree) in analyses by Father Tischner³¹. The beauty of the human body, the beauty of the face has a fundamental goal. It is a message of value and a gift of value. It makes a person feel dignity arising out of an encounter with another person. The aim of the encounter is to discover one’s own dignity and beauty. Man is the carrier of positive values, which arise out of the very essence of his existence. At the same time, the value of his existence points to the beauty of this life. According to Tischner, contact with the other and the beauty of the other results in openness. Both entities (the learning and the learned) acquire an appropriate sense.

Ethical Boundaries Of Body Presentations

The topic of the human corporeality carries ethical issues. Since culture tackles the issues most important for man, it should also deal with the topic of corporeality and the most beautiful message existing between men — love. Are there any boundaries of discussing the body in culture?

Both Father Tischner and John Paul II thought that the concept of ethics and aesthetics create boundaries inside human conscience. This combination of ethics and aesthetics is somehow connected with the topic of communicativeness. Mutual relations between man and woman — people who are aware of the mutual gift — creates communion. The similar function of communion should be fulfilled by the artist towards the recipient. The artist is responsible for his own work of art. When undertaking this topic in any of the branches of art or by means of different techniques, the artist must be aware of the complete truth of the subject presented by him. If he deals with presenting the body, especially

³⁰ Ibid., 247.

³¹ J. Tischner, *op. cit.*, 90-94.

its nudity, he is morally obliged to present it in a way which keeps the intention of the subject and which brings itself closer to the truth on the subject. The task of the artist is to establish communication and build connection with the recipient of his work of art. The artist is supposed to provide the recipient with his internal world of values by means of his creative idea. The recipient, invited by the artist to look at the work of art, interacts with the individual vision of the artist, a culturally adopted attempt to objectivize the work of art. Apart from his original idea, the artist, as the creator of culture, has to create works of art which constitute the message reflecting the truth. As far as the body is concerned, the true artist processes the issue of nudity, which does not lead to lust, but wakes the desire to look for deeper values, for the truth.

According to Tischner, the artist shows beauty, but as he writes, “beauty should not need anyone, even the artist”³². Tischner expresses a statement similar to that of John Paul II that the man, the artist, by means of his art, represents (with more or less success), the truth of the man and the beauty of creation. The task of the artist or other creator of art is to serve ethics by means of aesthetics.

However, there are some works of art (or reproductions to be precise) which do not evoke positive feelings in the recipient. They “arouse objection in the sphere of man’s personal sensitivity — not because of their object, since the human body in itself always has its inalienable dignity – but because of the quality or the way it has been reproduced, portrayed or its artistic representation”³³. If the recipient’s reaction is objection, disapproval, if he feels dissonance with his own sensitivity, this is probably when we have to deal with the objectification of man. We see the presentation of the body, which serves something completely different than looking for truth on the subject.

That is why John Paul II emphatically emphasizes the artist’s responsibility for his own work of art. The aesthetics of his work of art should raise ethical sensitivity, should be the strength and reason for ethics. However, the responsibility lies both with the creator and recipient of the work of art. The artist should look for such forms of body presentation, which will show the dignity, purity and betrothed character of the body to the level closest to the truth. On the other hand, the recipient must express an authentic desire to understand the intention of the artist. He is also obliged to make some effort in order to shape the truest image of the body. It is dependent on him whether he will make an effort to search for the truth or, as suggested by John Paul II, will “remain merely

³² Ibid., 99f.

³³ John Paul II, *Mężczyzna...*, op. cit., 249.

a superficial consumer of impressions, that is, one who exploits the meeting with the anonymous body-subject only at the level of sensuality which, by itself, reacts to its object precisely without choice”³⁴.

The reflections of Father Tischner on the topic of relations between ethics and aesthetics do not touch the manners of presenting the body in culture in a direct way. Just like John Paul II, he also talks about the necessity of such interpersonal relations, which will result in studying the truth of man. This results in his analyses of the face and their consequences with regard to people meeting each other. Father Tischner uses the concept of “face,” John Paul II talks about the body in general.

Both of them consider the body-face a great work of art created by God. Our whole existence here on Earth is a path towards discovering God, who placed his image in the work of art, that is man and his corporeality.

The reflection of both philosophers seems extremely important in the current discussion on the role of culture in the process of upbringing man. Society awakens from stupefaction and becomes an active and demanding recipient. As an example: we feel irritated by advertisements, we usually prefer European cinema, not thoughtless Hollywood films. The trendy, naturalistic model of presenting the body starts to repel the audience. Popular culture seems to deprive man of his own identity and individuality by means of many shallow and unethical propositions. Therefore we look for spirituality and we probably find it in our corporeality — in the value of the body in culture.

³⁴ Ibid., 251.

Part II –
Biblical Issue

The Question of Anthropological Dualism in the Old Testament and Intertestamental Literature*

1. The Problem of Anthropological Dualism

Religious dualism, both in history of religion and in theology, can be regarded as one of the most controversial and difficult to explain phenomena. Studies in history of religion are aimed at identifying dualistic traditions in different cultural centers and placing them in the right historical, geographical¹ and chronological context. The studies on the interdependences of particular traditions and their influence on other, non-dualistic religious movements are particularly challenging because modern researchers still missing certain knowledge or do not have enough data at their disposal. The theological reflection is in a much better position as long as it deals with subsequent phases of development of homogenous religious system.

* STV 7(1969)2.

¹ The best publication in the field of ethnology and comparative religions has been presented by U. Bianchi, *Il dualism religioso*, Roma 1958. In his monographic study he stands that the most important question is: “*c’è una connessione obiettiva, fenomenologica e storico-culturale, tra i grandi sistemi dualistici (i dualismi “culti”) e i dualismi primitivi?*” (p. 8). For this paper, of certain importance are some author’s remarks regarding the Iranian and gnostic dualism, together with his discussion about dualism as a worldwide religion within the Gnosticism (*Gnosis als Weltreligion*, p. 13 and following). See also a series of papers discussing the same topic published by U. Bianchi in a collective cahier of a meeting in Messina dedicated to the question of Gnosticism: *Le origini dello gnosticismo – The origins of Gnosticism*, Leiden 1967. Also W. Eltester, in his book *Christentum und Gnosis*, Berlin 1969, pp. 129-132 mentions the interesting theses of the Messina meeting regarding the relation between the Gnosticism and dualism, and a correct use of both terms.

Much more difficult to capture are, however, secondary foreign dualistic influences, which hardly ever could be distinguished from the development of indigenous, original religious thought in its radical form. The difference between an externally adopted dualistic idea, adapted and then incorporated into a theological system and between its influence, intensely stimulating an indigenous, original reflection in a certain direction does not seem to be significant.

There is a common tendency to subsume not only the notion of the real bifurcation of reality into two poles, which are irreducible to each other (proper dualism) or into two opposite elements, but also all tendencies to create oppositions, contrasts or antitheses (relative dualism) into the overall notion of dualism. The anthropological dualism, which is the subject of the present paper, is not limited, however, to a Platonic-Orphic concept of the body, considered as a prison of the soul², even though this opposition is going to play a rather fundamental role here.

Significant part of our considerations will be focused on the disparity between the two major constitutive elements of a human being, the inferior of which (usually referred to as body) becomes subject to a negative judgment or even disgust³.

Certainly, we should not expect to find in the Old Testament or in the Qumran documents a consistent lecture on the anthropological dualism. Considering the monistic presuppositions of the books of the Old Covenant in terms of human science (discussed later in this paper) and taking into account the attitude of careful distance – with regard to any form of dualism – kept by biblical traditions, only a practical approach, which simply opposes some non-dualistic anthropological concepts, is possible.

A similar situation can be found in non-biblical intertestamental literature, in particular in the Qumran documents. In this category, different literary genres can be distinguished. If, for instance, in parenetic (Test. XII Patr.) or didactic-legal treatises (The Qumran Community Rule), the anthropological dualism is a way of expressing a dissonance concerning ethics and respecting the Law, then in Apocalyptic writings or hymns this kind of dualism will justify spiritual struggles and dilemmas present in religious life. In both cases the anthropological assumptions is of secondary importance.

There are, however, certain fragments, in the Qumran literature, in which the didactical tendency gives way to theological exposition. But even there, the

² See G. Mensching, *Dualismus I*, 4. In: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*³ vol. III, 273.

³ See G. Van der Leeuw, *Phänomenologie der Religion*², Tübingen 1956, 342.

anthropological dualism is not considered an independent issue, but is always examined together with an ethical dilemma or even with cosmological bifurcation.

Both elements fighting each other inside a human heart represent two very different ethical values: the good and the bad. The fight between them is not only typically human; similar rivalry can be found on the cosmic level and its forces can influence a human life in a positive or negative way.

Both in the Old Testament environment and in circles where intertestamental literature was created, there is no point in distinguishing classical types of dualism, also it creates a risk of learning about its specific characteristics. What is important is that the main theater of this rivalry is the human, whose all powers participate in it. This is why, when examining issues constituting anthropological dualism, we actually deal with a whole spectrum of antithetic theses that come together with it.

The issue of anthropological duality and its origins was taken up with the finding and publication of, today widely known, Qumran texts. In these texts, not only antitheses and practical dualistic concepts, well-known from the Old Testament, have been found for the first time, but also a compact lecture on the dualistic view of human life.

It is not surprising then that from the very beginning of this research, the question of origins and foreign influences of the dualistic doctrine has been imposed⁴.

Although the issue of the genesis of Qumran human studies has been initially examined only occasionally, two tendencies have emerged in its course: one regarded anthropology of the Qumran Community only as a specific interpretation of the Old Testament teaching, enriched with some sharp contrapositions, to be found also in other intertestamental texts⁵, the other argued in favour of maintaining a fundamental distinction between the biblical tradition and the Qumran dualism, difficult to be derived from the influence of a late-Jewish Apocalyptic⁶.

⁴ K. G. Kuhn, *Die Sektenschrift und die iranische Religion*, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 49 (1952) 296-316; A. Dupont-Sommer, *L'instruction sur les deux Esprits dans le „Manuel de Discipline“*, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 142 (1952) 5-35; ibidem, *Le problème des influences étrangères sur la secte juive de Qoumran*, Revue de l'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses 35 (1955) 75-92; H. Wildberger, *Der Dualismus in den Qumranschriften*, Asiatische Studien 1 (1954) 163-177.

⁵ See E. Schweizer, *sarx*. In: Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament VII, 118-121.

⁶ Cfr in particular a paper by H. H. Rowley, *Jewish Apocalyptic and the Dead Sea Scrolls*, London 1957.

The radicalism of this approach would indicate – as claimed by the followers of the second tendency – not only the existence of non-biblical influences, but also of a completely foreign influences, such as Iranian⁷, early Gnostic⁸ or even proto-Mandaic⁹. Both extreme positions have been later criticized, which however has not contributed to achieve definite solution of the anthropological problem in terms of dualistic perspective of Qumran.

After the publication of most of the texts¹⁰, further fragments of well-known inter-testamental Apocryphs representing a similar dualistic anthropology were found there. This gave rise to the assumption that they might be of the same origins as the Qumran manuscripts. This particularly refers to the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, a writings that was characterized by dualistic assumptions most closely related to the Community Rule or Qumran Hymns.

Today it commonly stated that this apocryphal writing has its origins in an environment that had some contacts with Qumran¹¹, while the current views indicate significant influence of Christianity, regarding it even as a Christian writing¹².

⁷ Apart from works cited in comment no. 4, see also H. Michaud, *Un mythe zervanite dans un des manuscrits de Qumran*, *Vetus Testamentum* 5 (1955) 137-147; A. Vööbbus, *History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient*, Louvain 1958, 20-22; J. Danielou, *Demon II*, 2 in: *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité III*, 162.

⁸ Some commentators did not hesitate to consider the Qumran manuscripts the oldest Gnostic document: K. Schubert, *Der Sektenkanon von En Feschha un di Anfänge der jüdischen Gnosis*, *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 78 (1953), 495-506; H. J. Schoeps, *Das Gnostische Judentum in den Dead Sea Scrolls*, *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* 4 (1954) 276-279; R. Marcus, *Judaism and Gnosticism*, *Judaism* 4 (1955) 360-364; Bo Reicke, *Traces of Gnosticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls?* *New Testament Studies* 1 (1954/1955) 137-141 (a moderate position; mentions only pre-gnosis seen as stage of the development of the doctrine of Judaism). The broadest justification of gnostic elements found in the manuscripts can be found in I. H. Braun, *Spätjüdisch-häretischer und frühchristlicher Radikalismus I-II*, Tübingen 1957.

⁹ F. M. Barun, *Le Mandeisme et la secte essenien de Qumrân*, in: *L'Ancien Testamen et L'Orient* (Louvain 1957), 193-230. To be noted also an older paper by K. Stawarczyk, *Protomandaizm a powstanie gnozy (Proto-Mandaicism and the origins of Gnosis)*, *Collectanea Theologica* 16 (1935) 519-530 (partly outdated).

¹⁰ Until now, entire manuscripts and fragments from caves 1-3 and 5-10 have been published, from caves 4 and 11 only the most important documents have been published and a critical edition shall be published soon.

¹¹ In Caves I (1Q 21) and IV (4Q TLevi ar^ac; 4Q TNapht hebr.) some prototypes of fragments of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs written in Aramaic and Hebrew have been found. Further information provided in: J.T. Milik, *Le Testament de Lévi en araméen. Fragment de la Grotte 4 de Qumrân*, *Revue Biblique* 62 (1955) 398-406.

¹² This has been suggested, independently from the Qumran writings, by M. De Jonge, *The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, Assen 1953.

This – indeed problematic – explanation is not satisfactory, because it does not explain the origins of dualistic anthropology, it only brings it down to one source, not considering other constitutive elements of development of biblical anthropological concepts.

Neither the late-Jewish teaching on the two tendencies (j^esarim) of human being¹³, nor the late-Hellenic¹⁴ Judaism explains sufficiently the dualistic orientation of anthropology in the intertestamental literature. Therefore, a retrospective review of this anthropology, both in terms of its assumptions and its numerous implications, seems indispensable. The basis of this research will be, of course, the Old Testament, to which the intertestamental literature constantly refers.

Because the thematic scope of this article does not allow to discuss exhaustively all aspects of dualistic anthropology, we should limit ourselves to one – the most characteristic antithesis: body-spirit. It will allow us to capture the fundamental difference between the dualistic biblical and Hellenistic concepts, on the other hand, it is of considerable importance in the view of further development of biblical anthropology in the New Testament.

2. Body and Spirit in the Old Testament

The Hebrew Bible considers the human being an organic entirety, not affected by a distinction between individual functional organs like the heart (lēb), the life-giving element (nefeš) etc.¹⁵ Older biblical theologies of the Old Testament, persistently aiming at adapting the biblical data to Greek-Latin schemes¹⁶ were trying to distinguish two (nefeš – the vegetative soul and rūah – the “spiritual”

¹³ For the „two tendencies” see excursus: *The heart's vicious intentions* in L. Stachowiak, *Lamentacje – Księga Barucha (Lamentations – the Book of Baruch)*, Poznań 1968 147-157.

¹⁴ See i.e. B. Otzen, *Die neugefundenden hebräischen Sektenschriften und die Testamente die Zwölf Patriarchen*, *Studia Theologica* 7 (1953) 125-157.

¹⁵ Widely described in papers researching more general anthropological principles of the Old Testament. See in particular: K. Galling, *Das Bild vom Menschen in biblischer Sicht*, Mainz 1947; G. Fohrer, *Theologische Züge des Menschenbildes in Alten Testament*. In: *Das Wort im evangelischen Religionsunterricht 1959/60*, nr 1, 9-21; W. Zimmerli, *Was ist der Mensch*, Göttingen 1964; V. Warnach, *Mensch.*, in: *Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe* (München, 1963), vol. II 145-160; L. Köhler, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*⁴, Tübingen 1966.

¹⁶ I.e. J. Schwab, *Der Begriff der Nephesh in den Religen Schriften des Alten Testaments*, München 1913; R. Dussaud, *La notion d'âme chez les Israelites et les Phéniciens*, *Syria* 16 (1935) 267-277.

soul) or even more (*nefeš*, *rûah* and *bašar*, the body) constitutive elements in anthropological disputes.¹⁷

These, however, include neither *rûah* nor *bašar*, which can be defined as different aspects of one, given psycho-physical subject. It is difficult to consider the divine origin of the spirit¹⁸ as the basis for a more accurate distinction, because according to the testimony of the Bible, every element of a human has ultimately divine origins. The Old Testament considers a living body and all of its parts as one entity constituting each person's individual life; in the individual "parts" of an animated body, all of his personality may manifest. Undoubtedly, the ability to provide comprehensive representation of the manifestations of life of an individual in its seemingly separate aspects, is an original characteristic of the Hebrew way of thinking.¹⁹

The Hellenistic culture has brought a completely different point of view of an individual to the East. In his structure, two completely different elements can be distinguished: body (rather *soma* than *sarx* – see below), exponent of the material side, the inferior aspect of man's existence, and soul (*psyche*), of divine origin, which is striving to free itself from the bonds of the body.

Admittedly, it is not the aim of this paper to present the genesis and development of these views.

It is enough to quote the classic formulation of the most outstanding representative and theoretician of these views, Plato, who in his „Phaedo”, XI (66b- 67b) states as follows: "...as long as we do have a body (*to soma*), and our soul will be linked to such a great evil, never in the world are we able to achieve and own what we desire. And we say that this is the truth. Because the body, which requires nutrition, is the cause of problems... ... It fills us with desire, lust and fears and illusions of all kinds, and lots of nonsense, so that as they say we cannot ever take something in only by brain. Because all wars and riots and battles, they come from the body and its desires. Because all our wars are about getting the money, and the money is acquired for the body; like slaves we are obliged to accommodate it. And this is why we have no time to dedicate

¹⁷ Widely described by: A.I. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile*, Paris 1932, 196-222; P. van Imschoot *Théologie de l'Ancien Testament*, Paris 1956, vol. II, 35; W. Eichrodt, *Théologie des Alten Testaments*⁴, Göttingen 1961, vol. II/III, 75-99.

¹⁸ See L. Stachowiak *Teologiczny temat duchów w pismach qumrańskich (The theological topic of the Spirits in the Qumran writings)*, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL-u 10* (1967) 37-52, particularly p. 38.

¹⁹ See also A.R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* ², Cardiff 1964; A.S. Kapelrud, *Mensch*, In: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* ³, vol. IV, 863.

to philosophy... We actually have just this one indication, that if one of us wants to learn something in a pure way, they have to set free from the body and look at the soul alone, at the reality... Because if it is impossible, being inside a body, to see anything purely, there are only two choices: either we cannot acquire the knowledge ever, or only after we die. Then the soul will be separated from the body, which it was not before. And as long as we live, the closest we can get to cognition is if we do not consort with the body, if we do not have in common with it anything more than ultimate necessity, if we are not full of its nature but are free of its stigma, before god sets us free. Then, pure and liberated from the body's mindlessness, undoubtedly we will be surrounded by others like us and will by ourselves discover and learn all that is immaculate. And this is probably the truth".²⁰

In the anthropological investigations, philosophical terminology has been adopted, which allowed to define both views of man as "monism" and "dichotomy" (or even "trichotomy"), or more generally as dualism or pluralism.²¹ These terms however, can be slightly misleading if they are applied to the Bible, including even the New Testament.

They place the problem of biblical antitheses in a context that is rather alien to them. Since while the ancient Greek used to shape his image of man based on a philosophical reflection, the biblical approach is mainly the result of religious experience, and only to a small degree, of theological thought. The Bible thoroughly discusses the relation between man and God in all its aspects, while saying not much about the anthropological and psychological structure of man.

Therefore, before attempting to analyze the "body" and "spirit" in their authentic relationships, it should be stated that it will be rather a series of miscellaneous assumptions and reflections upon the essence of man, than a systematic anthropology.

The first lexicographical encounter with the Hebrew notion of *bāšār* in the Old Testament gives the impression of a complete differentiation of meanings.²²

²⁰ Translation by Marta Kostyk-Konik.

²¹ See i.e. S. Laeuchli, *Monism and Dualism in the Pauline Anthropology* (Biblical Research III 1958), 15-27 and P. van Imschoot, op. cit. II, 35.

²² Among the newer synthetic reviews, we shall mention: J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body*, London 1957, 11-16; O. Kuss, *Der Römerbrief*. Excursus: *Fleisch II* (Regensburg 1959) 529-530; A. Stöger, *Fleisch*, in: *Bibeltheologisches Wörterbuch*³ vol. I, 390-397; X. Léon-Dufour, *Chair*, in: *Vocabulaire de Théologie Biblique* (Paris 1962), 112-117; E. Schweizer, op. cit., 105-109; J. Fichtner, *Fleisch und Geist*, in: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*³, vol. II 974-976; J. Scharbert,

For the present paper, of no importance will be the *bśr* meant as part of the human body, one covering the skeleton²³, of a man or animal (Gen. 41, 2,19) or parts that are under the skin (i.e. Psalm 102, 6), even though this last meaning is probably the original one.²⁴ Not too much can be deduced from the collective term of *kol bāsār*, which designates all living creature, both animals and people (i.e. Gen. 6, 17. 19; Psalm 136, 25).

The Hebrew term sometimes also refers to the body of non-living beings, as is indicated eg in 1 Sam 17, 44; 4 Kings 9.36. The term *bśr* – which appears in these and similar texts – refers not only to the community of physical life, but also to the created and transient condition of corporeal creatures. Thus, it designates “each and every body”, a sort of transition to a metaphorical, or rather theological sense of the term which is of utmost importance for the explanation of this antithesis.

The key to understanding the concept of the “body” in the oldest writings of biblical tradition is the verse (Genesis 6, 3): “My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh (*hū’ bāsār*): yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years.” he will live one hundred and twenty years. “ Not without significance for the proper understanding of *bśr* in the text quoted above is the verb *jādôn*, which is usually explained in various ways.

According to the established norms of the Masoretic spelling should be combined with the core *dîn* (to judge), which, however, would be unacceptable in this context. It is not known what prompted LXX to translate this phrase *ou me katameine* as “shall not abide with” or “can not abide with”. Contemporary commentaries suggest a variety the meaning of the word: beginning from the Akkadian *danau* (to be strong, powerful) to the Arabic *dâna* (to be humiliated)²⁵.

This last explanation was recently taken up and justified by J. Scharbert²⁶ In his opinion, the basic meaning of the word is “of low value, bad” (like *Accadic dunnati*, an inferior thing), which would provide Genesis 6.3: “My spirit shall not

Fleisch, Geist und Seele im Pentateuch (Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 19), Stuttgart 1966; A. Sand, *Der Begriff „Fleisch“ in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen*, Regensburg 1967; P. van Imschoot, *Fleisch*, in: *Bibel-Lexikon*² (Einsiedlen 1968), 482-486.

²³ See i.e. Gen 2, 21 where God, after having cut off Adam’s rib, fills the remaining space with *bāsār*, meaning flesh.

²⁴ E. Schweizer, op. cit., 105, 15.

²⁵ A. Clamer, *La Genèse*, Paris 1953, 177.

²⁶ *Traditions- und Redaktionsgeschichte von Gen 6, 1-4*, *Biblische Zeitschrift* NF 11 (1967) 66-78, in particular 67.

always lose value in man, for that he also is flesh”²⁷.with the following meaning. The suggestion of Cz. Jakubiec²⁸, who argues for maintaining the *din* core, by referring to its another meaning – which is “to fight”, known from Koh 6, 10.

Apparently, *din* is not just a technical judicial term, but it can mean any discussion or even a fight (which results among others from Sam 19, 10). It would be, then, the oldest example of statement about the contradiction between the “spirit” and the “body” and maybe even a struggle between the two. *Bāsār*, the body, would correspond here to the symptom of weakness and imperfection of the human nature together with all their consequences, such as sensuality and excitability.²⁹ Such a condition of the human body does not allow for the unlimited presence of God’s element in it, which is the spirit.

An analysis of the literary tradition of this interesting statement goes even further. It is commonly attributed to the Yahvist tradition, following the famous commentator H. Gunkel, even though such a prominent expert on source analysis of the Pentateuch as M. Noth³⁰ speaks about the origin of this passage in a very restrained manner. Closer analysis of Yahvist anthropology questions the validity of attributing Gen 6, 1-4 to J. This tradition avoids using the term “spirit” in the anthropological sense, i.e. as a natural equipment of an individual.³¹

According to Gen. 6: 1-4, it will be naturally regarded as crucial to undertake the attempt of original elaboration of the text, instead of subsequent supplement elaborations, whose anthropological assumptions are completely unknown today. The Yahvist has already indicated the causes of the flood in 4, 1- 24 and continues in Gen. 6, 5 in a completely natural way.³² More interesting, however, is that in the J source, the “spirit of Yahve” means rather the charism of God than the universal attribute of man, and the concept of body is never assessed as it is in 6, 3. The P source provides us, however, with much more data about this concept, by attributing to man the “spirit of life” (not the “breath of life,” as the Yahvist does, beginning with Genesis 2: 7) in 6, 17 and 7, 15.

²⁷ Other solutions suggested by: E. G. Kraeling, *The significance and Origin of Gen 6, 1-4*, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 6 (1947) 193-2-8 and J. Fischer, *Deutung und literarischer Art. Von Gen 6, 1-4*. In: Festschrift F. Nötscher (Bonn 1950) 74-85; J. B. Bauer, *Die biblische Urgeschichte*², Paderborn 1964, 57-69.

²⁸ *Genesis – Księga Rodzaju (Genesis – The Book of Genesis)*, Warszawa 1957, 110.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 110.

³⁰ *Ueberlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuchs*, Stuttgart 1948, 29, 83.

³¹ J. Scharbert, *Fleisch, Geist...*, 18-22 and 35-36; J. Scharbert, *Traditions- und Redaktionsgeschichte von Gen 6, 1-4*, 70.

³² J. Scharbert, *Traditions- und Redaktionsgeschichte von Gen 6, 1-4*, 69.

Admittedly, the fact that, after determining the age limit of 120 years, the editor included in this group the Patriarchs, who lived much longer, cannot be regarded as decisive argument.³³ It merely proves that this fragment is not part of the main editing body of source P. In this case, however, the origins of the tradition should be considered a decisive factor, and not the time when it was elaborated.

J. Scharbert legitimately indicates analogies with the P source which is supposed to confirm his supposition³⁴, less clear is the juxtaposition of the text with Ez 37 and re-timing of the edition of this fragment to the times of Ezra and Nehemiah or even early Apocalyptic. The last statement would be interesting insofar as it would allow us to refer anthropological speculations to the emerging view on “spirits” considered as angels (see context of Gn. 6, 3!). Whether Persian influences should also be assumed – in the discussed period – it is impossible to settle by now.

Rather, the antithetic tendencies of the sacerdotal tradition should be considered – which will be discussed below.

Even though *bśr* can be derived, as the whole human being, from the act of creation by God, since quite early times it has been represented as the element least susceptible to the actions of the spirit.

This is why it occupies sometimes opposite positions in the very clear contrasts of the prophetic speeches: “But the Egyptians are mere mortals, and not God; their horses are flesh and not spirit” (Is 31, 3). This interesting sentence comes from a speech condemning the irresponsible policy of alliances of the nation of Judah. Other contrapositions of this kind are contained in Ps 56, 5, and, in particular, in Is 40, 6-7: “All people are like grass, and all their faithfulness is like the flowers of the field. The grass withers and the flowers fall, because the breath of the LORD (*Yahve, rûah jahweh* – a word play?) blows on them. Surely the people are grass.”

Thus, the concept of the human body includes everything that is transient, mortal, weak and limited, as opposed to the power, infinity and infinitude of God, represented by the “spirit” in a human being, regardless of whether it is the spirit of God or the spirit considered as a natural human’s feature.³⁵

³³ J. Scharbert, *Traditions- und Redaktionsgeschichte von Gen 6, 1-4, 70-71*.

³⁴ See texts cited above, Gen. 6, 17 and 7, 15.

³⁵ J. Fichtner (*Fleisch und Geist I*. In: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*³, II, 975) describes it accurately: *Der Gegensatz von Fleisch und Geist ist weder substantiell noch ethisch bestimmt, sondern eher dynamisch-funktional; hinter dem Gegenüber von Macht und Ohnmacht erscheint der Gegensatz ewig-vergänglich, dh aber Schöpfer-Geschöpf.*

Nevertheless, the Hebrew Bible has not elaborated this difference to the dimension of the opposition between the spirit and the body, even less so to the difference between the body and God. On the ethical level it has not clearly relate the body with the sin or the propensity to it. Nevertheless, it has made way, for further considerations, influenced by different factors.

3. Body and Spirit in the Hellenic – Jewish Tradition

The first contact between the original Hebrew thought and the elements of a radically different greek-hellenistic views³⁶ have not from the very beginning introduced fundamental changes in the concept of the body. The books of the Old Testament, written under the influence of the Greek culture (or even written in Greek) make clear reference to the well known Old Testament meanings, among which of a significant importance is the Hebrew notion *bāšār*, meaning the external, mundane existence of an individual (i. e. Sir 31, 1).

Undoubtedly, a great role has been played here by the double concept of body in the Greek culture. Apart from a simple equivalent of the Hebrew *bśr*, the Greek *sarx*, there is another one, aforementioned in the Phaedon of Plato, the *soma*.³⁷ Actually, in Hebrew, there is no direct equivalent of *soma*; therefore whenever LXX used it, there are eight different Hebrew words corresponding to it.

A more detailed differentiation between *sarx* and *soma* would be almost tantamount to presenting a specification of differences between the Greek and the Biblical anthropology. To put it synthetically³⁸, it should be stated that *soma* always refers to a basic distinction between the matter and the form, describing the result of shaping the corporeal substance into a particular form.³⁹

In this way, the Hellenism can create a contraposition of *soma* and *sarx*, but it can speak also of *soma (tes) sarkos* (Sir 23, 17 – see Col 1, 22; 2, 11 and

³⁶ Probably these contacts took place before Alexander the Great's expedition – see D. Auscher, *Les relations entre la Grèce et la Palestine avant la conquête d'Alexandre*, *Vetus Testamentum* 17 (1967), 8-30.

³⁷ The Hebrew *bašār* has been translated in LXX quantitatively respectively as (together with the Hebrew text of Sirach): 145 times as *sarx*, only 23 times as *soma*.

³⁸ More about it in a paper by J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body*, 13-15. Special attention should be paid to a historical perspective of the development of the Greek concept of *soma* in E. Schweizer, *soma.*, in: *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. VII, 1025-1042.

³⁹ As J. A. T. Robinson (op. cit. 13) notices, the Hebrew anthropology does not need to reach for this differentiation, considering a human being a one, living, psycho-physical substance.

further). *Soma*, unlike *sarx*, always designates a human being as a whole, only intended as an individual, and never, unlike *sarx*, does it designate all people or all corporeal beings in general.

The real contraposition of the Greek anthropology, body-soul, consists in the distinction between *soma* and *psyche*.⁴⁰ Although man has a *sarx*, but his being is a *soma*, a piece of matter shaped into an individual, with a soul incorporated in it, striving to be released from it. In a comprehensive Hebrew approach, this kind of distinction is simply redundant.

The most important difference, for the antithesis between body and spirit, between the two concepts is the lack of any symptom of weakness and transience in *soma*. In order to express such a concept, an exponent of this weakness, *sarx*, needs to be added (*soma tes sarkos*, as mentioned above).

In the case of the biblical antithesis discussed (*soma* will also play almost marginal role); the contraposition can only exist between the spirit and the body understood in the sense of *sarx*.

The dualistic approach to the problem of the body in Hellenistic anthropology could not have been without effect on the formulation of Greek-Judaic literature, despite attempts to translate the revealed concepts into the language associated with pagan concepts as accurately as possible. Hence, Hellenic-Jewish translators tend to strictly follow the distinction between *soma* and *sarx*, explaining, for example, Pr 5, 11 (see Job 41, 15) *bašar ûse'er* as *sarkes tou somatos*.

More important, however, is the fact that the essential Biblical distinction between the Creator and creation, in the anthropological perspective, which is expressed through the opposition between the spirit and the body, begins to acquire cosmic qualities. For example, the Hebrew phrase (Lb 16, 22 – compare 27, 16) *'e lohê hârûhôt lek'ol bašar* is translated by LXX in the following way: *theos ton pneumatōn kai pases sarkos*, thus distinguishing between the sphere of the 'soul' and the sphere 'body'. Of course, we are far here from achieving the appropriate dualism between the body and the spirit as two spheres present in man, nevertheless the oldest Greek translation of the Bible indicates the further possibilities of the development in this very direction.⁴¹

⁴⁰ See the abovementioned text of Plato, *Phaedon* 66b – 67a. It is doubtful if the great philosopher made a difference between *sarx* and *soma* – see also W. Stacey, *The Pauline View of Man*, London 1956, 74: *Sarx in Plato did not differ essentially from soma*.

⁴¹ See E. Schweizer, *sarx*. In: *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum N. T.*, vol. VII, 108, 14–26. The author's assertion, however, that the most influential factor here was *die persische Konzeption einer geistigen Welt, die sich über der irdischen erhebt* seems to be quite groundless. Certain relations of the Iranian worldview (probably also dualism) with the younger canon books of the Old

Other Hellenistic-Jewish texts either continue the same cosmic-dualistic developmental line⁴², or grant it a more anthropological sense. There are also more distinct attempts to transfer the original Greek dualism to the sphere of the revealed word of God, especially in Wisdom 7, 1- 2. 7, in the apocryphal writings 4 Mch 7, 13, in Henoch⁴³ and in the book of Jubilees.⁴⁴ The authors of these books not only clearly refer to the two spheres, but also highlight the distance and dissonance between the body, the source of lust and the spirit, *pneuma*.

A similar position is generally held by Filon of Alexandria. According to him, man consists of the sphere of the body (*sarx*) and the sphere of the spirit (*pneuma*), with the body being – according to the Greeks – regarded as the inferior, sinful part of man.

The statement by Józef Fawiusz about the anthropology of the Essenes, to which Qumran people belonged, also has a more problematic character; it would be a concept very similar to the Greek dualism of body and soul. “The body is fragile in its nature and the matter it consists of is transient, every soul is in turn eternally immortal, and consists of an elusive ether and is supposedly imprisoned by nature into body, but then freed from bodily slavery, as if after a long suffering, it is blissfully flying to the heights.”⁴⁵ Leaving aside the statement of Józef Fawiusz, which can be regarded as an obvious compromise in favour

Testament are hard to question if one considers the long period of Persian hegemony in Palestine, and more so the relations with the diaspora. The borrowings, however, seem to be of secondary importance and do not interfere with the essential doctrinal premises of St. Testament; nor can there be confirmed any visible Iranian influence on biblical anthropology. In Judaism, such influence may be taken into account, especially when considering the characteristic theory of the “two spirits” in *Qumran* (IQS 3, 13nn) and in the Testaments of the Twelfth Patriarchs (see more on this subject in: L. Stachowiak, *Temat dwóch duchów (The Problem of two spirits)...*, 42-43); however, here too, the interdependence – with regard to tradition – between Judaism and Gathami (especially Yasna 30, 3n) is not simple or direct. If intertestamental Judaism succumbed to Iranian influences, it was certainly not the classical doctrine of Zarathustra, but rather the Chaldean-Iranian syncretism, consisting especially in the elements of Zerwanism. See also R. Meyer, *Monotheismus in Israel and in Religion Zarathustras*, *Biblische Zeitschrift* NF 1 (1957) 48 ff.

⁴² For example, Jub 2, 2.11 and 10, 3: “God of spirits who are in all bodies”; I Hen 15, 4, 8; Philon of Alexandria, *De virtut.* 58 and part.

⁴³ The exact list of texts is provided by E. Schweizer, art. cit., 119n.

⁴⁴ This is discussed in more detail in M. Testuz, *Les idées religieuses du Livre du Jubilés*, Genève-Paris 1960.

⁴⁵ Bell. Jud. II, 154— 155 (ed. by B. Niese, *Flavii Josephi Opera* -, Berlin 1955, vol. VI, 183n); translated by E. Dąbrowski, *Nowy Testament na tle epoki II* (The New Testament in the context of the period), Poznań 1958, 212.

of the Hellenic approach, it is certain that the Greek-Jewish writings are only a step away from presenting the body as the source of sin; however, neither the Old Testament nor the apocryphal literature has made this crucial step.

Under the influence of a new, revelatory view of man, this step will be made by the New Testament, especially by St. Paul. Some utterances of the Testaments of the Twelfth Patriarchs, which explain the deceptive activities of the spirits of iniquity by referring to the bodily nature of man (*sarx* – Test. Acts 9, 7), or present the body as contaminated with sin (Test. Jude 19, 4) can not be decisive in this matter.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, these oppositions gain⁴⁷ a peculiar meaning when compared with other dualistic statements in the Test. XII Patr. – naturally as long as they do not have the character of interpolation or are not elements introduced by a later Christian editor.⁴⁸

Antithetic formulations of Saint Paul and the captivating description of the internal struggle presented in Gal 5 and Rome 7- 81⁴⁹ on the one hand, continue the Old Testament line, and on the other, open up completely new, as it seems, original perspectives. As for the contraposition of the body-spirit, in the letters of St. Paul, discussion has been going on for years, not yet settled or completed. Admittedly, all possible sources were proposed: the Old Testament, Greek dualism, rabbinicism, gnosis, Hellenic Judaism, Qumran. Some of these attempts tend to find a source equivalent to each of the anthropological

⁴⁶ “I was blinded by the master of error (*archon tes planes*), I was unconscious like a man, like a body tainted with sin.”

⁴⁷ Cf. L. Stachowiak, *Temat dwóch duchów...*, 40.

⁴⁸ Cf. L. Rost, *Testamente der XII Patriarchen*. in: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 3, vol. VI, 701–702 and J. Murphy- O. Connor, *Testamente der zwölf Patriarchen*. in: *Bibel-Lexikon* 2 (Einsiedeln 1968), 1733–1735, who strongly reject the hypothesis of the Christian origin of the Testaments, assuming the existence of its three successive aspects: the first of the Syrach period (Qumran influences?), the second of a strongly-emphasized Messianic character dated the first century BC and the third Christian from the first or second century after Chr. The dependence between the individual aspects and influences that contributed to their formation should be subject to a more thorough explanation.

⁴⁹ Cf. E. Ellwein, *Das Rätsel von Römer VII*; Kerygma und Dogma 1 (1955) 247–268; W. Matthias, *Der alte und der neue Mensch in der Anthropologie des Paulus*, *Evangelische Theologie* 17 (1957) 385–397; W. H. Taylor, *The antithetic Method in Pauline Theology*, doctoral dissertation. Northwestern Univ. 1958 (microfilm); H. Braun, *Röm. 7, 7–25 und das Selbstverständnis des Qumran-Frommen*, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 56 (1959) 1–18; W. Keuck, *Dienst des Geistes und des Fleisches. Zur Auslegungsgeschichte und Auslegung von Röm 7,25b*, *Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift* 141 (1961) 257–280; O. Kuss *Römerbrief II*, Regensburg 1960, 506–595; A. Sand, *Der Begriff „Fleisch“ in den paulinischen Hauptbriefen*, Regensburg 1967.

elements.⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, the Judaic dogma of two eons, typical of the intertestamental Apocalyptic, has had a significant influence in this matter⁵¹: “old eon” represents the inner struggles and tearing of a man, and spirit and body are their exponents and extremes; “eon new” or “future eon” will be characterized by the indivisible rule of the spirit.⁵² Certainly, however, the conviction of the body as subjected to weakness or even to contamination had a constructive implications with regard to the theological reflection of the apostle from Tarsus. The very transition, however, from the concept of the body as an earthly and temporal sphere, which is contrasted with the sphere of God (spirit sphere), moreover, the transition from the body, the exponent of the natural physical and moral weakness to the body regarded as the subject of sin, fallen under the dominion of the power of darkness⁵³, finds no justification in the sources discussed so far.

J. Nélis⁵⁴ rightly points out that the contribution of St. Paul to a new, deepened understanding of the antithesis of the body-spirit is more significant than assumed by the biblical criticism. In view of the described state of affairs, the retrospective derivation of the more precise content of this antithesis in the Old Testament’s and Intertestamental sources from these statements would be risky, although the general direction of development – radicalization of views on the role of the body in man – would correspond to Judaic tendencies.

⁵⁰ Cf. for example D. Flusser, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pre-Pauline Christianity*, Studia Hierosolymitana IV (1958) 215—266, especially 252—263; K. G. Kuhn, *New Light on Temptation, Sin and Flesh in the Scrolls and in the New Testament*. in: *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (New York 1957), 94—113; J. Pryke, „Spirit” and „Flesh” in the Qumran Documents and some New Testament Texts, *Revue de Qumran* 5 (1965) 345—360; R. Scroggs, *The last Adam*, Oxford 1966; O. Sander, *Leib-Seele Dualismus im Alten Testament?*, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 77 (1965) 329—332.

⁵¹ Cf. Especially. H. Ringgren, *Jüdische Apokalyptik*. *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 3 vol. I, 464—466.

⁵² This period is described in the final part of “The Treatise on the Two Spirits” – 1QS 4, 18-21

⁵³ On the subject of light-darkness antithesis, the equivalent of the cosmic opposition “body-spirit”, compare L.R. Stachowiak, *Die Antithese Licht-Finsternis – ein Thema paulinischer Paränese*, *Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift* 143 (1963) 385-421, and in Polish: *Człowiek między światłem a ciemnością według św. Pawła (Man between light and darkness according to the Saint Paul)*, *Studia Biblijne i Archeologiczne* (Poznań 1963) 179—197.

⁵⁴ *Les antithèses littéraires dans les épîtres de Saint Paul*, *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 70 (1948) 360—387,

4. The body-soul antithesis in the Palestinian tradition

Of course, here the Qumran writings dedicated to the deepest theological reflection and quite diversified anthropology come to the fore. The Qumran Community claimed, as is known, to be the only disponent of an authentic interpretation of the Law, ie practically the entire Old Testament, and to develop it in a teaching office considered as a prophetic in its nature⁵⁵. However, since Qumran represents essentially the Palestinian tradition despite its exclusivism, it is still advisable to consider the orthodox branch of this tradition in rabbinic and late-Jewish writings created in Palestine. Although these statements come mostly from a later period than the Qumran writings, they nevertheless often reflect the very old doctrinal tradition that sometimes goes back to the pre-Christian period. The doctrinal infiltration of Greek thought took place here much more slowly and more reluctantly, but its origins were no doubt already present in the Intertestamental period⁵⁶.

The oldest Talmudic tradition to some extent transforms the biblical antithesis of the body-spirit in the sense – also biblical – of the Creator-creation contraposition. “Body and blood” more and more often is considered an exponent of weakness and transience.⁵⁷ At the same time – from the second century before Chr.⁵⁸ – a very significant change takes place in the Orthodox Jewish tradition. In addition to the traditional, comprehensive view of man, taken from the Old Testament, a new one, similar to the Hellenistic contraposition body-soul emerges: according to this view the body is considered as something empty, demanding fulfillment, which by rabbinism is most often described by the term *gûf*⁵⁹, and – in later tradition – an invisible soul, regarded as the organ of personality. The “spirit”, on the other hand, begins to lose its dominant position in Judaic anthropology. Since the full development of these speculations falls only to the late age of the second Christian era, they are equally irrelevant to the biblical antithesis as well as to the Qumran antithesis.

What is more interesting, however, is the cosmic-dualistic contraposition of the so-understood “soul” and “body” as two genetically and materially

⁵⁵ This topic is exhaustively discussed by O. Betz, *Offenbarung und Schriftforschung in der Qumran-Sekte* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 6), Tübingen 1960.

⁵⁶ Cf. R. Meyer, *Hellenistisches in der rabbinischen Anthropologie*, Stuttgart 1937.

⁵⁷ Such a term is already found in Sir Hebrew 14, 18 (abm wdm) – cf. also Wis 12, 5 and Mt 16, 17 (as an exponent of cognition and natural understanding).

⁵⁸ Cf. R. Meyer, Art. cit., 115- 116, esp. 116, 9.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

different spheres. The man represent the synthesis of both of them and chooses between them, thus deciding to lead a life in the spirit of God or a life typical of inferior beings.⁶⁰ This ethical dualistic tone is far from the systematic contrapositions of Greek or Hellenistic-Judaic philosophy⁶¹; it could not develop properly on the basis of definitely “monistic” Old Testament views. In order to explain the dualistic internal struggles of human beings, another science of a more psychological nature has already been developed in the early rabbinic schools, compatible with the monolithic anthropological structure in the Old Covenant: the teaching on the two tendencies (*jes ârim*) bothering the human heart.⁶² Rabbinism does not associate these two tendencies particularly with the body, but with the organ of a human life of higher order – t.i. with the heart.⁶³

5. The anthropological role of the body-soul antithesis in Qumran

By approaching a broader discussion of Qumran views on the “body” in contrast to the “spirit”, it seems indispensable to define the dependence of terms on literary genres. Naturally, the considerations will concern previously published texts, that is, all of them except for a large part of the documents called as Dead Sea Scrolls from the Qumran cave 4 and 11. Besides, the statements of the utmost importance come from the scrolls from cave I. Interestingly, even among these scrolls, not all texts have the same significance with regard to assessment the problem of “body” or “spirit” and not all of them consider them dualistic. Antithetical connections are confirmed primarily by hymnic excerpts (IQH and hymnic ending of IQS); other statements are rather occasional.

The compact lecture of the dualistic theology of the The Qumran Community included in *The Treatise on the Two Spirits*⁶⁴ does not use the term

⁶⁰ Sifre to Deuteronomy 33, 2; Tb Chag. 16a — Cf. J. Bonsirven, *Textes rabbiniques.*, Roma 1955, 282.

⁶¹ Cf. R. Meyer, *Hellenistisches in der rabbinischen Anthropologie*, 145— 146; D. Stacey, op. cit., 110 nn.

⁶² Cf. uw. 13.

⁶³ Quite different approach can be found in Qumran theology – cf. R. E. Murphy, *Yeser in the Qumran Literature*, *Biblic* 39 (1958) 334-344, especially 335n.

⁶⁴ Cf. L. Stachowiak, *Traktat teologiczno-moralny o dwóch duchach w „Regule Zrzeszenia” z Qumran (Theological-moral treaty on two spirits in the „Rule of the Community” of Qumran)*, *Ateneum Kapłańskie* 67(1964) 219—228; idem, *Teologiczny temat dwóch duchów w pismach qumranskich (Theological problem of two spirits in the Qumran writings)*, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL-u* 10 (1967) no. 2, 37— 52.

“body” except for the eschatological perspective mentioned in the final parts of the text (IQS 4, 20- 21), which will be discussed below. This state of affairs proves clearly that the “body” did not play – in the dualistic speculations of the Community – the same role as the “spirit”, nor was its equivalent antagonist within the internal duality of a man’s life or division into two combating camps⁶⁵. The “body”, on the other hand, seems to be a very suitable term for expressing the relation of the religious Qumran people towards God; it described his full awareness of his own helplessness and weakness and the necessity of God’s intervention. It would certainly be inappropriate to oppose the theoretical considerations presented in Q1 to the religious practice of the Community, visible in Hymns (IQH), nevertheless the “body” seems to be a much more exponent of the spiritual profile of the Community⁶⁶ than of the official theology. At least the hymnic character of IQH had to play a certain role, favouring this kind of practical and personal reflection. A dualistic understanding of the situation of a member of the Community with regard to God was based on theological reflection, but at the same time it constantly stimulated and transformed it.

For this reason, some critics prefer to distinguish – based on literary analysis of the writings – between the various developmental stages of the Community: IQS in its doctrinal part would represent the older, original Qumran tradition, while IQH together with the final hymn of IQS would be the result of further development of the sect’s views, which was possibly subject to Hellenic influences.⁶⁷ In today’s state of research on the Qumran writings certain – sometimes far-reaching – changes in the worldview and practices of the Community can not be subject to discussion. The factors influencing these changes remain unclear; one can only presume them. The presence of current Hellenic influences does not seem probable here, considering the completely different concept of the “body” in both cases (see below). It is very likely, however, that the development of dualistic views has been influenced by the progressive radicalization of ethical postulates and separation from the rest of Judaism. Body-spirit antithesis is a typical example of one-sided interpretation of the found Qumran scrolls. Unfortunately, it has had some negative impact on further research. Because the first years of research were marked by the numerous attempts of finding

⁶⁵ It is about “sons of light” and “sons of darkness”.

⁶⁶ Cf. H. Braun, *Römer 7, 7–25 und das Selbstverständnis des Qumran-Frommen*, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 56 (1959) 1– 18.

⁶⁷ Cf. for example W. D. Davies, *Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls; Flesh and Spirit*. in: *The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament* (New York 1957) 165.

Qumran counterparts, which could enable achieving knowledge of the New Testament. Needless to say, in these conditions it was easy to explain many Christian concepts as Qumran terms, but sometimes the meaning appropriate to the New Covenant books was also transferred to the Qumran writings. Among the excellent and substantive explanations of many difficult anthropological issues exaggeration and sensation could not be avoided.

K. G. Kuhn, an eminent and distinguished researcher of the Qumran texts – put forward in 1952 the assertion that, in some of the texts of the Community, *bśr* means – analogically to the meaning of body in the New Testament – the sphere of sin and the world remaining in contraposition to God.⁶⁸ These views provoked radical opposition from scholars claiming that the concept of “body” in Qumran does not exceed the Old Testament meaning and cannot be attributed an absolute value.⁶⁹ To this day, one can indicate a lot of significant differences of opinions and discrepancies of views about the body-spirit antithesis in the texts from the Dead Sea. R. Meyer, for example⁷⁰ describes the concept of the “body” represented by the scrolls of the cave I in the following way: “It is impossible to prove in any text, even as it is probable, that the body is fighting the spirit ... It is impossible to say that the body belongs to the sphere opposite to God, as well as that the body⁷¹ can be regarded as a prison for the soul ... Everything supports the fact that the anthropological foundations of the Qumran Commune are still following old ways.”⁷²

In the another eminent work entitled: “*Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*”⁷³ J. Fichtner states as follows: “In the Rule of the Community of people from Qumran, the body designates not only their created nature, but also their politeness ... The body here explicitly enters the realm of perversity”. In order to elaborate a clear and objective picture of the Qumran *bśr* and its possible opposition to the “spirit”, an analysis of the most important

⁶⁸ K. G. Kuhn, *peirasmos, hamarta, sarx im Neuen Testament und die damit zusammenhängenden Vorstellungen*, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 49 (1952) 200–222.

⁶⁹ Cf. W. D. Davies, art. cit., 157–182 and F. Nötscher, *Zur theologischen Terminologie der Qumran-Texte*, Bonn 1956, 85–86.

⁷⁰ In Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, VII, 113, 11 nn.

⁷¹ „das Fleisch oder der Körper”.

⁷² H. Huppenbauer took on an even more extreme position, (*Bśr “Fleisch” in den Texten von Qumran*, Theologische Zeitschrift 13 (1957) 298-300) maintained in principle in his later monograph entitled: *Der Mensch zwischen zwei Welten*, Zürich 1959. He seems to deny any significant progress in the development of the meaning of the term “body” in Qumran. His arguments, however, were addressed by professional circles with considerable reserve.

⁷³ III Edition, art. *Fleisch und Geist* I, 2, Vol. II, 975-976.

texts should be carried out⁷⁴, excluding, of course, neutral statements or those referring directly to the Old Testament. Such texts include, for example, *bgwjt bšrw* in the Commentary on the Book of Habakkuk (IQpHab 9, 2): the body has been attributed a purely physical meaning here (see Sir 23, 16, Col 1, 22, 2, 11) ⁷⁵.

Because the Qumran sect grew out of the Old Testament and Judaism, the basic anthropological concepts in Qumran are not different from biblical principles.⁷⁶ Qumran people also share with the Old Testament a positive attitude towards the material world, God's work, thus separating themselves from Greek dualism. Possible negative assessment of the "body" can not be, thus, the result of considering his nature as "material". It is Qumran anthropology – to a deeper extent – than it is done in the Old Testament – which emphasizes the distance that separates the Creator from creation, whose natural exponent is the "body". In IQH 1, 21- 23, he opposes his weakness as being the creatures of God's omnipotence and wisdom with these words: "I am a creature of clay, fashioned with water, foundation of shame, source of impurity, oven of iniquity, building of sin, spirit of mistake, astray, without knowledge and terrified of the judgments of justice, what new can I say?" This is a pessimistic view of a man – many critics regard it as a result of depression or obsession of the author on this subject⁷⁷ – continuously repeated in IQH, relates to the bodily nature of man, although it cannot be considered its result. IQS 11, 21-22 states: "From the dust, after all, I am made and intended for the food of vermin. He is (ie man) a creation – a cluster of clay – and he is supposed to turn to dust" – compare IQH 3, 23-23; 12, 25-26; 13, 18.

The technical term for describing human weakness and helplessness of his endeavours is *jsr (h)hmr* or also *(h)'fr* "or" clay material (gunpowder), according to the Yahwistic description of man's creation in Genesis 2⁷⁸. Although the body is nowhere formally defined in this way, nevertheless these words refer

⁷⁴ The recently published article by J. Pryke, "Spirit" and "Flesh" in the Qumran Documents and some New Testament Texts, *Revue de Qumran* 5 (1965) 345- 360, does not add any significant new elements to the discussion.

⁷⁵ An extensive commentary on this text has been published by K. Eiliger *Studien zum Habakuk-Kommentar*, Tübingen 1953, 202–203.

⁷⁶ Cf. R. E. Lilly, *The Idea of Man in the Qumran Literature*, doctoral dissertation, Boston 1962.

⁷⁷ Cf. J. Licht, *The Doctrine of the Thanksgiving Scroll*, *Israel Exploration Journal* 6 (1956) 1– 13 (89– 101), who does not hesitate (p. 10) to state that it is about *an almost pathological abhorrence of human nature*, referring to the specific use of the root *ndh* and *crwh* as an expression of sexual disgust when considering human nature contaminated by the impurity of sin.

⁷⁸ Cf. J. P. Hyatt, *The View of Man in the Qumran Hodayot*, *New Testament Studies* 2 (1956) 276–284, especially 278n.

to it recognized as the most inferior part in a man; Anyway in IQH 15, 21 both terms: “body” and “a cluster of clay”, are used strictly parallel and have the same meaning: “imperfect, weak man”. A sect member can not do anything with his own power, with the power of the “body”, if God does not strengthen him (IQH 15, 13-14). This can be expressed negatively by presenting the body as an exponent of a weak human nature deprived of the ennobling gift of the spirit.⁷⁹ Such an assessment of the “body” does not lead to Greek dualism, nor does it make a Qumran *bśr* a negative feature of the spirit, but highlights the very positive feature of the body: the possibility of sublimation, elevation and even purification what would not be possible in relevant Greek concepts. This is accomplished by the “spirit” understood as a gift: “Through the spirit of the true God’s Council, the ways of man and all his iniquities will be cleansed so that he may see the light of life. And through the spirit of the holy Assembly he will be cleansed in his truth from all his sins. The remission of his sin will be made by the spirit of righteousness and humility, and by surrendering (his soul? *-nfs̄w*) to all the commandments of God, he will cleanse his body so that he may be sprinkled with water of purification...” (IQS 3, 6-8)⁸⁰.

This takes place in a certain – imperfect way- in temporal life, yet thoroughly in the eschatological period (IQS 4, 20- 21). In this way once again the fundamentally positive attitude of Qumran theology to the material side of man has been confirmed.

According to the Community’s often expressed conviction, the present came under the rule of Belial;⁸¹ and with it the man was subject to the sphere of his influence. It should be expected that the most vulnerable ground for this kind of influence will be the most inferior and at the same time the weakest part of the human being, and thus the body. The analysis of the texts will show in what sense the body reacts to contacts with the world of iniquity and whether the fight will ensue on this occasion.

The general conviction present in the Old Testament about the common sinfulness of the human race is connected with the body in IQH 4, 29-30: “What is the body in comparison with this (namely, the works of God’s power and omnipotence described above)? And what is the creation of clay to do such wonderful miracles? Although he is immersed in sins from the time he was

⁷⁹ D. Flusser, *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pre-Pauline Christianity*, 255, prefers to speak here of “the lack of a gift of grace”.

⁸⁰ This function of spirit is discussed in more detail in: Coppens, *Le don de l’esprit d’après les textes de Qumrân et le quatrième Evangile*. in: *Evangile de Jean*, (Bruges 1958), 209—223.

⁸¹ Cf. technical expression *bmmlt blj’l*: IQS 1, 18.23; 2, 19 and IQM 14, 9.

in the womb of his mother, and until his old age he will remain subject to sinful perversity. “There is no direct connection between the body and sin – Hebrew *whwh* refers not to the *bśr*, but to man; – the subject of sinfulness, however, is not generally the “son of Adam”, but man as a “creature made of clay”, regarded as a “body”. Apparently, both of these concepts remind the Qumran poet of sin and guilt, yet not considered as present, but as a chronic tendency to perversity. The position even more opposed to God refers to the physical nature of man in CD 1, 2 and IQM (Rule of War) 4, 3. In the first text, “those who despise God”, so they are most likely Israelites who act against the principles of the Community, are considered to be the equivalent of the “body”. Though the Old Testament context of the statement (see Jeremiah 25:31, Oz 4: 1) is universalistic, E. Cothenet⁸² is right when he writes: “Despite the universalism of the formula, the author’s attention is focused on the Israeli perspective.” The second text deals with the eschatological opponents of the sect and is taken from the inscription on the banner of a military unit of a hundred soldiers: “From God comes a hand that fights against a perverse body”⁸³. The last statement is all the more important because it compares the “body” with the exponent of perversity in Qumran (*wlh*); moreover, the similar meaning is expressed in IQS, 11, 9 and IQS 12, 12, which states that body is “fulfilled with guilt”. Some commentators suspect that the text was later supplemented by the copyist in IQM 12, 12⁸⁴, nevertheless, such an interpretation formulated in the heart of the sect would confirm the recognition of the body as susceptible to sin and guilt. The “body of wickedness” does not naturally have the technical meaning of the “sphere”, as it is in the New Testament, because it defines a certain category of people. The choice of the term *bśr* for this purpose, as well as the hidden opposition between people outside the Community, that is “body” and people living within the Community according to the principle of “spirit”, are highly significant. This will be confirmed by the analysis of several statements of the final part of IQS. The extension of meaning of term “body council” (*swd bśr*) in IQS 11, 6-7 does not completely coincide with the extension of meaning of term “sons of darkness” leading life outside the Community. The equivalents of this concept are “people” or “sons of Adam”, so the hypothesis of collective meaning seems to be the most justified in this point.⁸⁵

⁸² *Les Textes de Qumran II*, Paris 1963, 149.

⁸³ As for the commentary on the text, see J. Carmignac, *La Règle de la Guerre*, Paris 1958, 64.

⁸⁴ Cf. J. Carmignac, op. cit., 182, however more accurate view is held by J. van der Ploeg, *Le rouleau de la Guerre*, Leiden 1959, 148.

⁸⁵ Cf. W. Tyloch, *Rękopisy z Qumran nad Morzem Martwym (Qumran Dead Sea Scrolls)*, Warszawa 1963, 115 uw. 10.

Nevertheless, it is not neutral, as R. Meyer supposes, citing as a parallel IQ S b 3, 28 and IQ 34 fr 3 I, 3⁸⁶.

We should pay attention not only to the equivalents, but also to the opposites. In this context, the author of the final psalm admits the enormity of Wisdom, which was attributed to him. This gift is inaccessible to the “counsel of the body” and is only granted by God as “His eternal property” (11, 7) as participation in the fate of the saints (*gwrl qdwsjm*) with the “sons of heaven” (11, 8). There is, therefore, a contrast between the “human congregation” whose exponent is “the body” and the angels that are characterized by holiness. The adjective “saint” appears again, besides the already mentioned *gwrl qdwsjm*, in the term “foundation of the holy building” (*wswd mbnjt qwds* in 11, 8) and “holy house of Israel” which is synonymous with “eternal plant” (IQS 8, 5; compare 11, 8)⁸⁷. The author of the hymn essentially belongs to the “fate of God” (IQS 1, 10, 2, 2, IQM 17, 7) or “the fate of the saints” (see: IQH 11, 11; IQ 36 I, 3). Only his actual sins confirm that he did not completely free himself – leading earthly life – from the reach of the forces of darkness⁸⁸: “But I belong to the impious mankind and to the congregatio of a perverse body.” What this perversity consists of is described by the next words, listing three classic categories of sin (*'wnn*, *ps'* and *ht'h*), although here too it is difficult to attribute to the “body” the technical meaning of the subject of iniquity in the anthropological sense. Some suggestions in this direction are implied by the words IQS 11, 12: “If I fall through the sin of the body (my exculpation will be done according to the righteousness of God)”. Whether the “sin of the body” means a certain special category of crime or, more generally, the sinful nature of human existence⁸⁹, in any case it opposes God’s justice, i.e. can be recognized as belonging to a more general God vs man contraposition considered in the anthropological perspective.

G. Baumbaeh⁹⁰ explains the significance of this text in the following way: “The limitation of man as creation and his susceptibility to sin have been highlighted particularly clearly in the final psalm of the Rule of the Community.”

⁸⁶ art. cit., 110, 15–24.

⁸⁷ This issue is discussed in more detail in F. Nötscher, *Heiligkeit in den Qumranschriften*, *Revue de Qumran* 2 (1960) 161–181 and R. E. Murphy, *BŠR in the Qumran Literature and SARKS in the Epistle to the Romans*. in: *Sacra Pagina* (Paris 1959), 60–76, especially 65–67.

⁸⁸ Cf. remark 53.

⁸⁹ Cf. R. Meyer, art. cit., 112, 31.

⁹⁰ *Der Dualismus in der Sektenrolle im Vergleich mit dem Dualismus in den spätjüdischen Apokalypsen und dem Johannes-Evangelium*, doctoral dissertation, Berlin 1956 (published as: *Qumran und das Johannes — Evangelium*, Berlin 1959, 29).

As mentioned above, the body, in spite of its weakness and susceptibility to sin, can be purified by the gift of the spirit. It would be left to explain whether and what is the role of the “spirit of perversity” with regard to the aspirations of the body and whether the process of the actual and eschatological purification of the body is the result of a fight between the body and the spirit by analogy to the contraposition of the two spirits?⁹¹

This part of the discussion again refers us to the most systematic lecture of Qumran theology and anthropology, namely to The Treatise on the Two Spirits in IQS 3, 13-4, 26. Its last part (4, 15- 26) contains a recapitulation of the dualistic description of man’s life in an eschatological perspective. As a result of the victory of the truth (4, 19) and the destruction of iniquities (4, 18-19, 23) there will be the purification of some of the leftovers of perversity (*wlh*)⁹²: “Then God will purify all the deeds of man in His own truth and make a choice for Himself among the sons of men, removing all the spirit of unrighteousness from within his body and cleanses him with the holy spirit from all shameful deeds.” The text belongs to the most difficult ones in the “Rule of the Community”. Apart from the expression *mbnj’ jś* (probably to be read: *mbnh’ jś* – compare IQH 13, 15), which seems less important in these considerations, the meaning of the fundamental expression *mtkmw bśr* is unclear. Y. Yadin⁹³ comments on the term *mtkmw* and P. Guillbert⁹⁴ is following him on the basis of an analogy with Arabic as for the meaning of “*the inward part of flesh*”, which seems to be quite likely. Nevertheless, the interpretation of this text as an extended suffix, combined with the word *twk* (inward), which is already suggested by the first translator of the IQS W. H. Brownlee⁹⁵, is widespread. Yet another explanation was presented on the basis of the parallel text 1Q 36, 14, 2 by J.T. Milik⁹⁶, who adopted the meaning “dirt, contamination” in relation to the body, based on the Syrian word *ketam* (= soiled, contaminated).

Whatever the meaning of the individual terms is, the body here is the subject of contamination and remains in communication with the perpetrator of this activity – t.i. the “spirit of iniquity” (*rwh’ wlh*). However, the opposition

⁹¹ L. Stachowiak, *Temat dwóch duchów...*, 48–52.

⁹² Literary analysis of this fragment can be found in J. Licht, *An Analysis of the Treatise on the Two Spirits in DSD, Scripta Hierosolymitana* 4 (1958) 88–100.

⁹³ A Note on DSD IV, 20, *Journal of Biblical Literature* 74 (1955) 41–43.

⁹⁴ *Les Textes de Qumran*, Paris 1961, vol. I, 37.

⁹⁵ *The Dead Sea Manual of Discipline*, Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, Supplementary Studies 10–12 (New Heaven 1951) 17.

⁹⁶ *Qumran Cave I*, Oxford 1955, 141–142.

is not directly between the body and the spirit of holiness, but rather between the two spirits. Similarly, it should be emphasized that the spirit of sanctification by purifying the body, destroys the spirit of iniquity and not the body itself. It follows unambiguously that the association of the spirit of iniquity and the body as an exponent of weakness and even human sin is a *fait accompli* in Qumran mentality, although they are not two equal or specific forces: while the “spirit of iniquity” is active, fights, the body plays a passive, subjective role.

Two parallel texts of the Hymns cast a further light on the relationship of the spirit to the body: IQH 13, 13-14 and 17, 25. They use the very characteristic term *rwh bśr* (“bodily spirit”!), along with the less paradoxical *jsr bśr*⁹⁷ (“the tendency of the body”, possibly “a bodily creation” - IQS 10, 23). Essentially, “spirit” and “body” are two elements of a very different organic entirety of man. IQH opposes them as a state of weakness and sinfulness in a man (*bśr*) and the aspect of God, opening the way to his justice (*rwh*)⁹⁸. The spirit understood in this way is not a gift, but a natural endowment of the human being, which he received, just like the body, from God⁹⁹. In a man who lives in the temporal world subordinated to the reign of Belial, this spirit is more susceptible to the action of the spirit or spirits of iniquity, is religiously and ethically weak, it is a “bodily spirit”. In IQH 17, 25 the psalmist begs for God’s help against such *rwhwt*, inclining him towards evil. The text is, however, damaged in this place; however, the mention of the rejection of “what God hates” (17, 24) makes such an interpretation of the nature of these spirits certain.

A member of the Community left to himself is powerless in this struggle, because his “bodily spirit” easily opens the way for the deceptive actions of the forces of perversity. On the ethical level, one could speak of “bad inclination” or “bodily inclination” (see the above-quoted *jsr bśr* expression). The second statement refers to the understanding of God’s plans; “Bodily spirit” makes it impossible to practice it in everyday practice or significantly reduces it (IQH 13, 13- 15). It is, however, characteristic, that in addition to the normal description of the human bodily being: “born of a woman ... a building made of dust crushed with water ... whose essence is guilt and sin (?)”, also here this kind of spirit is connected with the rule of a perverse “spirit”. Despite the not very clear contours of the body as the sphere of the “spirit of perversity”, it is an element facilitating access of such a spirit. In other words, the human spirit

⁹⁷ Cf. remark 13.

⁹⁸ Cf. also R.E. Murphy, *BŚR in the Qumran Literature...*, 62.

⁹⁹ Cf. F. Nötscher, *Geist und Geister in den Texten von Qumran*. in: *Mélanges bibliques...* A. Robert (Paris 1957) 305—315.

seems to be a neutral factor in the struggle between the spirit of truth and the spirit of iniquity. Only a closer definition of the *bśr* of body, attributes it a special susceptibility to bad influences.

6. Conclusion: the body-soul antithesis' role in anthropology

Summing up this analysis of the most important anthropological moments of the Qumran concept of "body", it should be stated that the development of the concept in relation to the Old Testament is beyond discussion. This notion is developed not only in the direction initiated by Apocalyptic, but it presents in an extremely radical way the ancient statements of the Old Testament. The "body" in Qumran is not only regarded as an exponent of weakness, but also as a factor facilitating the access of sin. Nevertheless, the body is not a sphere of sin, nor is it irrevocably tainted with sin. It is certainly impossible to point out any influence of the dualistic Hellenistic anthropology on the Qumran Commune of the Dead Sea.

Furthermore, one cannot find anywhere in Qumran anthropology, the struggle between body and spirit in a strict sense. Qumran anthropology presents the opposition between two spirits, which, until the time of final purification, remain in a constant struggle; the body is entangled in this struggle, but not as a partner, but the subject of human weakness, open to successful attacks of the spirit of perversity. If the "body" sometimes represents temporality influenced by Belial in Qumran, then it is not "spirit", but God himself with the Prince of Light, that is a part of this opposition. It is therefore only about the new – the more dualistic – formulation of the old Old Testament opposition. Admittedly the new opposition of great importance to anthropology is the absence or presence of the spirit of truth, the gift of God. This spirit makes man who is "bodily", vulnerable to the weakness of the body, become "spiritual", prone to God's influence. Finally, it must be emphasized that as part of the eschatological renewal, the body will not be destroyed, the "spirit" will not be freed from it, as Hellenism would hold it, but the spirit of truth will cleanse the body of the remnants of iniquity that clung to it during the battle of the two spirits.

However, this will not be the result of the struggle of the spirit with the body, but the decisive intervention of God. It is difficult to talk about "dualism" or "dualistic" statements in the proper sense of the word, both in the Old Testament and in the literature related to it. The theological reflection of the Old Covenant persistently fought against all tendencies to consider evil or sin as an element independent of or existing beside God. Anyway, the description

of the God-Creator and the idea of God's free choice of Israel is tantamount to overcoming duality in the broadest sense of this word¹⁰⁰. Interestingly, the Qumran Commune, whose dualistic tendencies are all too obvious, is holding the same view. It does not hesitate to recognize the evil spirit or our evil propensities as a creation of God, making him the Creator of both the spirit of truth and iniquity. It seems that theology of Israel – especially after the period of slavery – has retained only a general anti-dualistic tendency, yet without rejecting side, original or foreign antithetic elements in liturgical formulas, moral instructions, etc. It is also possible that even the sacerdotal tradition did not remain free from such influences, as E. Stauffer rightly supposes¹⁰¹. In any case, this dualistic penetration has left very slight traces in the anthropological terminology of the Old Testament.

Among the later books, one can observe the deepening of the dualistic thought only in Hebrew and Greek Book of Sirach, accompanied with some psychological aspect. As a result of further observation of the developmental line of the anthropological tradition, it can be assumed that the proper transition from the non-dualistic forms of the Old Testament described above to the well-known anthropological dualism has taken place in the intertestamental literature. From contingent statements about opposing concepts, technical formulas of a clearly dualistic character are now being created; from transitory juxtapositions, two kinds of schemes, as those of two spirits, "two tendencies", etc. emerge. The manifestations of dualistic thought are most prominent and visible in the Testaments of the Twelfth Patriarchs, a repeatedly edited and interpolated writing, but in the original undoubtedly of Judaic origin; to a lesser extent it is present in the Book of Enoch and the Book of Jubilees, books of immensely complicated literary tradition.

The simplest, but by no means the only solution to the problem would be looking for the causal relationships between this tradition and the Qumran context. This would be tantamount to the conclusion, that it was Qumran, where the entire development of the dualistic anthropological reflection was concentrated; however, it does not fully correspond to either the literary or theological data of the analysis carried out here. Even in this case, the issue of the reasons for such intensive development of dualistic forms would remain open. It would not be explained ultimately by the specifically exclusive and even dualistic understanding of its own situation by the sect itself. Only in a sense it was the result

¹⁰⁰ Cf. G. Gloege, *Dualismus II*. in: *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* 3, vol. II, 274.

¹⁰¹ *Probleme der Priestertradition*, *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 81 (1956) 135–150.

of the internal and external conditions of the Community, and to a much greater extent, it was the consequence of the “theoretical” anthropological dualism. As for other ancillary influences, it should be noted that the late Jewish Apocalyptic along with the eschatological expectations has undoubtedly led to the radicalization of theological views and ethical postulates; it is represented by the science of “two eons”, which Judaism could easily project into the anthropological plane. Moreover, the role of “knowledge” and “wisdom” in the anthropological Qumran texts gives the impression of certain influences on the part of prognosis or gnosis. However, because the documentation of Gnostic systems dates back to the second century and at most the first century before Christ, only gnostic influence of the last two Christian centuries could be considered as relevant¹⁰².

Analogously to the later systems, it can be concluded that “gnosis” favored the formation of anthropological antitheses, the latter cannot however be explained only by means of a general reference to gnosis.¹⁰³ The Iranian influence was already discussed in more detail above. The intertestamental dualistic anthropology is mostly based on biblical elements, although some schemes have developed not without contribution of foreign influences, which, however, were not direct but mediated by the unorthodox Judaism or syncretic forms. As a result of those tendencies a dualistic atmosphere was created in communities particularly susceptible to their influence, intensified by internal-Judaic radicalism and Apocalyptic. This atmosphere influenced to some extent all the communities, which demonstrated intense theological reflection, using also common formulations, devoid of individual theological features; the latter were given to them by particular communities, depending on the specific ideological assumptions they adopted.

In Palestine, the propagator of these tendencies – and one of the most active ones – was undoubtedly the Qumran Community. However, it must not be forgotten that it was neither the only nor perhaps the most outstanding. Until now, the accidental discoveries and careful work of critics have confirmed that Qumran can be regarded as a community that has found many answers to its questions in a dualistic context. For scientific investigation it is important that it spoke its original language, highlighting in its entirety the issue of the old and the Intertestamental anthropological dualism.

¹⁰² Bo Reicke, *Traces of Gnosticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, *New Testament Studies* 1 (1954) 134–140; R. P. Casey, *Gnosis, Gnosticism and the New Testament*. in: *Festschrift Dodd* (Cambridge 1956) 52–80 and articles in above cited remark 1 from the collection *Le origini dello gnosticismo – The Origins of Gnosticism*, Leiden 1967.

¹⁰³ Cf. U. Bianchi, *Le dualisme en histoire de religions*, *Revue de l’Histoire des Religions* 159 (1961) 7.

How We Should Interpret Bible Verses About Man*

Modern theology always addressed biblical scholars with a question on the structure and role of man in the written messages of Revelation. From the moment when man took first a prominent, and later a rather fundamental place in theological reflection, the question started to acquire a completely new meaning. Most often it was about the confrontation of philosophical, psychological or even anthropological assumptions of theology with biblical data. Typical problems still debated today¹, were the relationship between the biblical and Greek-Hellenistic view on the structure of man.

It was discussed whether there was a specifically biblical view on man, how it possibly differed from general Semitic patterns, and whether and to what extent the encounter of revealed thought with the world of Hellenistic culture led to a change of views on man in the Old and New Testaments.

These questions were answered in accordance with the assumed hermeneutic assumptions of biblical teachings. First, all Bible data was collected about a man, his life, the operation of his organs, about his superior and religious life, about his death or about the continuation of his existence. It is not the task of this paper to present *in extenso*, or even outlining the interesting attempts that paved the way for the development of a more contemporary biblical anthropology². It is only worth recalling some of the classic themes of this stage of biblical reflection that have been kept up to date. Are we, therefore, justified to say that

* STV 12(1974)1.

¹ Cf. A.M. Dubarle, *La Bible a-t-elle une doctrine sur l'âme et le corps?*, "Recherches et debates" 35(1961), 1803-2000; H. Haag, P. Möhrers, *Ursprung und Wesen des Menschen*, Tübingen 1966; L. Stachowiak, *Biblijna koncepcja człowieka (monizm czy dualizm?)*, in: *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 2, Warsaw 1968, 209-226.

² A review of contemporary problems of theological anthropology with a comprehensive bibliography is provided by J. Krasieński, *Rola antropologii w teologii dogmatycznej*, "Antropocentryczny zwrot", AK 79(1962), 152-170.

according to the specifically biblical concept of man, which is assumed by this biblical reflection, man is considered as one indivisible psychophysical entity, or can one speak of an anthropological complexity?

Are there traces of anthropological duality present in the biblical scriptures, also well known in non-biblical circles? What is the basic meaning of anthropological concepts in the Bible? These questions require not so much new answers as deeper theological justifications. The same should be stated about the conclusions of biblical anthropology, both negative and positive.

It has long been evident that biblical writings of such different prehistory, written in such a considerable period of time and in such different circumstances, assume very diverse data about man. What is more, none of the books presents even basic theoretical principles of anthropology, but only occasional statements. They concern only specific manifestations of man's religious life, and it is the latter and not man himself which constitutes the main subject of interest of authors. Compiling these statements that assume very different, chronologically, locally and essentially life situations into one whole could easily lead to an artificial biblical image of a human being. Such a picture would not fully correspond to any of the individual statements. Therefore, modern biblical anthropology requires slightly different hermeneutic principles. Research on the structure of man, or its main point of interest, which it has not given up, was replaced by research on his relationship to God and the world, on attempts to understand his religious existence, his role in the community of the old and new God's people, and ultimately on the ethical consequences resulting from it.

Such a view reveals many new values, specifically theological, susceptible to confrontation with contemporary reality. Thus, it provides a more complete answer to questions currently posed by theology and fulfills the role of not only the source but also the link between its various factions. An in-depth look at the role of man in the Bible is a consequence of various factors, partly independent of each other. Contemporary biblical criticism has presented many biblical statements in a completely new light. First, it found in the Bible a series of parallel traditions that often had a long history; their view of man was different, it was subject to development, criticism and even devaluation. Today, there is no doubt that one cannot ascribe the analogous concept of man to the wisdom and prophetic tradition, just as one cannot identify the different views on a man which are assumed in the Jewish, Elohist and priestly tradition³.

³ This was demonstrated convincingly by J. Scharbert, *Fleisch, Geist und Seele im Pentateuch*, Stuttgart 1967.

Each requires careful monographic development, which would indicate – apart from only a few common components of man – independent reflection, confrontation with other views or their criticism.

Let us refer to the one example which confirms that the man of the wisdom tradition, the man of the book of Proverbs essentially realizes the ideals of temporal happiness identified from time to time with the fear of God, whereas in the Psalms such an attitude is criticized in favor of a purely religious attitude that imposes the faithful life with God and total dependence on Him. The problem of anthropology is even more complicated in wisdom books characterized by polemical tendencies, such as the Book of Job or the Book of Ecclesiastes. The latter even takes a formal polemic with contemporary ideas about the role of the life-giving factor of man and his fate: “Who knows the spirit of man, whether it goes upward, and the spirit of the animal, whether it goes downward to the earth?”⁴

In this difficult task of biblical anthropology, historical-literary considerations proved to be helpful. They have often led to the true origin of certain views on man, to their theological origin, and thus allowed to establish the original contribution of revealed thought to anthropology. The history of the editions has taught us to recognize in the individual layers of the inspired books traces of subsequent, sometimes conflicting views. In turn, the existential approach determined by philosophy made the Bible scholar interpret statements of Scripture about man from a slightly different point of view.

It drew attention to texts that did not say a great deal or nothing about the internal structure of a human being, but which pointed to the assumptions obvious to the world of the time. The collection of these assumptions, as far as it concerns understanding man by himself in the world of his culture and modernity, technically referred to by the German term *Selbstverständnis*⁵, often allows a much deeper insight into biblical anthropology than a set of formal data from the entire Bible about man, collected and systematically classified, can do. In any case, both ways of reconstructing the image of man are complementing and verifying each other. The new look of post-conciliar theology proved in an irrefutable way that the tasks of the Bible also include determining the anthropological background of sin, justifying the phenomenon of eternal life and resurrection, and moreover, many Christological statements. The anthropological

⁴ Ecclesiastes 3:21. Kohelet seems to fight the first indications (appearing in the biblical books only in the Maccabean period) of anthropological speculation about eternal life. Cf. R. Kroeber, *Der Prediger*, Berlin 1963, 136.

⁵ This term originated in circles of existential German theology and was then adopted in all modern theology, both non-Catholic and Catholic.

conclusions of the biblical scholar often belong to the field of dogmatic, moral theology or internal life. Of course, the various aspects of theology differ in terms of the methods of scientific work, hermeneutic principles, arguments, but nevertheless they pursue one goal.

Therefore, the following considerations will not be a lecture of biblical anthropology in its most important assumptions, but an attempt to indicate the method of anthropological interpretation of basic biblical statements. Above all, it should be noted that in its statements, the Bible never practically refers to the abstract concept of man or humanity. Man is always regarded as an individual – although often regarded as a member of the community – living in the world, but connected with God and other people, by multiple relationships. Even very general statements as for example those referring to God's anthropopathic grief over the creation of man (Genesis 6:6) or statements regarding the limitedness of his life (Genesis 6:3) relate not to human nature, but to people considered as rebellious with regard to God and those who lead a life that stands in opposition to His salvific will⁶.

As the basis of man's unity and solidarity with regard to reward, responsibility or suffering one should therefore consider not the (commonly accepted in the pagan world) awareness of belonging to the same human race⁷, but being a member of one theocratic People of God, bound by the same covenant with God, endowed with the same Law, conducting the same dialogue with God in its history. This dialogue between the God-Creator and man, a member of His community, has a personal character. It is characterized by a specific dialectic.

On the one hand, granted a place over all creation as being the image of God (Genesis 1:26), man rules over all the superior beings, and on the other, he appears to be an impotent creature, craving for the uplifting gift of God. These are, however, not two genetically different concepts born in different theological environments, but appearing in the Bible in various proportions, depending on the historic-redemptive and historical conditions of God's People. Today, it is not enough to say that this dialogue oscillates between three strictly anthropological elements: spirit, life-giving element and body⁸; it is also not enough

⁶ More extensive commentary on Genesis 6.1-4 is provided by J. Scharbert, *Traditions – und Redaktionsgeschichte von Gn 6, 1-4*, BZ NF 11(1967), 66-78.

⁷ In the most exhausting manner in the poetic form it was formulated by Terence (Heautontim, 1.1): *Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto*.

⁸ Basic information on this topic is provided by modern encyclopedias and biblical dictionaries – see especially *Mysterium Salutis* vol. 2, Einsiedeln 1967, 584-602 and *Sacramentum Mundi* vol. 1, Freiburg 1968, 168-176. The Polish translation of the modern *Dictionary of Biblical Theology* is in print. Also worth noting are the relevant entries developed in *Theologische Wörterbuch*

to state that in the each of these three elements the entire personality of a man can be manifested. Biblical anthropology rather deals with the theological consequences of the role of each of them. What is the meaning of *nefes* – the life-giving force – with regard to the religious existence of a human being? If it seems to assume a certain orientation in life⁹, then in what sense is it susceptible to confrontation with the Greek *psyché*, which, after all, is necessarily undertaken in the New Testament? Should its role in the new reality of salvation and rejection be understood as “neutral” in the sense assumed in Old Testament, or rather as a subject of new life, which is only threatened by eschatological death?¹⁰

If *rûh* (spirit) expresses a man living in the spirit of God’s charismatic action¹¹, and in any case as the creature, which has been granted divine characteristics, then one could ask in what relation to him and his personality remains the transcendent Spirit of Saint John, the Paraclete, the witness of truth¹² and the world of other transcendent spirits¹³? An extremely important issue in inter-testamental ethics and one presented in New Testament, where the spirit plays a dominant role, will be to establish the meaning of the term *pneuma*. The moral evaluation of behavior will be different if it is understood as a transcendent factor or as an aspect of the personality of a subject who is supported intensively by this Spirit. The ease with which non-biblical Qumran¹⁴ and inter-testamental

zum Neuen Testament (*sarx*, 98-151, *soma*, 1024-1091, the article on *psyche* is under preparation) and in *Theologische Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament* (article concerning *bšr* – vol. 1, 850-867; *js* – *ibid.*, 238-252).

⁹ Cf. W. Schmidt, *Anthropologische Begriffe im Alten Testament*, “Evang. Theologie” 24(1964), 374-388, esp. 371-381.

¹⁰ Contemporary biblical anthropology tends to understand death as a natural consequence of the limitedness of human existence. Some later texts – especially of apocalyptic origin – perceive death in the sense of a definitive eschatological rejection (“second death”) S. Haag (*Biblische Schöpfungslehre und kirchliche Erbsündenlehre*, Stuttgart 1967, 55) also includes in this category the statement of Wisdom 2:24.

¹¹ This aspect is particularly emphasized by the Jahwist tradition. In addition, the “spirit” (*rûh*) may mean an exponent of the religious life of man, which later (in the Deuteronomic tradition) is defined by the “life-giving element” (*nefes*). For further details see J. Scharbert, *Fleisch, Geist und Seele*, 80.

¹² Cf. A.M. Kothgasser, *Dogmenentwicklung und die Funktion des Geistparakleten nach den Aussagen des II. Vatikanischen Konzils*, Rome 1969; J.B. Patrick, *The Promise of the Paraclete*, “Biblioth. Sacra” 127 (1970), 333-345.

¹³ Cf. P. van Imschoot, *Geist*, BL Einsiedeln 1968, 535-536.

¹⁴ Cf. esp. F. Nötscher, *Geist und Geister in den Texten von Qumran*, in: *Mélanges Bibliques en l’honneur de A. Robert*, Paris 1959, 305-315; L. Stachowiak, *Teologiczny temat dwóch duchów w pismach qumrańskich*, “Zeszyty Naukowe KUL” 10(1967), 37-52.

literature passes from the transcendent sense to the anthropological “spirit” confirms that the authors were concerned with the supreme God’s salvific action. In any case, these anthropological considerations on the role of the spirit are a fruitful introduction to the theology of the residence of the Holy Spirit in the soul of a Christian (see Rom 8:11). The body as an expression of solidarity between people is an exponent of the weakness and transience of a human being considered in its extreme form as a radical opposition to God.

The latter will be developed only in inter-testamental anthropology and the one presented in New Testament, whereas in the Old Testament the body is considered as expressing first of all the situation of man as being created as inferior with regard to God and, therefore, as a creature of limited existence¹⁵, Sir 17:1-2 speaking about the creation of man by God states that despite the power and likeness of man to God, the life of people lasts a certain number of days, and each of us has a predetermined time of existence. The body understood in this way is neither an anthropological source nor a subject of sin, but it is most susceptible to sin. Both the Old Testament and the New Testament assume that the decision about committing sin begins in the heart: a decision in favor or against the will of God is made and is maturing there¹⁶.

Nevertheless, for the author of this very old text of Genesis 6:3, probably having its origin in the sacerdotal tradition, the body is considered a threat to the “spirit” understood as God’s power granted to man for the whole period of his life¹⁷. Neither the original form of the text nor its re-reading during the period of Babylonian captivity¹⁸ presents the body as an active anthropological factor encouraging committing a sin. The fundamental change will be introduced only by the Apocalyptic and the New Testament, replacing the theological justification of the relationship of man to God with the concept of two spheres of worldliness falling under the rule of Satan, which exposes the body and the sphere of God, and whose exponent is the spirit.

Interpreting the anthropological conditions of sin, we must not forget that the earliest written evidence emphasizes rebellion against God, primarily

¹⁵ Cf. *Mysterium Salutis*, op. cit., 593f.

¹⁶ Cf. J. Schreiner, *Persönliche Entscheidung vor Gott nach biblischem Zeugnis*, “Bibel und Leben” 6(1965), 112-115.

¹⁷ J. Scharbert, *Traditions...*, op. cit., 74 holds that the author of the statements probably understood both anthropological factors as being in a sense contradictory.

¹⁸ In its present form, the text of Gen. 6:1-4 can probably be dated to the time of Ezekiel’s writings, with which it shows certain similarities (see Ez 37:6). The editorial history of this text is considered disputable.

as a fact – and a decisive fact – introducing disharmony into God’s saving intentions. The anthropological assumptions serve more to illuminate the background of the event than provide its justification or cause¹⁹: the body made it possible for humans to become entangled in sin, it is considered a convenient area for its development²⁰. Subsequent speculations about two spirits fighting for domination in man’s soul²¹, two inclinations, or *jesarim*²², are only an anthropological attempt to justify the ethical dilemma of man, analogous to the concept of the two spheres: God and Satan.

Commenting on the anthropological statements of the New Testament, one must remember three basic assumptions. The first is the fundamental continuation of the anthropological Old and inter-testamental line as far as its basic structure is concerned. Authors who wrote in Greek partly out of necessity, partly deliberately, use new terms typical for Greek anthropology, such as “soul” (*psyché*), “reason” (*nous*), “conscience” (*syneidesis*), etc. However, these are not completely new terms from the point of view of biblical tradition; they were partly prepared by LXX, and even to a greater extent by the non-canonical inter-testamental literature that continued the development of Old Testament anthropology. However, the confrontation of biblical and Greek-pagan content is neither homogeneous in these texts nor in the New Testament, so the meaning of statements about the “soul” (*psyché*) in the sense more similar to the Hebrew *nefes* or Hellenistic *psyché*, considered as autonomous and immortal, must be determined by reliable, modern exegesis, not by a priori anthropological principles.

To quote only one of the more difficult examples, Matthew 10:28 warns his readers not to have fear in relation to those who kill the body, but who cannot kill the soul, and recommends to fear those because of whom body and soul can be lost in hell. In the first part of the statement – as it seems – a specifically

¹⁹ R. Pesch (*Anthropologie*, in: *Sacramentum Mundi* vol. 1, 171) writes on the subject as follows: “However, the occurrence of sin in the Bible is rather an ontic and salvific-theological event than an event related to a given period; community in a situation that is opposed to salvation (*Unheilsgemeinschaft*) is presented as a fact and not as a biological determinant.”

²⁰ Doctrines referring to the “entanglement in sin” are developed in the collective work of four Austrian theologians: *Ist Adam an allem schuld?, Erbsünde oder Sündenverflochtenheit?*, Innsbruck 1971 (cf. the review of the author of present paper, which will be published in STV this year).

²¹ L. Stachowiak, *Teologiczny...*, art. cit., 38ff.

²² Cf. esp. W.D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, London 1955, 20-35 and L. Stachowiak, art. cit., 41, including 26.

Greek opposition between the soul and the body²³ was expressed, which was not known in the Old Testament in this formulation²⁴. However, if one were to consider this statement in the context of the possibility of martyrdom, one should not interpret its main meaning as an emphasis on the perspective of sustaining life by the immortal soul if the body dies, although it does not deny such a possibility. The immortal soul is not the very subject of salvation: it is the soul with the body, that is the whole person, revived by the resurrection, and only the whole person may be subject to eschatological death. Also here it is rather teaching about “what will happen after the martyr’s death” than about the anthropological structure of a human being²⁵.

One of Gächter’s last major Catholic commentaries does not mention the anthropological meaning of this statement, and according to the text it should be regarded as a tightening of the obligation to profess faith in Jesus and the accompanying decision about choosing eternal life or rejection of it²⁶.

The second assumption, often neglected in the anthropological discussions of the New Testament, is their Christological character. For the inspired authors the fullest expression of the endless sequence of human generations is Christ, the archetype of “new man” and the head of the new human community. Thus, the anthropological statements of the New Testament acquire a soteriological dimension at the same time. God’s saving act realized through Christ is decisive for the inner renewal of man and for the profound change aimed at his eschatological resurrection: belonging to Him or the rejecting Him is expressed in anthropological terms.

From the point of view of Saint Paul, there is distinction between spirit and body²⁷, new and old man²⁸, “outer” and “inward” man (2 Cor 4:16), Saint John expresses the same view by the devaluation of all purely human aspects²⁹ in favor of an affirmation of faith in the mission of Jesus Christ. The condition of man in the world is determined, according to the fourth Gospel, by his “heavenly origin,” being a child of God contrasted with his worldly origin, which expresses

²³ Cf. L. Stachowiak, *Biblija...*, art. cit., 211 and *Theolog. Wörterbuch zum Neuen Test.* vol. 7, 1025-1042.

²⁴ The exception is the book of Wisdom, where the influences of Greek philosophy are clearly visible in anthropology (2, 22 n, 3, 4).

²⁵ Cf. O. Schilling, *Geist und Materie in biblischer Sicht*, Stuttgart 1967, 59f.

²⁶ P. Gächter, *Das Matthäusevangelium*, Innsbruck 1963, 343.

²⁷ Cf. *Theolog. Wörterbuch zum Neuen Test.* vol. 7, 124-136.

²⁸ Cf. Col. 3:10.

²⁹ Cf. R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Tübingen 1954, 422.

his belonging to Satan³⁰. Saint John speaks little about the very process of man's rebirth in the anthropological sense; "Being born of God" (J 1:13; 1J 2:29; 3:9; 4:7; 5:1), as well as being born "of heaven" (J 3: 3) and of the "spirit" (J 3:5-6) basically expresses the soteriological idea³¹, although it is between the sphere of the body and the spirit, which he regards as the situation that determines the human condition, which is decisive for man³².

Finally, the third and extremely important factor in the proper orientation of biblical anthropology is the eschatological nature of life and the world in which man decides whether he would like to live according to the teaching of Christ or contrary to it. First of all, it should be noted that the New Testament is above all a mission of salvation and not of rejection, sin and eschatological death. Therefore, it is primarily about the decision to choose life, while the prospect of definitive death and rejection with all its realness highlight the absolute necessity and irreversibility of this very decision³³. The eschatological situation in which a new man finds himself confronts him with a decision in which not only a superior part of him is involved, but the whole personality. Also, the consequences of this decision, such as resurrection, reward or eternal punishment, assume a biblical-holistic anthropological view. The genesis of the expectation of the eternal reward leads us to the theology of the Old Testament; it should be noted that it developed from the interpretation of the salvific perspective resulting from the Covenant, and not from the Greek soul-body dualism.

Admittedly, on the one hand, in claiming the immortality of the soul, it favored the justification of this teaching, and on the other hand it implied insurmountable difficulties in understanding the resurrection of the body because it used to have a definitely pejorative sense from the Greek point of view. It is the mention of the resurrection that caused the negative reaction of the listeners of Saint Paul in Athens (Acts 17:32), and the systematic study of it was a source of many difficulties for the Greeks at Corinth (1 Corinthians 15)³⁴. Although

³⁰ Cf. J 3:8.10; 8:41.44.

³¹ Cf. excursus 8 in: R. Schnackenburg, *Die Johannesbriefe*, Freiburg 19704, 175-183.

³² Cf. R. Meyer, *Theolog. Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. VII, 105-143 esp. 139 (incl. J 3:6).

³³ Cf. e.g. Mt 10:39. The perspective of the loss of temporal life emphasizes the postulate of an unconditional decision to live with Christ.

³⁴ It should be noted that the New Testament never officially speaks of the "resurrection of the body" in the sense of the Greek *sarx*: the subject of the statement on this subject is always *sôma* (cf. *Theol. Wörterb. zum N.T.*, Vol. VII, 1024- 91). In the Saint Paul's letters, the role of the body understood as *sarx* would be incompatible with its characteristics (see 1 Corinthians 15:15, where the Apostle states that "flesh and blood cannot attain the Kingdom of God."). The first

referring to the synthesis of spirit and matter in the salvific eschatological period³⁵ is consistent with the general orientation typical for Christian life described in the writings of the Saint Paul, it does not explain the anthropological process of the individual eschatological resurrection. The words of St. Paul 2 Cor 5:1ff express the hope of having an eternally permanent house of this tabernacle of God after this earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved; but while remaining in this sanctuary and being granted the presage of the future life by the Holy Spirit, we would not want to lose this place, but “for in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven.”

Here one can see that the mentioned statement undoubtedly concerns a future eschatology expected by the faithful in the near or longer term. In fact, even in the concept of present eschatology which can be found in the Fourth Gospel³⁶, the completion of eternal life already possessed is to be achieved in the future, so this can be considered the same moment of expectation which we can find in the writings of St. Paul. Due to the fact that man lives on earth as one psychophysical whole his eschatological future cannot take into account only one aspect of him, i.e. the purely spiritual side; indeed, both the body and spirit anticipate it in earthly life. The body, although it reminds man of his created and temporal nature, is fully susceptible to eschatological spirituality, which is, however, not synonymous with the loss of its physical character. Nevertheless, it is not possible to carry out further justification of this process within an anthropological framework.

One finds it difficult to consider relevant attempts made by contemporary theology as convincing³⁷. The process of the resurrection of bodies in both individual and collective terms probably requires a further Christological justification. What is, however, crucial here is not a question whether or not one should regard Christ's glorified body that Saint Paul saw on the road to Damascus³⁸ as the archetype of his words included in 1 Corinthians 15 and 2 Corinthians 5 but the fundamental theological truth about Christ who has been raised, the

texts stating *anastasis tes sarkos* (resurrection the body as a *sarx*) appear only in the Fathers: II Clem. 9,1; Justin, Dial. 80,5.

³⁵ Cf. O. Schilling, op. cit., 26-34.

³⁶ Cf. esp. J. Blank, *Krisis*, Freiburg and Br. 1964.

³⁷ Cf. e.g. M. Carrez, *Mit was für einem Leibe stehen die Toten auf?*, “Concilium” 6 (1970), 713-718. Other articles on this topic are included in the Polish version of “Concilium” 6-10 (1970), 222-243.

³⁸ M. Carrez, art. cit., 716f.

first fruits of those who have fallen asleep (1 Corinthians 15:20); and all believers will follow Him.

Perhaps the large-scale discussion in contemporary theology about the resurrection of Christ and the resurrection in general, will shed new light on the anthropological, or better, anthropological and theological conditioning of this object of Christian hope³⁹. Many important theological theses reached their mature form and full justification among the conflicting extreme or even erroneous positions⁴⁰. The aim of the review of anthropological issues carried out here was not supposed to exceed the hermeneutic framework of biblical anthropology, which is why it is far from taking into consideration all current issues. It presents rather material which is *conditio sine qua non* of constructive discussion than ready-made solutions whose orientation it can only imply. Above all, it was aimed at providing theology with biblical assumptions, formally spoken or assumed as obvious, and thus to contribute to a more complete understanding of the saving dialogue between God and man.

³⁹ Cf. R. Schnackenburg, *Zur Aussageweise "Jesus ist (von den Toten) auferstanden"*, "Bibl. Zeitschr. NF" 13 (1969), 1-17.

⁴⁰ Much controversy is caused in particular by a monograph written by X. Léon -Dufoura *Résurrection de Jésus et message paschal*, Paris 1971. Cf. K. Sokołowski, [Z dyskusji nad zmartwychwstaniem Jezusa], RBL 25(1972)3-4, 219-229.

Anthropology of Psalm 8*

We cannot talk about the biblical anthropology in a strict sense because Holy Scripture does not contain teaching about man as such, but only deals with his relation to God¹. We should rather talk about theological anthropology in the Bible. Similarly, Ps. 8 does not provide us with teaching about the structure of man nor the biological or philosophical meaning. Its central theme is God-the Creator and the relation of creation to the Creator who manifests his majesty in the world created by him, that is in man also. The exegetes usually amicably include this psalm to the so-called hymns, or songs in honour of God-Yahweh. They are different, however, at a more profound definition of its contents, genesis and objective. This explains why it is advisable to first make a short survey of the existing opinions on this theme, so that the subsequent assessment of the teaching of Ps. 8 about man could be possible.

Contents, Genesis and Objective of Psalm

Many exegetes, such as R. Kittel, A. Weiser, H. J. Kraus, M. Dahood et al., advocate that love for God demonstrated to Him by the whole of created nature is the main content of the psalm². The psalm, as A. Weiser states, combines admiration for the beauty of nature, in which it comprises a profound tribute to God, evincing himself in it³. Such a view brings God to the forefront as the

* STV 17(1979)1.

¹ Cf. J. Schmid, *Antropologie, Biblische A*, in: LThK, vol. 1 (1957) col. 604; L. Stachowiak, *Biblijna koncepcja człowieka*, in: *W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych*, vol. 2, Warsaw 1968, 209-226.

² Cf. R. Kittel, *Die Psalmen*, Leipzig-Erlangen 1922, 24-29; A. Weiser, *Die Psalmen*, vol. 1, Göttingen 1963, 94-98; H.J. Kraus, *Psalmen*, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1966, 65-73; M. Dahood, *Psalms* 1-50, New York 1965, p 48-52.

³ A. Weiser, op. cit., 96.

main element of the contents of this psalm, regarding other elements, including teaching about man also, as less important ones. Other scholars, such as E. Pannier and H. Renard, repeating the thesis of H. Gunkel, distinguish two central thoughts in this psalm: thoughts about God (verse 2-4) and thoughts about man (verse 5-9). F. Nötscher proceeds, clearly noticing three sections (lines?) in this piece of work: God, man and creation. These three sections combine in one cohesive whole, however, each of them develops the issues peculiar to itself and it could constitute the entirety by itself. In this view the teaching of Ps. 8 about man would claim special attention as something original, something ultimate⁴.

Among Polish scholars, Rev. A. Klawek primarily notices teaching about man in this psalm. Although he starts from a presumption that “psalm 8 celebrates the majesty of God’s name,” he also posits here the fact that “psalm contains contemplations about God’s attitude to man in a poetic form, about dignity of a human being, about favouring man among all other creatures. It is the examination of the idea of the Book of Genesis 1,26, where God says: ‘Let us create a man in our own image’. The second part takes these ideas almost literally.”⁵ A.A. Anderson is of the opposite opinion. He states in his comment to psalms that Ps. 8 mainly emphasises creation, i.e. it loves God, the Creator in His works. The author refers to psalms 19, 104 and 139 of a similar content. If, however, man is mentioned in these psalms, then it is only because he belongs to divine works⁶. It seems, however, that “the dispute” about the contents of psalm 8 is solved best by M. Dahood who assumes that we may talk about man only with reference to God. Hence, Ps. 8 demonstrates who man is in the context of God. In his opinion, psalm celebrates an unlimited majesty of God (verses 2-5) and dignity and authority of man, honoured by God (verses 6-10)⁷.

This concise survey of the views and opinions of the exegetes enables us to conclude that God is a central figure in the whole of Ps. 8, and man is great only because he owes everything to God as a divine creature. Talking about man, Ps. 8 always shows him through the prism of his Creator and Lord. These conclusions will become more evident when we consider them in terms of genesis and objective of this psalm.

The claim of H. J. Kraus about a dependence of this hymn on Old Babylonian or Sumerian hymnic poetry, in which we also come across love for local

⁴ Cf. E. Pannier, H. Renard, *Les Psaumes*, in: *La Sainte Bible*, vol. 5, Paris 1950; F. Nötscher, *Das Buch der Psalmen* (Echte Bibel), Würzburg 1959.

⁵ A. Klawek, *Quam admirabile est nomen tuum*, RBL 1 (1948), 6ff.

⁶ A.A. Anderson, *Psalms*, vol. 1, London 1972, 100-104.

⁷ M. Dahood, *op. cit.*, 49.

deities (e.g. Ishkur, god of storm). Almost the same words are repeated in the hymn in favour of Ishkur as it occurs in Ps. 8 in relation to the greatness and magnificence of God's name.⁸ Although it is very clear that Israel was developing under the influence of the cultures of neighbouring nations, however he clearly cuts ties with them, seeing his magnitude and historical role always in connection with God-Yahweh. For that reason many exegetes see the genesis of this psalm in the context of a religious cult of Israel. It is possible that the psalm could be written as a song for the festival of tents as an expression of gratitude to God for crops. It was probably sung during evening or night prayers which may be proved by a lack of any mention of the sun, and the mentioning of moon and stars: "when we look at your sky, at moon and stars, which you anchored in it" (verse 4). The statement that psalm 8 is the result of a personal afterthought of some unknown author about rich internal life seems to be the most convincing statement. Perhaps David was this author (although at present it may be extremely difficult to defend his authorship of this psalm). Somebody, who knew Jahwist and priestly stories about the creation of the world and man, permanently enriched by an oral tradition gave voice on their basis to their belief in God and man originating from God⁹.

Theological Assumptions of the Psalm's Author

We can say that the anthropology of Ps. 8 or in the stricter sense the teaching of this psalm on man derives from religious or theological assumptions of the author. Man according to this piece of writing appears in the context of God and the world created by him as a small, meaningless creature. This claim may be inferred from the antithesis which is observed between line 2 and 5. The expression *mah adir* ("how magnificent," line 2) is contrasted with the expression *mah Enosh [...] uben adam* ("who a man is," line 5). God is great and His name is magnificent. However, man even compared to other creatures is small, weak and evanescent. In the Book of Job man does not know much about the world

⁸ H.J. Kraus, op. cit., 67.

⁹ The question concerns the dependence of Ps. 8 on a priestly story about the creation of man, the so-called 'P' document. It seems that even though document 'P' was created after the Babylonian captivity (6th/5th century), the contents included in it were transferred much earlier in a tradition from generation to generation. For this reason, they could be known yet in Davidic times or in slightly more recent times, that is, in times when this psalm was already written. Both authors were inspired by one and the same source, that is, from an oral tradition.

created by God and he is helpless towards Him. He cannot manage either the weather or rain. His smallness is noticeable even more in comparison with the animal world, towards which man turns out to be the weakest creature (Job 38:33-29; 39:1-30)¹⁰.

The smallness of man is also confirmed by two terms occurring in line 5: *Enosh* and *ben adam*. Anderson is of the opinion that the author of Ps. 7 used these terms deliberately to emphasise the weakness of human nature¹¹. It is possible that the author knew the Jahwist document about creation and based on the expressions included in it specified his view on a man. *Sitz im Leben*, namely the situation in which the author of the psalm was in and the temporal scope in which he was writing were extremely important while specifying man. As mentioned above, line 4 indicates that the psalmist was looking at the sky and watching the moon and a countless number of flickering stars. This frightening silence of a summer night in the East provokes a man to a sad thought that he is a minor speck of dust in face of enormous space. Would God, having such a powerful world ahead, still like to think about a man?¹²

Meanwhile, the psalmist writes that God “remembers about a man” and “cares about him.” Both Hebrew words (*zakar* and *paqad*) have rich content. The word *zakar* appears 288 times in the Old Testament, including its extremely frequent use in cult. In a psalter, where it appears 44 times, on the one hand it means confident reference of man to God, on the other hand, however, it means God’s continual care about man’s issues. The term *paqad* is a synonym of this word in the sense of paying attention to someone, noticing him and becoming interested in him. In the theological meaning *paqad* expresses the idea that God despite the existence of enormous universe notices a man in it and is extremely interested in him. Man believing in God should not feel like a creature lost in the universe¹³.

A man is admittedly small, but God made him great, which is mentioned in line 6: “You, who made him slightly smaller than God.” The determination of its original wording and the theological content were the greatest difficulties

¹⁰ Cf. S. Grzybek, *Księga Joba*, in: *Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu*, vol. 2, Poznań 1975, 462.

¹¹ A.A. Anderson, op. cit., 102.

¹² Cf. R. Kittel, op. cit., 26.

¹³ According to Anderson, the theological sense of this word referring to a man would generally justify the application of the psalm to Jesus Christ, who descended to the depths of human experience, and at the same time he ascended to the tops to control the entire creation. Cf. A.A. Anderson, op. cit., 103.

in this verse. One and the other caused many problems, although it is seemingly simple. TM, and Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion and *Hexapla* by Origen suggest such a translation: “slightly smaller than God” (in Hebrew: *meath me Elohim*). LXX, the Syrian translation, the Vulgate and different targumim have the following equivalent: “from angels” (Greek: *par’ angelus*). It seems that the translation by LXX is not contradictory with the original Hebrew text. Many exegetes regard them as even quite appropriate commentary to the Hebrew original¹⁴. E. Pannier is of the opinion (which is also observable in the dictionary by E. Jenni – C. Westermann) that the word “*elohim*” in Hebrew, regardless of the fact that it means God’s own name, it is still used in a broader sense to describe high-ranking people, e.g. judges, kings (Ps. 82, 1. 6), angels (Ps. 97, 7) as well as national gods (Ps. 86, 8)¹⁵. The Israelites believed that there are intermediate beings, heavenly creatures between the only God and people, created in the image of God¹⁶. There are mentions about them in many parts in the Bible (3 Kings 22, 19; Job 1, 6; Is 6, 1-3, etc.). The psalmist probably signifies these creatures when stating that man is slightly shorter than them.

Certain stylistic reasons resulting from the structure of line 6 also enforces this opinion. The psalmist addresses God in the 2nd person in the first half of this line: “You made him (that is, a man) a little smaller.” The question may be suggested, from whom? If the author thought about the only, true God, then he would say: “you made him slightly smaller than you.”

The psalmist settled, however, for the statement: “You made him slightly smaller than heavenly creatures,” that is such creatures which surround God’s throne in heaven. Many contemporary Biblicists and philologists give such an interpretation, among others, Kraus, Anderson and Dahood. Anderson claims that acknowledging man as slightly smaller than God would be a contradiction of the contents of line 3 and 4: “From children’s mouths, from babies’ mouths You make enormous glory to show it to your opponents to tame an enemy, a powerful enemy.” Dahood clearly assumes that a man is not smaller than God in this psalm, but than heavenly creatures. Therefore, he explains it in line 6 as follows: “You made him (placed) slightly lower than gods.” He adds, in his comment, that the expression “gods” (*elohim*) means members of a heavenly court of Yahweh, that is these creatures which surround God’s throne in heaven. Only some authors are in favour of the old interpretation that man was created by

¹⁴ Cf. H. Gunkel, *Die Psalmen*, Göttingen 126, 28. Many contemporary exegetes repeat this after Gunkel.

¹⁵ E. Pannier, H. Renard, op. cit., 86.

¹⁶ Cf. G.v. Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, vol. 1, Berlin 1963, 159.

God as slightly smaller than Him¹⁷. Did the Israelites, at the time of the writing of Ps. 8, believe in the existence of angels or (intermediate beings between God and man)? It seems so. We need to distinguish a tradition which preached this thesis from its formal preparation in writing. Assuming this fact, we may say that the translation of LXX does not lower or distort the meaning of TM, but on the contrary it constitutes a perfect commentary to it and the only acceptable translation.

Although man in relation to God and the entire heavenly court is a shorter being, he is the tallest being among the living creatures on earth, the king of the entire created world. This idea is included in the words: “you crowned him with dignity and glory” (line 6 b), literally: “you crowned him with fame (*kabod*) and glory (*hadar*).” These two expressions symbolise the royal power of man, as it is present in the royal psalms (21, 6; 45, 4; 96, 6; 29, 1; 104, 1). They define the *status* of man on earth. God who is king in heaven wanted man to be king on earth, wielding this authority on His behalf and by His order. The fact that God appointed man to be a king is regarded by the exegetes as a comment to the ideas expressed in the Book of Genesis 1, 26-28, where he talks about man created in the image and likeness of God. In view of Ps. 8 this image and likeness should be understood as the royal power of man. Man is king of the earth, and by this he becomes similar to God. In the line discussed, similar to line 8, Yahweh, the Creator and Lord of the world, transfers the entire world to man as king appointed by God to rule it¹⁸. From this perspective, man may be regarded as the greatest being on earth.

However, does man really hold complete royal power? In .7 he says that God transfers everything to his feet. What does the word “everything” (*kol*) mean? Does it refer only to all creatures mentioned in line 8 and 9 or also to other people, e.g. those who we read about in Ps. 110,1: “Sit down at my right hand until I put your enemies as an ottoman for your feet”? The psalm does not refer to the enthronement of the entity in the sense of appointing him king in a specific place and time, but it means man as humankind and contemplates over his relation to the world created by his relation to God. The author attempts at balancing proportions between God, the heavenly court, man and the entire material world. Man not because of his merits or special attributes, but due to Divine mercy is ruler and lord of the created world. The enumeration of different animals, although incomplete, is to symbolise the power of man not only over

¹⁷ Cf. F. Nötscher, op. cit., 27.

¹⁸ Cf. H.J. Kraus, op. cit., 70.

animals, but also over all living creatures. There is a certain analogy to animals enumerated in the Book of Genesis 1, 20-24, which allows us to suppose that the author of Ps. 8 knew the priestly story and gave voice to it in his piece of writing. He approved of, together with the authors of the Jahwist story and the 'P' document, the authority of man over the entire world created.

Characteristic Features of Teaching Ps. 8 about Man

We may pose another question here, namely where the author of Ps. 8 draws inspiration on his opinions about man. It seems that he referred to the general view on man among his contemporaries. The cases of man were the main subject of interest of all ancient nations. It was almost amicably assumed that a man has something from the deity because divine blood flows in him and the gods created him out of their own beauty. For this reason, he became similar to the gods and is very precious to them¹⁹. These ideas were probably reflected in Ps. 8. Regardless of this fact, the author submitted the synthesis of all opinions about a man, familiar to him, both biblical and extra-Biblical ones. The idea of greatness and power and the power of men related to it dominates in them.

Lack of mention about the defeat and sin of man may be explained by this. Although the author mentions that man is weak as the son of earth (*Enosh*) moulded from clay (*ben adam*) then, however, man is great in the author's eyes. It is difficult to assume that the author of this psalm did not know the contents of the Book of Genesis 3, since he knew well the Book of Genesis 2. He intentionally omitted the information about sinful man. He did this because it did not harmonize with the general thematic assumptions of the piece of writing. He planned his psalm as a unified whole, aiming at loving God and elevating man. Due to the fact that man may be great only in combination with a great and majestic God, this explains why the author combined the statements of God and man in his psalm. Man, aware of his smallness and nothingness, regards the fact that the powerful and majestic God, Creator of universe, wanted to contact him, as a great mercy. He realises that in his existence, life and action is dependent on God. He also knows that he gets to know himself only in God and by God.

The subsequent conclusion is that man belongs to the Divine world. God remembers about him, cares for him because man is a part of the world, which belongs entirely to God. The idea of complete dependence of man on God is not

¹⁹ Cf. W. Zimmerli, *Das Menschenbild des Alten Testaments*, TExH 14 (1949).

unfamiliar to the author. As once, God “decorated the world created by him (the Book of Genesis 1, 3-24), he also “decorates” man now. The two incomprehensible words *kabod* and *hadar* constitute the best evidence of this. The exegetes conjecture differently on the issue of their relevant contents, but the statement that man thanks to kindness and the love of God carries His image in himself is probably closest to truth. He rightfully boasts that he is similar to God. We may say that thanks to this image man is fully honoured and decorated by God.

Eventually, however, a man is a great mystery for the psalmist, particularly in the context of universe and a powerful God living over it. Similarly, it is both extremely difficult to examine the world and permeate God and we cannot fully examine and permeate a man either. Only the Creator knows this mystery.

We may eventually pose the question if the psalmist tells us about a man contemporary to him or about a man from the future. Several texts of the New Testament and statements of the fathers of the Church seem to favour the latter from these solutions, noticing Messianic reminiscences in Ps. 8. In Hbr 2, 6-8 they are almost literally quoted in line 5, 6 and 7b from this psalm, referring to Jesus Christ. The author of the letter is of the opinion that Christ as “Son of Man” (Dan 7, 14), temporarily supple, who accepted the form of a servant, becoming similar to humans (Philippians 2, 7), called *Enosh* and *ben adam* in Ps. 8, 5, was elevated now to the dignity of a king and everything was transferred to His feet. Christ’s elevation as a king is also emphasised by Saint Paul the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 15, 27 and in Ephesians 1, 22, where he also quotes the words “everything was transferred to his feet” (Ps. 8, 7b) and refers them to the loved and elevated Christ. The exegetes’ opinion in this matter is quite homogeneous. Although some of them (e.g. F. Nötscher) assume that in Hbr 2, 6-8 the sense adjusted to Ps. 8 is meant, then, however most of them are in favour of the literal, even the historical sense of this psalm. The psalm describes a man of the present, a specific man, who living in profound belief in God sees the objective and essence of his existence only in Him²⁰. This man realises his smallness but he is simultaneously aware of his own greatness which results not from his merits and achievements but from the fact that he, as a Divine being, permanently takes advantage of Divine care and mercy.

²⁰ Kraus states that there are no traces of eschatological-Messianic thinking in Ps. 8, as if the afore-mentioned texts of the New Testament were to suggest that. H. J. Kraus, op. cit., 72.

Brotherly Love As Condition For Perfect Love Of God (1J 4:12)*

Introduction

In the First Epistle of John and in the Fourth Gospel, the whole of Christ's ethics is put into the commandment of brotherly love. No other moral obligation has been emphasized so strongly as brotherly or neighborly love (1J 2:7-11; 3:10-18; 4:7.11-12; 20-21; 5:1-2). It is a commandment (*entole*, see: 1J 2:7-8; 3:23) equally important as the obligation to love God (1J 4:21) and it gives Christians a mission of filling all their lives with love for their fellow brothers. The Apostle elaborates on this thought in a helical way around the central theme of unifying with God, which for Christians is manifested by the unity with fellow humans. It is already introduced in the prologue (1J 1:3) and the thought returns also in the ending part of the letter (1J 5:16)¹. Living in the light of faith, free from errors and with love for neighbors is presented as the basic condition of uniting with God. As faith and love are inseparable in Christian life².

John's teachings on brotherly love in the First Epistle can be put in the following points:

- a. Brotherly love as an old and new commandment in the context of the metaphors of light and darkness (1J 2:7-11);
- b. Motivation for brotherly love (1J 3:10-15);
- c. Ways of practicing brotherly love (1J 3:16-18; 5,16);
- d. Supernatural character of brotherly love (1J 4:7-5:2).

* STV 20(1982)2.

¹ Cf. *Traduction Oecuménique de la Bible. Edition integrale, Nouveau Testament*, Paris 1975, 739f. (In the English version, all quotations from the New Testament are based on the English Standard Version – translator's note).

² Cf. T. Hermann, *Elementy konstytutywne chrześcijańskiego życia w ujęciu św. Jana*, HD 3(1977), 172f.

One might easily notice the gradual shift from the commandment to actual source of brotherly love, which is God. Brotherly love is of God (1J 4:7), God is love (1J 4:8.16), brotherly love is the condition of God's perfect love (1J 4:12), the great importance of love in experiencing peace (1J 4:17-18), inseparable unity of God's love and brotherly love (1J 4:20,21-5:2) is the key point in John's teachings about love of fellow-man as brothers.

From this peak point of John's teachings we would like to extract and reflect on the statement that brotherly love is the condition of the God's perfect love. The Evangelist puts it in these words: "No one has ever seen God; if we love one another, God abides in us and his love is perfected in us" (1J 4:12).

This paper is an analysis of John's words and their context. The reason to raise the subject is its constant relevance in everyday Christian life that obliges us to perfect the practice of the highest imperative of love.

*"No one has ever seen God; If we love one another,
God abides in us..."*

In the pericope revealing the supernatural character and source of brotherly love (1J 4:7-5:2) the Apostle teaches: let us love one another, for love is from God (1J 4:7); God is love (1J 4:8); His love is reflected in the Incarnation and Redemption undertaken out of pre-existing kindness (1J 4:9-10); God's love is so great that it should inspire people to love one another (1J 4:11). Finally, Saint John concludes: "if we love one another, God abides in us..." This statement has its powerful inner logic. Since God and love is one, then as consequence abiding in love is abiding in God. A loving human is filled by God, God lives within him – "ho Theos en hemin menei," God grants him with a unique inner strength.

Saint John concludes with the statement "God is love" by saying that whoever has a particle of love is part of this Godly attribute and is united with God, as he puts it: "God abides in us." And vice versa: he who rejects love from his heart, separates himself from God. Abiding in love is a sign and effect of unity with God expressed by the formula of interpermeation and common action of God and creation: "God is love, and whoever abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him" (1J 4:16).

Christians are privileged with the presence of the Father and the Son, they love one another with the same God's love, and create unity that can be compared to the unity of the Trinity (J 17:21- 23). Brotherly love is the continuation of God's love in our relations with others. The neighborly community of Christians draws its origins from the union between believers and the

Father and the Son. At the same time, it is a sign of real participation in the Godly life³.

According to Saint John, the only way to understand brotherly love is to see it as stemming from the Father's love for us expressed through His Son. God's *agape* is the source and a model for any other kind of love. Father loves His Son (J 3:35; 5:20; 10:17; 15:9a-10b; 17:24,26); the way the Father loves His Son, the Son loves believers (J 13:1-34; 15:9,12); the way the Son loves believers, they shall love one another (J 13:34; 15:12; 1J 3:16;4:11; 4:19;). For St. John, the new and distinctively Christian aspect of brotherly love is the fact that God's love, which is manifested in relations between the Three persons of God and in the relation towards humans constitutes the motive and sets an example for our love⁴.

Through our love of one another "God abides in us" – as the Apostle says – and he uses the words "in us" (*en hemin*) twice, emphasizing the presence of God in his believers. God is present in a Christian believer with His love and His life, which is how a man becomes reborn, becomes a new man. He has new life within him, new recognition, new nature. God's presence is the source of energy for Godly life that all believers should possess at all times⁵.

Saint John knows the power of love that is the force of life. For him, love does not depend on feeling; it has nothing to do with sentimentalism or unspecified humanitarianism. The subject of such love is another human seen as a brother. Its authenticity is proved by deeds (1J 3:18). It is ready for the greatest sacrifice (1J 3:16). Brotherly love guarantees a true cognition and knowledge – *gnosis* (1J 4:7,8); and it is the foundation of unity with God (1J 4:12,13)⁶.

God that abides in man reveals His presence in the world and reveals His "grace" in people, in His witnesses. Church is the community of these witnesses, an essential element of the history of salvation, a reality of mission and evangelism⁷. Church is a community of love, a community living on the spirit of love. Christians' moral life within family relations has a role of spreading the

³ Cf. D. Deden, *L'amore di Dio e la risposta dell'uomo nella Bibbia*, Bari 1971, 97; A. Feuillet, *Le mystère de l'amour divin dans la théologie Johannique*, Paris 1972, 108. A. Feuillet noticed that the abiding formula (the residing, staying, abiding, living in) is the highest form of the Biblical doctrine of covenant that was introduced in the Old Testament (Ez 34:30-31; Ps 2:16). Cf. *Un cas privilégié de pluralisme doctrinale: La conception différente de Vagape chez saint Jean*, "Esprit et Vie" 37(1972), 503.

⁴ Cf. N. Lazure, *Les valeurs morales de la théologie Johannique*, Paris 1965, 248.

⁵ Cf. L. Mora di, *Dio è amore*, Roma 1954, 190.

⁶ Cf. W. Grossouw, *Revelation and Redemption a sketch of the Theology of St John*, Westminster 1955, 48.

⁷ Cf. A. Bondeyne, *Jesus Chrystus wyzwala i jednoczy*, "Znak" 11-12 (1975), 1370.

love that is active in God. Brotherly love in all its acts is a manifestation of God's presence in the world, an epiphany of the God of love. This is what the Church brings to the world, the presence of God and experience of Him⁸. Through brotherly love the disciples, living in a world they do not belong to (J 17:11.15), give testimony to Jesus being the one sent directly by His Father (J 17:21)⁹.

This is actually what the *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World* refers to when it states: "For it is the function of the Church, led by the Holy Spirit Who renews and purifies her ceaselessly, to make God the Father and His Incarnate Son present and in a sense visible" and that: "What does the most reveal God's presence, however, is the brotherly charity of the faithful who are united in spirit as they work together for the faith of the Gospel and who prove themselves a sign of unity (*Gaudium et Spes*, 21)."

It is thus not surprising that after describing God's great love towards humans in the acts of Incarnation and Redemption (1J 4:9.10), the Apostle does not encourage people directly to love God, but to love one another, to engage in brotherly love: "Beloved, if God so loved us, we also ought to love one another" (1J 4:11). He adds: "No one has ever seen God" (1J 4:12a).

As a matter of fact, God cannot be seen due to His spiritual nature and transcendence (See: J 18; 1 Tim 6:16; Col. 1:15), but if God is love and being born from God proves participation in Godly *agape* (1J 4:7), and all the while brotherly love makes "God abide in us" (1J 4:12), then God's abiding in us allows us to truly recognize Him. This is what Christ talked about in his valediction when he told the Holy Spirit that the world does not see Him, but the disciples know Him for He shall dwell with them and be in them (J 14:17)¹⁰. If we love one another, God dwells in us according to the words of our Christ the Lord: "If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him" (J 14:23).

As Urs von Balthasar points out, "this is what seems significant in the *agape* of Saint John: God is invisible, whoever lives in the neighborly love has God in him, a God that he can recognize and experience." You cannot see the invisible God, but we do see people, our neighbors, brothers. God can be seen in his children when they love one another¹¹.

⁸ Cf. L. Lochet, *Charité fraternelle et vie trinitaire*, "Nouvelle Revue Theologique" 2 (1956), 132.

⁹ Cf. W. Claude, *Amour*, in: *Vocabulaire de Théologie Biblique*, ed. X.L. Dufour, Paris 1964, 43.

¹⁰ Cf. C. Spicq, *Agape dans le Nouveau Testament*, Paris 1957-1959, III, 285f.

¹¹ Cf. H.U. von Balthasar, *Duch chrześcijański*, 135; F.F. Bruce, *The Epistles of John*, Michigan 1970, 109.

Saint Augustine explains: “By this we know that we abide in him and he in us because he has given us of his Spirit” (1J 4:13). Good, thank God. We know he lives in us. How do we know that he lives in us? John says: “he has given us of his Spirit.” How do we know that “he has given us of his Spirit”? Ask your heart! If it is full of love, you have the Spirit of God. How do I know this is how you recognize the Spirit of God within you? Ask Paul: “God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us” (Ro 5:5)¹².

God’s aim is to make people His friends, partners who are worthy of Him and to unite in love with them; as a result, to lead people to a unity of love for one another, and ultimately to make all humans live a life of love. It is the love of community that takes the center stage in John’s theology. There is no higher perfection than love in unity and communion with the Persons of God that happens through brotherly love¹³.

It might be important to point out that two statements by St. John are structured in the same way: “if we love one another, God abides in us” (1J 4:12) and: “Whoever confesses that Jesus is the Son of God, God abides in him, and he in God” (1J 4:15). In the first quote, the condition for God’s abiding in us is brotherly love (verse 12), and in the second it is acknowledging Jesus Christ as the Son of God (verse 15). So brotherly love and faith in Christ are interchangeable. This brings us to the conclusion that love and faith are connected to each other. Since the Apostle writes about both the brotherly love and faith in Christ as conditions of uniting with God then there is no brotherly love without faith and no faith without brotherly love for him which he emphasized by stating: “And this is his commandment, that we believe in the name of his Son Jesus Christ and love one another, just as he has commanded us” (1J 3:23)¹⁴. This may serve as confirmation that faith and love are inseparable in Christian life.

“...and his love is perfected in us”

“God abides in us” and never ceases to love or manifest it towards His children. For a person who can enjoy the abiding of God in them, there is the issue of growing increasingly more in God’s love, which is “in us” – *en hamin* (1J 4:12)

¹² Cf. Saint Augustine, *Homilie na Ewangelie i Pierwszy List św. Jana*, Warsaw 1977, II, 475, ML 35, 1977ff.

¹³ Cf. A. Feuillet, op. cit., 256f.

¹⁴ Cf. W. Thüsing, *Die Johannesbriefe*, Leipzig 1970, 148.

or “with us” – *met hemon* (1J 4:17). Love cannot grow on its own, since it is God’s attribute, but it can fill the soul and rule it completely. This is when we have the right to talk about the perfect love – *he teleia agape* (1J 4:18).

This perfection is mentioned several times in the First Epistle of John, see: 1J 2:5; 4:12; 4:17; 4:18. Christians can constantly improve the way they receive the love of God, and ultimately fill their entire soul with it¹⁵.

Love is verified mainly in following the commandments (J 15:10; 1J 3:23-24; 4:21; 5:2-3; 2J 5-6). “but whoever keeps his word, in him truly the love of God is perfected” (1J 2:5). Following the commandments leads to going deeper into God, as our Lord Jesus Christ said: “If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him” (J 14:23). “By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit” (1J 4:13); “And by this we know that he abides in us, by the Spirit whom he has given us” (1J 3:24).

Saint John’s words about the love of God being perfected (1J 2:5) is usually interpreted as the perfect love of the faithful towards God which is a consequence of following the word of God. However, we believe it is also possible to understand the words in the sense of God’s love in and by itself, the love that exists in God. One might therefore ask: How can the love that exists in God become perfected? In the Gospel of St. John the highest form of this love is mentioned in these words: “having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them to the end” (J 13:1). This means Christ’s love was ultimately fulfilled in the last moment of His life when He took death upon himself for people’s sins. In the First Epistle of John the love of God is also directed towards its ultimate end which is the moment of admitting humans the honor of being a child of God: “See what kind of love the Father has given to us, that we should be called children of God; and so we are” (1J 3:1). So the love of God is complemented and perfected when it reaches the goal of granting people the privileges of salvation. Such an interpretation has its foundation and justification in the verses: 1J 4:12 and 1J 2:5, both similar in content and structure, as in both of these extracts after the words “God abides in us” this formula follows: “and his love is perfected in us.”¹⁶

Such an understanding of God’s love towards people as we could see in the above-quoted text is also expressed by Saint Augustine: “Beloved, look: if we love one another, God abides in us and His love is perfected in us. Start loving and you will become perfect. Have you started to love? Then God has started

¹⁵ Cf. C. Spicq, op. cit., 347.

¹⁶ Cf. G. Deling, *teleioo*, in: TWZNT, VIII, 82; N. Lazure, op. cit., 236f.

to abide in you. Love the One who abides in you for Him to perfect you, as He has chosen to live in you in His perfect form.”¹⁷

The perfection of love also appears in how Christians experience the inner peace, safety and trust in waiting for the judgment day: “By this is love perfected with us, so that we may have confidence for the day of judgment, because as he is so also are we in this world” (1J 4:17); and: “There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear. For fear has to do with punishment, and whoever fears has not been perfected in love” (1J 4:18).

The one who loves, invited to be in contact with God the Father, because “he abides in God, and God abides in him” (1J 4:16), should never again live in fear of punishment, but instead get closer to God with courage and joyful hope that comes upon human from the presence of God. One should keep their heart in peace and in the belief that God’s love is infinite and as such lives in us, “abides” in *nas-menei*¹⁸.

Being aware of sin, a Christian reassures his heart before God (1J 3:19) and knows that God is generous and does not treat man according to his wrongdoings (1J 1:9; 2:1-2). Even though after the guilty escape of the first human (Gen 3:8-10) man feels he is a sinner (Luke 5:8-9) and his instinctive reaction is to see God as a Judge who punishes, it is with the revealing of the infinite nature of God’s love, and letting man participate in His life, in the fellowship of believers – *koinonia* (1J 1:6) that allows us to live in peace and joyful trust¹⁹. Saint John justifies his hopeful approach in these words: “because as he is (in heaven) so also are we in this world.” In the First Epistle of John the “He” (*ekeinos*) refers to Jesus Christ (1J 2,6; 3,3.5.7.16), but the already beloved one. As Jesus Christ is perfect in his love, so we are perfect through Him, through His anointing, through the Spirit, even though unlike Him, we still live in this world. We can have a joyful certainty and feel safe on the judgment day, because the same love of God is in us as the one that is finalized in Christ the Judge²⁰.

¹⁷ Cf. St. Augustine, *Homilie na Ewangelie i Pierwszy List św. Jana*, Warsaw 1977, II, 475, ML 35, 1977ff.

¹⁸ Cf. N. Lazure, op. cit., 248.

¹⁹ Cf. C. Spicq, op. cit., 349; C. Spicq, *La justification du charitable 1J 3, 19-21*, *Biblica* 40 (1959), 927. It is often pointed out that there is no “dread” of the day in St. John’s writings as we know it from the description of the final judgment in the Synoptic Gospels. Instead, John describes a serene and trustful anticipation of judgment day, which is a result of the fellowship of God and His Son. The fellowship – *koinonia* (1J 1:3) does not leave space for fear of the judgment day. See: S. Cipriani, *Il “giudizio” in San Giovanni*, in: *San Giovanni, Atti della XVII settimana biblica*, Brescia 1964, 179.

²⁰ Cf. W. Thüsing, op.cit., 155.

“There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear” – as the Apostle teaches (1J 4:18). What he means is that love and fear cannot coexist, only in souls that are not yet fully developed. But since *agape* has grown its roots deep into the heart of Christian who “abides in God, and God abides in him” (1J 4:16), the perfect love comes to being – *he teleia agape*, which does not allow fear. This triumph of God’s love is the sign of perfection for Saint John²¹.

For Saint John to be a Christian means to love. He distinguishes two kinds of people: those who love and those who do not love (1J 3:10). A Christian prevails in love “*menei*” (1J 4:16). The expression “we in God” and “God in us” was introduced by John to express everything that refers to our full, perfect communion with God. The kind of love in which man is in communion with God is the real and “perfected” love of God, that is the love of God in us²².

“His love is perfected in us” (1J 4:12) as long as His Spirit, the power of His perfect love lives in us, as the following words suggest: “By this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit” (1J 4:13)²³.

A full or perfect love is characterized by the Apostle in verse 10: “In this is love, not that we have loved God but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.” God Himself possesses love in the highest form. He grants it to His children, and by doing so he enables them to love one another and Himself. Love unites everyone who takes part in the same Godly nature. Saying that love is perfected is pointing to its fullness, its peak, its genuineness and authenticity. It is at the same time static and dynamic, as it means abiding or living in, as well as doing good. And in the words: “if we love one another, God abides in us and his love is perfected in us” we get a clear instruction that brotherly love can give us a certainty of God abiding in us because whoever loves takes part in the love that is God, and by doing so, he reaches the highest level of religious life. Through the love of all fellow Christians for one another, God’s love reaches its full potential and becomes perfected²⁴.

God’s *agape* in its infinite fullness becomes the source and model for all other types of love. Through Incarnation we know that God is love and that His

²¹ Cf. C. Spicq, *Agape...*, op. cit., 349.

²² Cf. J. Schneider, *Die Kirchenbriefe (Dans Neue Testament Deutsch, X)* Gottingen 1967, 167. We use the verb *menein* mainly as: abide, stay permanently, reside, live, occupy. It is often used in the First Epistle of John (1J 2:6,10,14,24,27,28; 3:6,9,14,15,17,24; 4:12,13,15,16), as well as in the Fourth Gospel. Cf. F. Gryglewicz, *Listy Katolickie, Wstęp, Przekład z oryginału, Komentarz*, Poznań 1959, 411.

²³ Cf. W. Thusing, op.cit., 145.

²⁴ Cf. C. Spicq, *L’amour de Dieu révélé aux hommes dans les écrits de saint Jean*, Paris 1978, 137f; R.R. Williams, *The Letters of John and James*, Cambridge 1965, 48f.

love is placed in us (J 17:23-26; 1J 4:8-16). The initiative comes from Him. Through the love that spreads onto man he experiences a great transformation and his relations with fellow Christians is directed. In our love towards our brothers the dynamics of God's love is revealed, and it takes on its full and perfect shape²⁵.

When God's love is seeded in the hearts of the faithful and God Himself abides in them, His love becomes perfect in the answer that they give to Him and His disciples. This way, the faithful reach the perfection of the Father that Christ talked about in his Sermon on the Mount: "You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat 5:48)²⁶.

The great significance of brotherly love is thus reflected in its reference to God. Loving one another is abiding in God, that is being united with Him in communion. God's love reaches its ultimate end within us, it reaches its perfection through communicating the benefits of salvation, which is the beginning of eternal life. This is what Saint Paul teaches us in his First Letter to Corinthians (1 Cor 13:8-13) by saying that love never ends. We can agree with Rene Laurentin that "there is at least one point in which the continuity between the earthly and eternal life is clear. This point is the love that develops on earth in mortal reality and which will be also experienced in eternity. So if one neglects this earthly love between people and only invests themselves in the eternal love for the invisible God, one lives in a lie which John also describes in his First Epistle (1J:10; 2:4; 2:22; 4:20; 5:10). This is when the mortal and eternal disperse into one another and become organically interconnected."²⁷

The community of Christian followers that manifests the greatest love and letting others and themselves know the love of God has a mission towards all the people whom Christ wishes to draw to himself (J 12:32). The love for fellow humans is a testimony given to the world about Jesus who was sent by his Father (J 17:21). "By this all people will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another" (J 13:35).

Christians should see and acknowledge the love of God and really get to meet Him following Christ's commandments. And through their daily experience of faith they should not only experience God, but also give an actual proof of such experience to non-Christians²⁸.

²⁵ Cf. D. Deden, op. cit., 96f. D. Mollat, *Saint Jean Maître Spirituel*, Paris 1976, 129f.

²⁶ Cf. F.F. Bruce, op. cit., 109f.

²⁷ Cf. R. Laurentin, *Rozwój i zbawienie*, Warsaw 1972, 155f.

²⁸ Cf. Urs von Balthasar, *Spotkanie Boga w świecie dzisiejszym*, Concilium 1-10(1965)6, 427. J.J. Navone, *Temoignage personele, Une spiritualité biblique*, Paris 1968, 151.

St. Hilary Of Poitiers On The Christocentrism Of The Spiritual Interpretation Of The Holy Scriptures*

Introduction

There was a period in the history of the Church, when the Holy Bible was not available for all the faithful¹. Today, reading the Holy Bible is not only recommended in ecclesiastical teaching, but ordered in the confessional as one of the forms of the works of penance. This is a paradox both with regard to prohibition and to the command.

It is difficult to understand that reading God's letter – as the Holy Bible² was called – addressed to every person could be banned or ordered.

There is no doubt that the sacred text is, on the one hand, a historical book, on the other a “holy book,” and for this reason requires interpretation. Today in various congregations of the ordinary faithful, the Scriptures are explained not only for private but also public reasons because it is carried out at liturgical or paraliturgical meetings. The question arises both about the value of exegesis practiced by all the faithful, as well as about their right and objective competence to interpret the Holy Scriptures.

One can also look for answers to this question in the writings of the patristic writers. If one had sought for answer in the writings of Saint Hilary of Poitiers, it is not only because he is representative and witness of the tradition of the whole Church, both the ancient East and the West, but mainly because

* STV 23(1985)2.

¹ BF, Poznań 1964, 148-150.

² For Saint Hilary Scripture is God's speech addressed to man: In Ps 65, 11, 255 (quote from A. Zingerle, CSEL 22, Vienne 1981).

immediately after his conversion, being still almost an ordinary member of the faithful, he wrote “Commentary on the Gospel of Saint Matthew.”

Undoubtedly, like other patristic exegetes, Saint Hilary was better prepared to comment on the Holy Scriptures than any contemporary believer, even one with great erudition. The erudition of Saint Hilary and people of his ilk was enormous³ but it is significant that erudition was something which was concealed by him, treated as something embarrassing. He himself admitted that it was because it made him concentrate for too long on the external aspect of the Scriptures⁴.

The entire historical-cultural aspect of the Holy Bible was the subject of a deep study of the Fathers of the Church – so they may also be regarded as the fathers of modern biblical scholars. However, by emphasizing this aspect of the exegetical work of the Fathers of the Church, one cannot fail to notice that all their interest in the Bible was aimed at focusing on its spiritual meaning. One can see this kind of aspiration in the writings of Saint Hilary, not only in his exegetical writings, but also in polemical-historical and dogmatic writings. Athanasius of the West, as Saint Hilary is usually called, does nothing else in his theological activity than reading the spiritual meaning of the sacred text. Hilary, in spite of allegorism, subjectivism, randomness and the associative method of reading the spiritual sense of the Scriptures, remains the Father of the Church, and the Church has recognized this sense as its own.

One may, however, pose the question of ‘on what basis’? What elements were crucial that Hilary, who was brought up in classical culture, living only a dozen years in the age of Christianity, despite his subjective methods of interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, became the Church’s interpreter of the holy text, a witness to tradition, and therefore one can also ask what elements – when it comes to modern believers – determine that their reading of the sacred text can be fruitful even if they do not have great biblical erudition? The answer to the question posed seems to be found in several statements of Saint Hilary, which will be now the subject of our reflection.

³ It is enough to refer to Origen, Eusebius of Caesarea, and from the West: Saint Jerome, Saint Augustine.

⁴ According to Saint Hilary Scripture did indeed arise in a specific historical and cultural reality (he appreciates the value of studying historical and philological realities, he emphasizes the importance of erudition, knows different interpretations of a given fragment of the sacred text), but its meaning lies in the current influence of the holy text on the faithful: In Ps 126, 6, 617; cf. 119, 4, 546; 118, He 16, 409; Zain 1, 418; 121, 3, 572; 121, 11, 577; 126, 12, 621; 132, 3, 686.

Christ as Object, Subject and Interpreter of Holy Scriptures

The first statement of the great importance of Saint Hilary is put in the following way: “The whole work, which constitutes the Holy Scriptures, announces with words, manifests through events, sets forth by the examples the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ.”⁵ This is the basic theorem of the Bishop of Poitiers, included in the preface of the first textbook of typological exegesis, as the “*Tractatus mysteriorum*” is usually called.

Scriptures Speak only about Christ

The quoted statement appearing in various wordings and styles on the pages of the exegetical writings of the Bishop of Poitiers and introduce the distinction between “work” (*opus*) and sacred books, while the term “work” does not mean only the idea, the thought that is contained in Holy Scriptures, but something that can be expressed in words and through the historical events, and what can be realized in the form of an example.

By studying the contexts in which the word “work” appears, it is easy to see that, according to Saint Hilary, three aspects of meaning can be assigned: the effect of one’s actions (the world, man is the work of God)⁶, then the action itself⁷, and finally the action of a man in which the relation to God is expressed⁸. Considering the frequency of appearance of above-mentioned meanings, the last one deserves special attention.

In the writings of Saint Hilary the expression “work of law” appears most often, however, one should consider it not as an act of observing the law, but as an action in which the relation of people appears, especially Old Testament characters towards Christ. The law in this expression does not mean the moral or ritual law, but, first and foremost, the “prophecy.”⁹ The law announces the coming of Jesus Christ, His incarnation, life and activity, passion, death and resurrection, and finally the Church¹⁰. According to the definition of Saint Hilary, following Saint Paul, the law is the “shadow of the future,” the “shadow

⁵ TM I, 1, 72 (I quote here the edition of J. Brisson, SCh 19 bis, Paris 1967).

⁶ E.g. In Mt 8, 5, I, 198 (I quote the edition of J. Doignon, Sch 254, T. I, Paris 1978 and SCh 258, T. II, Paris 1979); In Ps 91, 8, 351.

⁷ In Mt 16, 9, 56; In Ps 62, 7, 220.

⁸ In Mt 4, 13, I, 130/132; In Ps 120, U, 566/567; 120, 6, 583; 124, 8—9, 603.

⁹ In Mt 24, 1—2, 164/166.

¹⁰ In Mt 4, 14, I, 132; cf. 4, 1, I, 120; 4, 15—16, I, 134.

of spiritual things,” the shadow cast by the “body” of the New Testament reality¹¹. The “work of law” finds its completion and fulfillment in Christ. Even in the few statements in which the law is considered moral (it was a guarantor of discipline, purity, it developed moral habits and habits of honest behavior), it was aimed at strengthening faith in what was to come; it was to lead to the reality that was expected and awaited; The law was valuable insofar as the person observing it took into account its intentional or – to use the language of the Bishop of Poitiers – a “meditative” or “pedagogical” nature¹².

Following the tradition, in many cases, Saint Hilary identifies the “law” with the history of all Israel and all the books of the Old Testament¹³. It results from the belief assuming the work of law, which is concretized in the history of a particular individual and the chosen people, and which concretization is described in the sacred text. In this concretization a special role is played by prophets, whose first obligation was to announce the coming of Jesus Christ and all his mystery realized in a concrete historical, ecclesiological, mystical and eschatological reality¹⁴; then calling for the observance of meditative and pedagogical law¹⁵; and finally, the obligation to make the first interpretation of the history of Israel, the concretization of the “work of law,” extracting from it events that clearly heralded the advent of Christ¹⁶. The Old Testament events could be then regarded as a concrete relation of people to the law; people who have accepted its meditative and pedagogical dimension, or treated it only as a set of provisions, and therefore prohibitions and commands ordering and regulating human life.

Prophets, pointing to the meditative character of law, on the one hand fulfilled the “work of law,”¹⁷ on the other, they made the first interpretation of history in the perspective of the Christological reality of the law, that is, they announced the coming of Christ¹⁸. Perfectly understanding the meditative

¹¹ In Ps 118, Aleph 5, 361/362; Beth 8, 374; cf. In Ps 91, 1, 345.

¹² In Ps 118, Mem 10, 471; In Mt 17, 11, II, 70; cf. In Ps 91, 1, 345; 118, Daleth 5, 393; Lamech 11, 463; In Mt 18, 3, II, 78; 20, 5, II, 106; 24, 6, II, 170.

¹³ In Ps 118, Aleph 5, 361/362; cf. B. de Margerie, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'exégèse. Les pères grecs et orientaux*, Paris 1980, 39-45.,

¹⁴ In Mt 11, 2, I, 252; 23, 7, II, 160; In Ps 67, 32, 307; 68, 24, 344; 126, 15, 623; 138, 12, 753; TM 1, 12, 96; 1, 27, 120; 1, 29, 122; 1, 32, 126.

¹⁵ In Mt 2, 4, I, 106; In Ps 67, 32, 307; 118, Daleth 5, 393; Vau 1, 418; 128, 1, 637/638; 142, 2, 805; 146, 7, 849.

¹⁶ In Ps 134, 1, 695; 134, 6, 697; 134, 18, 705; 134, 20, 706; 134, 21, 707; TM 1, 32, 126.

¹⁷ In Mt 11, 2, I, 252/253; In Ps 52, 3, 119; 67, 1, 276; 141, 3, 801.

¹⁸ TM 1, 29, 122; In Ps 134, 1, 695; 134, 6, 697; In Mt 4, 14, I, 132; 7, 2, I, 180.

nature of the law, interpreting the specific works of law under the influence of the prophetic spirit, they showed some examples by which they strengthened faith in those features of Christ which he manifested himself upon his coming to earth¹⁹.

Christ as Creator of Reality Described in Holy Bible

Saint Hilary, claiming that the “whole work,” which constituted the “holy books” speaks only of Christ, adds an important remark: “For all this time of the created world, Christ gives birth to the Church, he sanctifies it, washes its guilt away, he chooses it, separates and redeems it, that is, through Adam’s dream, the flood of Noah’s time, the Melchizedek blessing, the justification of Abraham, the birth of Isaac, the captivity of Jacob, through true and understandable images in the patriarchs.”²⁰ Developing this thesis concerning Christ, the creator of the “work” expressed in the sacred books, the Bishop of Poitiers cites several examples. Prophetic words from the Book of Genesis: “This is the bone of my bones and the flesh of my flesh,” according to Saint Hilary, are pronounced by Christ with the lips of Adam²¹; when interpreting the creation of Eve Hilary notes that Christ, the creator of man and woman, announces through their creation the task which he fulfilled himself, when the Word became flesh and the church became the body of Christ. The Church, which was born and was called into existence through the blood and water flowing from His side, is still the body through which the eternal Word, the Son of God, abides in us²².

Then, referring to the story of Eve, he presented the history of the Church. By bearing children and bringing them up in a spirit of fidelity to Christ, the Church, made up of sinners and pagans, alone being burdened with guilt, like Eve, will be saved, resurrected in a bodily sense in eschatological times²³. In order to summarize the examples given, Saint Hilary states: “The mystery which is concealed in Adam and Eve announces the coming of Christ and the Church: at the beginning of history all this has been accomplished through the creation of Adam and Eve, what Christ prepared for the Church at the end of history.”²⁴ Christ is, according to Saint Hilary, not only the creator of the

¹⁹ TM 1, 12, 96; 1, 27, 120.

²⁰ TM 1, 1, 72/74.

²¹ TM 1, 3, 76/78.

²² TM 1, 3, 78/80.

²³ TM 1, 4, 80/82.

²⁴ TM 1, 5, 84.

whole reality described in the Bible, but also the pattern by which this reality came into being. Thus the New Testament reality turns out to be a reality that imitates the reality of Old Testament, which existed earlier.

This kind of reversal of the order in which what follows is imitated by what is happening earlier is proof of the great “divine mercy,” which consists in the fact that what had to be fulfilled in God had been earlier the subject of imitation. What was fulfilled in him and what he fulfilled himself was announced by types, historical circumstances and entire generations starting from Adam²⁵.

The thesis, according to which, the object reproduced and imitated appeared later than its reproduction, imitation or reflection, and the fact that reproduction, reflection are so accurate and precise that it is difficult to distinguish them from the object reproduced, that one can even speak of the “first copy,” is justified by Saint Hilary by means of the statement that God reveals only those things, with regard to which he decided that they should be first the subject of reflection and meditation, that before they become a fact for people, they were noticed in individual stages of the development of human life, and in their customs and were the result of human activities²⁶.

Christ as Interpreter of Biblical Reality

St. Hilary refers a Christological biblical reality, the creator and model of which is considered Christ, to a deep conviction about Christ as an interpreter of this reality. The Bishop of Poitiers states explicitly that, until the coming of Christ, the Holy Scriptures remained “a closed and sealed book,” a “useless book” for man²⁷. It was only the mystery of Christ that became the “key,” the “lion of the tribe of Judah” who broke the “seven seals” through incarnation, passion, death, resurrection, glory, kingdom and judgment. The principle of the “key” includes not only those who lived before but also those living after the coming of Christ. Like the prophets, so the apostles in Christ find the “key” to break the “seal” of the mystery, the Holy Scriptures, as Christ himself confirms after the resurrection, namely that only He is the authoritative interpreter of the sacred text²⁸.

Saint Hilary states the same assertion more generally when he says: “Do not doubt that what the Psalms say should be understood according to the

²⁵ TM 2, 5, 150; 1, 27, 120; 1, 32, 126.

²⁶ TM 1, 32, 126.

²⁷ Instr. Ps 5, 6/7

²⁸ Instr. Ps 6, 7/8.

evangelical preaching.”²⁹ The last statement finds its full explanation in the exegetical practice of the patristic writers. In order to understand what the prophet, the psalmist, or the hagiographer of the books of the Old Testament wanted to say, one should first ask Christ, his apostles, because the Gospel writings and the apostles speak about the same thing that the Old Testament did. This practice is expressed in countless New Testament quotes when explaining the meaning of the texts of the Old Testament. It is also implied by the definition of exegesis as a “comparison” of Old Testament and New Testament events, and the latter with Church events³⁰. But St. Hilary also goes the other way around. He claims that in order to understand what Christ, and his apostles, said or did, as well as what is currently happening in the Church, one should seek clarification in the writings of the prophets, in the history of Israel, in the experiences of people who awaited the arrival of Christ in Old Testament times³¹.

If one would like to answer the question of how Christ explained the Holy Scriptures, it would be necessary to read all the writings of Saint Hilary that say that Christ is the one who – through birth, life, activity, death, resurrection, the Church – fulfills all that he has initiated – in the form of an announcement, or in the form of implementation – in both the Old and the New Testament.

History of Salvation

Three statements of Saint Hilary about Christ as the only reality of which the Holy Scriptures speak, then of Christ as the creator and model of this reality, and finally of Christ as the interpreter of this reality find their further explanation in the concept of the history of salvation. From the point of view of the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, it should be said that if Christocentrism is considered in the writings of Saint Hilary’s as basic presupposition of every exegetical work on the Scriptures, then the history of salvation authorizes every participant, that is, every person to the exegetical work itself.

²⁹ Instr. Ps 5, 6.

³⁰ Instr. Ps 5, 6; definition of exegesis TM 1, 1, 72.

³¹ The following list illustrates the predictions for quotations: Mt quotes the Old Testament 32 times and the New Testament 33 times; Ps quotes the Old Testament 765 times and the New Testament 1180 times; TM quotes the Old Testament 47 times and the New Testament 57 times.

First Adam

In order to present a synthetical view of the essential features of the concept of the history of salvation according to St. Hilary, the following elements should be mentioned.

All mankind can be derived from two Adams: earthly Adam and heavenly Adam. The first one, because of his origin, was called “the son of God.” As a result of a double blessing, he was granted a dual task: to provide the earth with his offspring and to develop in himself and in his offspring the doctrine of God. Both tasks remain inseparable and equivalent, and both tasks granted man a status of a king and a priest³². As long as Adam remained the father of all mankind, he was the king and priest of all creation. Yet when considering Adam idealistically, as representative of whole human race, Saint Hilary often refers to his royal and priestly dignity.

Adam was the “favorite of God,” the most wonderful of God’s works. This dignity is emphasized by the threefold creative act: first, the creation of the soul according to the “image and likeness” to Christ; then the creation of the earthly body in the image of the earthly creation; and finally the connection of the soul with the body by the special and powerful breath of the Spirit. Human dignity is emphasized by its essence, nature which is the synthesis of what is earthly, with what is heaven, as well as free will and the right to decide about oneself, and finally being assigned a task of exercising royal and priestly power over all creation³³.

Adam was not only a king, but also a priest. He was supposed to spread the knowledge of God in the created world through which he was to unite the human race and all material beings with God. Endowed with reason, the gift of judging and discerning good and evil, he had the ability to become aware of the image and likeness of God in him. If he developed the received gifts, he would become “useful” to himself and the whole of creation, he would recognize the “image” of the one he was a reproduction of, he would have achieved similarity, and in the priestly function he would worship God not only in his own but also in the name of the world of the whole visible creation, of whom he was a king³⁴.

³² In Mt 1,1, I, 90; In Ps 66, 2, 270; TM 1, 1-2, 74/76.

³³ In Ps 118, Jod 6, 442; cf. 118, Jod 1, 439./440; 129, 4, 650.

³⁴ In Ps 65, 4-6, 251/252; 65, 2, 270; 129, 5, 651; 134, 14, 702; cf. 52, 8, 122; TM 1, 1, 74.

Second Adam

The first Adam, however, did not fulfill the priestly act, and thus also lost his royal dignity. He refused to worship God, rejected his right to possess the kingdom, broke the covenant with God, lost his paradise, destroyed order and harmony in himself and in all material creation, he took the attitude of a slave, became a master of disorder, lost his nobility and blessed spiritual growth, dishonored the name of man, and became like an animal; he ceased to be known to God, worthy of God's love, his will was weakened, his knowledge became limited, he lost the privilege of being the "head" of the human race, the patriarchal king and priest. Hilary, however, was not a pessimist. He saw in the divine revelation that the image of divine mercy manifested itself over the misery of mankind. This mercy was manifested at the moment of Adam's fall and it saved the human race. In the eternal plan of God the Father, there was another Adam, the savior of the first Adam according to which the first one was created³⁵.

In comparison with the first, the second Adam is heavenly in his nature. His body possesses the properties of our body, but because he comes from the Virgin Mary, he is conceived by the power of the Holy Spirit, he can be considered a heavenly body. The soul in Christ has not been changed, but it has become heavenly through unity with the Word of God. Through the unity of the Word with the soul and the body, there is such a close unity in Christ that according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church we speak of the unity of man, David, Jesus, or the "new Creation."³⁶

By being born of the Virgin, the second Adam gives a new beginning to humanity, takes over the "blessing" of the first Adam, becomes the father and head of all mankind, the king and priest of creation³⁷. By accepting this form of submission, and death as a sacrifice, a form of devotion to God, through this priestly act he again provides the human race with gift of eternity, sanctifies it and frees it from the burden of sin, he unites people with God, with each other and with all creation. He becomes a High Priest, mediator in the act of knowing God, a teacher, a doctor, a father³⁸. As a consequence of the priesthood act completed, Christ restores royal dignity to man, being the king and the center of human and

³⁵ In Ps 118, Iod 2, 440; 136, 5-7, 726/728; 142, 6, 807/808; In Iob 1, PI 10, 127 B; cf. In Ps 13, 1, 80/81; 66, 2, 270/271; 142, 6, 608; 149, 3, 867/868.

³⁶ The following authors discuss the issue of Christology: A. Orioff, *La Christologie d'Hilaire de Poitiers en relation avec une description des doctrines christologique du II au IV*, Moscow 1909; P. Galtier, *Saint Hilaire de Poitiers, Le premier docteur de l'Eglise Latine*, Paris 1960, 108-158.

³⁷ In Ps 67, 22, 287; T M 1, 18, 116.

³⁸ In Ps 68, 23, 333; 91, 9, 353; In Mt 4, 1, I, 120; 3, 6, I, 116; 14, 16, II, 30; T M 1, 18, 116; In Ps 66, 9, 275; 149, 3, 867/868.

world history, he allows all those who accept him in faith to participate in his power. Those who believe in Christ receive the gift of being children of God, the eternal inheritance of the kingdom, the church, the body of Christ, the city of the great king, the “royal priesthood.”³⁹

History of Man as History of Christ

Saint Hilary often repeats that knowing and understanding the history of the human race leads to an understanding of Christ, the Church, that every detail of history if it does not contribute to education in the spirit of Christ and the Church will be tantamount to distortion and perversion of their ideas. The entire task of members of the Catholic Church is recognized by our author in striving to involve everyone in a conscious participation in the history of the second Adam and his kingdom. He uses every opportunity to show that the history of the Church has been entrusted to the apostles and their successors. He explicitly states that the Lord’s power and strength were given to the apostles, who became a “reflection of the Lord, the ‘heavenly,’” With the Lord’s power, they purify what the first Adam has polluted, fulfill the function of Christ’s eyes, are the light of the world, the lamps of God, the transmitters of the mysteries of Christ. Bishops and presbyters are the successors of the apostles, heirs of truth and the heavenly forces of the second Adam, distributors of divine gifts, princes and fathers of families of mankind⁴⁰.

Beginning with the history of salvation, Saint Hilary considers his main task as a bishop, pastor and spiritual father to familiarize his faithful with the history of salvation, to make them aware that spiritual life is nothing but a history in which and through which an ever closer union with Christ is achieved.

In the life of individual believers and their groups or entire nations there is no coincidence, randomness, fate determined by movement of stars, but a divine pedagogy aimed at forming appropriate members for the body of Christ. Teaching the faithful to read the history of their own specific life in the ecclesial community in the Scriptures, which is tantamount to a communion with Christ, constitutes an important task of Hilary as an exegete, a theologian and the Father of the Church⁴¹.

³⁹ In Ps 149, 3, 867; cf. In Ps 2, 32, 60; 51, 3, 98; 138, 1, 744; 138, 29, 764; In Mt 1, 1, I, 90.

⁴⁰ In Mt 6, 1-4, I, 170/174; 12, 15, I, 280; 27, 1, II, 202; In Ps 138, 34-37, 767/771; De Syn 9, PI 10, 546 A; In Ps 67, 12-13, 287/288; 118, Nun 2-3, 475; 138, 34, 767.

⁴¹ For Saint Hilary’s mystery of Christ is both a historical fact (the historical Christ) and a presently realizing history of salvation (the mystical Christ). For this reason, Hilary juxtaposes biblical events with the events concerning an individual man: in Ps 13, 4, 81/82; TM 1, 1, 72.

Exegetical and Theological Consequences of Biblical Christocentrism

Biblical Christocentrism and the history of salvation imply specific norms for fruitful reading and spiritual understanding of the Holy Scriptures, and thus for practicing theology.

Essence of Spiritual Sense of Holy Bible

However St. Hilary explicitly states that the “whole work” which constitutes the Scriptures must be referred to Christ, but also repeatedly admits that whenever the holy text speaks of Christ, it often refers to a detail which clearly indicates only Christ. What is more, in several cases, he even fights unjustified biblical Christocentrism⁴².

In order to answer this difficulty, it is first necessary to pay attention to those statements in which Saint Hilary emphasizes the way of speaking of Christ. By opposing those who referred Psalm 120 to Christ, the Bishop of Poitiers claims that it does not refer directly to Christ. Psalm 120 speaks of divine revelation, the source of the theory and practice of human life, especially faith in divine promises, passed on to man. The commentary on Psalm 120 imposes two general remarks: the claim that the Scriptures speak only of Christ is to be understood explicitly or implicitly. Often the mystery of Christ is in first place, and in other cases the other truths of divine revelation are considered of highest importance⁴³.

Commenting on Psalm 138, Saint Hilary states that the content of the Holy Scriptures should be referred to Christ even when it directly describes the life of patriarchs, prophets, martyrs, apostles, heathens, Jews, because “everything in Christ and through Christ came into being,” therefore what was said about other people or events should be actually referred to Christ, in “which and through whom everything” has been realized. Our author deduces the following conclusion from the aforementioned theorem: I present this kind of explanation in order that nobody should think that “everything that is said in the Psalms cannot be – without justification – referred to Christ.” Most often Saint Hilary finds this justification in the letters of St. Paul⁴⁴.

⁴² In Ps 1, 2, 20; T M 2, 11, 156/158; cf. In Ps 63, 3, 226; 141, 3, 801.

⁴³ In Ps 120, 1-4, 561; cf. 1, 3, 21; 63, 2, 225; 118, Gimel 7, 381; 120, 10, 565; 135, 2, 713; 136, 2, 745; 138, 5, 748; 139, 2, 777.

⁴⁴ In Ps 138, 1, 744.

Undoubtedly, the specific logic and unique coherence of the argument of the Saint Hilary can amaze the modern reader of the treaty on the 51st Psalm. From the very beginning to its last parts, the treaty indicates that Jews, despite being a chosen people, despite God's miraculous intervention in their specific history, always keep the same infidelity and hatred for Christ, with which they addressed God in the course of their history. This unfaithfulness finds its culmination when they crucify Christ. A question arises about the motives of blurring the distinction between the subsequent stages of the history of Israel by Saint Hilary. Does the crucifixion of Christ have the same qualification of guilt and punishment for unfaithfulness and malice in the case of Jews both before and after the coming of Christ?

In order to solve this difficulty, it should be remembered that Christ occupies a central place in all the writings of Saint Hilary. To confirm this truth, the Bishop of Poitiers uses the methods of Scripture interpretation typical of the spirit of that era, such as love for etymology, the symbolism of numbers, the search for nuances and difficulties in the literal meaning of the holy text, etc. An example is the treaty on the 51st Psalm. After presenting the methodological remarks, the author introduces the etymology of the name Abimelech, which means "the house of brother's power." This etymology reminds Saint Hilary of the words of St. Peter: "You as living stones will be built into a spiritual temple into a holy priesthood" (1P 2:5); "But you are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people" (1P 2:9). After creating the semantic bridge between the text of the Old and New Testaments through the etymology and quotations of the New Testament, Hilary states: "This very house of Abimelech, that is the home of the brotherly kingdom, was entered by the real David, the holy king, the righteous, the East, because he became a man. Humankind is his brotherly home, the brotherly kingdom, because mankind is co-successor of the same body, glorious body, according to the words of Christ himself: 'Come, be blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom which has been prepared for you even since the creation of the world.' (Mt 25, 34)." The whole argument ends with the following conclusion: "The Word that has become flesh dwells in us, who are both brothers and a spiritual home and a royal priesthood."⁴⁵ or, to express this idea in modern language one can say that "the home of the brotherly kingdom" is nothing but the history of the salvation of fallen humanity, or, in the language of Saint Hilary: the mystery of the eternal plan, the mystery of the will of God and the blessed kingdom, the mystery of the father's will, the mystery of human salvation; since the creation of the world, the mystery of our

⁴⁵ In Ps 51, 2-4, 97/100; cf. Instr. Ps 15, 13; In Ps 2, 43, 70; 61, 2, 210; In Mt 5, 6, I, 154; 31, 7, II, 234.

salvation has been manifested in Christ.”⁴⁶ The entire treaty on the 51st Psalm presents the development and implementation of the history of the salvation of mankind, first in the context of consequences of incarnation for all people, then the relation of the people chosen to it, both before and after it has been completed, and the vocation of all mankind to participate in it⁴⁷.

A similar thought pattern can be found in many places of the *Treaties on the Psalms*. There is a constant tendency in the writings of Saint Hilary to organize and systematize all biblical material according to the main idea taken from Saint Paul that Christ is at the center of the history of mankind. Saint Hilary recognizes this idea in an interpreted text either directly or indirectly (he often suspects it or assumes it). Using the idea taken from Saint Paul, he combines and integrates all the elements of the meaning directly or indirectly resulting from the interpreted text, that in his comments one and logically coherent historical-conception reality is created (despite the fact that particular elements of this reality, taken in themselves, in other context, could provide material for a different thought structure). The reality created by Hilary is nothing more than a consistent elaboration of the thesis and assumption that the “whole work” of the Holy Scriptures is of a Christological nature. Even if this reality does not appear *explicite* in the psalmist’s statements or in the narrative of biblical events and it does not directly speak about Christ, it is even present in a more natural way in the broader historical context. Putting the same thought in the terminology of biblical patristic meanings, it must be said that – according to Saint Hilary and other patristic writers – there is only one biblical sense and one subject of theological studies, which is the mystery of Christ, considered from various aspects and deepened over the centuries, in the view of the impossibility of certain authors of achieving its complete knowledge.

Faith as Condition of Participation and Understanding historic-soteriological Reality of Holy Scriptures

The basic norm of practicing exegesis and theology follows from a biblical historic-soteriological reality concentrated in Christ. The most basic condition, without which one cannot talk about an exegetist or a theologian (according

⁴⁶ L. Małunowiczówna, *De voce sacramenti apud S. Hilarium Pictaviensem*, Lublin 1956, 134-150.

⁴⁷ In Mt 2, 5, I, 108; 17, 9, II, 70; 18, 3, II, 78; 20, 8, II, 1110; 28, 2, II, 218; 31, 7, II, 234; In Ps 2, 43, 70; 51, 16, 108; 53, 3, 136; 53, 6, 151; 54, 13, 156; 56, 5, 171; 58, 9, 187; 61, 2, 209; 67, 23, 298; 68, 13, 323; 131, 4, 664; 138, 2, 745; 139, 2, 778.

to Saint Hilary) is a norm of faith. Its necessity is justified by the Bishop of Poitiers on many levels.

From an anthropological perspective Saint Hilary regards faith as the main factor in the realization of man. Man was supposed to, and is still supposed, to become himself. Having belief in divine promises was a decisive condition of whether a man would become a spiritual being, who is useful not only for himself, but also for other creatures. Above all, will man fulfill the purpose of being called into existence, that is realizing the “image” and “likeness” to Christ dependent on faith. Admitting the first betrayal of God, by advocating external values, he committed an act of unbelief, which became the mother of his soul, and sin has become the father of his body. An inner man, called to reproduce and realize the image of Christ with his will, abandoned his task and vocation, realizes the external image, and consequently adopts bodily properties⁴⁸.

A return to the original state of man is possible only through faith in Christ. Faith in Christ makes man return to the original state, makes him regain the possibility of realizing the ideal of man and of all mankind. Faith in Christ unites all people and all of mankind with God. Faith, which has its beginning in the will, unites in man the spiritual element with the material, unites the human aspect with the divine into one inseparable whole. For this reason, faith in the mystery of the incarnation is paid special attention in the writings of the Saint Hilary⁴⁹.

Intellectual preparation is absolutely necessary for a fruitful reading of the Holy Bible. Scripture, however, is mainly a “speech of God” (*sermo divinus*), which is why it can only be understood through faith in Christ and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Faith and gifts distinguish the exegete not only from educated people and experts in various disciplines, but even from those experienced

⁴⁸ In Ps 52, 8, 122; 54, 8, 152; 1,18, Jod 1, 439; Nun 20, 486; Ain 14, 503; 144, 2, 829; Is Mt 10, 18—20, I, 236/240; 10, 22—23, I, 240/242; De Trin. 10, 1, PL 10, 345 A. Faith according to Saint Hilary is understood as: 1) *fit quod dicitur*, which is synonymous with *veritas*: In Mt 10, 29, I, 250; 18, 7, II, 114; In Ps 64, 1, 233; 118, Phe 4, 508; TM 1, 37., 134; 2) *rerum fides* that is, the veracity of historical events: In Mt 1, 2, I, 92; 2, 2, I, 102; 3, 6, I, 120; 7, 1, I, 180; 14, 14, II, 28; 16, 1, IX, 48; 17, 3, II, 64; 19, 2, II, 92; In Ps 1, 21, 112; 1, 29, 122; 1, 31, 126; 51, 2, 97; 68, 12, 322; 146, .1, 844; TM 1, 3, 78; 3) *fides dictorum* — the veracity of prophetic promises: In Mt 5, 12, I, 104; 11, 2, I, 254; 11, 11, I, 266; 21, 1, II, 122; 30, 3, II, 224; In Ps 2, 44, 71; 66, 19, 239/240; 90, 1, 345; 4) fulfillment of prophecies: In Mt 30, 8, II, 223; 32, 6, II, 246; In Ps 53, 3, 136; 119, 3, 546; 134, 6, 698; TM 1, 6, 86; 1, 8, 90.

⁴⁹ In Ps 118, Ain 14, 503; Nun 20, 486; In Mt 7, 6 I., 184; 10, I, 218; 14, 17, II, 30; 15, 4, II, 38; 17, 3, II, 63; cf. In Ps 52, 9, 123; 67, 286; 67, 12, 287; 67, 28, '3104; 118, Phe 4, 508; 138, 34, 767, 138, 38, 772.

Jewish exegetes who were brought up and gained education by studying the holy text.

Due to its essence, faith becomes a condition without which one cannot speak of exegesis and the theologian. This conviction of Saint Hilary is a consequence of biblical Christocentrism, the concept of man as the image of Christ; it is Christ, through the incarnation, who restores the original appearance to man. Faith in the present state of being introduces man into the Christological reality. The exegete, by participating in this reality, does not have to concern himself with chronology, literary genre, various authors, because in all books one and the same word of God is expressed. From this point of view, faith justifies the principle of the Old Testament's interpretation of the Holy Scriptures in the context of the New Testament, the interpretation of the New Testament in the context of the Church, and the interpretation of the Church in the light of Christ and His eschatological kingdom. One and the same faith in Christ merges all the biblical books, creates a homogeneous environment in which the mystery of Christ is either announced or realized, or is intended to be completely fulfilled in the eschatological kingdom⁵⁰.

Finally, the fact that the Scriptures use specific biblical language can be considered as an argument in favor of faith. St. Hilary accepts the conventional character of the meanings of the individual elements of the language. Each element: words, characters of language are assigned by interlocutors with a certain meaning. Assuming the conventionality of meanings, the interlocutors understand each other thanks to the ties existing between them, which are based on shared experience, customs, belonging to one and the same cultural and spiritual group⁵¹.

The specific language of the Holy Scriptures could not be comprehensible and useful to man, if one would not consider Christ as "key," a reference point necessary for understanding the conventional meanings of its elements. Prophets, believing in the advent of Christ, understood this language. Seventy translators, in the community of Jewish believers, translated the Hebrew text into Greek and carried out the first interpretation of the Scriptures⁵². On the other

⁵⁰ In Mt 1, 4, I, 96; 1, 5, I, 98; 5, 15, I, 168; 23, 6, II, 158; In Ps 1, 7, 24; 61, 2, 209; 63, 5, 227; 63, 9, 230; 65, 7, 253; 67, 21, 295; 144, 4, 830; 148, 3, 861; cf. In, M t 13, 2, I, 296; 29, 2, II, 220; 31, 4, II, 230; 33, 4, II, 252; Instr. Ps 5, 6; In Ps 1, 9, 25; 2, 20-21, 52; 2, 33, 62; 54, 4, 99; 51, 16, 108; 91, 1, 345; 118, Jod 12, 446; Mem 4, 468; Phe 4, 508; 125, 2, 605.

⁵¹ This is demonstrated by his encouragement of his readers to undertake semantic analyzes of language elements.

⁵² Instr. Ps 8,9; In Ps 2,3,40.

hand, those Jews who did not believe in the arrival of Christ, which was foretold by the prophets, deprived us of this “key,” which is crucial for understanding Scriptures, rejected faith in the literal coming of Christ, rejected the possibility of knowing the Christological reality of the law, what is more, they separated themselves from the reality in which, as an environment of common religious experience, the experience of faith, the biblical language was understandable, communicative and functional⁵³.

Remaining in Continuous Communication with Christological Reality

The second consequence for the exegete-theologian, resulting from the Biblical reality considered from the historic-soteriological perspective, concentrated in Christ, flows from faith. It is a necessity of continuing tradition, in connection with the Church, within the continuously developing history of salvation. Justifying the foundations of the authority of the Septuagint, the Bishop of Poitiers cites two arguments: the Septuagint was established before the coming of Christ, and the translators themselves had all the necessary competences to carry out their task⁵⁴. The first argument suggests that seventy interpreters, according to the tradition of Moses, in whose faith the coming of Christ was maintained, made the first translation of the Holy Bible before the coming of Christ, and revealed the Christological reality through the competent interpretation. The second argument, justifying the competence of interpreters, indicates explicitly that the tradition and background valuing faith shaped their personalities, and at the same time educated them in the way they could become exegetes and theologians.

Being strongly embedded in tradition is tantamount to being strongly embedded in the Church. St. Hilary states that the Word of God has entered the boat of the Church, and this explains why only the one who is a member of the Church is able to understand the Word of God⁵⁵. The necessity of staying in the community of the Church results from the necessity to remain in the Christological reality as an environment and context in which “divine speech” can be understood. The external sign of remaining in the Church is confirmed by appealing, by Saint Hilary, not to the authorities of ancient and modern theologians and exegetes but to the authority of the people of faith, seventy

⁵³ Instr. Ps 5, 6/7; In Ps 2, 2-3, 38/39; 59, 1, 192/194; 142, 1, 805; 143, 1, 814.

⁵⁴ In Ps 2, 3, 39/40.

⁵⁵ In Mt 13, 1, I, 296; 7, 10, I, 190; 14, 9, II, 20.

translators, prophets, and apostles. The apostles' authority is of key importance especially and has a decisive role in resolving all biblical problems⁵⁶.

Conclusion

Two general remarks arise from the synthetic interpretation of the biblical christocentrism presented by Saint Hilary. The first concerns the subject of theological study and biblical studies. The above-mentioned presentation of the arguments of Hilary implies that the mystery of Christ manifesting itself in history, of which he is the creator and interpreter at the same time, constitutes the essence of theology and exegesis. The biblical senses, considered as the result of biblical and theological research and study, in this approach are nothing but different aspects of incomprehensible mystery of Christ. Because the mystery of Christ is revealed in history and is history itself, therefore the theological and exegetical study is of a historical nature at least in the sense that this mystery can be recognized by applying the aspect-oriented method by comparing what is contained in the Scriptures with what people are currently experiencing in a particular episode of history, because the creator of the latter is Christ. One could say that it seems to follow from the last statement, that for Saint Hilary, there are no rigid forms of dogmas established once and for all but one: the incomprehensible mystery of Christ. Although always and everywhere studied, it will never be understood and expressed in words. In the act of studying it, a person constantly extracts new aspects from it. It is the task of the exegete and theologian to update it, to make the faithful acquainted with the complexity of its message. If ordinary believers do this even at liturgical meetings, then, according to Hilary, even though they have not completed specialist theological and biblical studies, they can read and interpret the holy text fruitfully.

The second remark indicates the conditions *sine qua non* of the existence and operation of the theologian, exegete, no matter if he is a specialist or an ordinary faithful. These conditions are faith in Christ and perservance in participation in the Christological reality of the Church and the community of the faithful. The above claim does not undermine the value of biblical and theological studies – as understood by us in terms of erudite knowledge. Scholarly biblical commentaries and the theological and historical writings of Saint

⁵⁶ Instr. Ps 1, 3; 3, 4; 5-6, 6/7; In Ps 1, 12, 27; 2, 5, 40; 2, 9, 43; '66, 5, 273; 51, 7, 102; 67, 28, 303; 125, 6, 608/609; 126, 12, 621.

Hilary can be regarded as the denial of such a conclusion. The Bishop of Poitiers, by encouraging his readers – by his own example – to intellectual and moral preparation for the study of the Scriptures, also emphasizes the pointlessness of practicing exegesis and theology if it is not accompanied by faith in Christ, in isolation from tradition, the continuity of history, finally in isolation from the community of the members of Church.

The Theological Importance Of Creation In The Old Testament*

Introduction

The Bible begins with a story about the creation of the world by God. The exegesis of the Old Testament usually begins with an explanation of the story of the Book of Genesis about the beginning of the world. This story, considered to be the work of a priestly author, is characterised by a certain schematic and at the same time lofty idea of God's transcendence. The author wants to give the foundations of strict monotheism, which is the cornerstone of the Israeli religion. It depicts an extra-worldly being, called Elohim, who exists before, above and beyond all things and which at some point called the world into existence. The author of the story treats only about the creation of the visible world, describing the works of creation from the least perfect to the most complicated, of course according to his own judgement. Based on the Bible, it is not surprising that faith in God, the Creator of heaven and earth, appears to many people today as the fundamental truth of Christian teaching. To believe means to recognise that the world was created by God.

Exegeses of the Old Testament have long ago stated that the God of Israel revealed Himself to his people first and foremost as the Saviour. Before he revealed himself as the Creator of the universe, he intervened in the history of the nation in order to free it from the shackles of Egypt. For the people of the Old Testament, Yahweh is above all and indeed the Saviour God¹. Faith in the Creator God takes a secondary place in the Old Testament in relation to faith

* STV 26(1988)1.

¹ Cf. P. Humbert, *bara*, "Theologische Zeitschrift" 3 (1947), 401; *Qana*, Festschrift f. A. Bertholet (1950), 259ff; *Padl*, ZAW 24 (1953), 35ff; *yasar* (BZAW 77), Giessen 1958, 82ff. It is characteristic that M. Garcia Cordero, *Creazione* (Racconto della Genesi sulla), in: *Enciclopedia della Bibbia II*, Tanino, col. 603, believes that the Hebrew verb *bara* in its original sense does

in the Saviour God. The primary and direct object of the Israeli faith is God, who brought the nation out of Egyptian captivity, and not the God who created heaven and earth². The Old Testament scriptures show that the statement "I am your Saviour" called for centuries another statement, "I am your Creator." The theme of creation is a constitutive part of soteriology, i.e. the science of salvation³. The very faith in Yahweh as Creator is relatively late. First Israel knew Yahweh as its God, and only through experience in the history of salvation did it come to the knowledge that Yahweh is the Creator God and Lord not only of Israel, but of the whole world. The theology of creation, the fruit of which is Genesis 1:1-2.4a, was developed only in the Babylonian captivity. This will be particularly evident in Deutero-Isaiah, in whom the terms "God" and "Creator" will be used interchangeably, as terms describing the same reality of the omnipotent God⁴. Thus, the theme of the Creator God is secondary to the theme of the Saviour God and as such it appears quite late in the history of Israeli traditions, being subordinated to the theme of salvation history⁵.

The Oldest Period

During a long period of time, which lasted many centuries, Israel knew the cosmogenic tradition, but did not give it any particular theological significance. Creation is not an integral part of the original credo of Israel. It is a generally

not actually mean "to create," but "to free" or "to set free," only the context in which the verb occurs leads to the idea of creation.

² E. Jacob, *Théologie de l'Ancient Testament*, Neuchâtel 1955, 110.

³ W. Vischer, *Quand et pourquoi Dieu a-t-il révélé à Israël qu'il est le Dieu créateur?*, "Foi et Vie" 58(1959)3-4, 3ff. Cf. G. von Rad, *Das theologische Problem des alttestamentlichen Schöpfungsglaubens*, BZAW 66 (1036), 38ff; Idem, *Theologie des Alten Testaments (I)*, München 1966, 149ff.359ff; *Theologie des Alten Testaments (II)*, München 1968, 248ff.357ff; G. Lambert, *La création dans la Bible*, NRTh 75 (1953), 252-281; B.D. Napier, *On Creation Faith in the Old Testament*, "Interpr." 16 (1962), 21-42; Th. Boman, *The Biblical Doctrine of Creation*, "The Church Quarterly Review" 165 (1064), 140-151; K. Barth, *Die Kirchliche Dogmatik III/1*, München 1945.

⁴ M. Filipiak, *Biblia o człowieku. Zarys antropologii biblijnej Starego Testamentu*, Lublin 1974, 73, note 1; see B. Couroyer, *Isaïe 40,12*, RB 73 (1966), 186-196; see also R. Koch, *Teologia della redenzione in Genesi 1 - 11*, Rome 1967.

⁵ Cf. Ch. Hauret, *Origines de l'univers et de l'homme d'après la Bible*, DBS VI (1960), col. 908-926. "Es ist aber schwerlich zu übersehen, dass in der Aussage des ATs die in der Mitte der Geschichte geschobene "Herausführung Israels aus Ägypten" der primäre Orientierungspunkt ist." W. Zimmerli, *Grundriss der alttestamentlichen Theologie* (Theologische Wissenschaft 3), Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln-Mainz 1972, 25.

accepted truth that exists in different peoples, regardless of their intellectual level and cultural level⁶. The nations neighbouring Israel (Sumerians, Babylonians and Egyptians) had a tradition of creation, or better, of the origin and organisation of the world, although they practically knew no creation. Stories of a religious nature convey faith in the existence of matter from which gods were born⁷.

It is under the influence of political and religious events that Israel becomes aware of the theological significance of the problem of the world's emergence. Israel's neighbours have been interested in this for a long time, as evidenced by the cosmogonic systems developed by Egyptian priests in Heliopolis, Memphis and Hierapolis, or the Sumerian-Acadian traditions led by the famous Babylonian epic *Enûma Eliš*, composed in honour of the god Marduk for New Year's Day⁸.

Data on the origins of the world are less visible in Ugarit and Canaan, although Baal's fight with the god of the sea (Jam) could be a reflection of the myth of creation. In particular, the god El, well known in the Semitic world, is praised in Ugarit as the father of humanity, the creator of visible things, and in other documents as the great-grand maker of the earth⁹. The God El also appears in the Old Testament in the patriarchal tradition that tells of Abraham's meeting with Melchizedek, priest of El-Ejon, Creator of Heaven and Earth (Genesis 14:18ff). This means that Israel knew the notion of creation before it had drawn consequences on a theological level.

The Jahwist Tradition

Jahwist was the first to capture the importance of this topic. He begins his work with a story about the formation of a man and a woman by Yahweh and their being placed in the garden of Eden (Genesis 2). However, this story serves as an introduction to Genesis 3 because it allows the author to place the persons of the drama (Yahweh, Adam, Eve and the serpent) to lead the Jahwist theme through episodes such as the murder of Abel, the Flood, the Tower of Babel to the choice of Abraham through the story of the patriarchs and their descendants (Genesis 12-14). The cosmogonic motif is doubly limited: Jahwist mentions the appearance of animals and the first human couple in the oasis that God prepared for them

⁶ Cf. Deuteronomy 26:5ff; Joshua 24:2ff; for the tradition E the theme of creation is unknown, not much space is devoted to it in tradition D.

⁷ Cf. M. Gołębiewski, *Biblia a literatury Wschodu*, AK 441 (1982), 219-233.

⁸ R. Labat, A. Caquot, *Les religions du Proche-Orient asiatique*, 1970.

⁹ J. Gray, *The Legacy of Canaan*, VTSup 5 (1963), 154ff.

on the steppes, as opposed to Genesis 1, where the perspective is directed towards the whole cosmos. Moreover, the story from Genesis 2 acquires meaning only in the perspective of the history of salvation. The creation of man leads to the election of Abraham and, as such, is the first chapter in the history of God's blessings, followed by Jahwist's theology covering the period from the ancestor of Israel to all mankind¹⁰.

To understand the meaning of the story of the beginning, told by the Jahwist in Genesis 2-4, one has to realise that he lives in the 10th century, after the glorious reign of David. He was closely aware of the changes caused by the royal conquests. Jahwist tries to interpret the events of his time by combining them with the patriarchal tradition. He wants to show David's reign on the line of Yahweh's plans¹¹. For the first time in its history, Israel is confronted as a political power with other nations. His political role is to be justified from a theological point of view. Therefore, the Jahwist is not satisfied with the reference to the epoch of the fathers, but returns to the beginning of human history, so that in the name of faith the place of Israel among other nations may be confirmed. In this way it is possible to explain the fact why the Jahwist's description at the beginning takes up the subject of creation.

There is a widespread view that Genesis 2:4b-25 is the second description of the creation of the world. This is justified by the fact that the text refers to the creation of the first man and his wife, and then to the creation of animals and trees. It is also possible to point out some parallels of description to the Genesis 1 creation, in which some of the statements are theoretical and dogmatic in nature, while here they are rather pictorial and concrete in nature. This fragment is not an independent whole, but rather a preparation preceding the description of the fall of man and is connected with this description by the unity of the narrative form and subject matter. In addition to a small mention in the introduction to the story (in 5n), which has a negative character, there is not a single word about the creation of great cosmic spaces and other works. All the attention is focused on the question of how these things exist, what kind of mutual, concrete relations bind them, what the world looks like from the point of view of good and evil¹².

¹⁰ Cf. G. von Rad, *Das erste Buch Mose Genesis. Kapitel 1-12*, 9 (ATD 2), Göttingen *1972, 27-42; cf. also H.W. Wolff, *Das Ke-rygma des Jahwisten*, EwTh 24 (1964), 73-98 (Ges. St. 1964, 345ff).

¹¹ R. Clements, *Abraham and David. Genesis 15 and its Meaning for Israelite Tradition (SBT II)*, 5, 1967.

¹² W. Trilling, *Stworzenie i upadek*, Warsaw 1980, 12ff.

Deutero-Isaiah Theology

In Deutero-Isaiah cosmogony takes on paramount importance due to the circumstances in which Israel finds itself in the Prophet's age¹³. The elite of the chosen people live in bondage, and the fall of Jerusalem in 587 completely buried any hope of a renewal of the Judeans. Meanwhile, an anonymous prophet, called Deutero-Isaiah, sees a radical change in the situation of exiles in the first military successes of Cyrus (around 545-540), who will become the ruler of Babylon in the year 538. On behalf of Yahweh he announces the future release of the Jewish community in Mesopotamia, its return to the Holy Land and the restoration of worship in Jerusalem¹⁴.

This message of consolation was badly received by contemporaries who doubted that Yahweh would and could intervene in favour of the chosen people. Did the fall of Judah not show her weakness? Could God, who does not have his own sanctuary, compete with Marduk, whose power extends beyond the borders of Babylon?

The Prophet responds to opponents' allegations, referring to the creation of the world by the God of Israel. He constantly returns to this point in his oracles¹⁵. Yahweh is able to gather the nation around him because he directs the events of history, gives orders to heavenly bodies, princes and elements of the world. His power over history and nature, which no one can question, comes from the fact that he created heaven and earth without anyone's help. He himself is the ruler of the world because he is the only Creator of the world; he holds everything in his hands: Cyrus and Babylonia, Judaeans, past and future. The motif of the Creator God in Deutero-Isaiah is not to praise Yahweh (although this intention is not alien to the prophet)¹⁶, but rather to strengthen the present and future fate of the nation. Thus creation in Deutero-Isaiah has a soteriological function (Is 42, 5; 45, 6n. 18 and other). The exile prophet establishes a close relationship between salvation and creation. He does not limit himself

¹³ R. Rendorff, *Die theologische Stellung des Schöpfungsglaubens bei Deutero-Jesaja*, ZThK 51 (1954), 3-13.

¹⁴ Cf. R. Martin-Achard, *Israel et nations*, CTh 42 (1959), 13ff.

¹⁵ Cf. Is 40-42, esp. 40, 12ff; 44, 24ff; 45, 12ff.

¹⁶ G. von Rad, *Theologie (II)*, 245. "Créer et racheter sont pratiquement synonymes chez le Second Esaïe qui parle aussi de la création d'Israël pour rappeler que celui-ci est le peuple élu — Es 43, 1, 7, 15; 44, 24 etc." R. Martin-Achard, *Remarques sur la signification théologique de la création selon l'Ancien Testament*, in: *Permanence de l'Ancien Testament. Recherches d'exégèse et de théologie*, "Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 14", Genève-Lausanne-Neuchâtel 1964, 150.

only to juxtaposing them, but also makes them one and the same reality. In his opinion, the victory of Yahweh over the forces of chaos is a harbinger of his triumph over Babylon, and the choice of Israel and his return to Jerusalem are in fact creative works. The Creation is the first of Yahweh's historical wonders and testifies in its own way to God's saving will¹⁷.

The theme of creation appears in Deutero-Isaiah in the prologue (40) and in the epilogue of his book (55). It takes the form of all possible literary genres used by our prophet. These statements play a supportive and encouraging role in the prophet's argumentation. If Yahweh is the Creator not only of Israel, but also of the world, He is also the Lord of the universe, and as such He has the Babylonians in His hands. He can also grant a new grace to a nation that is in captivity and distance the violence of its enemies. The following texts come into play here: 40:12-31; 43:1-7; 44:24-28 (-45:8); 54:4-6 and others.

Statements about creation in Deutero-Isaiah have above all a tendency and a polemic function: if Yahweh is the Creator of the universe and his Lord, it is not the Babylonian god Marduk. By this statement, the author wants to inspire trust and confidence in the salvific work of Yahweh. These statements are subordinated to the Deutero-Isaian understanding of history and as such are an expression of the author's salvific faith. In first place is the historical choice of Israel as the greatest creative act, which is only the work of God's grace. In this way, concepts such as creation and the new way out can occur together, as the first way out was also the creation of Israel (cf. 51:9-13 and 42:5; 43:2.19; 44:24; 45:6-8; 48:3.7). The new work of salvation of Yahweh is also a new creation. The liberation of Israel – understood as a creature – is rooted in the will of Yahweh and finds its basis there. Therefore, in the Deutero-Isaiah creation and history, history and nature are not yet radically separated, as has been the case in theology until our times¹⁸.

Expressions that the author uses to define the actions of the creation are interchangeable with expressions that are historically coloured, namely, the verb "choose." Thus creation and history create unity for him. The new salvation will be a new creature (40:3; 40:28-31; 46:9f; 48:12f) that is more than a return to the old order. In this way the theology of creation and eschatology are closely connected. Thus, statements about creation take on an existential dimension

¹⁷ G. von Rad, *Theologie (II)*: "...die Schöpfung ist ihm das erste der geschichtlichen Wunder Jahwes und ein sonderliches Zeugnis seines Heilswillens."

¹⁸ Cf. Th.M. Ludwig, *The Tradition of Establishing of the Earth in Deutero-Isaiah*, JBL 92 (1973), 345-357.

in Deutero-Isaiah; they are simply directed towards the present. It is about awakening listeners to believe that God is in charge of the events of history.

Particularly noteworthy are his statements about the creative power of the word Yahweh (cf. Is 40:6.8; 55:8-11 and 44:26; 45:23f; 51:16). The prophet's reflection on this subject grows to the rank of a synthesis¹⁹. It can be said that the central point of the prophet's proclamation is the creative aspect of Israel's redemption. By introducing the term "goel" applied to Yahweh and the theme of being chosen, Deutero-Isaiah gives the reason why Yahweh intervened creatively to redeem Israel²⁰. Through his preaching, he also opposes the extremely attractive power of worship of Marduk and the deities associated with him in Babylonia, with magnificent feasts and rites, with priests, countless wise men and fortune-tellers. The theme of creation, which underpins the salvation of Israel, serves at the same time to worship the Yahweh and devalue the power usurped by the pagan gods. The prophet's declarations therefore contain a doxological and polemic aspect, which should not be forgotten when analysing the writings of Deutero-Isaiah.

Priestly Tradition (Genesis 1)

In Genesis 1, the cosmological theme receives its fullest expression. However, the impressive character of the first page of the Bible cannot overshadow other manifestations of faith in the Creator God. Despite its importance and rank, the priestly story cannot be privileged among other statements of the Old Testament on this subject²¹.

Genesis 1 is both doctrinal and sacred in character; it combines scientific interest with liturgical care. A story composed in a priestly environment – and perhaps recited for a liturgical ceremony – strikes us with its weight, rhythm and extremely solemn tone. The author tries – in the Egyptian wise man's way – to enumerate all the components of the cosmos, allocating to each element the appropriate place that has been set for him in God's plan. This concerns light, darkness, water, sky, earth, plants, animals, and so on. The author writes simply for the glory of God. Vocabulary, style, composition, content – everything

¹⁹ Cf. H.D. Preuss, *Deuterocesaja. Eine Einführung in seine Botschaft*, Neukirchen 1976, 58-60.

²⁰ C. Stuhkmüller, *Creative Redemption in Deutero-Isaiah* (AnBib 43), Rome 1970, 233-237.

²¹ W.H. Schmidt, *Die Schöpfungsgeschichte der Priester Schrift* (WMANT 17), Neukirchen 1964 d P. Beauchamp, *Création et séparation. Étude exégétique du (...) Gen 1*, Paris 1970.

is aimed at expressing the greatness, wisdom and goodness of a creative work. From beginning to end, the story praises the creator of heaven and earth.

This doxological intention occurs together with the polemic finale. Genesis 1 definitely excludes the existence of any divine reality other than the Creator. It desacralises radically the world and everything it contains: the forces of chaos are given for the service of God's word, the earth is obedient to Him, the heavenly bodies serve as day and night markers, there is nothing divine in the universe. Heaven and earth are creations and as such depend on the will of God who created them.

Against the background of the cosmogony and beliefs of Israel's neighbours, Hexameron is characterised by exceptional, if not surprising, theological sobriety. There is no trace of faith in the multitude of conflicting deities, which, according to the Mesopotamian myth, originated from the waters of primordial chaos. The world came into being not as a result of a struggle between the demiurge and other gods, nor by another birth among gods, but it is the work of the powerful God, which exists before and aside of which no god exists and will exist (cf. Is 43:10; 45:5). Hexameron shows celestial bodies, like the sun, moon and stars as entities completely natural and subordinated to the transcendent God, they are simply ordinary creatures²².

This profanation of the cosmos, which contrasts with the way we look at the nature of the nations neighbouring Israel, allows mankind to live without the eternal fear of confronting enemy forces. It is a liberating description because it frees man from the cult of natural powers, gives the world to man, while in other cosmogonies man is a slave of the world. Genesis 1 places man over creation and entrusts him with the mission of representing the Creator, and to what extent man is the image of God and his icon. The author shows man as the most perfect of God's creations. For he has something in him of God himself, he is his image, which manifests itself in the fact that, by the will of the Creator, he conquers the earth and rules over other living beings. In a woman she sees a biblical creature equal to a man. Sexual intercourse and progeny is presented in Hexameron as the realisation of the will of the Creator.

According to Genesis 1, God establishes an order that determines the fate of the cosmos and man. The latter is determined by space and time, and is given a rhythm of life. In order to better grasp the theological intention of Genesis 1, it is necessary to mention the circumstances in which this chapter was written. For a priestly writer, the conquest of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar meant that

²² Cf. J. Synowiec, *Jak rozumieć Heksaameron?*, CoTh 52(1982)1, 28f.

the Israeli tradition, which the nation had lived through the centuries, was completely challenged. The author's aim is to rethink the whole history of Israel and to base its existence on fundamentals so permanent that the crisis marked by the fall of the kingdom of Judah can no longer be repeated.

God's creative action is purposeful and reasonable. The clear construction of the description of the creature is supposed to give the impression of a deliberate and planned order. The Creator is wise, is the God of order and harmony. This kind of image of God is the outflow of contemplative wisdom into the magnificence of the world. This wisdom is based on Israel's experience to date, such as the creative power of words, the superiority of the Yahweh over all nations and their gods, the one-of-a-kind grace for man, and the ordering power of the Law²³.

The life of the chosen people can be safeguarded if it is based on certain and definite institutions, perpetuated by God forever. Genesis 1 tells us about the foundation of the first of these dispositions. It is the establishment of the order of creation, which will be confirmed by the Noachite covenant (Genesis 9), while Genesis 17 designates a place for the people of Yahweh within the framework of mankind according to the order of Abraham. If the Jahwist, through his story of the appearance of Adam and Eve, opens his story of salvation, the priestly writer begins the story of divine institutions that place the world, humanity and the nation of Israel in mutual relations by referring to the creation of the heavens and the earth. Fidelity to God in relation to what he decided "at the beginning" is the surest guarantee of the future of Jerusalem and the nations.

The fact that it was at the time of the greatest humiliation that such lofty thoughts could be formulated, especially about man, is a clear sign of unbreakable faith, but also of the fact that Israel opened itself at that time to the wisdom of the world around it and was thus able to grasp the image of man in a more universal way. The Book of Genesis does not only refer to man as a member of the Israeli nation, to whom God speaks and to whom He sometimes severely punishes, but to man in general, as a thinker or philosopher can talk about it²⁴.

²³ Cf. W. Trilling, *op. cit.*, 70-71.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Theology Of Psaltery Hymns

One might think that in Israeli hymnology there are numerous doxological statements referring to the Creator God. In fact, the psalmists mention the saving interventions of Yahweh at the time of departure and in relation to Zion, they speak of the royal reign of the Yahweh and His goodness in relation to the unhappy, they praise the care and justice of God. Meanwhile, faith in the God “who created heaven and earth” is expressed in the Psalter only in passing, generally in relation to the history of salvation, and in prayers from a fairly late period. Thus, the theme of creation in its current form, Ps 19, combines and is subordinated to the theme of the sublimity of the Law, which was given to the chosen people²⁵. In Ps 136, on the other hand, this theme is directly related to the saving interventions of Yahweh at the time of leaving Egypt and is shown on an equal footing under the sign of merciful fidelity to God²⁶.

Due to the representativeness of this psalm, it is appropriate to deal with it somewhat more broadly. While Psalm 104 is dedicated solely to creation and makes no reference to Israel, in Psalm 136 the first verses are a hymn of praise to creation, and two thirds of the psalm are dedicated to praise Israel, who glorifies his God for the great works done in history. These are two great events: the liberation of Israel and the creation of the universe. This close-up of the two themes is extremely characteristic because it contains a specific concept of the history of Israel and the creation of the world. The Psalm has a very clear structure. After the worship of Jehovah, “God over gods” and “Lord over lords” (in 1-3) worships the Creator God (in 4-9), showing His strange action in honour of Israel (in 10-24). Israel begins by worshipping the creation of the universe in order to reach its own history with the same refrain. God created the world and took care of His people in the same way and for the same reason, “for His mercy forever.” A direct transition from creation to “the moon and the stars to rule at night” (in 9) to the fact that God “beat the first-borns of Egyptians” (in 10) is not accidental at all. Thus, starting from the creation of the universe, we are reminded of the main outlines of the history of Israel: the escape from Egypt, the humiliation of enemies, the passage through the Red Sea to the desert and the entrance to the Promised Land.

²⁵ Ps 19 consists of two pieces originally independent of each other, the first of which seems to be older. Cf. H.J. Kraus, *Psalmen 1* (BK XV/3), Neukardhen 1966, 152-161.

²⁶ Ps 136 takes up the pattern of the historical creed, but refers to creation. The refrain sees in all acts of Yahweh an expression of His merciful faithfulness. H.J. Kraus, *Psalmen 2* (BK XV/2), Neukirchen 1966, 899-963.

The first conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the psalm is that praising the history of Israel in its very beginnings and worshipping the creation of the world is one and the same, because Israel believes in Yahweh, who for him is both the Creator of the universe and the Lord of its history. The starting point for this reflection was, of course, the history of the chosen people. Israel – like every individual and every nation – needed to become aware of its own existence, before concentrating its attention on its beginnings and in turn on the beginnings of the universe. It is obvious that these two beginnings do not belong to the same order. There is a ravine between the creation of the universe from nothingness, or more precisely in this context – from chaos, and the emergence of Israel liberated from Egypt at a specific historical moment. Yet it is precisely the awareness of Israel's own origins and, as a consequence, of creation that is included in the combination of these two orders. If Israel lives and acts it is because it has owed its existence to Yahweh for centuries, i.e. from the very beginning, the decisive moments and events. In short, Israel was created by God. Salvation and existence – this is the fruit of the consciousness that Israel expresses through this psalm in relation to its origins. In relation to the universe, Israel contains, in some form, the beginning of things that occur in the entire creative work; it is a matter of salvation. It is, of course, a work of God and therefore worthy of praise. It is not important that it derives from mythical images, i.e. from an approach to issues that contains nothing of science. It corresponds to that stage of culture of the ancient Middle East in which Israel lived and thought. The essence and originality of Israeli thought lies in the fact that images, order of things, basic beliefs, as well as cognition derived from the observation of phenomena are related exclusively to Yahweh. If Ps 136 puts at the forefront of the essential things the faith of Israel, he does so because Israel was the first to free itself from concepts of the world contrary to that faith.

This Psalm can also be treated as a fruit and the purest expression of Israel's faith, which seeks to free itself from mythical fatalism. Regardless of our cognitive abilities, it is certain that God Himself acted in the creation of the universe, as well as in the emergence of man and the nation of Israel. Therefore, God's work, God's creative work as His historical work, is a salvific work, and only as such (salvific) is a creative work²⁷.

Ps 33 and 89 remind us of the greatness of Yahweh, His goodness and righteousness, mentioning creation on an equal footing with the choosing

²⁷ Cf. P. Gilbert, *Idea stworzenia w Starym Testamencie* "Communio" 4 (1982), 46-57; cf. also H.J. Kraus, *Psalmen 2*, op. cit., 900-902.

of Israel and David²⁸. Psalm 74 mentions his triumph over the powers of chaos among the works of God's release of Israel²⁹. Psalms 145 et seq. place greater emphasis on the providential work of Yahweh and on the help he brings to the poor than on the work of salvation of God³⁰.

Two psalms in particular deserve attention: 8 and 104 that show points of contact with Genesis 1. In addition, Ps 104 is close to the hymn to the sun god Aton, ascribed to Pharaoh Amenofis IV³¹. Both represent a tradition of wisdom, and the relationship they demonstrate with the history of salvation comes down to the use of the name of Yahweh. Ps 8 places the Creator, the work created and the creation itself in the manner of Genesis 1 in appropriate relationships. Ps 104 is more interested in God's dominion over nature, than in the creation of the world. The panorama of the world inspires admiration in the psalmist, who praises the greatness of the Creator, His knowledge and kindness towards the creations that fill the earth³².

Wisdom Literature

The above observations apply also to wisdom texts that were probably written in the period after the captivity. Here we are thinking above all of the Book of Proverbs and Job. The Israeli sage praises the infinite majesty of God, who wanted to bring heaven and earth to existence and brought order and harmony. Contemplation of the cosmos sustains his enthusiasm, but the history of salvation never enters consciously into his meditation on the work of the Creator God. The cosmogonic theme in the tradition of wisdom is based directly on the testimony that the universe gives to Yahweh. It is primarily of a doxological nature.

Some texts from the Book of Proverbs remind us that the works of creation testify to the existence of the Creator on whom they are totally dependent and

²⁸ Psalm 33 is an alphabetical prayer that takes up the traditional motifs of the royal reign of Yahweh, His creative work, and the world in general. Ps 89 – ending with a lamentation – begins with a hymn praising at the same time the covenant with David and the defeat of the sea. Ps 24 combines the tradition of creation with the liturgy of the royalty of the Yahweh.

²⁹ Ps 74 is a lamentation that supposes the destruction of the Jerusalem temple.

³⁰ Cf. Ps 121:2; 124:8; 134:3; 135:6 and others.

³¹ Cf. R. Martin-Achard, *Approches des Psaumes*, CTh 60 (1969), 70-85; R. Tournay, *Le psaume VIII et la doctrine biblique du Nom*, RB 78 (1971), 18-30. For Ps 104 cf. H.J. Kraus, *Psalmen 2*, op. cit., 706. Cf. also H.W. Jüngling, "Macht euch die Erde untertan" (Gen 1, 38), in: "Theologisches Jahrbuch 1985", Leipzig 1985, 56-59.64-66.

³² Cf. H.J. Kraus, *Theologie der Psalmen* (BK XV/3), Neukirchen.

over whom God extends his care³³. Other texts again show the role of Wisdom in the creation of the world. Proverbs 8:22n emphasizes its previous existence in relation to the world and its presence in the formation of heaven and earth³⁴. The whole cosmos bears the sign of its Creator and pays tribute to Him.

The theme of creation plays a decisive role in Job³⁵. It appears especially in the passage that speaks of Yahweh's wisdom and intelligence, revealed during the cosmogonic struggle with the forces of nothingness (Job 26:5-14)³⁶. The second text praises wisdom, which is inaccessible to man, and which only God has. The expression of this wisdom is the establishment and determination of the laws of the universe (Job 28:26nn)³⁷. Job's poem ends with a suggestive description of the power of the Creator God (Job 38-41). Job emphasises that God gives him a hearing that he is in front of his face and in this way he makes contact with the Creator. He realises, however, that there is no proportion between creation and Creator. It is no longer for Job to report the matter to God, but Yahweh himself will lead his case and fill it with questions that Job is unable to answer. In order to embarrass him, God somehow introduces the universe to the stage, showing all its components, reminds him of the laws and asks Job about his participation in the creation of the world and its organisation. The creation is the clearest proof of the distance that separates Yahweh from his interlocutor. This distance reveals the finiteness of man and the absolute sovereignty of God over the work of creation.

In order to strengthen his arguments, the author of the Book of Job introduces monstrous beings such as Behemoth, the hippopotamus, Leviathan and the crocodile (Job 40n), which appear in the last part of Yahweh's discourse and are supposed to convince Job of the unexplored nature of God's activity³⁸. A creation is not able to understand God's work, it is not able to grasp its meaning. This spectacle of nature – not the story of salvation – puts the reader

³³ Cf. Proverbs 14:31; 17:5; 20:12:22.

³⁴ Cf. Job 28:20ff.

³⁵ Cf. S. Terrien, *Job* (CAT XIII), Neuchâtel 1963; G. Fohrer, *Das Buch Hiob* (KAT 16), Gütersloh 1963; J. LeVêque, *Job et son Dieu. Essai d'exégèse et de théologie biblique*, 2 vol. (EJB), Paris 1970.

³⁶ Cf. R. Tournay, *L'ordre primitif des chapitres XXIV-XXVIII du livre de Job*, RB 64 (1957), 321-334. The author suggests moving 24:18-25 after 27:23 and 25:2-26:4 after 26:5-14.

³⁷ Cf. Proverbs 3:19f and 8:22f.

³⁸ Cf. E. Ruprecht, *Das Nilpferd im Hiobbuch. Beobachtungen zu der sogenannten zweiten Gottesrede*, VT 21 (1971), 209-231; J.V. Kimier Wilson, *A return to the problems of Behemoth and Leviathan*, VT 25 (1975), 1-14; B. Couroyer, *Qui est Béhémot? Job, XL, 15-24*, RB 82 (1076), 418-443; cf. W. Zimmerli, op. cit., 24-34. § 4. *Jahwe, der Schöpfer und König*.

of the Book of Job before the impenetrable mystery of God and encourages him towards admiration and adoration. Creations bear witness to the uncontested power of the Yahweh; they reveal the wisdom and power of the God of Israel.

Conclusion

Let us gather our comments in the form of conclusions.

1. It is true that the concept of creation takes on theological focus in Israel quite late. The chosen nation was primarily interested in history and its relation to God, and then asked a question about the beginning of the world. Over time, as a result of historical events, it gradually developed a lesson on creation. Babylonian slavery played a decisive role in the theological reflection on creation.

2. The Old Testament texts testify that the statement “Yahweh has made heaven and earth” corresponds to a threefold theological intention. It has at the same time a doxological, soteriological and polemic character. The Old Testament taken as a whole evokes a cosmogonic fact to praise the glory of the God of Israel and emphasise His transcendence, to question the worship of nature, freeing man from the caring cosmic and agrarian forces, and to guarantee salvation for Israel and the world, relying on the power of God, able to make all things new out of love for his chosen.

3. The Old Testament shows us that the theological reflection on the creation of the world and mankind has been expressed in various forms in the history of Israel, there is no single formula of Israel's faith in creation, but it is always about the same faith expressed in a formulation conditioned by the current cultural context, always with the triple theological intentions mentioned above. This can be seen in the Old Testament writings, starting with the Jehovah and the priestly writer, through Deutero-Isaiah and the author of the Book of Job, whose faith was later expressed in the first article of the creed: “I believe in God the Almighty Father, the Creator of heaven and earth.”

“For Christ Is the End of the Law” (Rom 10:4). Topicality of Religious-Moral Principles of the Old Testament*

One of the most important, but also the most challenging problems in modern theology is to determine to what extent the religious-moral principles of the Old Testament retain their binding character. As is well known, the Old Testament includes quite numerous less-than-perfect ethical principles—reflecting a specific historical-cultural background—which in the light of the New Testament we consider old-fashioned and non-binding. For example, one can evoke here the polygamy of patriarchs (Dt 17:17, 21:15), the law of retaliation (Lev 24:19-20), teachings on allowing a bill of divorce (Dt 24:1), and even entire sets of a moral character, such as the so-called family decalogue (Lev 18:7-17), which assumes the structure of a family from patriarchal times. A traditional, scholastic statement that of all the ritual, legal and moral principles of the Old Testament up to now only the moral principles are binding, does not stand up to scrutiny. Fr. Professor Stanislaw Olejnik, who enriched the theological sciences in Poland with a monumental textbook¹ and the most recent monographs on moral theology², which are supposed to constitute a comprehensive study on the whole of Moral Theology, rightly points out that this traditional position cannot be accepted today. In the same place, Fr. Professor Olejnik also provides a proper key and criterion which allow for determining the extent of the topicality and validity of the religious-moral principles of the Old Testament, pointing out that, “All commandments, and in particular those which relate to fellow men must

* STV 28(1990)2.

¹ S. Olejnik, *W odpowiedzi na dar i powołanie Boże*, Warsaw 1979.

² S. Olejnik, *Teologia moralna: Dar-Wezwanie-Odpowiedź*, vol. 1 *Wprowadzenie i idea wiodąca*, Warsaw 1980; vol. 2 *Człowiek i jego działanie*, Warsaw 1988; vol. 3, Warsaw 1988; vol. 4, Warsaw 1989.

be confronted” with the requirements and perspectives of the love assessing their value and usefulness in our times. Their point of reference must always be Christ. He, in turn, accumulates them all in His commandment of “loving thy neighbor.”³

This, by all measures a good point, invites a deeper biblical analysis and elaboration. Any partial treatment of the Old Testament does not correspond to current theological thought. “For whatever was written previously was written for our instruction, that by endurance and by the encouragement of the scriptures we might have hope” (Rom 15:4). Hence, each generation must endeavor anew to learn and fulfill the divine plan expressed in the Holy Scriptures, which in their entirety—that is not only the Old and New Testaments taken together, but also every passage and every expression individually—are carriers of the redemptive message of God, and therefore also hope. Each scriptural passage constitutes an integral part of God’s redemptive plan, therefore it retains its binding force equally with redemption itself, to which it is assigned. As is well known, the Bible in its entirety, with all its parts, is inspired, therefore, as the Council insists—“all books of the Old and New Testaments, written under divine inspiration, remain permanently valuable” (*valor perennis*) (DV 14).

The relevance of the Old Testament moral teaching is a subject of vivid interest among biblical scholars. It was studied extensively by P. Grelot, N. Lohfink, R. Schnackenburg, J. L. McKenzie and others⁴. In Poland the topic of the significance of the religious-moral forms for the Christian teaching on morality was researched by, among others, Fr. S. Łach, Fr. Cz. Jakubiec, Fr. J. Frankowski, bp Jan Szlaga, and in particular Fr. L. Stachowiak⁵.

³ S. Olejnik, *Teologia moralna 3: Wartościowanie moralne*, Warsaw 1988, 16.

⁴ Cf. P. Grelot, *Sens chrétien de l’Ancien Testament*, Paris 1992; N. Lohfink, *Pieśń chwały*, Warsaw 1982; J.L. McKenzie, *Wartości Starego Testamentu*, “Concillium” 1-10 (1966/67), 627-664; R. Schnackenburg, *Das Ethos des Alten Bundes und die sittliche Botschaft Jesu*, in: *Der Mensch und sein Auftrag*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1983, 9-39.

⁵ Cf. S. Łach, *Religijno-moralne wartości Starego Testamentu*, in: *Pismo Święte w duszpasterstwie współczesnym*, Lublin 1950, 59-81; Cz. Jakubiec, *Stare i Nowe Przymierze – Biblia i Ewangelia*, Warsaw 1961; J. Frankowski, *Dlaczego chrześcijaństwo nie wyrzeknie się Starego Testamentu* “Znak” 212 (1972), 216-221; J. Szlaga, *Etos Ludu Bożego Starego Przymierza* in: *Studio lectionem facere*, Lublin 1980, 63-66; L. Stachowiak, *Biblijne ujęcie węzłowych zagadnień moralnych*, STV 6(1968), 11-28; *ibid.*, *W poszukiwaniu chrześcijańskiego sensu Starego Testamentu*, AK 72(1969), 417-426; *Id.*, *O ile prawdy i normy Starego Testamentu zachowały wartość dla kształtowania dzisiejszej doktryny moralnej*, AK 76(1971), 208-211; *Id.*, *W poszukiwaniu paranezy w Starym Testamencie*, CT 48(1978)2, 37-57; *Id.*, *Pouczenia etyczne w literaturze międzytestamentalnej*, CT 48(1978)3, 43-62.

The question which arises first is, why the traditional, clear and rather convenient division into obsolete legal and ritual principles and the still binding moral-ethical code does not stand up to scrutiny any longer?

Furthermore, how in the moral message of the Old Testament can we distinguish what is an expression and reflection of changing—and as such subject to expiration—temporal and cultural conditions from that which in the ethical scope retains the *valor perennis*?

Finally, what, for moral valuing, are the practical consequences of the principle stressed by Fr. Professor Stanislaw Olejnik, namely, that the usefulness of the ethical principles shall be assessed in the perspective of the supreme commandment of love and the very person of Jesus Christ as a living embodiment of the love revealed and fulfilled in human?

The major goal of this paper is to attempt to answer this question. The starting point of a proper assessment of the normative character of the Old Testament is the fact that all principles—ritual, legal and religious-moral alike—draw their binding force from the faith in the inspired nature of the word of God. Phrases such as, “Thus says the Lord,” or “God said to Abraham,” “Moses,” or “David”: “say to the Israelites” and similar constitute the ultimate justification of the theonomic character of all principles, norms and institutions of Israel, governing the entire life of the people of God. Therefore, any division, even if sometimes necessary, will be of a rather artificial nature. Whereas we used to distinguish in the Old Testament some ritual-liturgical compilations, such as Ex 34:14-26, Is 33:14-15; religious-moral ones (Decalogue: Ex 20:1-17, Dt 5:6-21) or legal ones (Lev 20:9-21), this distinction only means that in all aforementioned compilations it is the ethical, ritual or legal principles that predominate. All of them, however, are of a strictly religious character, understood as an indication of the will of God, which encompasses the entirety of life of the people of God; in the biblical language: “conduct before God” in justice and sanctity, as well as “service,” that is the ritual sphere.

All the principles, with no exceptions, not only in the normative sphere, but also in their motivation, point to and already are a response to the action of God. A telling example of that is the so-called Code of the Sanctity of Family: Lev 20:9-22. All provisions are hedged by legal sanctions, more often than not capital punishment; whereas insofar as its theological grounds it points to fulfilling the promise granted to Abraham in the form of the land given to Israel as, “its legacy” and to the community with God Yahweh, who is the actual agent of sanctification.

Human acts in the Bible are of an interlocutory structure, that is, they are always a response to a particular action of God. Their root and source is faith

in the presence and action of God: “Hear, O Israel, Yahweh is our God, the Lord alone!” (cf. Dt 6:4, Mk 12:29). A direct consequence of this confession is an obligation to love God and one’s neighbor (cf. Mk 12:30-31). Thus, Israel’s monotheism is rightly described as ethical monotheism. The revelation of the only God corresponds to an obligation to, “display God’s glory among the nations, be to them the light” (Ez 39: 21; Eph 5:13). This obligation applies unconditionally to all spheres and actions, in particular to everything that concerns ritual, family and social life, as well as encompasses a wide scope of individual duties.

The Decalogue as a set of obligations following from the Covenant is preceded by a historical prologue: “I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery” (Ex 20:1, Dt 5:6). The Decalogue, as can be easily noticed, consists of an entirety of ethical norms in the ritual and social scope, if tightening the society mainly to a widely understood family. Both in the Elohist (Ex 20:9-17), as well as in the Deuteronomistic version (Dt 5:6-20), the Decalogue, in its content, is intimately linked with the Covenant made on Sinai. God, entering the community of life and love with His people, bound him – by the Decalogue – with particular principles which were supposed to guarantee the most intimate communion of Israel with their God, based on mutual dedication, a telling expression of which is the formulae of the covenant: “I will take you as my own people, and I will be your God” (Ex 6:7). This time not any specified goods but God alone gives Himself to Israel and obliges them to follow His sanctity and faithfulness.

Therefore, the reading of the entire moral Law which refers to the Divine Revelation as the response to the gift and calling from God—as Fr. Professor Stanisław Olejnik does—captures the interlocutory and normative character of the Divine Law accurately, and the entire sphere of ethical actions of man—as his response. At the same time, such a perspective, especially in reference to detailed principles, creates severe difficulties, as it requires entirely new considerations which will replace casuistic thinking with truly theological categories.

Thus, the purpose of particular ethical norms—as Fr. Professor L. Stachowiak accurately points out—is “to create within the Covenant an atmosphere of a dialogue,” which by fulfilling the Decalogue as the “Covenant Chart” makes Israel a rightful partner in the indissoluble Covenant relationship⁶.

The only grounds of all these religious-moral principles of the entire order is the revealed will of Yahweh, expressed in a laconic: “I Am the Lord”

⁶ L. Stachowiak, *Rozwój norm moralnych w historii zbawienia Starego Testamentu*, AK 81(1973), 45.

(cf. Ex 31:13; Lev 21:15; Ez 5:13). The Bible does not know any other motivation. This theonomic character of the entire Divine Law of the Old and New Testament constitutes one of the crucial marks of the biblical ethos.

In the face of numerous misunderstandings in this regard one shall stress that both Old and New Testaments alike unequivocally show the stability of both the Sinaitic Covenant, as well as its Law (that is the Torah), related to Moses. First it is done by the Deuteronomistic Tradition, which constitutes a new interpretation of the meaning of the old Law in the changed context of the Babylonian slavery, and then by Christ Himself. The Law, according to the Deuteronomist, is primarily an unmerited gift from God Himself (Dt 4:2), a symbol of redemptive endurance of God’s will (Dt 4:3), a peculiar symbol of His closeness (Dt 4:7), or even of intimacy with the living God (Dt 4:4), an expression of Israel’s wisdom in relation to other nations (Dt 4:6), as well as the only path to life (Dt 4:1-4). For its inimitable function, the laws given by God at Sinai are unchangeable, like God Himself is (Dt 4:2). The only correct conclusion following from understanding the Law in such a way is expressed in the words, “Now therefore, Israel, hear the statutes and ordinances I am teaching you to observe, that you may live (...) Observe them carefully, for this is your wisdom and discernment in the sight of the peoples (...)” (Dt 4:1-6).

Also Christ Himself clearly states His attitude towards Old Testament Law. His fundamental declaration, “Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets. I have come not to abolish but to fulfill.” (Mt 5:17) shows that Christ confirms and fulfills the Old Testament in its entirety. As elaborated in the following explanation, Christ does not change even the smallest letter (that the iota was), or even add the proverbial ‘dot over *i*’. Everything retains its binding force, and so it shall remain until the end of times, when the Law will prove unnecessary, as everyone will be able to see and experience its fulfillment in God.

The word “plērōō,” used by Christ to describe the fulfillment, expresses both the fact that Christ perfected Old Testament Law, as well as that in Him all promises announced thereof were fulfilled and actualized. To illustrate this, one can think of a container filled to the brink. The contents of the instructions which Christ brings fill the “container” of God’s Law so fully that from now on Jesus Christ is not to be understood without Old Testament Law, and conversely the Law cannot be understood without Jesus Christ. The fullness that Jesus is in relation to Old Testament Law is a kind of an indissoluble integrity of Jesus with the Law, and said Law with Jesus. Therefore, a strong effort must be made to read the aforementioned quote, like Martion did, in the exact opposite way to what Christ meant: “Do you think that I have come to fulfill the law or the prophets? I have come not to fulfill but to abolish.”

St. Paul, stressing that “Christ is the end of the Law” (Rom 10:4), wants to point out that Jesus is the purpose and fulfillment of the Order, and not its abolishment. The expression used here by St. Paul “telos gar nomou—Christos” shows a distinctive purposefulness of Old Testament Law, which from the beginning God oriented towards Christ as its climax. Only He, and not the Law, can rule over man and determine his relationship to God. By His obedience to the Father in grace and power of the Holy Spirit, He becomes the Agent of Justice arising from faith, and not works. In Him the Law reached its boundary and He created a new order of grace in which we have access to the Father and justification⁷. The entire Law and Prophets were embodied in the living person of Jesus Christ. From now on, no commandment, not even the commandment of love, but love present and fulfilled in Jesus Christ becomes the ultimate and highest ethical principle of Christianity. In Christ the entire Law and Order is present, hence Christians do not need to adopt the Mosaic Law first in order to reach Christ. All that is needed is to believe in Christ as the Lord and Savior, adopt Him with one’s heart and declare it aloud to become a participant of exoneration.

Jesus’ undivided YES towards Old Testament Law in its entirety does not mean a full approval of the interpretation of the Law as used by the Pharisees and Scribes in Jesus’ times, but rather adopting all instructions from the Old Testament as hints and principles of behavior, as well as a vital part of the proclamation of salvation, which was completely subject to, and as such oriented at, redeeming the people of God. Everything that was written—as St. Paul teaches—“was written for our instruction” and therefore for our salvation (Rom 15:4). Hence, it is not enough to ask what redemptive meaning the particular passages used to have for old Israel, but also it is necessary to learn what meaning they have for us today and what God wants to tell us with them in such an extremely different historical and topical situation of us living in the 20th century. A foot-bridge here can be an analogy of the existential situation of the people of the first and ultimate covenant, a situation of danger, fear, anxiety, but also the need and yearning for salvation. A key to proper understanding is an existential interpretation of the entire Bible in the light of the fullness that Christ is and brings. Naturally, the proclamation of salvation included in the Bible cannot be understood statically, as if a sentence uttered once had always the same value and an identical meaning to all generations that adopt the Bible as the word of God. Uttered in a specific historical situation by Moses, prophets and authors, or

⁷ Cf. A. Schlatter, *Der Brief an die Römer*, (Erläuterung zum N. T. 5), Stuttgart 1962, 185.

even editors of Holy Scriptures, it included the entire redeeming truth that God wanted to pass to his people. The same utterance seen in the context of a unity and wholeness of the plan of salvation oriented, from the beginning of time, towards Christ, only in Him receives its full theological meaning.

From amongst the religious-moral principles the best example is that of the commandment of love. Both commandment of love of God (Dt 6:5) and of one's neighbor (Lev 19:18), formerly known as two commandments, not only become bonded by Christ in an inseparable unity (cf. Mt 22:37-40), but also Christ clearly points to Himself as an example, a motif for their keeping: "This is my commandment: love one another as I love you" (J 15:12; cf. also 15:17).

From now on it is not the commandment but following the living example of Jesus Christ which becomes the center and fullness of the moral teaching of the New Testament: "This is my commandment: love one another as I love you" (J 15:12). In Christ a new measure and a new, full scope of love is revealed (Mt 5:43). Revealing this fullness is affected in Jesus Christ. From the very beginning this commandment remains, however, a foundation on which, "the whole law and the prophets depend" (Mt 22:40). The Old Covenant from the very beginning has been oriented to Christ as its fullness and at the same time He is its end, climax and fulfillment. Love, as a mark characteristic to Christ's disciples (J 13:35), receives its necessary complement in following Jesus and taking up one's cross daily (Lk 9:23), in which conformity and obedience to the will of the Father and love towards others are both expressed.

The fullness revealed in Jesus Christ is further expressed in the fact that not only the entire sphere of ethics, but also that of ritual became subject to it. Taking up the teaching of the Old Testament prophets (Os 6:6), Christ points out that mercy takes precedence over sacrifice (Mt 9:13), and in case of a conflict between these two spheres, Christ orders: "Therefore, if you bring your gift to the altar, and there recall that your brother has anything against you, leave your gift there at the altar, go first and be reconciled with your brother, and then come and offer your gift" (Mt 5:23-24).

Such an interpretation arises from faith in the unity of the divine plan and continuous work of one and the same God the Redeemer. The hermeneutical key to a full theological interpretation is the principle given by Christ himself, "You search the scriptures, because you think you have eternal life through them; even they testify on my behalf" (J 5:39).

The words of God's proclamation and in consequence also of "the Scriptures" on each stage of the history of salvation were a path to life, although how both "the Scriptures" and life itself were understood has been changing and deepening. A practical example of applying such a Christocentric interpretation

as early as in the Apostle Church is Lk 24:24-25. Christ Himself opens to His disciples a theological depth present in the scriptures of prophets, but cognizable only in the light of faith in Risen Christ, who alone, “beginning with Moses and all the prophets, He interpreted to them what referred to Him in all the Scriptures.”

The word of the Scriptures always arises from specific experience and must also be interpreted in an unchangeable manner in light of the experience of faith of all of God’s people—first of the Old Covenant, then that of the New Covenant. For its historical background this experience may be quite diverse, however insofar conveying the contents, read in the light of human existence, it will always be very similar, or even identical. On all pages of the Bible, regardless of different eras and different names, we encounter a human being who amongst numerous dangers is fighting or gives in to evil, who trusts, believes, struggles for saving his hope or leaves and curses God. Man, who goes astray and sins, but no less intensely also yearns for salvation. Man who prays, awaits redemption or is silent in the face of evil, full of resignation and pain. Man who loves and hates, rejoices and mourns, is born and dies and yearns to comprehend the meaning of his suffering, sorrow and joy.

The contents of the Old Testament, read through the prism of the experience of living people, and in particular by the power of the redemptive work of God, have not become obsolete. At the same time, as follows from Heb 11, this is not only about a positive example of just men of the Old Order, such as Abel, Abraham, Jacob or Moses, but also fratricidal Kane, insidious Ezau, the harlot Rahab or sinful David—weak in his sin but also grand in his repentance.

Thank God the Bible is not an exemplary Book showing only shining examples but a Book of Redemption, a place of meeting all those who believed in the redemptive power of the word. That faith, from Abraham to Paul and all those who, “summon the name of the Lord as their Savior” in an unchangeable way gives them access to salvation (Gen 15:6; Rom 4:3, 5:9, 22; Ga 3:6).

By becoming fulfilled in Jesus Christ, the redemptive meaning of the Old Testament events have not been crossed out. Partial and theologically incomplete meaning of the events does not erase then the actual, literal sense of all particular texts of the Old Testament. Quite the contrary, a proper reading of the complete theological meaning, to which we gain access in Jesus Christ, assumes a faithful reading in the literal sense first. In the specific historical situation it also expressed the fullness of the redemptive meaning, and therefore also the salvation needed as per the capabilities as well as the needs of the people for whom the Mosaic Covenant is still the ultimate one, and as such, the complete Covenant.

The New Law, announced by Jesus Christ in the Sermon of the Mount and Risen Christ Himself as the limit and fullness of the Law constitute the only criterion of a complete theological interpretation of all norms, principles, commandments, as well as ritual institutions of the new “God’s Israel” (Ga 6:16). It is noteworthy to point out, though, that according to St. John the revealed divine will from the very beginning was expressed in the words, “For this is the message you have heard from the beginning: we should love one another” (1J 3:11). In this light, Christ restores all institutions to their original perfection and fullness intended by God (cf. Mt 5:33-37.39-42: the law of retaliation, swearing oaths), enriches them and gives them spirit (Mt 5:27-30, 21-26: desire as the source of adultery, wrath as the root of a murder), but also changes some of them and makes them obsolete, as is the case with the divorce letter (Mt 5:31-32) or the provisions of forbidden practices. Christ Himself—as Mk 7:19 puts it—“Thus he declared all foods clean.” Christ as a “Fullness” of the revelation constitutes a unified evaluation criterion for all provisions, laws and institutions of the Old Testament, regardless of their literal or content classification.

The one-time-ness and exclusiveness of the sacrifice of the Cross (Heb 8:27, 9:28) as the only and perfect sacrifice of the new and eternal covenant (Mt 26:28) reveals a temporary and preparatory character of the Old Testament sacrifices, and by the same token to a large extent relativizes the unchangeable nature of the ritual legislation of the Old Testament.

The only and eternal sacrifice of Jesus Christ therefore means the end of the numerous sacrifices of the Old Testament, however, it certainly does not erase the historical-redemptive meaning of said sacrifices which they had for ages, until that very time, as without them the absolute and entire meaning of the sacrifice of Jesus Christ would not be understandable either. One and the same word has been carrying out its redemptive mission simply by unchangeably being the carrier of the proclamation of salvation, and at the same time, an irreplaceable means of salvation, although actualized in a different way as by the measure of the revelation of God the Redeemer. The sacrifices of the Old Testament remain in such a close unity with the sacrifice of the cross and the bloodless sacrifice of the Last Supper that without them the entire theological meaning of that sacrifice would be actually impossible to comprehend. In this light, the end of the ritual law, as well as its climax is expressed in its fulfillment, and not in revealing its secondary meaning. Similarly to the ancient ritual of Pesach, it is merely subject to the judgment in the light of the new Law of the Spirit, the fullness of which is the common ritual made “in Spirit and truth” (J 4:23).

The mission and proclamation of the Old Testament Books was then a widespread proclamation, from the very beginning aiming at Christ as its end and fulfillment.

The entire theological meaning revealed in Christ also entails a greater obligation, “Much will be required of the person entrusted with much, and still more will be demanded of the person entrusted with more” (Lk 12:48). Therefore, it is not the feeling of superiority, but perfect love as realized in Christ that becomes the only criterion characteristic of true disciples of Christ (cf. Mt 16:24, 1J 3:11).

Part III –
Dogmatic Issue

Contemporary Trends in the Catholic Teaching on the Eucharist*

Catholic Church's Statements about the Eucharist

The Church's task is to guard the mystery of the Eucharist and to pass it on from generation to generation. The Church believes that it receives the support of the Holy Spirit in carrying out its mission and the awareness of this fact authorized its teaching office to preach its doctrine over the centuries.

In fulfilling this vocation, the Church never intended to formulate, once and for all (in specific wordings), the whole truth. Often it was about statements related to a given historical epoch, statements directed against certain heresies in order to salvage the Christian truth.

The teaching of the Council of Trent on the Eucharist is extremely polemical, set in a climate created by the statements of reformers. Hence, it would be impossible to attempt to build a systematic treatise on the Eucharist based on the resolutions of the Council of Trent which focused all its attention on those parts of teaching on the Lord's Supper which met with the strong objections of the reformers in an impressive way defending the teaching of the Church's Tradition. A theologian therefore must be confronted with the following question: What Christian values of the Gospel were then attempted to be saved? The answer to this question takes the form of an imperative: We have an obligation to teach these essential values using language and methods of expression appropriate to our times.

So what is actually crucial in the dogma of the Council of Trent?

In the formation of this dogma, we can distinguish three levels:

a. Level of faith. Although the senses only experience bread after consecration there is no bread but the Body of Christ. In this case simply a fact is stated

* STV 11(1973)2. The article is a paper presented during the nationwide session/conference of Polish dogmatists, which took place in Ołtarzew on October 24, 1972.

without closer investigation on the particular way in which this transformation proceeds;

b. The ontological level: The bread is transformed into the Body of Jesus Christ. The term “transformation” is already the result of a certain reflection on the process “stated” by faith;

c. Philosophical and natural level: This transformation is called *aptissime* transubstantiation. The speculative analysis of the Eucharistic event has already taken place on this level.

The first and second level of the Eucharistic event form an unchangeable and lasting element of dogmatic statement. The third one, however, requires clarification. Its content was expressed through the use of Aristotelian-scholastic conceptual tools, which the Council of Trent did not intend to canonize. Here, therefore, there has been an autonomous space for theological research created.

Let us remain for a moment at the resolutions of the Council of Trent because there one can find the origins and motivations of contemporary attempts to present the study of the Eucharist. With full recognition of the prominent achievements of the Council Fathers of the Trent, addressing them with the objection that they created a break between the real Presence and the Sacrifice and Communion should not be considered as an attempt to undermine their exceptional role.

To justify this attitude, it should be added immediately that the Fathers of the Council of Trent were not able to act in any other way, for since the period of the disputes with Berengarius, which kept the full attention of theologians, the basic problem was the real presence of the Body and Blood of Christ.

In its legacy, the Council of Trent passed to the subsequent era a great and appreciative task: the creation of the necessary synthesis and the introduction of systematics between the three parts of the teaching about the Eucharist. Unfortunately post-Trent theology has not undertaken this mission.

All the pietism of the new era has focused on the cult of Christ present in the Eucharist in a bodily manner, which takes place not only during the Mass. The incidental, trichotomic scheme of the Council of Trent was taken over by the post-Vatican II theology, so that it was introduced as binding for catechisms and theological textbooks, and the first part of the trichotomy of the Treaty on the Eucharist was largely expanded.

It is surprising that this modernly criticized trichotomy scheme has been copied in the latest textbook of dogmatic theology, published by J. Auer and J. Ratzinger¹. The following issues are discussed there: the problem of real

¹ Cf. *Kleine katholische Dogmatik*, vol. 4 (*Das Mysterium der Eucharistie*), Regensburg 1972.

presence, of the Eucharist as a sacrificial Feast and of the Holy Communion. In the meantime, it is true that the first and fundamental theorem of the teaching about the Eucharist is: this is My body, which is given to you, and not: under these species I am present. We offer Christ as our sacrifice and we receive Him.

This seems to imply that the whole meaning of making Christ present in the Eucharist is reduced to the act of receiving the Host, and that is why He becomes present².

Among the reflections on the Eucharist, first place is occupied by the Lord's Supper which is tantamount to sacrifice and food.

Ideological Tensions

In the teaching about the Eucharist, two trends, seemingly paradoxical, run in parallel: while the extraordinary teaching office, opposing the pressure of heretical opinions, highlighted mostly the real presence, the ordinary Magisterium office from the beginning of Christianity never lost interest in the Eucharist in its entirety (e.g. in the liturgy). The conviction that the Eucharist is the Sacrifice of the Holy Mass including the presence of the whole saving work of Christ being his real presence and the presence oriented towards communion was developing in an organic way.

While elaborating the study on the Eucharist, we must not forget about these two tendencies of the Church's teaching. A synoptic view of these two trends leads us to the following view of the holistic vision of the Eucharist: the Eucharist is the sacramental presence of the whole of Christ's reality or the integral event of Jesus in order that the faithful could receive this saving gift through consuming the Eucharist³.

Methodological Starting Point

The above reflections lead us to the problem of the methods used by theological thought when considering the mystery of the Eucharist. At the beginning, chronologically and materially, there is a historical-redemptive method proper to the Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, and today, newly rediscovered

² Cf. K. Rahner, *Die Gegenwart Christi im Sakrament des Herrenmahles*, in: *Schriften zur Theologie*, vol. 4, Zürich 2 1961, 384.

³ Cf. J. Betz, *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* 2 III, col. 1154.

and reevaluated, probably leads to the original understanding of the mystery of the Eucharist. Along with the decline of the biblical understanding of the history of salvation, and especially in connection with the decline of conviction of the existence of strict connection between the Sacrifice of the Holy Mass and Passover, the place of the historical-redemptive aspect is occupied by the allegorical-symbolic method. It could be expected that unrestrained over-interpretations and exaggerations of this method will have to trigger an appropriate response. This objection was justifiably expressed in the philosophical and metaphysical method which probably stood firmly in guard of the Eucharistic reality. The concept of transubstantiation, sanctioned by the Fourth Lateran Council, was elaborated here.

On the Evangelical side, where from the very beginning of the Reformation the Mass was strongly opposed as a sacrifice, and the Eucharist was conceived as a feast exercised by the commune, the phenomenological-idealistic method was used with the predilection. Again, the mystery theory of O. Casel and the liturgical movement paved the way for the renaissance of historical-redemptive biblical thinking. Paying attention to the historical aspect of the Eucharist is an extremely important and prolific discovery in the context of reflection on the Eucharist. Only this method makes it possible to capture the essential components of this sacrament.

Any other methods contribute to the development of the study of the Eucharist, if they concentrate on preserving the historical-redemptive approach. This short methodical outline mentioned here only *pro memoria*⁴ is a transition to today's newest approaches to the study of the Eucharist, to the attempts to capture its problems from the position of existential phenomenology. Behind all our previous observations was the implicit intention of pointing out the important fact that it is only in a relative sense that it is possible to speak of a "new" approach to the Eucharist or even a "new theology" at all.

Theology practiced in a responsible manner never begins its activity from point zero. It either takes over the theological aphorias, i.e. problems unresolved by its previous representatives, or formulates its own questions about the unchanging content of the revealed truths, questions from the position of a believer who is living in the twentieth century. Nevertheless it should be noted that this theology clearly distinguishes between the content of Revelation and the ways it is formulated⁵.

⁴ Cf. J. Auer, J. Ratzinger, *Kleine katholische Dogmatik*, vol. 6, 133f.

⁵ The core of the matter is reflected in several concepts that are difficult to translate into Polish: *continuité dans la discontinuité*, with roughly speaking, the *continuité* would refer

Today's Hermeneutics of Statements about the Eucharist

Due to the fact that today we elaborate the hermeneutics of the statements of the Teacher Office of the Church, interpreting them in the context of the historical, social and cultural conditions and other factors, thus trying to extract the essence of these judgments for its new, contemporary to us, valorizations, we also have a duty to investigate the background and conditions of today's trends in Eucharistic thought. It will thus not be so much about the presentation of different aspects of these tendencies but a more general issue: an attempt to recognize genetic assumptions of contemporary profiling of the teaching of Eucharist.

One of the characteristic features of our culture is a different attitude of man in relation to reality. A rational, conceptualist position is contrasted with another point of view on reality: a phenomenological attitude. Existential phenomenology holds the assumption that human consciousness is oriented, *per se*, to the reality that appears phenomenally to us; it is the attitude of being open to reality, which in turn reveals itself to our consciousness. Man experiences himself as a world-oriented being – the world of things and people.

In communing with the world, man does not appear as a passive receptor of external reality. On the contrary, he feels actively rooted in this reality. This reality is complex and elaborated to such an extent that it can be said that every human being creates his own world. The shape of the world depends in large part on the attitude of my consciousness. In order to exemplify this issue, one can say: I can pass by trees indifferently, yet an ordinary tree conceals in itself many meanings. Their quality depends on me. In a different way, a carpenter will look at a tree in a different way than a gardener or a learned dendrologist. All this applies even more to the man and his fellowman. Characterologically, it means that man is distinct from his phenomenal being.

Therefore, he is not a man of self-confidence, but a man who learns his own imperfection and who is listening with respect to the world and to other people with his entire personality. Incidentally, we can note here that this perspective explains to us the origins of today's man's opening to dialogue, meeting, ecumenical movement, and even to dialogue with Marxism, to change of the profile of education, sincere exchange of opinions between parents and the child – all this together undoubtedly affects the irenic formation of today's man.

to the content, while *discontinuité* would emphasize the diversity of the external expression of the revealed truth, while emphasizing the essential continuity which occurs between the substantive content and the new wording.

It is, therefore, a different context from the one which was typical, for the most part, for older conceptualism and deductive thinking, when the interlocutors participating in the dispute were not so much in dialogue, but with more or less bravery, they tried to fight each other. In the textbooks of dogmatics of this type, after the thesis with its theological qualification was presented, immediately appeared a paragraph entitled: *Adversarii*, where the defenseless opponent was simply supposed to be defeated. In the same style, the part of often astonishing objections was edited, as well as even more astonishing clear and concise responses to these objections. Today's situation also conditions our view of the way of teaching itself proceeds which is deprived of its paternalistic character, gaining, or rather regaining, its proper serving function.

Today's man is unable to give a confession of faith like "in blindness," confess truths of faith closed in systems, methods and treatises. True community is the goal of his aspirations and endeavors. Forms, institutions, organizations and structures are then accepted as long as they fulfill a subordinate role in relation to this community. A typical symptom of altered spiritual attitudes is – however we would look at this issue – an attempt to revalorize corporeality and emotional life. One and the other sphere of his existence is to be lived by a man as a symbolic reality, simply as a mystery. The thought of a modern man is oriented towards the future. He knows that every new discovery opens up a sequence of new questions and new perspectives. Man is aware that he himself has also been involved in a powerful stream of evolution, this latter idea finds its expression in an unprecedented way in the Christian writings of Teilhard de Chardin.

We continue to discern in the man of our time the indomitable urge to this kind of reconstruction of the world, so that it becomes habitable and able to develop further. The voices of cultural historians (A.J. Toynbee) can be heard, according to which the first symptoms of the common culture of the world can already be seen.

Another thought – also not without significance for contemporary studies on the problem of the Eucharist – is the observation that the culture in which we live is the culture of large cities and human communities, whose phenomenon reveals new problems of human co-existence. In architecture, it manifests itself in striving to achieve the effect of plasticity of space. Bold church buildings are designed to meet the requirements of a number of functions. In painting, art and sculpture, we notice a fascination with original archaism. Black art, Aztec art, Byzantine iconography, Romanesque frescoes are being rediscovered. In a word, we become witnesses of a feverish search for elementary and symbolic means of expression.

Today's artist seems to hold the conviction that absolute reality surpasses and exceeds above everything created by man. At the same time, we observe the tendency to reproduce the extremes of what is ugly and imperfect. It can therefore be said that contemporary, avant-garde aesthetics, leaning towards the absolute, and thus creates a religious climate, and fertilizes the soil for the germination of religious values. Similar considerations could be made about poetry. To what extent and how far is the word the transparency of the Absolute. Word Incorporated. The causative Word, the Word of agency entrusted to the priest⁶. However, this all would exceed the framework of our intentions. The above remarks should, at least in part, be more clearly related to the Eucharist. If we consider the twentieth century as a period of contemporary tendencies in the Eucharist, then we can divide it – most reasonably – into two parts: the first part is completed by the first half of the 20th century, and the second half – by the second half of the same century.

The First Half of the Twentieth Century – a Turn towards Tradition

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first signs of renewed reflection on the Eucharist could be noticed. Looking for ways leading to Tradition, L. Billot (1931) and M. de la Taille (1933) speak of the Eucharist as *sacrificium in signo vel in sacramento*. In the Eucharist they see the symbol, the sacramental sign of the onetime reality of the Cross. At the same time, they regarded this sign as being strictly related to the Sacrifice of the Cross. These theologians thus entered an intermediate path, running between the two extreme positions of the post-Trent theology. On the one hand, they avoided the hard reality of accepting a new sacrifice, analogous to the sacrifice of the Cross, and on the other hand they distanced themselves from the view leading to the claim that the Eucharist was only a pure sign, and consequently having no connection with the reality of the Sacrifice.

The theory of citizenship in theology was elaborated by A. Vonier (1938) and above all by O. Casel (1948). Reflecting on liturgical texts and on Thomistic science, as well as conducting studies on the history of religion, Casel elaborated new intuitions with regard to the problem of the Eucharist. Referring to the

⁶ Cf. excellent study of K. Rahner, *Priester und Dichter*, in: *Schriften zur Theologie*, vol. 3, Zürich 1956, 349-375.

ancient concept of *mysterion*, he developed his theology of mystery presence (*Mysterien-Gegenwart*). In symbolic activities and through these activities and through the word of the liturgy, Christ's saving actions become present. The commemoration that takes place in the cult can be simply identified with the presence of one of God's works⁷.

Within the cult activities the Christian becomes not only a participant in the fruits of Christ, the acts of salvation but these acts become present themselves, namely through Word and rituals. The real presence of Christ and his salvific work are thus realized under the concealment of symbols.

Not all elements of Casel's theory are acceptable. Its main ideas have, however, become a permanent property of modern doctrine about the Eucharist. Thanks to this Benedictine theologian, we have gained an insight into the full richness of the Eucharistic Feast. Casel created the basis for a synthesis that has been missing since the time of Council of Trent, in which sacrifice, communion and real presence harmoniously connect with each other. Let us not fail to mention here that Casel's theory had unexpected ecumenical implications. Advocates of evangelism have made it clear that this turn in Catholic theology about the Eucharist can be the basis for agreement on one of the most controversial issues. In the long-term Catholic-evangelical disputes concerning the Sacrifice of the Cross and the sacrificial rituals of the Mass, it turns out that the statements about one and the other aspect of the sacrifice lie very close to each other, and so close that it is difficult to believe that fierce polemics is even possible after period of four hundred years⁸.

The First Half of the Twentieth Century. Today's Eucharistic Thought

Reflecting on the Eucharist, theologians did not limit themselves to referring to traditional thought. The last fifteen years have especially brought new solutions. It is characteristic that the attention of theologians was again focused on the subject of real presence. This presence, however, is not considered by theologians as an isolated event but as a peak of the presence of the entire salvific event of Jesus taking place in the assembly of the ecclesial community.

⁷ Cf. O. Casel, *Das christliche Kultusmysterium*, Regensburg 1960, 79.

⁸ “[...] das ist sicher, dass beide Aussagen sehr nahe beieinander liegen, so nahe, wie es nach vierhundert Jahren einer kampfdurchtobten Geschichte nicht für möglich gehalten werden sollte”. H. Asmussen, *Abendmahl und Messe*, Stuttgart 1949, 24.

Attempts at new reflections develop on the basis of the existential phenomenology mentioned above. The right and even the obligation to carry out new reflections deepening the study of the Eucharist is implied in the opinion of many modern theologians by certain statements of the Council of Trent considered by them as imperative.

Here are two Council statements: *Quae conversio convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia trans substantia te est appellata* (D877), and: ... *quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissim e transsubstantiationem appellat* (D 884). One can conclude that they do not exclude the possibility that someday theology will elaborate a concept more appealing to the mentality of believers.

With all the immutability of the content of Revelation, the very notions of this expressive content are associated with a specific epoch and intellectual culture of this epoch. If, then, we conclude further, the Fathers of Trent used, as children of their times, the Aristotelian scheme of concepts, we today – as children of the 20th century – have the right and duty to investigate this problem using contemporary conceptual apparatus. What is characteristic of people of the modern day is the fact that we all do not feel like Aristotelians anymore. We do not think and are even no longer able to think in terms of substance and accidents. We are more sensitive to the world of personal relationships today. The personalistic concept of man found itself at the center of the phenomenological way of thinking.

Modern man – we can regret it more or less – is less concerned about metaphysical issues. Yes, man wants to explore the ultimate meaning of things but he does not investigate mythological principles. He is guided by another question: what is the meaning of these things? Their purposefulness? Their meaning assigned to them by man? We are more interested in the meaning of things granted them by man than in what they are in themselves. In our philosophical investigations, we constantly make substitution processes, whether consciously or not: we consider things in their relation to a man or a person, and only in this respect they are interesting to us. Actual presence is not just something objective, a reality lying “outside of me,” independent of me, having no relation to me; real presence is a manifestation of the existence that concerns me personally. Here one should appreciate the prominent contribution of several contemporary theologians who were able to exploit the phenomenological way of perceiving things in this manner. Maintaining continuity with the doctrinal line of Council of Trent, these theologians have exposed the thesis of this council *Institutum ut sumatur* (D 878).

Developing of Contemporary Intuitions

In terms of thinking about existential phenomenology, the Eucharist is presented with a certain predilection as a feast of the Christian community. The *Coena Domini* of Saint Paul is interpreted as a community of the table with the Risen Christ, where the Risen Christ himself is the Host of the feast, while the commune is its guest. The presence of the Lord under the species of bread and wine is therefore seen in a personalistic manner; the species of bread and wine seen in this perspective are gifts of the Host of the Feast.

Just like in everyday life, bread and wine, as gifts of the Host of the feast, are more than mere biological food – they are an expression of the owner's love and friendship – so the species of bread and wine are essentially a means through which Christ manifests and realizes his grace and love for the commune. Bread and wine are identical with the Lord, as long as He alone is identifying himself with His gift. These gifts are his transparency, manifestation.

In the consciousness of today's man, the idea has become elaborated, that the body is the transparency and manifestation of the spirit. The material sign is the carrier of spiritual and internal content. In our opinion, our body is realization of our personality⁹. This category can be successfully applied to the act of understanding, in faith, to the Eucharist: the Person of Jesus Christ manifests Himself in the bread, that is, in the body that experiences a kind of extension to our times through the bread which Christ himself chose as a symbol of his Body.

Let us make a further step forward. In the Eucharist, it is about presence considered in the human manner, i.e. we do not refer to mere physical presence (some *praesentiam circumscriptivam*), the physical location of things. I can speak of human presence only when there is actually personal contact between myself and another person, when I can see the other person, shake his/her hand, exchange gifts under any form. It seems that this reflection can be applied to the Eucharist. Emphasizing the fact that Christ wants to be present among us, we overcome the too static and too-substantive notion of the Eucharist. Jesus wants to be present through His Body and through bread, which is an extension of this body. What we mean here is consistent with the doctrine of the Council of Trent, which develops a scholastic concept of concomitance. Namely, the reality that is present *vi verborum* is the Body first; but – along with the Body, the human

⁹ The German language knows several terms *Körper* and *Leib*. *Körper* is a body with a specific shape, weight, etc., while *Leib* is the subject of personal communication, an expression of love, hatred and friendship.

soul of Jesus – the Word of God is also made present. Therefore, not only the Body is present, but also the Word, which became a human being.

That is: It is even possible to go beyond and the supra-Council term *Institutum ut sumatur*, by more precisely defining the concept of *sumatur*. Christ does not so much want to gather us around his table to feed us with His food; through receiving the Eucharist the friendship between God and man is renewed, at the Eucharistic Table we are included into the whole of the saving event of Christ. This kind of communion is Sacrifice.

Critical Moment

Here we are touching the critical moment of our deliberations. A disturbing question irresistibly appears: does not this type of Eucharistic vision lead to dilution or even negation of the mystery in its ontological sense? Is reality regarded only as a feature which I personally attribute to a thing? Considering this problem more fundamentally, from the point of view of another field of theology one can ask: is God only the result of our interpretation of the world, a sign of our existence, or is it a superior being that existed prior to us, constituting *a priori* my existence? My *vis à vis*? To illuminate this problem, one must go beyond phenomenological data, beyond the signs of their meaning, beyond manifestation and transparency, to the very presence of Jesus Christ, to the presence of Christ in his humanity. Medieval ontology presented here the proposition of a substance, that is a concept which corresponds to the deepest essence of being. We can and we have the right to talk about trans-signification and trans-finalization, however, under the condition that we will be understood correctly: Christ gives bread a truly new meaning through His creative word; if so, there is no point in claiming that His presence is the result of my faith or the faith of the Church.

We are dealing here with God's creative and effective presence which is the creative power that detects and activates my faith. To avoid any misunderstandings, we must compare faith with reason because things are the same here. Human reason grants things their meaning and thus transforms them but reason also discovers the sense of immanent things at the same time. The world was rational before man even thought about it. Faith attributes a new meaning to gestures and things but at the same time it discovers the realities that God has renewed through the Logos, faith also deciphers the meaning of the thing that God reveals to us under the cover of signs. In this way, faith participates in the Holy Spirit who lives in us, in God's view of things. If we define the Eucharist

as *Mysterium fidei*, then faith must be regarded as a way of objectively seeing things, as an ability to detect the effective presence of the risen Lord hidden under the cover of the bread and chalice. The risk of distortion proves its deep connection with the structure of our perception of things.

We are willing to re-emphasize one of the elements to its extreme form. It seems that new tendencies in Eucharistic theology result in two achievements: they enrich the study of the Eucharist with a personalistic factor, a moment that belongs to the treasury of our faith as well as the truth about transubstantiation, and at the same time they give justification or at least they require, a new justification and reevaluation of the ontological foundation of the Eucharistic presence. However, new interpretations complement the traditional formula of faith, and they are not able to replace it. It is not enough to pay attention to the Eucharistic activity in which we are involved; attention should also be focused on the Person itself, who is acting and manifesting oneself. Indeed, Christ is present there to be consumed in the form of the Eucharist, but He is present there.

Towards an Appropriate Solution to the Problem

The assessment of contemporary attempts to interpret the phenomenon of real presence cannot be made today without taking into consideration the encyclical *Mysterium fidei* by Paul VII. It seems that the above way of presenting new trends in the doctrine of the Eucharist coincides with the content of teaching of the encyclical, which states as follows: "After the transubstantiation of bread and wine, they acquire a new meaning and a new function without any doubt because they are no longer common bread and common drink, but a symbol of a sacred reality and a sign of spiritual food; but they take on new meaning (*novam significationem*) and a new final (*novum finem*) because they contain a new reality which we rightly call an ontological. However, there is no longer hidden what was before, under the aforementioned species, but something completely different, and it is not only because of the particular conviction of the Church but in fact because after the transformation of the substance that is the essence of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, there is nothing left of bread and wine except the very figures under which Christ resides in His entirety and not diminished in his physical 'reality', present even in a bodily manner, although not in the same way in which bodies are located in space."¹⁰

¹⁰ *Mysterium fidei*, in: *Wiadomości Diecezjalne*, Katowice 35 (1967), 96.

These words of the encyclical, undoubtedly the most important in the entirety of its lecture, are nothing more than a description of the Trent Council's formula of transubstantiation. At the same time, however, and this is important to us, they contain certain indications encouraging to go beyond the formula of Trent Council:

- a. The sensualist-physical notion of presence, still widely popular among people is being rejected¹¹;
- b. The encyclical adopts an open attitude towards scholastic teaching, defining the concept of "substance" with the help of the term "reality," and thus the document of the Pope is no longer connected with the old philosophical-natural term of substance;
- c. When the encyclical in the words which follow immediately this statement defines transubstantiation by the term transelementation ("transelementation"), it distances itself cautiously again from the classical interpretation; the concept of transelementation is much wider and indefinite than transubstantiation.

The above considerations imply that the understanding of contemporary aspirations in the study of the Eucharist presupposes the knowledge of the thought of Trent and the encyclical *Mysterium fidei*. The new currents of Eucharistic theology are consistent with the teaching of the past.

E. Schillebeeckx holds the opinion that the concepts of trans-finalization and trans-signification are only terms that expand the mystery of change with new aspects but do not express it¹². Schillebeeckx is not content with a mere phenomenological interpretation deprived of the metaphysical condensation of presence; the mystery of transformation is achieved through the power of the creative action of the Holy Spirit, the transformation is, according to the theologian of Nijmegen, "an act of new creation."

¹¹ Cf. Roman synod of 1059 against Berengarius, who had to sign the following *Confession of faith*: "...panem et vinum... post consecrationem non solum sacramentum, sed etiam verum corpus et sanguinem Domini nostri Iesu Christi esse, et sensualiter non solum S acramento, sed in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari et frangi et fidelium dentibus atteri." D 690. In the teaching of the Catechism, it was commonly taught that the Host accepted was not allowed to be bitten which caused insurmountable scruples on the part of the faithful.

¹² E. Schillebeeckx, *In der Eucharistie hängen Transsubstantiation ('conversio entis'; was ist die vorhandene Wirklichkeit? Christi Leib) und Transsignifikation (neue Sinn-Stiftung oder Zeichen-Wert) unlöslich zusammen, aber man kann sie nicht schlechthin identifizieren. Die eucharistische Gegenwart*, Düsseldorf 1967, ch. 101.

Practical and Pastoral Remarks

In conclusion, we present a few practical remarks about the possibility of exploiting theological professional terms in preaching¹³.

a. Because professional theological language is not the language of the kerygma, it should not normally be used during sermons. However, it can be successfully used for meetings in smaller groups (e.g. adult catechesis, student seminars, etc.), and it is all the more advantageous that the concepts of trans-finalization and trans-signification provide a fertile ground for carrying out explanatory explanations.

b. Close attention should be paid to the fact that these concepts do not express anything completely new but attempt to express various aspects of New Testament data in a different conceptual framework. They are not really anything but an exemplification of the words: "This is my Body." Listeners will surely become enriched by the experience that the same New Testament doctrine can be expressed in different ways.

c. It is also necessary to show the difference between the revealed truth and its wording. It is also necessary to emphasize the difficulties that the concept of substance implies with regard to contemporary mentality whose difficulties only concern the theological interpretation in no way affecting the truth of faith itself. One should not deny that theology has its limits; it sometimes takes centuries of intellectual effort to get an approximate insight into some truth of faith, which is evidenced by the history of dogmas. Indicating the limits of theology will certainly not be harmful with regard to the preaching itself. Finally, the fact that we do not even know and we will not know how is the transubstantiation process actually carried out, should not bother us, provided that we would be capable of saving our eucharistic – fully rational – piety.

¹³ Further remarks follow the thoughts included in the study: H. Volk, Fr. Wetter, *Geheimnis des Glaubens*, Mainz 1968, 27ff.

The Need and Ways of Integration in Christology*

Introduction

The last Council calls for a renewal of seminary studies to be aimed at opening up the minds of the Alumni increasingly more “to the mystery of Christ, which permeates the entire history of the human race, has a constant influence on the Church and acts mainly through the priestly ministry.”¹ It encourages that in addition to dogmatics other theological teachings should strive for renewal through a more lively connection with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. He demands that the lectures of dogmatics be coordinated with other theological sciences taking into account the biblical themes, the teachings of the Eastern and Western Fathers, the history of dogmas, as well as exploring the mysteries of ‘begetting and discovering the connection between them. Alumni are to learn to perceive the presence of these mysteries in the liturgy and in the whole life of the Church, to solve human problems in the light of revelation, to apply God’s eternal truths to the changing conditions of human life and to proclaim these truths in a way that is accessible to all people².

The Council itself did not draw up any special constitution on Christ but in many of its documents it put Christ at the centre of the whole history of salvation and stressed the connection of Christology to other branches of theology: the science of the Trinity, ecclesiology, the sacrament of anthropology, anthropology, protology of eschatology.

* STV 15(1977)1.

¹ OT 14. Cf. LG 7.28.

² Cf. OT 16.

The necessity of Christological Correlation in Theology

From the postulates of the Council there is an unambiguous need for inter-departmental cooperation in the field of Christology, the need for dogmatics to take into account the achievements and demands of other theological disciplines and some Christocentric orientation of these disciplines, and thus to constantly refer to the Christological synthesis to be created by renewed dogmatics³. The need for a Christological correlation of theology stems from the essential unity of its subject, origin and purpose. Despite its fragmentation into many disciplines and treaties, theology is in its essence a scientific, methodical reflection on different aspects of one and the same mystery of salvation, fully revealed and realised in Christ, and recognized today and passed on to future generations in the faith of the Church. Theology is to be the proclamation and interpretation of this mystery because it all originates from the original kerygma of the apostles who proclaimed and interpreted the saving events of Christ that they witnessed.

Throughout the first centuries, the theological reflection on faith developed as essentially one "holy knowledge," based on the inspired texts of Scripture and serving the liturgy, proclamation and spirituality. This deep unity can still be seen in the Middle Ages, although the Scholastics have already practiced a parallel commentary on Scripture and theology which we can call systematic. Gradually, however, a separation of strict theology from the liturgy, preaching, ethics and Christian spirituality took place. The division of theology into isolated disciplines finally took place in modern times⁴. Purely speculative theology later attempted an emergence from its isolation by half-hearted means: on the one hand through the so-called *dicta probantia* (collecting biblical and patristic quotations, often taken out of context, which were often only an illustration and not the basis for dogmatic theses), and on the other hand through the so-called *corollaria pietatis* (certain remarks of a devotional character on the margins of lectures, e.g. about loving and following Christ). For the purpose of preaching and catechesis, attempts were made to create a separate kerygmatic

³ The problem of Christological concentration in all contemporary theology was the subject of a Christological symposium at the Catholic University of Lublin on 18-19 April 1974. Cf. also A. Nossol, *Chrystocentryczny charakter współczesnej teologii katolickiej*, RTSO 2 (1970), 33-50.

⁴ Cf. e.g. Y. Congar, *Wiara i teologia*, in: *Tajemnica Boga*, Poznań 1961, 142f; M. Herearing, *Jedność teologii i jej podział w epoce renesansu i baroku Zarys problemu*, in: W. Granat, *Dogmatyka katolicka. Tom wstępny*, Lublin 1965, 51-65; A. Zuberbier, *Materiały do teorii teologii praktycznej*, Warsaw 1970, 31.

theology⁵ instead of strict theology; especially Christology, attempts were made to restore its kerygmatic character. At the same time, other¹ fields of knowledge and ecclesiastical life were isolated from Christology and the whole doctrine of faith, making it all the easier for them to deviate: ethics became purely legal or philosophical, spirituality – purely moralistic or devotional, biblical, in the field of rationalism and liberal Protestantism – apologetic and historians – contact.

In the last few decades, the need for close communication between all the disciplines of the Church has been rediscovered. The development of biblical studies has allowed apologetic and dogmatic Christology not only to properly justify the foundations of Christianity (to solve the problem of the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history, to reach the pre-paschal Christology and so-called Jesuology, to learn the various stages of shaping the oldest Christian tradition), but also to deepen the interpretation of the main truths of faith, highlight the secrets of revelation often overlooked (such as paschal mystery) and more appropriately show the hierarchy of these secrets in light of Christ's work of salvation. In turn, in close collaboration with dogmatics, biblicalism has become more of a theology than an introduction. It has begun to highlight the main themes of revelation and their mutual relationship; in particular, it seeks to show the very figure of Christ who is the fullness of revelation and the centre of the whole history of salvation.

It was also understood that the life of the Church in its various manifestations was also a criterion of Christian dignity, an expression of tradition, *locus theologicus*, and at the same time a goal of theological research. Theology as an ecclesiastical science must grow out of today's living faith of the Church and serve it, i.e. it must have by its very nature the character of a kerygma. Moralists, for example, demand that dogmatic ontological Christology is the basis for anthropology and ethics, believing that an end to biblicism alone could threaten some moralizing or philosophical tendencies. They also rightly emphasize that moral theology's analysis of sin, conscience, and freedom of will can be used by dogmatics to deepen the problems of Redemption, the life of grace, and perhaps even to better understand the mystery of Christ's self-awareness. The theology of liturgy in turn draws attention to the paschal mystery of Christ as the centre of the history of salvation, reminds us of the salvific function of the humanity of Christ and the profound sense of the mysteries of the earthly life of Jesus, and finally shows the salvific activity of Christ glorified in heaven and the close

⁵ Its problems are presented, among others, in: B. Pylak, *Teologia kerygmaticzna*, in: W. Granat, op. cit., 179-195.

connection of this activity with the sacramental liturgy and the mission of the Church. Similarly, catechism tries not only to show Christ as an ideal for young people, but also to bring about an encounter with him, the experience of his presence and action in the Church.

On the other hand, the practical disciplines of the Church, through their connection with dogmatics, especially with Christology, can no longer be reduced to moralizing, devotion, rubricism or pastoral techniques, but becomes theology – science with the ability to carry out Christ’s plan of salvation. Moral theology, for example, in showing the ideal of the new man, refers to Christology in a reduced way. Liturgy and catechism prepare for a fruitful encounter with Christ in the Word and sacraments. In this way, interdisciplinary cooperation and the Christological correlation of the whole theology are already bearing much fruit, although they are still underdeveloped and many problems still need to be solved⁶.

Council Postulates Integration in Christology

As far as dogmatic Christology is concerned, the Council’s postulates demand that integration be as far-reaching as possible, both historically and systematically.

Integration in the Historical Direction

Integration in the historical direction must consist in showing the multitude of different varieties of Christology that have evolved over the centuries and, at the same time, the identity of the mystery of Christ that they explain. It is necessary to find a point of view that would make it possible to see the fundamental unity of the content presented by the various Christologies, and at the same time their own specificity, avoiding both the acceptance of one Christology only as a synthesis of all others, and reducing all Christologies to a common denominator, with the blurring of all distinctions.

We also encounter in the Scriptures different approaches to one and the same mystery of Christ, especially the so-called Christology of exaltation – bottom-up,

⁶ The problem of specific interdisciplinary cooperation between dogmatic Christology and biblical science, liturgy, moral theology and catechism was presented on the basis of statements in a panel devoted to interdisciplinary cooperation in the field of Christology which took place during the meeting of the dogmatic section of Polish theologians in ATK on 27 September 1974.

visible in the original apostolic kerygma and in individual synoptics, and the so-called Christology of pre-existence – top-down, in the versions of John's and Peacock⁷. In the patristic period two types of Christology are created in the East (Alexandrian and Antiochian) and one type in Western Christology (African-Roman). Different types of Christology coexisted also in the Middle Ages and modern times, e.g. Thomistic and Scottish, continued today by the so-called unified and divisive Christology (*Einigung- und Trennungchristologie*). Respecting the multitude of types of Christology, in the Christian tradition we tried to find a common point of view, connecting all these Christologies. This was done, for example, in the formula of reconciliation, just after the Council of Ephesus, and especially according to the Chalcedonian formula. In Scholastica, a common point of view was established based on the ahistorically understood resolutions of the first councils. Nowadays, it is a matter of showing fully the specificity and value of different Christologies, and at the same time their harmonious contribution to the comprehensive illumination of the mystery of Christ, following the example of the richness of colours in the rainbow⁸.

Integration in a Systematic Direction

Integration in a systematic direction must first consist in integrating traditional Christology: speculative, static, essential, penetrating into the mystery of the Incarnation (and separately into the mystery of Redemption), with biblical Christology: concrete, dynamic, existential, analysing the concrete events known from the Bible, the main mysteries of Christ's life through which the mystery of salvation has been revealed to us and realized.

In the early Church, the teaching of faith was reflected in the second article of *the Apostles' Creed*, which recalled the main salvific events of Christ's life. Similarly, the entire liturgy and liturgical homilies were focused around these particular events. Later, the Christological article was included in the Trinitarian scheme of the *Apostles' Creed* and the Church began to develop a speculative "theological" Christology, associated with trinitology. *Theologia* in patristics had essentially a historical-saving approach, it was closely connected with a specific *oikonomy*. This happened gradually, especially in the concrete mysteries of Christ's life, no longer as mere events enabling us to know

⁷ R. Schnackenburg, *Christologie des Neuen Testaments*, in: MySal vol. 3, part 1 (1970), 227-388; *Jesus Christus*, in: SM vol. 2 (1968) col. 911-917.927-954.

⁸ Cf. P. Smulders, *Dogmengeschichtliche und lehramtliche Entjaltung der Christologie*, in: MySal, op. cit., 389-475; D. Wiederkehr, *Entwurfeiner systematischer Christologie*, *ibid.*, 477-483.

the concrete figure of Christ or having a profound sense of salvation, but only from the point of view of their value resulting from the union of persons (that is, from the top-down, deductive path). Only in the liturgy of the ecclesiastical year and the Eucharist the very events of Christ's life through which our salvation was achieved were still remembered and celebrated in an Alexandrian environment (already in Origen's *De principiis*), the theological Christology as immanent, discussed within the framework of trinitology, was separated from the specific Christology of the Incarnation, the so-called *oikonomy*. After the Councils in the 5th century defined the essence of personal union, the following topics were also discussed.

In the Middle Ages concrete Christology is basically connected with speculative Christology. In the *Elucidarium* of Honorius of Autun, in the *Sic et non* of Abelard, in the Third Book of Lombard's *Sentence*, the mysteries of Christ's life chronologically were entwined in a lecture on systematic Christology. St. Thomas separated speculative Christology (about the very mystery of the Incarnation) from concrete Christology (about the mysteries of Christ's life and their causal and exemplary influence). At the end of the Middle Ages this division became established and gradually, undoubtedly under the influence of the Aristotelian concept of science as a knowledge of something common and necessary, there was an elimination of concrete Christology from the theological treatises. The lecture of the mysteries of Christ's life is still apparent in the theological treatises of Suarez, but in principle, in common practice, it has moved to devotional-ascetic literature⁹.

It was only under the influence of various trends in modern philosophy, emphasising the importance of history and the meaning of concrete human existence, as well as the development of biblical teachings that show God's revelation in the history of salvation, that the need to deal with the concrete events of Christ's life in Christology was understood anew. Following the example of the first Fathers of the Church, a thorough biblical analysis of concrete events in the life of Jesus began, treating it as a starting point for new interpretations of the very dogma of the Incarnation¹⁰.

Integration in Christology must then consist in integrating Christology in the narrowest sense of the science of uniting two natures in one person with soteriology (the science of Redemption), or ontological Christology (the science of Christ

⁹ Cf. A. Grillmeier, *Christologie*, in: *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. 2 (1958) col. 1157ff; in: SM vol. 1 (1967) col. 871-785; *Geschichtliche Überblick über die Mysterium Jesu im allgemeinen*, in: MySal vol. 3, part 2 (1969), 3-22.

¹⁰ An example of such a concrete Christology is e.g. the work of C. Duquoc, *Christologies*, 2 vol., Paris 1968-1972.

in itself) with functional Christology (the science of the meaning of Christ for us). So it is about combining the Christology of the Incarnation with the Christology of the Cross and the Passover, and referring to the patristic tradition – the theological Christology (*theology*) with economic Christology (*oikonomy*).

Although the division of Christology into *theology* and *oikonomy* took place already in the patristic period, the Fathers strongly emphasized the relationship between the Person of the Son of God and the economy of salvation. They even argued that if Christ had not been God, He would not have completed our Redemption. By closely associating the Incarnation with Redemption, they demonstrated that the very Incarnation of the Word was a renewal of mankind. Latin Christology in particular had a soteriological character. Soteriology did not separate from Christology until the 12th century, largely under the influence of the Anselmian theory of alternative redress. The first case of the separation of soteriology from Christology is encountered in the *Sentences* of Arras (Atrèbathenian). Reformists in the 16th century against Scholastica and referring to St. Paul and St. Augustine emphasize the soteriological character of Christology. They oppose the theology of the Incarnation, which explores the ontological structure of the God-Man, the theology of the cross which penetrates into the meaning of God's salvific action in Christ's life, especially in his death and resurrection¹¹.

Under the influence of Evangelical Christology, as well as developing biblical theology and an anthropocentrically oriented contemporary philosophy (existential phenomenology), in recent years attention was paid to the soteriological character of the whole Christology and the development of so-called functional Christology. The object of research is not so much Christ in Himself as Christ for us: in His function of our mediator, in relation to our salvation. By emphasizing Christ's mission and the salvific meaning of all his life, Christ's central place in the whole history of salvation and even, under the influence of Teilhard, in the whole process of evolution of the cosmos is also revealed. In principle, it is understood that there is a need not to limit oneself to functional Christology itself, but to combine it with ontological Christology. However, such a holistic Christology is only *in statu fieri*. At the same time, the harmony between biblical and systematic Christology looks different. Sometimes they are presented in parallel, sometimes one of them becomes the main basis or starting point of the other¹².

¹¹ Cf. A. Grillmeier, *Christologie*, art. cit.; J. Ratzinger, *Wprowadzenie w chrześcijaństwo*, Kraków 1970, 180-193.

¹² Cf. R. Lachenschmid, *Christologie und Soteriologie*, in: *Bilanz der Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 3, Freiburg 1970, 82-120.

Finally, integration must consist in a Christocentric orientation of all dogmatics, i.e. the so-called Christological concentration, i.e. the presentation of the mystery of Christ as the centre of the whole history of salvation. It is a matter of showing the deep and manifold connections between Christology: on the one hand, Trinitology, the science of the inner life of the Father giving Himself to us through his Son in the Holy Spirit, and on the other hand, anthropology, ecclesiology, theology of history, eschatology, theology of the whole history of the salvation of mankind, the gradual manifestation and realization of the biosphere of salvific plans for the whole world, not only in human, but also in cosmic dimensions¹³.

It is worth mentioning that in the history of theology we encounter a double view of the subject of this discipline. According to St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent and Johannes Duns Scotus, this object (understood as a *subiectum* and not *obiectum*) is God as God (*sub ratione Deitatis*). According to St. Augustine, Kasjodor, Robert of Melun, Roland of Cremona, R. Kilwardby, R. Grosseteste, G. Biel and P. d'Ailly, it is *Christus totus aut integer*; so we have a certain concept of Christocentrism here. Nowadays, Christological concentration in theology is trying to be undertaken in a double way. Traditionally, the mystery of Christ is placed in the middle of a dogmatic lecture, treating the mysteries of faith – discussed earlier and later – as preparation for it and as its consequence. Sometimes it is placed at the beginning of dogmatics, as a starting point for the whole history of salvation. Each of these views has its advantages and disadvantages and some excellent solution has not been found yet.

Contemporary Attempts at Integration in Christology

Rahnerian Attempt of Integration in Christology

K. Rahner gives outlines of integration in his articles, propagating the concept of so-called transcendental Christology, closely connected with anthropology,

¹³ The problem of such integration was presented more extensively by A. Nossol in a paper entitled *A new attempt to formally grasp the mystery of Christ in dogmatics*, delivered at a Christological symposium at the Catholic University of Lublin on 18 April 1974. The very need for such integration was justified by the same author in several of his articles. Cf. *Teocentryzm czy chrystocentryzm w wykładach teologii dogmatycznej*, *CoTh* 41(1971)2, 15-28; *Prymat christologii w dogmatyce*, *AK* 79 (1972), 90-400; *Potrzeba chrystologicznej interpretacji w teologii dogmatycznej dzisiaj*, *RTSO* 4 (1974). Cf. also K. Reinhardt, *Neue Wege in der Christologie der Gegenwart*, "Communio" 6 (1977), 5-20.

or even identified with it¹⁴. It shows Christ as the mediator and peak of transcendence of all creation towards God and at the same time the self-giving of God to all creation. He interprets the Incarnation of Christ itself as the absolute highest – though unnecessary and undue – and the only fulfilment of the human transcendence open to the Absolute Being, and at the same time as the most radical personal self-responsiveness of the God of Humanity.

Rahner and W. Thusing published a comprehensive, almost textbook study of Christology in the *Quaestiones disputatae* series¹⁵. This study is divided into two parts. The first, the work of Rahner himself, gives an outline of a dogmatic lecture on the doctrine of Christ, contained in 35 theses and extensive theorems. These theses are grouped in the following 5 chapters: I. To the phenomenology of our attitude towards Jesus Christ; II. Transcendental Christianity; III. To the theologically understood history of the life and death of Jesus; IV. Theology of Jesus' death and resurrection; V. Contents, durability, boundaries of classical Christology and soteriology and new orthodox possibilities of soteriological Christology. The second part of the work, elaborated by W. Thusing, is a biblical development and deepening of the dogmatic lecture and a critical examination of Rahner's theses in light of the latest exegesis results. Thusing also discussed the very problem of cooperation between exegetes and dogmatics in theological research, the critical function of the New Testament in relation to classical Christology, and the importance of Christology for all theology, and ecclesiology in particular¹⁶.

Depending on Rahner's concept of Christology, there remains an extensive textbook entitled *Das Christusereignis*, taking into account almost all the achievements of modern Christology, but not forming a compact whole¹⁷. It sees the mystery of Christ as the greatest work of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, known increasingly more precisely in the history of revelation and in the first centuries of Christianity. This work is the point of God's greatest closeness to the world and, thanks to the saving mission of Christ, carried out mainly in the paschal mystery, it is at the centre of the whole history of salvation. The authors present in the following chapter: introductory remarks on the topic; Christology, the saving action of the Father in Christ; the foundations of Christology

¹⁴ Cf. Schriften vol. 1, 160-222; vol. 4, 137-155; vol. 5, 183-221, vol. 8, 213-235; vol. 9, 194-388; *Jesus Christus. III. Dogmatische Vermittlung*, in: SM vol. 2 (1968) col. 927-957.

¹⁵ K. Rahner, W. Tüsing, *Christologie-systematisch und exegetisch. Arbeitsgrundlagen für eine interdisziplinäre Vorlesung* (Quaestiones Disputatae 55), Freiburg 1972.

¹⁶ Cf. review by E. Ozorowski, STV 12(1974)2, 262ff.

¹⁷ ¹⁷ MySal vol. 3, part 1 (1970) and part 2 (1969).

in the Old Testament; the Christology of the New Testament; the development of Christology in antiquity; the outline of systematic Christology (its general principles and the understanding of the whole reality of Christ within the framework of God's relationship to the world and the world to God); the saving functions of Christ as Revelator, Lord and Priest; the mysteries of Jesus' life; the paschal mystery; the effectiveness of God's saving action in Christ; the place and participation of Mary in Christ's mystery; the mystery of Christ as the work of the Holy Spirit; and finally Christ in the reach of the experience of the world.

Integral Christology by W. Pannenberg, Ch. Duquoc, W. Kasper
and E. Schillebeeckx

Many theologians have recently made radical attempts to rework integral Christology, based primarily on biblical theology.

W. Pannenberg, an Evangelical theologian, emphasizes the unity of soteriology with Christology and the connection between functional and biblical Christology, and ontological and traditional Christology. He divided his work into three parts: I. Awareness of the divinity of Jesus; II. Jesus the Man before Jesus the God; III. The divinity of Christ and Jesus the Man¹⁸. In the beginning, he discusses the tasks and methods of Christology and its strict unity with soteriology. In the first part, he speaks of Jesus' resurrection as 'the basis of his unity with God, and analyses comprehensively the relationship between "the deity of Jesus and the deity of the Father. In the second part he examines successively the meaning of Christ's true humanity, the meaning of his messianic function and the salvific meaning of Christ's substitute death on the cross. In the third part, it is first characterised by the impasse of traditional doctrines of the two natures in Christ. He then tries to outline his own approach to the mystery of Jesus' personal unity with God, combining the dialectical patristic theory of enhypostasis with modern theories of the peak of fulfilment in the Jesus' sonship of the human personality. Finally, he mentions Christ's royal power, pointing out that the recapitulation of mankind took place through Christ.

Ch. Duquoc makes an attempt in these two volumes to rework Christology based on a thorough analysis of biblical statements about the specific events and functions of Jesus¹⁹. In the first volume, the author first examines the mysteries of the earthly life of Jesus and the messianic titles and divine-human *status*

¹⁸ W. Pannenberg, *Grundzüge der Christologie*, Gütersloh 1964.

¹⁹ Ch. Duquoc, *Christologie. Essais dogmatique*, vol. 1, *L'homme Jésus*, Paris 1968; vol. 2, *Le Messie*, Paris 1972.

shown by the Bible and then presents an interpretation of the mystery of Christ in different periods and in different currents of the Church's traditions. In the second volume, he discusses in detail "Christ's messianic mission: the events of Christ's Passion and worship, the various interpretations of Redemption, the importance of messianism in history, the problem of paralysis, and the meaning or value of Christ's revelation.

W. Kasper tries to summarise the synthesis of Christology as the doctrine of the person and work of Christ in the claim that Jesus is Christ²⁰. At the beginning of his work, he reflects on the general issues of contemporary Christology and the figure of Jesus Himself, his historicism and religious value for today's man. He emphasises that the first criterion of Christology is the earthly Jesus and the resurrected Christ. The starting point must also be the faith of the ecclesial community in the fact that Jesus is Christ. The main content of Christology is the cross and the resurrection of Jesus, and its main problem is to explain the relationship between the Christology of "ascending" (worshipping Jesus) to the Christology of "descending" (Incarnation of the Word). Next, the author presents in two parts of the work the history and destiny of Jesus and the mystery of his figure, revealed in the titles awarded to Him. In the first part, he shows the way from the earthly Jesus (thoroughly analysing his appearance on earth, proclaiming the kingdom of God, doing miracles, claims expressed in the messianic titles, and finally death) to the risen Christ (explaining both the foundations and the content of faith in the resurrection of Jesus). In the second part, he tries to delve into the mystery of Jesus Christ by interpreting His biblical titles: the Son of God, the Son of Man, Mediator between God and man. In both parts he tries to discover the close relationship between the figure of Jesus and His life and the work of salvation of mankind. This relationship is particularly evident in Jesus' death and resurrection, and in the Messianic titles awarded to him.

E. Schillebeeckx calls his work about Jesus a reflection on someone who lives²¹. At the outset, he suggests the problems of criteria, methods and hermeneutics of Christology. He first states that the norm and the criterion for any interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth must be Himself. He then presents the criteria for knowing Jesus as a historical figure. Finally, he explains the division of his further Christological analyses into three parts: I. Gospel of Jesus Christ; II. Christian interpretation of the Crucified Risen One; III. For whom do you

²⁰ W. Kasper, *Jesus der Christus*, Mainz 1975.

²¹ E. Schillebeeckx, *Jesus-het verhaal van een levende*, Rrugge-Bloemendaal 1974.

have me? In the first part, he speaks first of the gospel of the kingdom of God proclaimed by Jesus both in oral teaching (beginning of prophetic activity – baptism in the Jordan, proclamation of the kingdom of God, parables, blessings) and in the whole practice of life (miracles, community of table and life with disciples, attitude towards the Father in heaven). He then mentions the kingdom of God fulfilled in the rejection of Jesus by the Jews and His death (the meaning of Jesus' death shown by Himself). Finally, he deals with the testimony of the first Christians on the death of Jesus, the empty tomb, Christophany and the paschal experience (the conviction of Christians that the Crucified is alive and that God's kingdom is present in him).

In the second part, devoted to the Christian interpretation of the Crucified Risen One, the author analyses the evangelical, general interpretation of the Risen Jesus (various pre-Canonical models of the faith in Christ), the New Testament interpretation of the resurrection event itself (biblical expressions of faith in the resurrection), the passage from theology of Jesus to Christology, and finally the post-New Testament Christological reflection in the ancient Church (Christological dogma). In the last part he tries to answer, in the name of contemporary man the question once posed to the disciples by Jesus: For whom do you have me? He presents the contemporary crisis of Christology as a legacy of the Enlightenment, the non-theoretical “universal horizon of understanding” (man crushed by suffering constantly asks what their meaning is and how to be liberated from it) and the figure of Jesus as the “parabola” of God and the “paradigm” of humanity (the image showing God and His salvific activity in history and the model or prototype of humanity living in the kingdom of God).

Integral Christology in the View of L. Bouyera, B. de Margerie and C. Chopin

Less radical attempts at integration in Christology can be found in works referring to traditional Christology.

L. Bouyer develops Christology as one of the departments of great theological synthesis. He divides his reflections into two parts: I. Creation and salvation (the following volumes of this part are devoted to the economy of salvation: the Mother of God, as a prototype of the supernatural state of humanity, to the Church and – the volume being prepared – to the glory of God revealed by the universe); II. Learning about God (here he intends to include theology as a teaching about God in the Trinity in the following volumes: the Eternal Son, the Spirit of Consolation and the Invisible Father). The volume on the Eternal

Son is dedicated to the theology of God's Word and Christology, treating it as a transition from the economy of salvation to theology²². The whole lecture about Christ is presented in three parts. In the first one, he speaks of "preparation" or gradual manifestation of the Word of God in the Old Testament (Word of God, Wisdom, Kingdom of God, Messiah, Servant of the Lord, Son of Man, waiting for the consolation of Israel). In the second, called the "Resurrection," he presents the Christology of the New Testament (the gospel of Christ – the gospel preached by Christ, the course of the gospel from the teaching of the kingdom of God to the Passion, the resurrection and kerygma, the Christology of the early Church, St. Paul, the individual evangelists and the letter to the Hebrews). The third outlines the history of efforts to understand faith in Christ (the problem the faith of the Apostles to the *Creed* of Nice and Constantinople, between Nestorianism and monophysitism, scholastic Christology, modern Christology – between metaphysics and psychology). At the end of this part, the author expresses his own concept of Christology as a transition from the Word of God revealed to men to the Eternal Son residing with the Father, that is, from the economy of salvation to theology.

B. de Margerie's lecture on Christ and His mission in the world revolves around the following three problems: why to discuss Jesus, how to talk about Him today and what is His mission in the world²³. In the first part of his work, the author emphasises the absolute and universal primacy of Christ the Redeemer in the world and shows the relationship of non-baptised people and non-Christian religions with Christ's work of Redemption, stating that the *raison d'être* of Christ in the Church and in the world is God's salvific dialogue with people, realized throughout history. In the second part he analyses various contemporary approaches to Christology (Teilhard, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer – from an earlier and later period, creators of the theology of secularisation and sanctification of the world), trying at the end to show the synthesis of *profanum* and *sacrum* in the consecrated Heart of Jesus. In the last part, he first considers the contribution of the former councils, Luther and the Council of Trent to the teaching of Christ's mission in the world (especially the emphasis on the teaching of the new Adam). He then presents the doctrine of *Vaticanum II* about Christ as a prophet, priest and king. Finally, by analysing individual aspects of the mystery of Redemption, he presents the Eucharist and the Heart of Jesus as a synthesis and the final accomplishment of the universe, history and revelation.

²² L. Bouyer, *Le Fils éternel. Théologie de la parole de Dieu e christologie*, Paris 1974.

²³ B. de Margerie, *Le Christ pour le monde. Le Coeur de l'Agneau*, Paris 1971.

A slightly older attempt at the partial integration of Christology is the textbook developed by C. Chopin. He presents Christology and soteriology – first in a biblical then a systematic way – as two parallel parts of one whole, i.e. the mystery of the Incarnate Word and His salvific mission. He first discusses Christology and biblical soteriology, then the theology of the Incarnation and the theology of the mediation of the Incarnate Word presenting the mystery of Redemption as part of a lecture on the priestly function of Christ.

Attempts at Christological Concentration in all Theology

Attempts at a more compact integration in Christology, and even the Christological concentration of all theology, are given in the latest²⁴ textbooks of dogmatics, developed by A. Zuberbier, M. Schmaus and W. Granat. They present the mysteries of Christ as the centre of all dogmatics and incorporate into a unified lecture on Christology not only the doctrine of Redemption as Christ's saving action, but also the doctrine of the Trinity as the main content of Christ's teaching.

A. Zuberbier's textbook is very concise and intended for a wide range of readers²⁵. The author introduces us to the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth, and then presents what Jesus teaches us about Himself, our Father in heaven, about the world as a work of God, about God giving Himself to people despite their infidelity, about the coming of the kingdom of God in His person and activity. He discusses the central event of Jesus' salvific activity – the paschal mystery and the fruits of this mystery: the mission of the Holy Spirit, the Church of Christ (its nature, sacramental life, the mission to preach the gospel, testimony of Christ and attitude to the world) and the final conclusion of the work of Redemption on the day of the Second Coming.

A new textbook by M. Schmaus first presents the teachings of the Old Testament about God, creation, sin and angels²⁶. He then discusses in turn the deeds of Jesus Christ (especially the salvific death and resurrection), His words (revelation of the Trinity) and the very essence of Christ in biblical and systematic terms²⁷.

²⁴ C. Chopin, *Le Verbe Incarné et Rédempteur*, Toornai 1963; Polish translation: *Tajemnica Chrystusa*, Poznań 1969, 167-310.

²⁵ A. Zuberbier, *Wierzę. Dogmatyka w zarysie*, Katowice 1969.

²⁶ M. Schmaus, *Der Glaube der Kirche. Handbuch katholischer Dogmatik*, vol. 1, München 1969, 251-430.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 431-689.

The recently published handbook by W. Granat speaks about the way of man to God and God towards man before Christ, and then about the meeting of people with God through Christ and in Christ. This lecture on this meeting includes topics such as: Christ's historicity, his humanity and divinity, saving mysteries, teaching about God, the nature of man and his friendship with God, man's response through faith, hope and love, and the role of Mary and others in Christ's salvific missions²⁸.

H. Kung does not write a textbook of dogmatics but in his controversial work *Christ sein* tries to present a vision of Christianity that is most appropriate in his opinion to the contemporary seeker²⁹. All his arguments are focused mainly on the Jesus Christ Himself. It first shows the spiritual horizon of our time as a liberation of Christianity from the influence of modern religious humanism and non-Christian religions. He then explains what the specific character of Christianity is. He confesses that Christianity is not limited to ideology, but to the person of Jesus Christ, and that Jesus, in the light of history and faith, is a real person. In the main part of his work he analyses thoroughly the entire program of Christianity shown by Jesus Himself. He first illuminates the social context of Jesus' activity and states that it directly provocatively destroys all social life patterns. It expresses the view that Jesus in all his activities is concerned both with God's cause (the centre of his existence and the proclamation confirmed by miracles in the coming kingdom of God and the highest norm is the fulfilment of God's will) and with man's cause (Jesus' theocentrism includes anthropocentrism, concern for the humanisation of man; the norm of his actions towards people is love, expressed in forgiveness, service and self-denial). It then signals Jesus' conflict with the Jewish hierarchy, which ended with his death and the new life of the Risen One. He explains that the resurrection was a transhistorical event, not subject to human control and not requiring evidence, that it was only the post-paschal community and the evangelists themselves who began to multiply various kinds of evidence (in the form of a relationship about an empty tomb and Christophany) and that in the resurrection it is ultimately about our conformity to Christ through the practice of faith in life. He goes on to analyse the problem of interpreting the gospel, stating that it contains many myths that require reinterpretation, as well as a number of different interpretations, and show Jesus exclusively in His functions toward us. Hence calling the Christ God according to him would mean that Jesus of Nazareth is the revelation

²⁸ W. Granat, *Ku człowiekowi i Bogu w Chrystusie*, vol. 1, Lublin 1972, 259-533.

²⁹ H. Kung, *Christ sein*, München-Zürich 1975.

of the true God for faith. Finally, he writes about the emergence of the Church as a community of faith in Christ, outlining here his ecclesiology as depicted in *Die Kirche*. After a detailed outline of the program of Christianity, the author in the last part speaks about the very practice of being a Christian. He considers whether the decision for believing in Christ is at the same time a decision for the Church and what are the criteria for being human and being a Christian. In the end, he concludes that being a Christian means being radically human because following Christ comes down to loving one's neighbour.

Conclusion

1. The need for multiple integration in Christology as well as the Christological correlation of all theology must not raise any doubts nowadays. As we have seen, this is supported by the clear indications of the last Council as well as by the multiple tendencies that can be seen in the post-conciliar renewal of theology. The Christological correlation of theology profoundly corresponds not only to its unity, but also to its return to biblical sources, to apostolic tradition and its kerygmatic character, the proclamation of the mystery of salvation and the call to faith. Similarly, the systematic integration of Christology itself, the greater link between biblical and speculative Christology and the mystery of the Incarnation and the mystery of Redemption allow it be possible to make from the mystery of Christ the central theme of the entire lecture on dogmatic theology and, more importantly, to show Christ and his salvific works as eternally living and highest value in which we are involved and to which we are to make a full consecration. The integration of the different directions of Christology better reflects the unfathomable richness of the revealed truth about Christ and the history of constant efforts of Christian thought to penetrate this truth most deeply. It also takes into account the specific circumstances that have led to the gradual clarification of the various aspects of the mystery of Christ in dogmatic definitions. Finally, it emphasises the fact that one and the same Christian faith has been expressed over the centuries in different traditions in the East and West, and that there has almost always been a variety of theological approaches to one and the same Christological dogma. Therefore, such an integration of Christology is of great importance for the preparation of ecumenical dialogue and the proper exposition of the problems of theological pluralism and reinterpretation of dogmas.

2. However, it is difficult to find any ideal way to achieve this correlation and integration. Attempts made so far show many different possibilities, each of which

has its advantages and disadvantages. As for the Christological correlation of the whole theology, especially the dogmatic, one can take Christology – the science, the work and Christ Himself – as the starting point for the lecture of all other theological treatises because the whole salvific economy of God was revealed to us fully only in the mystery of Christ. It is also possible, following the traditional dogmatic system, to consider Christology as a central theological treatise and to show that the whole revelation of God and the history of salvation were directed towards Christ, that in him they found their full realisation, and that the further history of salvation in the Church in the world until the second coming of the Lord is the continuation of Christ's salvific work and derives its meaning and effectiveness from the mystery of the Incarnation and Redemption. The systematic integration of Christology itself can also take on different forms. It is possible to move from Christ's work, His words and deeds to His person, or from Christ's person to His work. In other words, it is possible to begin by showing what Christ has done, and then analyse who he was, or vice versa. The first way is probably more in line with the biblical phenomenological character of the latest approaches to Christology. The second follows the line of traditional concepts.

Integration in the historical direction can also be carried out in different ways. The prospective method recommended by the Council can be adopted, i.e. to show the gradual development of the revelation of the mystery of Christ in St. and N. The Testament and the development of an awareness of faith in this mystery in the history of the Church up to the present day, the formation of different traditions and many theological approaches, while preserving the essential identity of faith, is precise where necessary in symbols of faith and dogmatic definitions. It is also possible to use a more traditional retrospective method, i.e. to present today's awareness of the Church's faith in the mystery of Christ with various theological controversies and emerging problems, and, going back through centuries of Church tradition and the development of theological thought, to show the whole historical-biblical background of Christian Christology. This will prove its identity and at the same time its constant development and richness of views. Thus, theologians, lecturers and textbook authors have different possibilities to implement the postulates of correlation and integration. The lack of one ready-made model in this field as a result of the ongoing process of post-conciliar renewal of the entire theology sometimes gives rise to some anxiety. However, it is a creative anxiety, protecting against routine and ossification. This situation makes it necessary to rethink and adapt the lectures on the central mystery of Christianity to the current conditions and needs of the listeners in order to revive their faith and commitment to the salvific work of Christ.

Magisterium of the Church in the Face of New Interpretations of the Dogma of Original Sin*

Introduction

After the Second Vatican Council, theological discussions on original sin flourished¹. This is surprising in that the Council itself did not discuss the doctrine of original sin, and consequently did not bring any new elements to it². The Council confined itself to short allusions to original sin, using the traditional form of Catholic doctrine³. This does not mean, however, that this understanding of original sin has been sanctioned and confirmed anew. No theologian has attempted to interpret the Council's position in this sense. On the contrary, the fact that the Council omitted the scheme of original sin was seen as encouragement to undertake new studies of this doctrine⁴. In this omission, some

* STV 16(1978)1.

¹ A relatively complete picture of these discussions, although thematically close to the issue of monogenism, is presented by T. Łukaszuk, *Związek dogmatu grzechu pierworodnego z monogenizmem w katolickiej teologii ostatniej doby*, Warsaw 1976. This article goes beyond monogenism and addresses all aspects of the doctrine of original sin, which have been the subject of the Magisterium. In the proposals on monogeneity, the article represents a certain correction of the position previously taken.

² The prepared scheme *De peccato originali in filiis Adae* did not enter the Council at all. Cf. Paul VI's speech of 11 July 1966, AAS 58 (1966), 650.

³ Cf. J. Weismayer, "*Erbsündet*" und *Sündenverflochtenheit in der theologischen Tradition und in den lehramtlichen Aussagen*, in: *Ist Adam an Allem Schuld?*, Innsbruck-Wien-München 1971, 360.

⁴ In this sense, Cardinal G. Garrone explained the position of the Council at the International Theological Congress in Rome in 1966. Cf. *Acta congressus internationalis de theologia Concilii Vaticani II*, Città del Vaticano 1968, 36.

theologians wanted to see a sign of the working of the Holy Spirit, who thus opposed the hasty “canonisation” of the traditional theology of original sin, leaving the necessary freedom for future discussion⁵.

The theologians found positive encouragement for their actions in Pope John XXIII’s speech to the opening of the Council in which the Pope encourages us to distinguish in every dogma the proper deposit of revealed truth from the way in which this truth is expressed⁶. However, only the Magisterium of the Church can authoritatively interpret the content of the deposit revealed. This applies both to the writings of Bible and to the rulings of past councils. The Magisterium of the Church can – and sometimes must – indicate which theological interpretations of the contents of the faith are in harmony with the revealed doctrine and which deviate from it or distort its meaning. In order to achieve this goal, the Magisterium of the Church can use two ways: either by denouncing theological theories, even by name, as inconsistent with revealed doctrine, or by positively interpreting the content of the Catholic faith in a given point. In the latter case, it is up to the theologians themselves to confront their own opinions with the position of the Magisterium and to carry out any possible corrections. In the post-conciliar period, the Magisterium of the Church mainly uses the second way, i.e. it tries to positively submit a valid or safe doctrine of faith.

The subject of the Magisterium of the Church is not only the Pope, but – as the last Council emphasised – also bishops in communication with the Pope. Therefore, after a brief presentation of new theological interpretations of the dogma of original sin, it is appropriate to discuss the statements of both bishops and the Pope on the subject of interest to us and to assess their importance for theological research.

New Theological Interpretations of the Dogma of Original Sin

The external situation immediately after the Council seemed to be conducive to a serious discussion on the dogma of original sin. At the same time, the internal structure of this truth of faith, linked, as in no other, to the changing categories of thinking and understanding of man and the world, called for in-depth reflection in order to determine what constitutes the proper deposit of the revealed truth and what is only an adventurous expression of it. Theologians attempting

⁵ Cf. K.H. Weger, *La théologie du péché originel en discussion*, Information documentation on the United Kingdom, doss. 67-38, 2.

⁶ Cf. AAS 54 (1962), 792.

a new interpretation of the dogma of original sin point to a number of reasons for this kind of work. Among these reasons, a serious position – although not the only one and not the most important – is occupied by the conspicuous inconsistency of the image of the beginnings of humanity, worked out by natural anthropology, with the image adopted so far in the traditional science of original sin⁷. The more serious reason for the turning point in the theology of original sin can be seen in the modern progress of biblical teachings. In particular, the principle of literary genres, finally accepted by *Vaticanum II*, brought a great deal of light to the proper sense of revelation⁸. A related reason for the return of original sin in theology is the application of hermeneutical principles, worked out by biblical exegesis, to the documents of the Church's Magisterium. These principles were applied to the interpretation of Church documents from the past centuries, especially when interpreting the decree of the Council of Trent⁹. The abandonment of the existing philosophical and conceptual apparatus, commonly used in theology, and the creation of a new one has also had a decisive influence on the development of the doctrine of original sin in a new form. The philosophy of the previous period, and in which concepts were described as original sin, expressed thoughts in ontological categories (substance, nature, affliction, quality, etc.) and in juridical categories (head or representative of humanity, covenant, reading, etc.). Recently, instead of those concepts, categories derived from a personalistic philosophy, such as: meeting, dialogue, presence, alienation, etc. have been introduced. This set of new concepts which according to some theologians corresponds better than the previous concepts of authentic religious thought contained in the sources of faith, seriously influencing the emergence of a new form of expression revealed by the doctrine of original sin¹⁰.

Two different tendencies can be observed in the attempts of Catholic theologians. The first trend was mainly aimed at aligning the Catholic doctrine of original sin with the image of the beginnings of mankind, which is now governed by the natural sciences. The discrepancy between the natural and theological view was mainly revealed in two points: on polygenism and the

⁷ Cf. P. Schoonenberg, *Quelques remarques à propos de la discussion actuelle sur le péché originel*, Information documentation sur L'Eglise conciliaire, doss. 68-4, 3. Difficulties posed to the traditional form of a lecture on original sin by natural sciences as well as changes caused by these difficulties in the theological elaboration of the problem are presented by B. Hałaczek in *Antropogeneza w teologii katolickiej XX wieku*, STV 13(1975)2, 47-80.

⁸ Cf. LG 12.

⁹ M. Flick, Z. Alszeghy, *Il peccato originale*, Brescia 1972, 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

attribution of the state of perfection to man at the beginning (before sin), which seemed to be decisively contradicted by natural science. The new interpretations of the dogma of original sin, which remain within the framework of the first tendency, have departed more or less decisively from both of the above two postulates of the classical doctrine of original sin¹¹. As for the abandonment of the second postulate (man's perfection before the fall), there is a certain gradation in various authors: some – denying Adam the supernatural gifts, perfecting him in the natural order, such as: knowledge, control over passions, power over nature – give him the supernatural gifts of justice and holiness together with immortality, which placed the first man high in the religious and moral order. The translation of the gift of immortality differs fundamentally from the translation used in theology to date. It is said that Adam before sin was free not from death, which is the mere end of every corporeal being, but from the painful process of dying, which in the aftermath of sin and remoteness from God has only become truly painful and dangerous¹². Other theologians go even further and deny man before sin (“Adam”) the real possession of supernatural gifts, holiness and justice, claiming that man possessed them at most only virtually as a promise, which would come true in the case of the non-existence of sin¹³. These interpretations, departing from the two postulates mentioned above, also preserve all the traditional doctrine of original sin¹⁴.

The second trend, much more radical, is not satisfied with the reconciliation of the Catholic doctrine of original sin with the natural sciences. That is not what it is all about in the first place. It sees in the Church's doctrine of original sin in a way of interpreting a given revelation, which is strictly conditioned by historical circumstances, and which, as only a way of expression, can be profoundly transformed. In the pursuit of these transformations this tendency does not count at all, or at least not with all the specific elements of dogma, as this dogma was formulated at the Council of Trent¹⁵. Not only is monogenism or

¹¹ The interpretation maintained in this spirit has been presented by theologians such as: K. Rahner, *Erbsünde und Evolution*, Conc 3 (1967), 459-465; R. Lavocat, *Réflexions d'un paléontologiste sur l'état originel de l'humanité et le péché originel*, NRT 89 (1967), 582-600; P. Grelot, *Réflexions sur le problème du péché originel*, Tournai 1968; Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, *Il peccato originale in prospettiva evoluzionistica*, Gr 47 (1966), 201-225.

¹² Such a concept of the gift of immortality is presented by P. Grelot, op. cit., 87-93.

¹³ Cf. Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, art. cit., 217ff.

¹⁴ K. Rahner makes it clear that his intention is to preserve all elements of traditional doctrine except monogenism. Cf. art. cit., 460.

¹⁵ The word “dogma” is accepted in a broad sense: as the equivalent of all Catholic doctrine on original sin, contained mainly in the decree of Trent *De peccato originali*. As we know, not all

the claim of primordial human perfection invalidated but it is also believed that the claim of one numerical source of universal sinfulness does not belong to the strictly dogmatic layer of Catholic doctrine. Instead of explaining the sinful state of mankind by the sin of one man, it is explained by talking of the “sin of the world,” i.e. the sum of the evil committed in the past and still being committed in the world¹⁶. In other theories of this tendency, original sin is reduced to a state of imperfection (incompleteness) which is characteristic of entities immersed in the process of evolution, aiming at continuous improvement¹⁷. Still other new theories want to understand original sin as something in demand of salvation by Jesus Christ, without any preconditions for this demanding by the crime of the individual or even by the crime of all mankind¹⁸.

Finally, some exegetes believe that what we used to call original sin is, according to the Bible’s teachings, the power of present sin in the world, which man is not able to resist¹⁹. In the latter view, the very concept of original sin as hereditary guilt becomes inadequate. There is no sin that is inherited; there is only sin that has invaded the world and spread out by human acts in history to such an extent that every human being must submit to it²⁰.

The hallmark of the theological concepts of original sin outlined above, necessarily in a very brief summary, is that all of them – including the most radical ones – rejecting certain elements as insignificant from the doctrine of the

the sentences of this decree have the value of a strict dogmatic definition. In all contemporary discussions, it is mainly a matter of establishing what is a strictly dogmatic term in this decree, and what is only a theological explanation.

¹⁶ The author of the theory of “world sin” is P. Schoonenberg. He lectured his theory in many publications, the most important of which is: *De Macht de Zonde*, Melmberg 1963; French translation: *L’homme et le péché*, Paris 1967; German translation: *Theologie der Sünde*, Einsiedeln-Zürich-Köln 1966. In addition to Schoonenberg, this theory is also accepted by H. Rondet, *Le péché originel dans la tradition patristique et théologique*, Paris 1967, 307-329. On the Polish ground, the theory of the “sin of the world” is upheld by Fr. Różycki, although the method of its elaboration is far from that of Western theologians. I. Różycki, *Nowa interpretacja dogmatu in sensu recto: zagadnienie nieśmiertelności w stanie sprawiedliwości pierwotnej*, ACr 5-6 (1973-1974), 465-508. Recently this theory has been fostered by collective work: *La culpabilité fondamentale. Péché originel et anthropologie* modern, P. Guilluy (ed.), Gembloux 1975.

¹⁷ Cf. A. Hulbosch, *Die Schöpfung Gottes. Zur Theologie der Schöpfung, Sünde und Erlösung in evolutionistischen Weltbild*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1965.

¹⁸ Cf. A. Vanneste, *Le théologie du péché originel*, RCA 22(1967), 492-513.

¹⁹ Cf. H. Haag, *Biblische Schöpfungslehre und kirchliche Erbsündenlehre*, Stuttgart 1967; S. Lyonnet, *Das Problem der Erbsünde im Neuen Testament*, SdZ 180 (1967), 33-39.

²⁰ Cf. H. Haag, *Die hartnäckige Erbsünde*, “Theologische Quartalschrift” 150(1970), 456. The author demands that the term “hereditary sin” be expelled from theology (Erbsünde).

Trent decree, represent the conviction that they preserve what constitutes its dogmatic and binding layer²¹. On whether this is really the case, the Magisterium of the Church proclaim these tasks include preserving (*conservare*), defending (*defendere*) and clarifying (*explicare*) the deposit of revealed truths²².

Statements by Bishops on the Dogma of Original Sin²³

Since the proper tasks of the Church's Magisterium include both the defence of revealed truths and the interpretation of their content in relation to the current problems of the believer, both tasks must be carried out through concrete action. The statements of the bishops about original sin manifest – albeit to varying degrees – an interest in both these tasks of the Magisterium.

The care for the preservation intact of the deposit of revealed truths is marked by the letter of Cardinal A. Ottaviani, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, from 24 July 1966 to the Presidents of the Episcopal Conference²⁴. Among the views “which, without difficulty crossing the boundaries of a mere opinion or hypothesis, seem to violate the very dogma and foundations of faith in a certain way,” the letter also includes new interpretations of the Catholic doctrine of original sin: “there is no lack of those who either treat the doctrine of the Council of Trent about original sin lightly or comment on it in such a way that Adam's original sin and the transmission of sin itself are at least dimmed” (n. 8)²⁵. Cardinal Ottaviani saw two dangerous tendencies in the new interpretations of the Catholic doctrine of original sin: the first diminishes the very importance of the teachings of the Council of Trent, while the second exposes them in a sense inconsistent with their fundamental intention. According to Ottaviani, the importance of this science, as a dogma

²¹ Cf. H. Haag, op. cit., 66-71.

²² Cf. LG 25. For a theological discussion of the relevant tasks of the Church's Magisterium, see S. Mosa, *Rola Kościoła w przekazywaniu objawienia*, in: *Kościół w świetle soboru*, Poznań 1968, 45.

²³ In this section we will discuss the statements of members of the Church hierarchy in which, even if they are based on the authority of the Holy See, the personal authority of the Pope is not involved.

²⁴ *Epistola ad Venerabiles Praesules Conferentiarum Episcopaliūm*, AAS 58 (1966), 659-661. E. Dąbrowski, *Konfrontacje*, Poznań 1970, 388-385.

²⁵ *Nec desunt qui doctrinam Concilii Tridentini de peccato originali vel parvipendunt vel ita commentantur ut originalis culpa Adami et ipsius peccati transmissio saltem obfuscentur*. AAS 58 (1966), 661.

in the strict sense, is so serious that any diminishing or disregard for it poses a threat to the very foundations of faith. No less dangerous to faith, according to Ottaviani, is the attempt to translate this doctrine in such a way that Adam's guilt and the transmission of sin itself are not clearly enough emphasised.

The Congregation's letter had a specific purpose: to inform the bishops of the ways and dangers spread here and there, so that each of the bishops could, according to his duty and office, suppress or prevent these errors. He also required bishops to discuss these matters in plenary conferences and to pass on their comments to the Holy See. The letter itself, as well as the bishops' answers, were to remain secret²⁶. However, it happened differently. The content of the letter got into the press, often in a distorted form, causing storms in the theological environments of the West. People started to talk and write about the new Syllabus, which threatens the freedom of theological research. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith therefore published the authentic text of the letter in the official organ of the Holy See in order to remove misunderstandings and exaggerated suspicions²⁷.

From the responses of the Bishops' Conferences sent to Rome, only two were published: the response of the French Episcopate²⁸ and the response of the Dutch Episcopate²⁹.

The response of the French episcopate does not entirely share the concerns expressed in the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The French bishops state that the teaching of original sin is one of those truths of faith which it is difficult for many priests who are obliged to teach the faithful. They are silent because they do not know how to speak [about it]. According to the French bishops, theological work in this area is essential in order to be able to give true doctrine in an accurate, complete and comprehensible manner³⁰.

In the response of the French bishops, the emphasis was placed on the real difficulty of the traditional doctrine of original sin, sometimes leading preachers of faith to silence. Hence the theological work that would help to overcome

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ *Editorial note* explains the motives for publishing the text. Ibid., 659.

²⁸ *Réponse de la conférence épiscopale française à la lettre circulaire de Congrégation pour la Doctrine de la Foi*, DC 49 (1967) Col. 327-338 (On original sin: col. 334). E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 383-393 (on original sin, 390).

²⁹ *Réponse des évêques hollandais au questionnaire du Cardinal Ottaviani*, DC 50 (1968) col. 1096-1112 (on original sin: col. 1108-1109). The text in Dutch was published in *Katholiek Archief* dated 2 I 1968, E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 394-393 (on original sin, 403).

³⁰ Cf. DC 49 (1967) col. 334.

this difficulty, i.e. new interpretations of the Catholic doctrine of original sin are needed. These interpretations should, however, give true doctrine, in an accurate, complete and comprehensible manner. The French bishops, in the very complicated issue of the new interpretations of the dogma of original sin, confined themselves to general statements that are undoubtedly correct, but which do not contribute much to a specific doctrinal-theological situation. They said nothing about what conditions are required for the given doctrine to be a truly Catholic doctrine. Nor is there any word about when this doctrine is falsified or depleted and when it is put at risk.

Elsewhere, the French bishops write clearly that they are aware of their responsibility in the doctrinal field. “This task, we read in the document, is intrinsically positive: we must proclaim the Word of God, spread the teachings of the Council, and clearly define the established points of faith.”³¹ Despite this general declaration, the bishops did not tempt themselves to clarify the established points of faith in the Catholic doctrine of original sin. After all, it seems that they acted in this manner, being aware of the enormous difficulties that this issue poses.

The response of the Dutch bishops shows much greater boldness in addressing the specific problems associated with the new interpretations of the dogma of original sin³². First of all, it responds to the accusation made in Cardinal Ottaviani’s letter that the new interpretations of original sin do not take enough account of the teachings of the Council of Trent. Dutch bishops admit that the Council of Trent preached the doctrine of original sin on the basis of its authority as a universal council. “This by no means relieves us from interpreting this Council in the light of Scripture and the whole tradition, i.e. it does not relieve us from introducing here too a distinction between the theorem and the way in which it is expressed, along with all that this distinction contains and supplements.”³³

It can already be seen from this statement that the Dutch bishops not only endorse the fact that the truth about original sin is expressed in a different way from that adopted at the Council of Trent but they also consider as important the two basic principles that are in force in many new interpretations of this truth of faith. The first principle states that the proper content of the teachings of the

³¹ Ibid.

³² This answer is assessed strictly by Dąbrowski, who believes that it contains formulations and interpretations full of insinuations and spreading anxiety and confusion. E. Dąbrowski, *op. cit.*, 382, note 2.

³³ Cf. DC 50 (1968) col. 1108.

Council of Trent can only be grasped in the light of a scientific study of Scripture and tradition (including the Eastern and pre-Augustinian traditions). Only as much as Scripture and tradition say could and did the Council of Trent teach³⁴. The second principle, commonly accepted today, demands that all decisions of the Magisterium should distinguish between the correct and deliberate theorem and the way in which it is expressed. Sometimes one attempts to identify an intentional theorem with a fundamental thought in relation to which the formal meaning of words and sentences is of secondary and insignificant importance³⁵35.

Turning to more specific matters, Dutch bishops stress that in the doctrine of original sin, the question of whether sin and the influence of personal sin on other people are accepted is of paramount importance. The affirmative answer to this question seems to be the most important element of the Catholic doctrine of original sin. It does not matter whether it is the sin of one man and the influence of that one sin on all. They praise the work of theologians who, on the basis of Scripture, seek to point to a more serious influence of sin as such than that of Adam himself, considered as an individual. Some theologians have thus come to a theory about the sin of the world and the inner tendency to evil of every person who is burdened with the sins of other people. This theory of the “sin of the world” is put forward by the bishops as a possible interpretation of the most important content of dogma, without claiming that it is the only or the best theory. They call for further discussion, which should highlight the benefits and drawbacks of this concept. The closure of the Dutch bishops’ argument about original sin is their conviction that the Church’s teaching office never defined in a way that would engage its highest authority that there was only one Adam from whom all people came.

The response of the Dutch bishops is clearly intended to show that in the modern debate on original sin, theologians cannot be accused of disregarding the decree of the Council of Trent or obscuring the idea of sin or its transmission to other people. These allegations, contained in Cardinal A. Ottaviani’s letter, the Dutch bishops are trying to move away in the first place from the theories disseminated in their country³⁶.

³⁴ Apparently, this principle – as binding in the interpretation of the Tridentinum – was stated by H. The Hague, op. cit., 69. Cf. also: E. Gutwenger, *Die Erbsünde und das Konzil von Trient*, “Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie” 89 (1967), 434–446.

³⁵ This principle is adopted today by many theologians who interpret the doctrine of original sin in a new way. Cf. Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, art. cit., 213ff.

³⁶ It is worth noting that at that time, after Cardinal A. Ottaviani’s letter, the famous *De Nieuwe Katechismus* was published, approved by Cardinal B. Alfrink, in which the theory of the “sin of the world” found itself as a catechistic lecture on the dogma of original sin.

Nothing is known about the content of other episcopates' answers to Cardinal A. Ottaviani's letter. One can only guess that they signalled certain theories, which aroused anxiety among theologians and the faithful. The fact that Pope Paul VI recommended to the first Synod of Bishops in 1967 to deal with a doctrinal issue in the first item of his deliberations is a confirmation of this assumption. In his opening address to the Synod, Paul VI expressed the concern of the Church and his own for the preservation of the Catholic faith in its intact state and internal compactness³⁷.

The question of new interpretations of the dogma of original sin was brought to the deliberations of the Synod in the relationship between Cardinal M. Browne³⁸. According to the relator, this issue has become particularly sensitive today, either because of problems related to the theory of evolution, or because of the exegesis, especially in the first chapters of the Book of Genesis. These new problems encourage theologians to study the dogma of original sin to greater depth. The studies of these few elements cannot be called into question. First, original sin should not be mixed with any sum of the sins of deeds committed by people. This makes it all the more unacceptable that original sin should only be seen as a symbol of our original position, in which we were able to do both good and evil. It seems that the relationship in this negative part aims to exclude theories – though not explicitly mentioned – which original sin they would like to replace by the sin of the world or to see in it a symbol to describe the state of a certain underdevelopment of man immersed in the process of universal evolution.

In the positive part, the relator reminds us that every hypothesis must take into account: a) that we are dealing with sin truly committed at the beginning of human history; b) that by birth it is handed down to all men; c) that in every man it is inherent as its own, so that for the individual sons of the first Adam the redemption brought to them by Christ, the second Adam, is necessary. It is not difficult to notice that the positive points, which according to M. Browne should have every hypothesis faithfully reproduce the scheme of reasoning adopted in the decree of the Council of Trent. These points harmonised perfectly, especially with the monogenism assumed by this decree as certain. The other thing is whether these points belong to the basic doctrine of the Council of Trent, i.e. to those which the decree intended to pronounce in the first place.

³⁷ *Allocution à l'ouverture solennelle du synode épiscopale*, DC 49 (1967) col. 1729-1735 (mainly col. 1731).

³⁸ *Relatio de opinionibus periculosis hodiernis necnon de atheismo*, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1967. E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 418-393 (on original sin, p. 423).

Cardinal Browne's report was not a draft resolution because his task was only to provide the synod with material for discussion on a doctrinal issue. When the discussion opened and developed his role was over³⁹.

In the report of the doctrinal synod commission in which this issue has been discussed again, taking into account the votes of the synod fathers, there is no clear position on the new theory of original sin. The report confines itself to stating that fathers have regretted that some Catholics have questioned certain elements of faith in the mystery of original sin⁴⁰. It will probably not be far from the truth to say that in the Synod, following a direct confrontation between the various opinions of the fathers, there has been some general calming in the doctrinal field, including the field of original sin.

The high-profile case of the *New Dutch Catechism* was yet another opportunity for episcopate representatives to speak on new interpretations of the dogma of original sin⁴¹. Appointed by Paul VI in the summer of 1967, the Cardinal Commission in the composition: J. Frings, J. Lefebvre, L. Joeger, E. Florit, M. Browné, Ch. Journet issued a statement in which, among other things, it responded to the *Catechism's* attempt to re-present the dogma of original sin⁴². The purpose of the whole declaration was that the faithful should know how to think and testify of the Good News of human salvation, in full conformity with the Church of Christ and the See of Peter. With regard to original sin, according to the commission's statement, the new difficulties arising from the study of the origins of mankind and its slow evolution must not prevent the *Catechism* from faithfully presenting the Church's teaching on this subject. According to it, man, at the beginning of his history, rebelled against God, and consequently lost for himself and for all his seed the holiness and justice which he possessed; for this reason he passes on to all his descendants the true state of sin to all his seed, along with the spread of human nature⁴³. In this statement,

³⁹ The daily press mistakenly publicised the report by Cardinal M. Browne, seeing it as a project of a new *Syllabus of errors*. Cf. E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 410f.

⁴⁰ *Relatio Commissionis Synodalis constitutae ad examen ulterius peragendum circa "Opiniones periculosas hodiernas necnon atheismum,"* Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1967, 5.

⁴¹ *De Nieuwe Catechismus Geloofsverkundiging voor volwassenen*, Nijmegen 1966. The *Catechism* aroused great interest throughout the Catholic world. Discussion of the stir caused by this catechism, cf. E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 434-456.

⁴² *Dichiarazione della Commissione Cardinalizia su "Il Nuovo catéchisme"* (*De Nieuwe Catechismus*), in: *Il Nuovo Catechismo Olandese*, Torino 1969, 3-12.

⁴³ "Le nuove difficoltà che lo studio dei problemi riguardanti l'origine del genere umano e il suo lento evolversi suscitano oggi circa la dottrina del peccato originale non devono impedire che il "Nuovo Catechismo" proponga jedélmente la dottrina della Chiesa, secondo la quale l'uomo,

the commission positively highlighted the most important points of Catholic doctrine about original sin, of course in its opinion. These are: the true sin of rebellion against God committed at the beginning of mankind's history; this sin has caused a real loss of the holiness and righteousness which man really possessed before sin; man, sinful at the beginning, communicates to his descendants, together with human nature, the true state of sin. The declaration does not make it clear whether the true state of sin is simply the loss of a gift of holiness and justice, or something more. However, it seems to assume that this loss is an important element of this state.

It is worth noting that the Cardinal's commission does not include the claim that there is only one man who has sinned, especially since this one man is the natural ancestor of all mankind, among the essential points of the Church's teaching about original sin, which cannot be omitted in the catechism lecture. It also sees no need to mention man's possession of supernatural gifts, including the gift of conditional immortality, before sin – or loss of it after sin. It maintains, however, that the sin that determined the state of the hereditary flaw was committed at the beginning of the history of mankind.

In light of these points, which are considered unwavering, it is necessary to avoid, according to the following statement, expressions which may mean that original sin is only contracted by individual people to the extent that those who being inwardly included from the beginning of their lives in a society in which sin reigns will find themselves in some way in the path of sin. This negative part of the declaration undermines the teaching of the Catholic doctrine of original sin adopted by the Dutch *Catechism*. It is unsustainable on the grounds that it does not retain the essential points of the Church's teaching⁴⁴. It cannot be denied that the statement of the Cardinal Commission is a doctrinally more mature and balanced document than the previously discussed writings of the episcopates. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept that it, too, should express the position of all the bishops on this issue.

fin dall'inizio della sua storia, si ribello a Dio (cf. GS, 13.22) eon la conseguenza di perdere per sé e per tutta la sua discendenza quella santità e quella giustizia nette quali era costituito, e di trasmettere a tutti i discendenti, attraverso la propagazione dell'umana natura, un vero stato di peccato." Ibid., 7.

⁴⁴ Based on the findings of the Catechism discussed here, the text of the Catechism has been amended in those points – including the doctrine of original sin – which has been challenged by Rome. These amendments constitute an indispensable addition (Il supplement) to all possible editions of this Catechism. Cf. G. Gozzelino, *Il Supplemento al Nuovo Catéchisme Olandese*, Catechesi 38(1069)8-9, 30-34.

In order to determine the doctrinal importance of the bishops' statements, two circumstances are essential: first, these statements, with the exception of the declarations of the Cardinal Commission, are not official documents for the teaching of the faith; second, they are not compatible with each other. Both circumstances, taken together in this case, mean that the statements of the bishops discussed above have little doctrinal significance. They should be treated as an expression of the private beliefs of their authors. They were not addressed to the Lord's people as a lecture of faith, or a warning of errors, but were limited to the mutual transmission among the bishops themselves of observations about errors or dangers to the faith. The intentions of these documents did not go beyond mutual information. This also applies to the letter of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of 24 July 1966, which, according to its clear words, had a purely informative purpose. In this letter, the Congregation did not condemn any errors: it listed them only to facilitate the work of the bishops, who should, in accordance with their official responsibility, take care of the defence of faith against danger in their territory. The fact that even the publication of these documents was the work of chance is not insignificant⁴⁵. Moreover, a circumstance that reduces the doctrinal significance of the bishops' statements is their divergence in content. They do not constitute a consensual testimony of faith. A testimony that is inconsistent cannot be a teaching in which the help of the Holy Spirit manifests itself, which gives the words of the bishops the character of authenticity⁴⁶.

The position of the Declaration of the Cardinal Commission on the Dutch *Catechism* is slightly different in this respect. This declaration, intended to be published from the beginning, was intended to instruct the faithful when their faith is in accordance with the faith of the Universal Church and the See of Peter. The preservation of the Catholic doctrine points reminded in the declaration was supposed to guarantee this conformity. Given the importance of the commission as such (it acts in its own name, without referring directly to the Pope's authority) and to the objectives that guided it, it must be said that it is only theologically probable that the Catholic doctrine points listed by the commission belong to the unchanging dogmatic layer of the doctrine of faith.

⁴⁵ "Huiusmodi errores et pericula, singula *quidem* hic Ulic sparguntur, summaria vero synthesi collecta hac epistola locorum Ordinariis exhibentur, ut pro suo quisque munere et officio satagat ad ea compescenda vel praecavenda." AAS 58(1966), 661.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Report of the Synod Doctrinal Commission*, in: E. Dąbrowski, op. cit., 431.

Statements by Pope Paul VI on the Dogma of Original Sin

Pope Paul VI followed with great interest – and perhaps even anxiety – the stormy post-conciliar discussion on the dogma of original sin and the possibility of finding new forms of its expression. A manifestation of this interest was the organization, inspired by the Holy Father himself, of a symposium of a selected group of exegetes, theologians and naturalists, whose task it was to discuss the doctrinal situation in the episode of the Catholic doctrine of original sin⁴⁷. In his speech to the participants of the symposium, the Pope expressed the hope – slightly exaggerated in his optimism – that the fruit of this meeting could be a definition of original sin better suited to the requirements of the faith and reason of the man of our times⁴⁸. Paul VI pointed to the possibility of a new interpretation of the doctrine of original sin by referring to the well-known statement of John XXIII in his speech inaugurating the Second Vatican Council.

The Pope stressed that in order to develop new ways of expressing dogmatic content, theologians and exegetes need freedom of search and judgement. However, it is a question of freedom that is actually required by the scientific nature of their studies and for the good of human salvation, to which all activity in the Church should be directed. In the very nature of this freedom, there are certain limits to it: only that is allowed which serves to discover the truth – for this is what is demanded by the scientific character of studies – and what is for salvation – for this is what is demanded by the subordinate and servile character of studies in the Church. The Pope made it clear that these studies are limited by the living Magisterium of the Church, which is closer to the norm of truth for all believers⁴⁹.

According to the Pope, the doctrine of original sin as to its existence and universality, as well as to its nature as true sin in Adam's descendants and its sad consequences for the soul and body is the truth revealed in many places in Scripture, especially in Genesis 3:1-20 and in Romans 5:12-19⁵⁰. It is up to exegetes and theologians to have a deeper knowledge of the contents of these

⁴⁷ The Symposium was held on 11 July 1966 in Rome. Its participants were: E. Dhanis, Ch. Moeler, R. Masi, R. McKenzie, P. Benoît, E. Boné, Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, R. Gagnebet, K. Rahner, M. Labourdette, V. Marozzi, G. Ruggieri. Cf. DC 48 (1966) col. 1346.

⁴⁸ *Allocutio iis qui interfuerunt Coetui v.d. "Simposio" a theologis doctisque viris habita de originali peccato*, AAS 58 (1966), 652.

⁴⁹ *Questi limiti sono segnati dal Magisteria vivo della Chiesa, ch'è norma prossima di verità per tutti i fedeli*. Ibid., 653.

⁵⁰ Paul VI's attribution of the doctrine of original sin in Genesis 3:1-20 raised objections on the part of exegetes. Cf. F. Dexinger, *Alttestamentliche Überlegungen zum "Ersünde" – Problem*, in: *Ist Adam an Allem schuld?*, op. cit., 31f.

texts: they will achieve this knowledge if they follow the principles of analogy of faith in their research and if they follow the teachings of the Councils and documents of the Holy See. In this way they will find proper meaning in the teachings of the Church. The Pope left it to theologians to look for this meaning.

Regardless of leaving theologians the possibility of searching for the essential meaning of the doctrine of the Church, the Pope pointed out that the explanations given by some contemporary authors on the question of original sin are incompatible with the doctrine of the Church. Starting from the unproven assumption of polygenism, they deny, more or less clearly, that the sin from which such a wave of misery came to mankind was first and foremost the disobedience of Adam, the “first man,” committed at the beginning of history⁵¹. These explanations, according to Paul VI, are not consistent with the teaching of Scripture, tradition and the Magisterium of the Church, according to which the sin of the first man is passed on to all his descendants *propagatione, non imitatione, inest unicuique proprium* and is *mors animae*, that is a culpable lack, and not just a mere absence of holiness and justice even in new-born children. Also the theory of evolution would be unacceptable if it led to the denial of Adam’s disobedience, which is decisive for the fate of mankind. This disobedience cannot be imagined as not depriving Adam of the holiness and righteousness with which he was endowed.

The Pope’s objections to the natural theories of polygenism and evolutionism are not absolute. The Pope does not talk about their value in the natural sciences (he only mentions polygenism, according to the actual state of things that it is an unproven assumption), or even about their absolute inconsistency with the data of the Church’s teaching. It merely points out that some theological explanations, taking into account polygenism and evolutionism, lead to the denial of the essential theorems of the dogma of original sin. This does not mean, however, that every theological interpretation that counts on polygenism or evolutionism must necessarily reject these claims.

⁵¹ “(...) inconciliabili con la genuina dottrina cattolica le spiegazioni ehe del peccato originale danno alcuni autori moderni, i quali, partendo dal presupposto, ehe non è stato dimostrato, del poligenismo, negano, più o meno chiaramente, che il peccato donde è derivata tanta colluvie di mali nell’umanità, sia stato anzitutto la disobbedienza di Adamo, «primo uomo», figura di quello futuro, commessa all’inizio délia storia.” AAS 58 (1966), 654. The above statement of the Pope was interpreted differently, sometimes even contradictory by theologians. Cf. L. Lefèvre, *Les Leçons de l’allocution du 11 juillet 1966*, *La pensée catholique* 21(1966)102, 32; R. Rouquette, *Un discours du pape sur le péché originel*, “*Etudes*” 10 (1966), 382; A. Dubarle, *Evolution et péché originel*, “*Le Monde*,” 6 VIII 1966.

Not without significance for the correct interpretation of the papal statement is the detail that it does not put emphasis on the individuality of the first sinner, and the use of the phrase “first man” in quotation marks the fact that papal thinking is not alien to the possibility of understanding “Adam” in a broad sense, as an expression for all “first people”⁵². Moreover, it is striking in the papal statement that it does not include in the Church’s current doctrine of original sin claims of possession or loss by man of supernatural gifts, including the gift of conditional immortality⁵³.

At the first Synod of Bishops in 1967, a thought was born, which was then transformed into a concrete proposal that the Holy See, together with the Episcopal Conferences, should develop a positive and pastoral explanation of these issues, which make up today’s doctrinal problems, so that the faith of the people of God can be safely guided⁵⁴. The Pope’s response to this demand was a solemn confession of faith on behalf of the whole Church on June 30, 1968, at the end of the year of faith⁵⁵.

In this *Creed*, the Pope does not condemn any errors, but rather lectures positively on the doctrine of the Church, in which he should believe and actually believes God’s people, and from which he must not deviate. In the case of original sin, *the Creed* proclaims: “We believe that all have sinned in Adam; which means that the original sin committed by him has caused the fall of human nature, common to all men, to the condition in which it bears the consequences of that sin. This state is not the one in which human nature was at the beginning with our great-grandparents, equipped with holiness and justice, and in which man was free from evil and death. Such a fallen human nature, devoid of the gift of grace that had previously decorated it, wounded in its own natural talents and subject to the power of death, is passed on to all people; in this sense, every human being is born in sin. We maintain, therefore, after the Council of Trent,

⁵² Commentators of the papal statement point out that the official text published in the AAS has been modified in relation to the text submitted by the Vatican press office. The original text placed some emphasis on the individual character of Adam and his role as the great-grandfather of all mankind (“...la disobbedienza di un solo primo uomo, Adamo, progenitore dell’intera stirpe umana”). This emphasis is not visible in the official text, where the phrase *primo uomo* is taken in quotation marks. Cf. R. Rouquette, op. cit., 382.

⁵³ The classical theology of original sin treated the theorem of the possession by man against the sin of immortality as the dogma of faith. Cf. J. Sagües, *De Deo creante et elevante. De peccatis*, in: STS, vol. 2, Matriti 1958, 791-798.

⁵⁴ *Relatio Commissionis synodalis*, op. cit., 13.

⁵⁵ Paulus VI, *Sollemnis professio fidei*, AAS 60 (1968), 433-445.

that original sin, together with human nature, is passed on by birth and not by imitation: that it is everyone's own sin⁵⁶.

The Catholic doctrine thus laid out, which must guide the faith of the people of God, can be summed up in the following points.

a. All men have sinned in Adam, which means that his sin has determined the fallen state of nature of all men, in which this nature bears the consequences of Adam's sin. Therefore, it is maintained as a binding doctrine about hereditary sin itself, about sin in somebody (in Adam). In comparison with the teachings of this point, all theological concepts which are difficult to maintain and which, while denying the idea of inheritance, would like to identify original sin with the inevitability of committing personal sins, turn out to be difficult to maintain. According to the teaching of Paul's *Creed*, original sin is a sin committed *in alio*; this is its specific and required content by the dogma.

b. The state in which human nature found itself in the aftermath of the sin of that other person (Adam) is not the state in which it was in man (in our great-grandparents) before sin. Man before sin was equipped with holiness and righteousness and did not know evil and death. In other words, the Church's current doctrine of original sin includes the assertion that there is a real existence of a state of primary justice in which man truly possessed grace and justice, enjoyed moral innocence and freedom from death. Theological theories, which question the real existence of a state of primary justice, are in opposition to the Church's doctrine, which is recalled at this point.

c. The inner structure of original sin identifies itself with the state of a fallen nature caused by the sin of someone else (Adam): this state is characterized by the lack of grace that had previously adorned human nature, the injury of its natural talents and the submission of nature to the power of death.

d. The original sin thus described can be passed down with human nature by birth, not by imitation, and is everyone's own sin.

⁵⁶ "Credimus omnes in Adam peccavisse; quod significat originale culpam ab illo commissam effecisse, ut natura Humana, universis hominibus communis, in talem laberetur statum in quo illius culpae consequentias pateretur. Qui status iam ille non est, in quo natura Humana initio in protoparentibus nostris, utpote in sanctitate et iustitia constituas inveniebatur, et in quo homo expers erat mali et mortis. Itaque haec humana natura sic lapsa, gratiae munere destituta, quo antea erat ornata, in ipsis suis naturalibus viribus sauciata atque mortis imperio subiecta, omnibus hominibus traditur; qua quidem ratione omnis homo nascitur in peccato. Tenemus igitur, Concilium Tridentinum secuti, peccatum originale, una cum natura humana, transfundi propagatione, non imitatione, idque inesse unicuique proprium." AAS 60 (1968) 439. The Polish translation, disseminated as the *Creed*, Poznań 1971, is exceptionally incorrect. In the passus of original sin, this inaccuracy reaches the point of distorting the fundamental sense.

The Pope, recalling the fundamental points of the Catholic doctrine of original sin, which should not be lost in theological interpretations, uses traditional terminology. He speaks of Adam, of our great-grandparents, of the sin committed by Adam as the cause of the universal state of decline. Does it intend to teach that, according to the Church's valid teaching, there was only one Adam (or one pair of great-grandparents) who is responsible for the religious-moral ruin of humanity, or that only one sin of this one Adam is the direct cause of the said ruin, or finally that this Adam is the natural forefather of all mankind? It seems that in the absence of a clear emphasis in Paul's *Creed* on these matters, often questioned by theologians, it can be concluded that, according to the Pope, they are not essential and necessary points of the doctrine of faith about original sin. They are the Church's accepted way of expressing the content of the faith, but they do not identify with the content itself. The doctrine of faith recalled by Paul VI, therefore, does not require that the perpetrator of our original sinfulness be necessarily the individual Adam, or that in his one-off sin we see the total cause of this sinfulness, or the individual Adam as the natural forefather of all mankind. Theological theories, which with the preservation of other binding points of Catholic doctrine depart from the idea of one ancestor of humanity in explaining original sin, limiting themselves to the idea of one sinner (theological monogenism), and even resignation from the postulate of one numerically common source of sinfulness (theological polygenism), do not collide with the *Creed* of the people of God⁵⁷.

Pope Paul VI returned to the theme of original sin in his address to the general audience on 5 May 1971⁵⁸. He states that the doctrine of original sin is very often questioned today. Thus the Holy Father reminds us of certain points of Catholic doctrine: original sin does not identify with personal sin; it is an inherited sin, both in terms of guilt and punishment, of Adam's sin; this inheritance has the following consequences: enmity with God (Ephesians 2:3), the deterioration of the balance in nature (Romans 6:20) and the loss of immortality, which was the privilege of mortal man in a state of justice.

It is easy to see that in this speech the Pope repeats in detail what he included in a solemn form in his *Creed*. The Holy Father's remark that the doctrine of original sin is being questioned today proves that, according to the Pope's discernment, his confession of faith has not achieved all of its purposes at this point. In the statements of the Pope discussed above, some slight shifts

⁵⁷ Cf. T. Łukaszuk, op. cit., 335f.

⁵⁸ Paul VI, *Allocution de l'audience generale du 5 mai 1971*, DC 53 (1971), 552. Italian text in "Osservatore Romano" of 6 V 1971.

in emphasis can be seen in secondary matters, but in important matters they invariably present the same points of Catholic doctrine about original sin.

The Pope's statements about original sin are undoubtedly of greater doctrinal significance than the speeches of the bishops discussed earlier. Especially the papal *Creed* of the People of God, uttered by the Supreme Shepherd on behalf of all the people – as the official name of the *Creed* indicates – cannot fail to have a certain doctrinal seriousness. For a correct assessment of this seriousness, it is essential to take into account, on the one hand, the Pope's intention and, on the other hand, the nature of the act itself, which belongs more to the pastoral field than to the magisterial one in the strict sense⁵⁹. The Pope's intention, clearly indicated in the introduction, was not to define new truths, but to maintain and strengthen an existing faith. This is especially evident in the section on original sin. The Pope does not make any new claims on this subject, but only upholds the teachings of the Council of Trent about original sin. It is striking that the Pope does not uphold this doctrine with all its details (Adam, the first man, one forefather of mankind, one source of universal sinfulness), expressed in the canons of the Council decree, but only reminds us of what really constitutes a subject of safe faith in this doctrine, the theological interpretations of which should not be ignored.

The solemn form of expression used by the Pope in the *Credo Populi Dei* seems to guarantee that the truths about original sin contained therein are still the subject of Catholic doctrine in force today. All new interpretations of original sin developed by theologians, if they wish to be Catholic interpretations, must therefore take into account the points of the Catholic doctrine of faith, as recalled and confirmed by Paul's *Creed*. However, does this mean that all these points are an unchangeable dogmatic science? Some theologians, suggested by the solemn form of *the Creed* of God's people, were inclined to assume that the Pope repeated in it only that of the Trent decree, which dogmatically defined the original state and original sin⁶⁰. However, the above assessment does not seem to be correct.

The Pope mentions neither in the introduction nor in the text itself that he limits himself only to a repetition of defined dogmas. It is unjustifiable to impose such an intention on him. He merely wants to confirm (*confirmare*) the faith

⁵⁹ It seems that A. Kubiś's assessment does not take into account the pastoral character of the Creed of Paul VI and is therefore exaggerated. A. Kubiś, *Kwalifikacja teologiczna wyznania wiary Pawła VI*, "Analecta Cracoviensia" 1 (1969), 185-189.

⁶⁰ Such an opinion was represented a few years ago by I. Różycki, *Pawłowe "Credo narodu Bożego"*, in: *WNZP*, vol. 3 (1969), 140.

of the brothers, i.e. the faith of the whole Church in the form and power that it possessed at the time of the proclamation of the *Creed*. The faith of the Church lives not only in dogmas, but also on the truths of Catholic doctrine, which, although contained in the documents of the Magisterium (even the solemn Magisterium), can only be theologically certain or only theologically probable. Their theological qualification can be determined by analysing the documents from which these truths originate. Applying the above principle to the doctrine of original sin, as recalled by Paul VI's *Creed*, one can question whether, for example, the doctrine, upheld by the Pope, of human possession before sin and the loss after sin of the gift of bodily immortality, really belongs to dogmatically defined truths.⁶¹ Even in this case, however, if it was not about dogma in the strict sense, the theologian should feel bound by the Pope's position. There is no right to reject this recklessly, since the Magisterium of the Church considered it advisable to uphold it.

Conclusion

Anyone who closely observes the relationship between the Magisterium and theology in recent years with regard to original sin feels a twofold statement being imposed: first, theologians have not ceased to preach new interpretations of the dogma of original sin even if they do not agree with everything in the postulates contained in the statements of the Magisterium of the *Creed* of Paul VI inclusive⁶²; second, the Magisterium of the Church does not speak out on this matter⁶³. These two parallel facts, constituting a certain problem, at the same time form the basis for solving it.

⁶¹ The doubt in question was put forward by I. Różycki during the symposium "reinterpretation of dogmas" in Krakow, 26-28 III 1973, in the paper entitled *Nowa interpretacja dogmatu in sensu recto: zagadnienie immortality w stanie sprawiedliwości pierwotnej*, published in "Analecta Cracoviensia" 5-6 (1973-1974), 465-508. The author even believes that in the present state of affairs, i.e. taking into account the Creed of Paul VI, theologians may depart from corporal immortality in the theological interpretation of the state of primary justice.

⁶² Cf. Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, *II decreto tridentino sul peccato originale*, "Gregorianum" 52 (1971), 595-637; P. Grelot, *Péché originel et rédemption, examinés à partir de l'épître aux Romains*, Paris 1973; P. Guilluy (ed.), *La culpabilité fondamentale. Péché originel et antropologie moderne*, Gembloux 1975.

⁶³ Review of the Magisterium's statements from the period after 5 V 1971. (Paul VI's speech in a general audience) proves that none deal with the question of original sin.

It must first be said that an oversimplified way of solving the problem would be to attribute to theologians, who preach new theories of original sin, a mere disobedience to the Magisterium's teaching, or a disregard for its seriousness. Such voices could be heard from those authors who attributed a one-sided apologetic and adjudicating character to the speeches of the Magisterium, especially *the Creed* of the People of God⁶⁴. Moreover, it is impossible to maintain the conviction – in the face of obvious facts to the contrary – that Western theologians accepted Paul's *Creed* with a pact of silence. On the other hand, it is true that the majority of theologians saw Paul VI's *Creed* as a pastoral address, which was equally guided by the two objectives listed by the Pope in the introduction: to affirm the faith of the brothers and to transmit its content in a form appropriate to the requirements of our times. The Pope's aim was not only to defend endangered points of Catholic doctrine, but also to present its content in a new form. Therefore, Paul VI's *Creed* was supposed to be an attempt, undertaken by the Master's Office, to present the unchangeable truths of faith in a new form, i.e. an attempt to reinterpret existing doctrinal formulas. According to many theologians, the realisation of this task in *Credo* was not the happiest⁶⁵. This fact leaves room for the work of theologians, aiming at new interpretations of the truths of faith, including the dogma of original sin. Theologians working on this issue want to see in their efforts the implementation of the Pope's 1966 recommendation, in which he entrusted theology with an elaboration of a more contemporary definition of original sin, i.e. better responding to the requirements of faith and reason, which are felt and revealed by the people of our time⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ Cf. F. Holböck, *Credimus. Kommentar zum Credo Pauls VI*, Salzburg 1970, 17.

⁶⁵ Anonymus, *Bemühungen um eine Kurzformel des Glaubens*, HK 23 (1969), 38.

⁶⁶ Cf. Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, op. cit., 30.

The Greek-Latin Dispute Over the Communion of Infants*

The problem of the infant communion, which in the Catholic-Orthodox confrontation is rather secondary, has not yet been elaborated on. However, it is an interesting example for the history of theology of how the same theological problem can have different contents and functions, depending on the historical context in which it is raised.

Starting Point of the Dispute

The communion of infants was abandoned during the 13th century in the Western Church. This was the result of a new Eucharistic spirituality initiated by a reaction to the Berengarian doctrine. The guiding principle of this spirituality was to emphasize the truth about concomitance, and its most characteristic feature was an increase in respect for the saints. The cessation of the communion of infants was motivated by the danger of unintentional insult, which lasts as long as the child is not able to distinguish the Eucharist from ordinary bread. The Eastern Church did not experience a similar reaction, which of course increased mutual differences in spirituality and Eucharistic customs.

The oldest text on the infant communion dispute comes from the famous *Libellus de erroribus Armenorum*, the official author of which is Pope Benedict XII (1334-1342), while the actual authors were the two Latinising Armenian bishops. They counted 117 Armenian heresies, superstitions and abuses. The publication of this magazine by the Pope provoked a lively reaction in the Armenian Church. The pleas were mostly generalised and exaggerated, included in the form of accusations. The answer to these pleas was taken care of by the synod

* STV 16(1978)2.

in Sish (1342), convened especially for this purpose. The Synod's explanations are factual and respectful of the Holy See, but at the same time there is much regret in them, especially because of accusations that are particularly unjust or absurd. As for the communion of infants, the Armenians were accused not so much of the mere fact as of binding it to a false doctrine of baptism: that they make the importance of this sacrament dependent on both Confirmation and the Eucharist being given. The Synod in Sish, responding to this accusation, confirmed the custom of giving three sacraments to infants at the same time, but rejected the main accusation as an unjustified insinuation¹.

The Latin accusation – albeit formulated in a less conciliatory spirit – had a basis in reality. In any case, it is a fact that Gregory Dattivensis (deceased 1411), who acted a little later and who significantly reinforced anti-Roman tendencies in the Armenian Church, openly accused Latin people that their deceased children do not receive salvation because after baptism they do not receive communion². In addition, giving all three sacraments of initiation to infants helped to create an awareness that baptism could only be given by priests. In the correspondence between Pope Clement VI and the Catholicoi of Armenians after the synod in Sish, we find, among other things, the question whether the Armenians recognise the validity of baptism given by a non-priest³. This question has at least two aspects, practical and theoretical. In practice, baptism and priesthood can be so closely connected that laity do not dare to give this sacrament even to a dying child. Theoretically, although this is not a necessary consequence of this state of affairs, the validity of baptism given by a priest may not be questioned⁴. In the letter of Clement VI of 29 September 1351, there is a reference to a previously issued order of the Pope for the Armenian Church

¹ Mansi, vol. 25 col. 1236.

² C. Galanus, *Conciliationis Ecclesiae Armenae cum Romana*, vol. 2, Rome 1661, 590.

³ O. Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, vol. 16, Coloniae Agr. 1691, 314.

⁴ Such voices appeared e.g. in older Greek theology, and their source were former canonical regulations reserving communion only for priests and bishops. For example, this is decided by the can. 47 of Apostolic Canons. In: *Iuris ecclesiastici Graecorum historia et monumenta* (publ. B. Pitra), vol. 1, Rome 1864 23. A similar provision is contained in the Apostolic Constitutions, book 3, chap. 13 n, where a non-priest who dared to baptise was even compared to the sons of Korah. *Ibid.*, 235. Photius only questioned the validity of baptism given by someone who pretends to be a priest, but he considered baptism given by a lay person for someone in mortal danger to be important. Letter to Leon Archbishop of Calabria (PG. vol. 102, col. 774 n.). In the compendium of synodal canons prepared in 1336, M. Blastaris considered every baptism given by a priest to be doubtful and ordered to repeat it. *Syntagma alphabeticum* (PG, vol. 144 col. 1108).

to stop giving communion to infants⁵. This would be Rome's first formal intervention in this matter.

The Florentine Council took a different, more tolerant stance in the dispute over the communion of infants. The formula of the union proposed by the Latin side included the demand to renounce heresy and total tolerance for other differences. As a result of the discussion, the Greeks adopted the position of the Romans on three traditionally controversial issues: the truth about the origin of the Holy Spirit *a Patre Filioque*, the primacy of the Pope, and the doctrine of Purgatory. The Romans, on the other hand, treated the union not as a return of those who had gone astray, but as a reconciliation of opposing brothers, the sons of one mother Church⁶.

However, it is not known whether Florence dealt with differences considered to be non-heretical. The preserved files of the Council are silent on this subject; however, some data indicate that this issue was the subject of the Council's discussions. Mansi, for example, signals the opinion expressed by St. Antoninus, a member of the Council, although not yet as a Florentine bishop. Among the eastern rites, which do not contain heresy, although they differ from the rites of the western church, Antoninus also mentions the communion of infants⁷.

His statement shows a relationship with the Apostolic Constitution of *Accepimus nuper* of Leon X of 18 May 1521, which contains the same list of Greek separations⁸. In this document, the Pope strongly defends the Eastern rite in connection with the Latin bishops of the Ionian Sea islands. Leon X states that the criticism of the Greeks on account of their distinctiveness is incompatible with the findings of the Florence Council. This would argue in favour of the existence of a conciliar document, which is unknown today in this case: probably from there both Antoninus and Leon X drew up a list of approved Greek separations. Contrary to St. Antoninus, the Constitution does not make the slightest allusion about the alleged superiority of Latin over Greek rites. Its general tone indicates that the Pope recognises the equivalence of Greek rites rather than just tolerating them.

The classical positions of eastern theology were first defined by St. Simeon of Thessaloniki and the Nilus of Rhodes. Simeon (deceased 1429) represents the intransigent direction. His *Dialogue in Christo adversus omnes haereses* is an

⁵ O. Raynaldus, op. cit., 315.

⁶ Union bullae of 6 July 1439, in: *Documenta Concilii Florentini de unione Orientalium* (publ. G. Hofmann), vol. 1, Rome 1935 h. 16 n.

⁷ Mansi, vol. 31, col. 1812.

⁸ *Monumenta Ucrainae Historica*, vol. 13, Rome 1973 83 n. (in short: MUH).

extensive argument against the Latins. It culminates in a several-century process initiated by the Constantinople synod of 692 (called *in Trullo*), the formation of classical anti-Latin polemics of the Greeks. The arguments used there still constitute an iron repertoire of Orthodox polemics with Catholicism. In removing infants from communion, Simeon sees above all the risk of their loss of salvation⁹. In his work *De sacramentis*, he made this allegation particularly harshly clear¹⁰.

Nilus, Metropolitan of Rhodes, living one generation before Simeon, spoke more gently on the same subject. Referring to can. 84 of the Synod *in Trullo*, which refers to the communion of infants, he points out that no canon hinders children's access to the holy table. Nilus of Rhodes, however, does not go so far as to claim that by refusing it to children eternal salvation was closed to them in this way¹¹.

Comparing the positions of Western and Eastern theology in the dispute over the communion of infants, it should be noted that both sides are fundamentally intolerant to the custom of the other side, with the western side showing a slightly higher degree of tolerance. The allegation of misrepresentation in western arguments appears at most indirectly and the Florentine formula, although open also to diminishing interpretations, even proclaims the fundamental equivalence of the two customs. For both parties, the basic principle of the dispute is presented in a different way, to which individual arguments are subordinate. Namely, the East defends the communion of infants in the name of fidelity to tradition, while the West defends its custom in the name of respect for sacred mysteries. In this situation, Western theology can at most proclaim the superiority of its own custom but it cannot accuse heresy of the traditional custom against it. The situation of eastern theology is more difficult in this respect because there are no equally important contraindications to accuse the opposing side of heresy, so this accusation appears more easily and more often in it.

The Union of Brest Period

After the fall of Constantinople, the main area where western Christianity met or tried to meet the eastern was the Russian lands. During the 16th century, the first descriptions appeared of customs of the Moscow state, which was extremely

⁹ PG, vol. 155 col. 102.

¹⁰ Ibid., col. 236.

¹¹ *Responsio decima ad Ionam Hieromonachum*, in: *Inedita canonical responsa Constantinopolitani Patriarchae Lucae Chrysovergae et Nili Metropolitanæ Rodensis*, Odessæ 1903 62 (quote for M. Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium*, vol. 3, Paris 1930, 302).

exotic for Europe at that time. However, there is a lot of disinformation in these brochures. J. Fabri, the confessor of the Roman king Ferdinand, writes in 1521 that the Moskal's Confirmation is given only by bishops, and is received only after reaching adulthood¹². On the other hand, he knows nothing about communion immediately after baptism. He only remembers with dismay that the Eucharist is given there to three year old children¹³. Another informant at the time, A. Guagnini, attributes to the local Church total conformity with Latin practice in this respect¹⁴.

First of all, however, the meeting of both Christian traditions took place in the Kingdom of Poland at that time. The first Polish work devoted to the Ruthenian religion, by the Kraków professor Jan of Oświęcim (Sacranus), was created on the wave of regret over the failure of the union, and is therefore unfriendly to Ruthenians and their religion. The number of three eastern errors in Lyon and Florence grew to 47. The Sacranus also enumerates 22 consecutive schisms that the Eastern Church had undertaken over the centuries. However, he either does not know or does not consider it a mistake to give communion to infants¹⁵.

The intellectual situation in Ruthenia and the pressure of Protestantism in the country were not conducive to interest in the issues of Eastern Christianity. This state of affairs changed only when the idea and then the implementation of the union with the Ruthenians encouraged many to grab the pen, both supporters and opponents¹⁶. It is interesting to look at the tracks of the discussion about the communion of infants at the time, as it reflects well the mutual relationship between the two faiths, which was finally perpetuated at that time and is still valid to this day. In particular, it is worth looking at the mechanism that has made the list of heresies that the Orthodox Church exposes to Catholicism much longer than the Catholic list of Orthodox heresies. The main ideologue of the Union was Fr. P. Skarga. His doctrinal settlement, published in 1577,

¹² J. Fabri, *Religio Moscovitarum*, in: [J. Łasicki], *De Russorum, Moscovitarum et Tartarorum religione*, Spira 1582 177.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁴ A. Guagnini, *De religione Moscovitarum omniumque Ruthenorum*. In: [J. Łasicki], *op. cit.*, 268.

¹⁵ Sacranus, *Elucidarius errorum ritus Ruthenici*. Cracoviae 1500. In: [J. Łasicki], *op. cit.*, 184-219.

¹⁶ Cf. two bibliographical studies: M. Wiszniewski, *Historia literatury polskiej* (History of Polish literature), vol. 8, Kraków 1851 248-496; A. Brückner, *Spory o unję w dawnej literaturze* (Disputes over the union in old literature), KH 10 (1896), no. 3, 578-644.

follows the line of the Florentine Council¹⁷. Although Skarga shifts the focus to the problem of the primacy of the Pope, the basic Florentine assumptions did not change: to recognise the doctrinal purity of the Roman Church, while to reduce the demands on the Eastern Church to truly relevant. To this end, the author distinguishes between liturgical and dogmatic distinctions, the latter being the only ones that are important to him¹⁸. In spite of these assumptions, the number of eastern heresies in Skarga increased to 19, of which – a characteristic feature – as many as 7 relate to Eucharistic errors¹⁹. Infant communion was not included in the list because the Council of Trent clearly stated that there was no doctrinal error in this custom.

In the first years after the signing of the Union in Brest in 1596, its supporters not only stressed the equivalence of the two traditions and the invalidity of liturgical differences, but also preferred to use a more conciliatory Florentine list than the one drawn up by the Complaint, as regards dogmatic differences. If they sometimes mentioned the communion of infants, it is only when calculating the differences that deserve to be respected²⁰.

With time, however, reference was made to this rite for polemic purposes. Namely, the anti-Uniates, initially poorly prepared theologically to polemics with Catholicism, drew on the anti-Catholic achievements of Protestants and emphasised, among other things, the accusation that Catholics give communion only in one form. Although this allegation did not directly concern individuals, by reason of the union they felt obliged to defend the dogmatic legitimacy of the Latin custom. The fact that communion of infants is usually given to infants in the Eastern rite in one form, and yet such communion is not considered unworthy or less worthwhile, proved to be a useful argument. Bishop H. Pocij, in his great apologetic letter to Patriarch Alexandria Meletius (1601), quotes this argument twice²¹.

M. Smotrycki also refers to the communion of infants as an argument in a letter from 30 October 1629 to the Patriarch of Constantinople, Cyril

¹⁷ P. Skarga, *O jedności Kościoła Bożego pod jednym Pasterzem, y o greckim od tej jedności odstąpieniu*, Vilnius 1577. Quote for: *Pamiętniki polemiczkiej literatury* (Russkaja istoričeskaja bibliotieka), vol. 2, Petersburg 1882 (a text with annotations of the additions made to the edition: Kraków 1590).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 492.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 471-477.

²⁰ Cf. e.g: *Harmonia albo Concordantia wiary, sakramentów y ceremoniey Cerkwi ś. orientalnej z Kościołem ś. rzymskim*, 1608. In: *Pamiętniki polemiczkiej literatury*, op. cit., vol. 2 col. 193 n.

²¹ H. Pocij, *Obrońca Wiary S. Katolickiej*, Supraśl 1768, 62.101.

Lukaris²². Smotrycki, one of the leading anti-Uniate publicists and the creator of an excellent grammar of Russian, in July 1627 secretly professed the Catholic faith before the Uniate Metropolitan Józef Rutki²³. Two years later he writes a letter to Lukaris in which he asks the Patriarch to make efforts to unite the two Churches. Perhaps it was an attempt to implement the union's plans of Prince Konstanty Ostrogski, who was outraged by the only partial union carried out by Bishops Pocij and Terlecki. According to Smotrycki, a new point of disagreement was added to the old discrepancies between the two Churches, namely the matter of communion in one form. However, this problem should have not constituted a significant obstacle because also in the Eastern Church infants were given only the Lord's Blood, while the sick were given only the Body itself, and it is not for them to criticise in the Romans what they do on their own²⁴.

While the Catholic side not only did not accuse the anti-Uniates of heresy because of giving communion to infants but even positively used this fact in their polemics, the opposite side quite quickly accused a violation of faith due to the abandonment of this rite in the Catholic Church. For the first time, this accusation was formulated in the anonymous work *Antigraphe*²⁵. This brochure was a response to two Uniate letters: the *Script*, which is unknown today, and the *Harmony* mentioned above. The author reminds us that originally the Roman Church also observed this rite, and the witness is called by Fr. P. Skarga himself, who mentions this custom in the biography of St. Cunigunde²⁶. At the same time, the accusation of abandoning the communion of infants illustrates the more general accusation that it is the essence of the Roman Church to honour the spirit of novelty²⁷.

On the Catholic side, the first attack on the communion of infants took place as early as in 1642. He was accompanied by K. Sakowicz, the leading polemicist of the anti-Uniates next to Smotrycki, later by a Uniate (from 1625) and an archimandrite in Dubin. Sakowicz breaks with the previous Catholic tactics of not exaggerating dogmatic differences, while the custom of those defending

²² MUH, vol. 2, 98-109.

²³ Ibid., 31.

²⁴ Ibid., 103.

²⁵ *Antigraphe albo odpowiedź na Script uszczypliwy przeciwko ludziom starożytnej Religii Greckiej od Apostołów Cerkwie Wschodniej* wydany, Vilnius 1608. Cf. B. Waczyński, *Czy Antigrafe jest dziełem Maksyma (Melecjusza) Smotryckiego?* (Is Antigrafe the work of Maxim (Meletius) Smotrycki?), RTK 1 (1949), 183-210.

²⁶ Cf. P. Skarga, *Żywoty świętych Pańskim*, vol. 5, Warsaw 1880, 72.

²⁷ *Antigraphe*, op. cit., c. 38.

themselves against the Orthodox Union lengthens the list of the opponent's mistakes to the maximum. The very title of the book reveals the author's basic idea²⁸. The book opens with a register of these anti-Uniate heresies. In the chapter dedicated to the Eucharist, we find the accusation that "giving communion to infants for no reason brings great dishonour to the Blessed Sacrament"²⁹. This accusation is still further developed in the book. The basis for the deductions is classical Catholic teaching on this subject, but commented on subjectively. For example, from the decisions of the Council of Trent, the author only recalls that the doctrine of the necessity of the communion of infants has been rejected, but does not notice that stigmatisation of the rite itself – as it does – is contrary to the teachings of the Council. It is also significant that Sakowicz himself, while working in Dubin, abolished the communion of infants, although he met with some resistance³⁰. He did it many years before the Zamość Synod of 1720, which finally put an end to this custom.

It seems that nobody from the Catholic side tried to bring Sakowicz to order³¹. Against him, however, was Pimin from the Kiev Academy, under the alias of which the Metropolitan Mohyla hid himself. With regard to the accusation of the communion of infants, the defence was no less violent than the attack, but more logical. The author is based on the argument about the necessity of communion for salvation, although he does not draw such extreme conclusions as Simeon of Thessaloniki in his times. He refers to the Fathers of the Church, mainly Western Fathers, of course. Everything is subordinated to the accusation that it is in the nature of the Roman Church to deviate from the truth and to run for novelties³².

²⁸ K. Sakowicz, *Epanorthosis abo perspektywa y objaśnienie błędów, herezyjey y zabobonow w greckoruskiej cerkwi dizunitskiej*, Kraków 1642.

²⁹ Ibid., c. C4 retro.

³⁰ Ibid., 24.

³¹ Sakowicz's aggressive attitude met with far-reaching approval of the Latin Bishop of Lutsk, A. Gembicki. He agreed to produce a translation of the resolutions of the Kiev Synod of 1640, prepared by the archimandrite, with harsh remarks on the margins. Cf. *Sobór Kijowski schizmatycki przez oycę Piotra Mohilę złożony i odprawiony roku 1640, w którym iż wielkie absurday przeciwności wierze świętey katolickiey znaydują się, przeto czulością pasterską i staraniem Andrzeia Gembickiego, biskupa Łuckiego, na przestrożę Rusi nie w uniey będącey, żeby wiedziała jakiego pasterza naśladowe: który jeśli sam nie wie jako wierzy, a jakoż ich może prawdziwej wiary nauczać?*, Warsaw 1641, Kraków 1642.

³² E. Pimin, *Lithos abo kamień z procy prawdy cerkwie świętey prawosławney ruskiej na skruszenie fałeczno ciemney Perspektywy albo raczey Paszkwilu od K. Sakowicza*, Ławra Pieczarska Kijowska 1641, 70ff.

In the period of the Brest Union it is possible to observe a typical pattern of behaviour towards unification proposals. Since this controversy is dogmatically secondary, parties seeking reconciliation – all Latin theologians and Uniate theologians – try to emphasise the doctrinal legitimacy of the existing differences. Anti-Uniate theologians, on the other hand, are interested in emphasising the dogmatic importance of even secondary differences, in order to protect their Church from the destructive influence of the union in their opinion.

Sakowicz's speech was an announcement of a change in this situation. Namely, it expresses its resignation from the hope of unification of the entire Eastern Church in the Kingdom of Poland for the union. As this hope became increasingly more faint, the Uniate Church was somehow forced to look for its own formula of identity and to define its attitude towards the anti-Uniate Church. Sakowicz was the first to understand the situation intuitively, although probably not very consciously. In 1633 Władysław IV recognised the legality of the anti-Uniate hierarchy in his country. It was becoming increasingly clear that the anti-Uniates would remain a permanent and significant phenomenon in the country and that the Union process encountered almost insurmountable barriers and would stop there. As a result, in the Uniate Church there was a need for a clear separation from the anti-Uniates and development on one's own territory. In this way, the list of heresies exhibited by the Uniates on the Orthodox Church also became much longer; as part of this trend, infant communion became one of the first elements that the Uniate liturgy tried to change.

Disappearance of Infant Communion in the Uniate Church

Both in Florence and in Brest the equality of both practices with regard to the communion of infants was recognised. So how did it happen that in a relatively short time the superiority of Western discipline was recognised? A partial answer to this question can be found in the treaties on this subject of P. Arkudiusz and K. Galano, two outstanding Uniate theologians of the 17th century³³. Both theologians were closely connected with the Union movement within the territory of the Kingdom of Poland. The Greek Archduke personally participated in the Brest Synod in 1596, the Italian Galano in 1664-1666 stayed in Lviv with the union's mission among the Armenians.

³³ P. Arcudius, *De concordia Ecclesiae occidentalis et Orientalin in septem sacramentorum administratione*, Paris 1626; C. Galano, *De communione puerorum ante perfectum usum rationis*, in: *Conciliationis Ecclesiae Armenae cum Romana*, vol. 2, Rome 1661, 589-603.

According to the Archdiocese, the doctrine of the salvific necessity of giving communion infants is proclaimed not by the Greek Church, but by Greek heretics. Heresy is based on two erroneous assumptions: 1) Baptism is invalid if it is not affirmed by Confirmation and Communion; 2) Baptism forgives only sins, while God's life is given by Confirmation and Communion. Meanwhile, "through baptism man truly and inwardly becomes a righteous and holy son of God, and thus an heir and participant of the heavenly kingdom." Baptism would not be a sacrament of rebirth if we did not receive life through it. Children who die without baptism do not suffer, they only do not receive salvation. On the other hand, the Eucharist is not necessary for salvation *necessitate medii*, nor is it necessary for infants to help repel temptations, nor is it necessary for babies to eat it spiritually *in voto Ecclesiae*. Hence the danger of insult during distribution is a sufficient reason not to give communion to infants. The postulate of Arcudius is therefore unequivocal: although the Roman Church does not condemn the Greek rite, the Greeks would have done better if they had adapted to the Roman Church rather than abiding by the old custom³⁴.

The theology of Arcudius, although of a large class, is undoubtedly a western theology. This is indicated not only by its scholastic terminology (necessity of *necessitate medii*, sacrament *in voto Ecclesiae*), but above all by the one-sided concept of the salvific role of the Eucharist. It derives from the Augustinian theology of grace, understood mainly as a help on the way to salvation. Although the Eucharist for Arcudius is the sacrament of belonging to the Body of Christ, on this level the actual reception of the Eucharist is not necessary even for adults, but it is necessary as an aid in the fight against sin.

In the same spirit and using similar arguments he develops Galano's arguments. A new element of this theologian's work was the clear definition of the main objection against Western custom, formulated in the spirit of Western theology. Even if communion is not necessary for infants, it undoubtedly increases the grace of baptism. So why is it denied to infants? In answering this question, Galano does not go beyond the traditional arguments of Western theology, namely, he refers to 1 Corinthians 11:28 for the conscious reception of the Eucharist, while infants are not capable of receiving this sacrament with faith and devotion. The practical proposal for a treaty is also the same as in the case of Arcudius. The author advises Armenians to adapt to the Roman custom as a better expression of respect for the Eucharist³⁵.

³⁴ P. Arcudius, op. cit., 36-45.278-319.

³⁵ Cf. Galano, op. cit., 596f.

Both treatises are enlivened by the same concern for demonstrating the validity of Western practice and the same lack of interest in the arguments in favour of preserving traditional customs. In both treatises, it is based on Western theology, while theoretical arguments are placed above the existing tradition. In a word, Uniate theology, cutting itself off from the polemical, anti-Western tradition initiated by Simeon of Thessaloniki did not develop its own position, more in line with the spirit of the East, on the communion of infants and adopted the solutions of Western theology in their entirety. The practice quickly adapted to theology.

In the Russian Church the communion of infants was abolished by the Zamość synod in 1720. The clause authorising priests not to make changes if this threatens to be scandalous shows that the custom that was then in common use, or at least not dying out, was abolished. The text speaks with great respect about the custom to date, while the change is justified in terms of due reverence for the Blessed Sacrament and the religious harmlessness of depriving infants of communion. The Synod also decided – following the Western custom – to catechise children who are to receive Holy Communion after reaching an appropriate age³⁶.

The Zamość Synod is undoubtedly a landmark date in the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Poland. Depending on the point of view, it is said to have been a summary of more than a hundred years of united Catholicism or more than a hundred years of their Latinisation. The most important subject of the reform was the revision of liturgical books, as a result of which the Uniate liturgy was finally harmonised with the Catholic theology of the time.

The process of the disappearance of infant communion in other Uniate Churches is also significant. In this intervention of 1521 Leon X defended, among other things, the legitimacy of the communion of infants. In 1564 Pius IV included the communion of infants among the heretical and godless practices and ridiculous madness committed by the Italo-Greeks³⁷. This is the first papal statement against this rite after the Florentine Council. The sharp tone of the speech was caused by the schismatic tendencies of the Italian Greeks at the time, which led the Pope limiting their previous exemption. The Pope's inclusion of infants on the list of Greek errors is astonishing, all the more so as

³⁶ *Synodus provincialis Ruthenorum habita in civitate Zamosciae anno 1720*, Rome 1724. Quote from the second edition: Vilnae 1777, 66f.71f.

³⁷ Pius IV, *Bullarum, diplomatum et privilegiorum sanctorum Romanorum Pontificum*, vol. 7, Augustae Taurinorum 1862, 271f.

the Council of Trent, convened by the Pope two years earlier, clearly stated the orthodoxy of this ancient custom. It may be added that the Pope's decree does not contain a formal ban. The list of errors written in anger reveals the author's personal aversion to the Italian Greeks.

The communion of infants in the Italian Uniate Church was not abolished until Benedict XIV with the Constitution of *Etsi pastoralis* of 1742³⁸. Although the Popes sometimes suggested to the Eastern Churches to adopt the Roman custom, they refrained from direct interventions³⁹. Benedict XIV himself was an outstanding and kind expert in Eastern rites. He also repeatedly ordered Latin Ordinarians and priests to respect eastern liturgical differences. However, the secret of his speech on infant communion seems simple. Namely, Rome applied different rules to the Uniate Churches in the East, while treating Uniates scattered among Latins differently. In the latter case, he was rather interested in the slow absorption of the Uniates by the Latin Church, without even hesitating to use certain forms of discrimination for this purpose⁴⁰. In particular, he supported the reform of those rituals that somehow influenced the doctrine.

The correctness of the above interpretation is indicated by the fact that in the famous encyclical on Eastern rites *Allatae sunt* of 1755, the same Benedict XIV suggests abandoning the communion of infants, but does not issue any order on this subject⁴¹. Although the papal wish is different from the injunction, it is undoubtedly a form of pressure. The fact that the Pope wishes to stop the communion of infants in this encyclical sheds new light on the problem of Latinisation because the encyclical is directed against the Latinisation of Eastern rites. Benedict XIV saw the abandonment of the communion of infants not as a sign of Latinisation, but only as "a consequence of the Catholic principle of special reverence for the Blessed Sacrament."

This gives rise to a difficult and sensitive problem, where the boundary between Catholicisation and the Latinisation of the Eastern rites runs. Catholicisation expresses the Holy See's concern for the doctrinal legitimacy of Eastern Christianity. On the other hand, Latinisation, which means Latin influences that have no dogmatic or pastoral justification, is intrinsically undesirable because it contributes to the disappearance of the rich tradition of the Eastern rite.

³⁸ Benedictus XIV, *Bullarium ab anno 1746 (!) usque ad totum annum 1748*, Rome 1761, 76.

³⁹ Cf. *Letter by Gregory X of March 1577 to the Patriarch of the Maronites*, in: *Bullarium Maronitarum* (ed. T. Anaissi), Rome 1911, 72.

⁴⁰ Cf. the rules on mixed marriages in the aforementioned Constitution of Benedict XIV, *op. cit.*, 80.

⁴¹ Benedictus XIV, *Opera omnia*, vol. 8, Prati 1843, 331f.

In practice, it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between the two phenomena, especially – as can be seen in this case – when there are many reasons for both a change and abandonment of a change.

In the history of the Eastern Churches, all too often, under the slogan of eliminating doctrinal errors, this boundary has been moved in favour of Latinisation. On the other hand, the Catholic opponents of Latinisation generally did not face this problem: by postulating de-Latinisation, they kept quiet about the changes in their rite that were too clearly related to dogma.

A characteristic feature is the coincidence of some dates. In 1596, the Holy See undertook to fully respect the request of the Brest Synod that all rites and ancient ceremonies of the Greek Churches contained in the traditional liturgical books be left unchanged and completely intact⁴². In the same year, the synod of the Maronite Church, the oldest Uniate Church, introduced significant liturgical changes⁴³. Similarly, Pope Benedict XIV, who forbade Italian Uniates to give communion to infants, and advised all Uniates to stop this ritual, issued different instructions to Coptic missionaries. This was the response of the Congregation of the Holy Office of June 14, 1741 to the letter of the missionary Remigio da Trento. This missionary describes in detail the insults to which the Blessed Sacrament is threatened when given to infants. Undoubtedly he was not personally convinced of this ritual and expected that the Holy See would authorise missionaries in Egypt to stop it. However, the Congregation's answer was completely different: although it is better and more appropriate not to give communion to infants, this custom should not be pushed forward as contrary to the Copts' rite, which is ancient and does not oppose faith. In order not to discourage the very idea of union, missionaries should respect all rituals that do not endanger the soul and do not oppose the dignity of the Church. With regard to the communion of infants, it is sufficient to exercise due care to ensure that the sacrament has the respect it deserves⁴⁴.

It would be unfair to accuse the Holy See of having a double policy towards the Eastern Churches. It is enough to recall that in all Uniate settlements Rome demanded a clear renunciation of views that it considered heretical. However, it showed considerable tolerance for those rituals which it considered inappropriate (e.g. some of the seven Eucharistic errors listed by P. Skarga) or less appropriate

⁴² MUH, vol. 1, 169.

⁴³ The records of the Maronite Synod on Mount Lebanon from 1596 were published by Mansi, vol. 35, col. 1021-1028. The Synod prohibits, among other things, communion to infants (can. 7). This ban will be recalled by the synod on Mount Lebanon in 1736, *Ibid.*, vol. 38, col. 47.

⁴⁴ *Collectanea S. Congr. de Propaganda Fide*, vol. 1, Rome 1907, 100f.

(e.g. the communion of infants). In these matters, Rome basically chose a strategy of patience and not imposing anything by force. Changes were made only when the Uniates themselves became mature in their understanding and need, although sometimes the Holy See supported and even accelerated the process. Only in the case of the Italian Greeks was there direct papal intervention, while in all other cases the change was passed by the synods⁴⁵. However, judging only the method of change can be accused of the intention to deprive the Uniate Churches of their eastern identity at the root of the Roman idea of the EU.

This accusation should also be considered using the example of the Zam-ość Synod, especially criticised by opponents of the Union⁴⁶. To some extent, it was also undermined by the Uniate opponents of Latinisation⁴⁷. Resolutions of the synod only give general guidelines, rarely entering into specific matters. In the executive regulations to the liturgical reform undertaken by the synod, the justification of individual decisions was abandoned⁴⁸. That is why it is necessary to refer to a detailed study of the archimandrite of Polikarp Filipowicz, who, as a censor, prepared implementing regulations⁴⁹.

The liturgical reforms can be divided into four groups. The first included dogmatic reforms aimed at adapting the liturgy more closely to the new dogmatic situation that arose since the Union. The recollections of the Pope in the liturgy had been consistently introduced, and the symbol of faith had been placed in *Filioque*. Texts that might suggest that the fate of the deceased has not yet been resolved by the time of the final court had been retouched. The references to only seven general councils were removed, as well as references to the idea of communion with the anti-Uniate Church, e.g. the reference to customs or Kyiv synods. In the same way, the recollections of St. Grzegorz Pałama and Marek Efeski were removed. Finally, a series of reforms were undertaken, the guiding principle of which was to show special respect for the Eucharist: it was forbidden to bring wine already mixed with water to church, the ritual of pouring

⁴⁵ To these Uniate synods, which abolished the communion of infants, two Melchick synods from 1790 and 1806 should be added. Mansi, vol. 46, col. 633.732.

⁴⁶ Cf. J. Siemaszko, *Zapiski*, vol. 1, Sankt-Peterburg 1883; G. Chruszczewicz, *Istorija Zam-ojskago Sobora*, Vilnius 1880.

⁴⁷ Cf. M.M. Solowij, *De reformatione liturgica Heraclii Lisowvskij, Archiepiscopi Polocensis*, Rome 1950 h. 120-125.

⁴⁸ Ob isprawlenii bogoslužebnych knig. Okružnoje pismo uniatskago mitropolita Afanasija Szeptyckago k duchowieństwu ot 1738 goda, Poczajew 1905 (ordinance on the communion of infants can be found on page 30). This text, published as part of the anti-Uniate action, is supplied with a biased discussion of synodal regulations.

⁴⁹ MUH, vol. 5 h. 371-415.

warm water into the cup was abolished, scrupulousness was increased by the Eucharistic crumbs and the communion of infants was abandoned. Finally, in defence of the virginity of St. Joseph, the claim that he was a widower was removed, and the verse that the prophet Elijah had been sanctified even before his conception was modified.

The second group consisted of reforms with a pastoral goal. Long prayers of almost half an hour during the sacrament of penance, which made it practically impossible to use the sacrament more often and more widely, were replaced by a short liturgy, Latinised to such an extent that it even added absolution from ecclesiastical censorship. The ban on baptism during Lent was lifted and the canon refusing to baptise the deceased as a result of the duel, even if they had repented before their death, has been relaxed.

The third group included reforms directed against anti-Latin texts or texts that could be interpreted as anti-Latin texts. For example, the phrases directed against Latin people that they use unleavened bread have been deleted, the remark that baptism by only one immersion is heretical and that in such a case the baptism should be repeated and the mention of the alleged heresy of Pope Honorius had been erased.

Finally, the fourth group introduced a series of detailed deletions and retouches to adapt the liturgical books to the current liturgical reality or to adapt them to the new mentality. For example, orders no longer observed that marriage should be celebrated that baptism should be preceded by forty days of strict fasting, and participation in the liturgy by three days of sexual restraint, which also applies to lay people, had been removed. An intervention was made in a text expressing the assumption that God's judgement will take place in March. In the description of Our Lady of Sorrows, the emphasis was shifted from the external manifestations of pain to the plane of the spirit. The form of "Save me by faith and hope alone," which could be used by Protestants, was replaced by the prayer "Save me by infinite goodness and thy mercy."

The Zamość Synod became the basic point of reference for the Orthodox Church, especially the Russian criticism of the Union. In addition, this synod has been constantly invoked to justify the use of violence against the Uniate Church in 1839 and 1874. Indeed, Western influence on both the resolutions of this synod and the development of the Uniate Church in general was undoubtedly something. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the changes introduced by virtue of their very source deprived the Eastern Church of its identity or obscure it. This allegation could relate at most to some of them. For it does not seem that the essence of Eastern spirituality is total impenetrability when it comes to external influences. Nor can it be argued that this spirituality

by its very nature rejects development or the need for reform, or that it must be anti-Western or indifferent to changing pastoral needs.

The polemic about the Latinisation of the Eastern Church resembles a discussion between Slavophiles and settlers (ophthalmologists) about Russia's attitude towards the West. Just as one cannot believe that Kirejewski or Axakov were better Russians than Bieliński or Hercen, or vice versa, it would be just as risky to claim that the Uniate Church is less eastern than the Orthodox Church. Besides, the Orthodox Church is also not alien to flying tendencies, as evidenced by the role of Thomism in the Kiev Academy or the Protestant traditions of Russian school theology in the nineteenth century. As far as the Zamość Synod is concerned, it undoubtedly reflects the occidental tendencies of the living Church, whose shepherds honestly cared for the spiritual goodness of the sheepfold entrusted to them, and at the same time were sincerely attached to their rite.

Finally, it is worth summarising the reasons for the disappearance of infant communion in the Uniate Church. Although giving communion to infants does not violate any dogma, Catholic theology has pointed to dogmatic reasons, recommending that this custom be abandoned rather than upheld. The main reason for this was special respect due to the Eucharist, while the secondary reason was the fact that young children were unable to distinguish the Eucharist from ordinary bread. Therefore, the Holy See generally supported the process of departing from the ancient custom, also when it was strongly committed to defending the Eastern rite from unnecessary Latin influences. In principle, however, the changes came from the Uniate Churches themselves, although Uniate theology did not develop its own perspective on the subject, repeating only Western approaches. This state of affairs was largely due to the fact that Eastern traditional theology treated this problem in a polemical, anti-Western spirit. Moreover, the abandonment of the communion of infants brought some pastoral fruit in the form of the obligation to catechise before the first communion.

On the other hand, the dogmatic fuzziness of the problem allowed different positions to be taken on it, depending on the circumstances. As a rule, during the formation of the union, the Holy See maintained respect for the communion of infants, as well as for all rites that did not directly oppose Catholic dogma. The changes came usually after many years of communion with Rome and were a sign of the final acquisition of Catholic consciousness by the Uniate Churches, as well as an expression of a loss of hope for the Orthodox Church's union adjacent to a given Church. Different solutions to this problem reflect the classic tension between centripetal and centrifugal tendencies in the Uniate Church of the Christian East. There is no reason to attribute any of these tendencies to a monopoly on authentic Eastern spirituality.

The Problem of Infant Communion in Accusations of Latinisation of the Union

The murders committed in 1705 by Tsar Peter on the Basilians in Polotsk heralded a new period in the history of the Russian Uniate Church⁵⁰. Taking advantage of the weakening and then collapse of the Kingdom of Poland, the Tsardom began a decisive policy of violence against the union without any ideological argument or polemics. As we know, there was no shortage of rape – mutual rape – during the enlargement of the Union. However, while in connection with the Brest Union a rich theology developed, both propagating and fighting the union, now the polemic theology had been replaced by imperial demonstrations and official writings of Orthodox bishops and tsarist governors. In the times of the Kingdom of Poland, decisions about the union were made by the interested parties themselves. For example, the diocese of Przemyśl adopted the union only in 1692, the Lviv diocese in 1700, and Łuck in 1702, because the bishops of these dioceses did not join the union until then. The anti-Uniate hierarchy was allowed to exist even in those cities whose rightful bishops accepted the union, which was tantamount to allowing for the existence of a diocese in the Uniate diocese. Now the Tsardom had appropriated the right to decide on the faith of the subjects. Its policy consistently sought the complete liquidation of the union and in a short period of time it reached its goal, despite the interruption in persecution that took place during the reign of Paul I and Alexander I.

In view of the complete lack of polemic literature during this period, the study of the problem of infant communion must necessarily confine itself to describing the mechanism of this silence, as well as the restoration of the paths of liturgical reform, carried out under the slogan of returning to the pure Eastern liturgy. The period of persecution during the reign of Catherine II may be omitted, despite all its sharpness, as there was no attempt to interfere in the liturgy celebrated by the Uniate Church at that time⁵¹.

The official beginning of the liquidation of the union was – inspired by the memorial of a young Uniate priest J. Siemaszko – the depiction of Nicholas

⁵⁰ Ibid., 14-28.

⁵¹ Cf. extensive set of documents, MUH. vol. 7. The military action of Catherine was accompanied by propaganda developed by G. Konisski, the Orthodox archbishop of Mohilev, about the alleged persecution that the Orthodox Church was supposed to suffer at that time from the Uniates. G. Konisskij, *Słowa i riecz, Mogilew 1392*. The history of the whole action was prepared in the biased spirit by M. Kojalowicz, *Istorija wozsojedinenija zapadno-russkich uniatow starych wremien*, Saint-Petersburg 1873.

I from 22 April 1828, establishing a church college of the Greek-Uniate Church⁵². The tsar imposed on the college, among other things, the obligation to ensure that the liturgy in the Uniate Church was purely eastern, not polluted by foreign influences, which was guaranteed in the Uniate bullae of 1595. The show was unequivocally directed against the Zamość synod⁵³. The more far-sighted immediately saw in it a stage on the road to the liquidation of the union⁵⁴. In a short period of time new tsarist and college decrees appeared, which introduced the Russian language into schools and seminars, abolished Basilian monasteries, ordered the expulsion of organs, bells, limited contacts with the Latin Church and the suchlike. The new regulations were published by the Tsarist authorities⁵⁵. At the same time, the repression of priests opposed to the changes took place, such as expulsion from the parish, flogging, imprisonment, penance in an Orthodox monastery or deportation.

The key factor was the decree of the college of 7 February 1834, which ordered the Uniate Orthodox churches to accept liturgical books, printed in the synodal printing house in Moscow⁵⁶. In a memorial to the government from 3 October 1837, Siemaszko himself stressed that the Uniate religion consists almost exclusively of simple people, for whom external differences are the most important obstacle to turning to Orthodoxy. This explains why it was necessary to introduce the decoration and liturgical rituals of the Greek-Russian Orthodox Church into the Uniate Church. With all their practical significance, they did not violate dogmatic and fundamental beliefs, and therefore, according to the author, they could not give either the Uniate clergy or the Latin an important reason for protest or justified complaints⁵⁷. The “Uniate Work” – as Siemaszko perversely calls the whole action – was clearly subordinated to Great Belarusian nationalism, with the aim of transforming the Uniate “from semi-Polish Catholics into Orthodox Russians.”⁵⁸ This transformation was to take place “imperceptibly” (*nieczuwstwi-tielno, niezamietno* – words often appearing on the pages of Siemaszko’s *Notes*).

⁵² MUH, vol. 8, 146-150.

⁵³ This was immediately understood in Rome. This is evidenced by a report written in November 1828 by Archbishop Caprano of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith on the possible consequences of the tsarist ukase. MUH, vol. 8, 133-146. Among the rituals at risk, Caprano also mentions a new practice for the communion of infants. *Ibid.*, 139.

⁵⁴ Cf. statement by A. Campodonico, who was in St. Petersburg at the time. MUH, vol. 8 131ff.

⁵⁵ The main documents on this subject were collected by J. Siemaszko himself, in: *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 662ff.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 14.19.

⁵⁸ Memorial of June 1835, *Ibid.*, vol. 1, 691.

It was striking that there was no effort on the part of the reformers to convince them of the rightness of the changes introduced. The changes were introduced on a flat-rate basis, under the slogan of de-Latinisation and de-Polonisation. There was not even a list of Latinisms that should be cleaned from the Uniate liturgy – it was to be undertaken automatically, by the very use of the Moscow liturgical book⁵⁹. In addition to the insistence that the clergy should actually celebrate according to these books, the main attention was paid to the introduction of the tsarist gates, the ejection of organs, bells.

The tomb of God decorated in the Polish way or paintings of St. Francis⁶⁰. The “Uniate Work” was completed on 12 February 1839, when the incorporation of the Uniate Church in Russia to the Orthodox Church was officially announced.

Similarly, although with some modifications, the union was liquidated in the Congress Kingdom as part of Russification after Poland’s January Uprising⁶¹. Since it was no longer possible to carry out “*nieczuwstwitielno*” in this liquidation, its promoters (Bishop-intruder M. Popiel and several dozen priests – apostates from Galicia) were Orthodox from the very beginning. A police method of summoning priests individually was also undertaken in order to force them to adopt the Orthodox Church. There were attempts to convince, but above all the argument that Orthodoxy is the indigenous religion of these lands was developed. In the face of the actual failure of the whole action, an opinion was even voiced that for the liturgy to be purely Orthodox, it is not necessary to fully comply with the Moscow liturgical books⁶².

However, with regard to the communion of infants, the Uniate discipline, as too openly Latin, could not be tolerated. Thus, for example, in the report of an archival visit in 1880 in the former Uniate Orthodox churches of Chełm region, there is information that in some churches, according to the old Orthodox custom, during the bishop’s liturgy, children were brought to Holy Communion

⁵⁹ The only such list can be found in the unfinished work of Siemaszko of 1827 r. *Socinienie o Prawosławii Wostocznoj Cerkwi*, printed *ibid.*, vol. 1 308-339. The author mentions, among other things, the abandonment of the communion of infants (p. 332).

⁶⁰ These cases are, for example, the only subject of a visit to parishes carried out by Siemaszko in 1837. 2, 39-55. Sensitised to the way priests celebrate the liturgy, Siemaszko does not mention giving communion or not to infants. This is probably due to the fact that communion was rarely celebrated at that time.

⁶¹ Cf. J. Pruszkowski, *Martyrologium czyli Męczeństwo Unii S-tej na Podlasiu*, vol. 1-2, Lublin 1921-1922.

⁶² Cf. *Niedoumjennyje woprosy cerkownej praktiki w sowierszenii bogosluženiija*, Chołmsko-Warszawskij Eparchialnyj Wiestnik 8 (1886), 61f.

in significant numbers – up to 40, and up to as many as 60⁶³. This indicates the introduction of this rite by new hosts and from this point of view it is a secondary matter whether the information concerns a fact or just a desire for a fact. A separate question on this subject in the Catechism's elaboration of the sacrament of Penance and the Eucharist has a similar meaning⁶⁴.

There are still some anti-Latin tendencies to be discussed in the Uniate Church itself. Such tendencies were never lacking in the Uniate Church and they had their prominent representatives also among the hierarchy, e.g. Bishop of Chełm J. Susza (1652-1685) or Archbishop of Polotsk H. Lisowski (1784-1809). The latter began work on the de-Latinisation of the Uniate liturgy, criticising the Zamość synod for this. He justified his intention with a practical objective, i.e. with regard to the enlargement of the Union. Excessive separateness of the Uniate liturgy from the schismatic liturgy, as it is called, alienated the anti-Uniates to the Union, hence the differences had to be reduced to a minimum. The list of Latinisms drawn up by Lisowski on 28 December 1786 in a letter to the Warsaw nuncio F. Saluzzo is extensive⁶⁵. It is striking that there are no changes aimed at taking care of the special respect due to the Blessed Sacrament. Lisowski is also silent about the abandonment of the communion of infants. At the same time, the openness and courage with which the Polotsk archbishop describes the reform he is carrying out suggests that the reason for this silence is not the fear of being put at risk by the Holy See, but rather his own Catholic consciousness, i.e. the awareness of the dimensions of dogmatic changes not included in the list. If this silence was due to tactical reasons, it was at least testimony that the author knew that in the eyes of the Holy See these changes had a connection with dogma.

In the 19th century only the Uniate Church in Galicia could develop normally, but the situation of the union in the Tsardom of Russia contributed to a significant inhibition of anti-Latin tendencies in it. They appeared only marginally and in the form of pro-Orthodox and Belarusian currents⁶⁶. The situation at the time is reflected in the commentary by the Lviv metropolitan H. Jachimowicz to the encyclical *Amantissimus* of Pius IX dedicated to the

⁶³ Ibid., 2 (1880), 325.

⁶⁴ *Katichizickeskoje uczenije prawosławnej Cerkwi o tainstwach Pokajaniija i św. Priczaszczenija*, Ibid., 6 (1884), 303.

⁶⁵ This letter was published by M. M. Soloviy, op. cit., 120-125.

⁶⁶ Galician Ukrainian activists have often complained that Poles exaggerate the importance of these trends. Cf. *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae* (publ. M. Harasiewicz), Leopoli 1862, 1023; H. Jachimowicz, *De ritibus observandis*, Leopoli 1862, 16.

Eastern liturgies. The Metropolitan omitted the papal warning against arbitrary reforms in liturgy and the use of liturgical books not approved by the Holy See, believing that it did not apply to his Church⁶⁷. At that time, the decisions of the Zamość Synod were universally adhered to in the matter of communion for children, as can be seen from the reactions of the Galician Uniates to the Eucharistic revival in Pius X's time. They prove that the Latin custom was rooted and unchallenged there⁶⁸.

The internal tension between the two tendencies only revived in the Galician Church after the First World War. The centripetal tendencies were mainly represented in the Lviv environment, under the patronage – albeit with some distance – of Metropolitan A. Szeptycki himself⁶⁹. The main motor behind this trend was the monthly magazine *Nywa*, headed for many years by H. Kostelnyk, known especially from his activity in 1945. The Ideal Bible of *Nywa* and the whole current was the famous work of C. Koralewski (real name: Charron) about the Uniate movement⁷⁰. In fact, it was only after its appearance that Byzantinism (as the movement described itself) became apparent as a phenomenon that was important and had a clearly defined ideology⁷¹. The aim of Byzantinism was to restore its original purity to the Eastern rite. The crossing of different elements in the union was, as it was claimed, the most serious obstacle to its propagation. Kostelnyk even went so far as to dubiously claim that Russia hated the union mainly because it saw it as a tool for the Latinisation and Polonisation of the Russian nation. If the Uniate Church had not been Latinised and Polonised at the time, the Tsardom of Russia, according to the author, would have had almost no reason to persecute the Union⁷². With regard to the Eucharistic customs, Kostelnyk decisively questioned the need for the Eastern rite to accept

⁶⁷ H. Jachimowicz, op. cit., 12-17.

⁶⁸ Cf. I. Czarnodola, *Ważniest perszoj św. spowidi i perszoho św. pryczastyja ta sposib prigotowanja ditej do sych św. Tajn*, *Nywa* 3 (1906), 285-290.314-320; K. Czechowicz, *Dekret św. Apost. Prestola o perszom pryczastyju ditej*, *Wistnyk Peremyskoj Eparchii* 24 (1912), 142-144. The second item is a pastoral letter on the occasion of the decree *Quam singulari*. K. Czechowicz comments with particular fondness on the passus of the decree, expressing sympathetically about the custom of giving communion to infants in the Eastern liturgies. In his statement, however, there is not even a trace of a postulate to restore this custom in the Galician liturgy.

⁶⁹ A. Szeptyckij, *Pastyrskij lyst pro obrjadowi sprawy*, Lwiv 1931. The author proclaims the need for moderate de-Latinisation of the Greek liturgy, emphasising that the reform can only be carried out by canonical means.

⁷⁰ C. Korolevskij, *L'uniatisme (Irènikon 5-6)*, Prieuré d'Amay 1927.

⁷¹ H. Kostelnyk, *Unija w ewolucji*, *Nywa* 23 (1928), 1-5.

⁷² H. Kostelnyk, *Na zakinczannja*, *ibid.*, 24 (1929), 376.

the liturgical consequences of the doctrine of concomitance⁷³. Of course, from this perspective, Eucharistic adoration or resistance to communion for infants is pure Latinism, which stems from Western theology and has nothing to do with Catholic dogma.

The pro-western trend, weaker in number, found its hot leader in the bishop of Stanisławów region, H. Chomyszyn. In his opinion, the liturgical purism of the Byzantines was a deadly threat to the religious vitality of the Uniate Church. He considered the doctrinal hostility of the Byzantines towards the creative religious influences of the Western Church as a manifestation of the schismatic spirit. Understanding the need for a special rite for converts from the Orthodox Church, he believed that the desire to adapt the liturgy more closely to Catholic spirituality would be born in them organically, as they become more deeply rooted in the Catholic Church⁷⁴.

We should also mention the developing neo-Uniate movement in pre-war Poland, which set itself the goal of restoring union in the former Russian partition⁷⁵. Despite celebration of God's service in the rite adopted in the Russian Orthodox Church, i.e. Byzantine-Slavic, it is difficult to see in this movement a manifestation of Byzantine tendencies. Anyway, the movement gathered activists and apostles rather than theorists and theologians. Catholic priests celebrating in this rite gave communion to infants in accordance with its principles⁷⁶.

Summary

1. The Greek-Latin dispute over the communion of infants is an integral part of the dispute over Eucharistic worship. The reason for the dispute are the changes in the western liturgy as a result of the reaction against Berengar. The changes themselves were based on drawing consequences from the traditional Eucharistic realism, but they are a novelty in relation to specific traditional

⁷³ H. Kostelnyk, *Stojannja i kljaczannja w cerkwi*, *ibid.*, 24 (1929), 201-209. Kostelnyk studied this problem in depth in parts in subsequent issues of *Nywa* work on epiclesis from 1928.

⁷⁴ H. Chomyszyn, *Pastyrskij lyst pro wyzantijstwo*, Stanisławiw 1931, 8. Therefore, Chomyszyn defends fervently Eucharistic adoration, devotion to the Sacred Heart, apostolate of prayer. *Ibid.*, 19, 27 n.

⁷⁵ Cf. E. Wyczawski, *Ruch neounijny w Polsce w latach 1923-1939*, *STV* 8(1970)1, 409-420.

⁷⁶ They explicitly provide for communion of infants in the liturgical books of this rite: *Liturgical book*, Rim 1943, 283-286; *Trebnik*, vol. 1, Rim 1945, 286-276; and the columns for these books: *Treboispolnienije*, vol. 2, Rim 1951, 36f.

customs. Thus, Orthodox theology accused the West of illegitimate novelty in relation to traditional rites, while Catholic theology justified the changes with fidelity to the traditional worship of the Blessed Sacrament. Both approaches reflect two different approaches to ecclesiastical tradition. In the East, more attention is paid to the permanence of the deposit received, while in the West, the need for the organic development of tradition is appreciated.

2. In addition, the dispute revealed separate positions on the necessity of the Eucharist for salvation. Some emphasised the *sacramentum*, while others emphasised *res*. Eastern theology taught about the necessity of material consumption of the Eucharist, and Simeon of Thessaloniki or Gregory Dattivensis even claimed that anyone who has never consumed the Eucharist can never be saved. Western theology, on the other hand, emphasised that already through baptism man really becomes a member of the Body of Christ.

3. The dispute revealed the different links between the theology of the Eucharist and theology of grace. The Eastern followers of infant communion saw in the Eucharist, above all, the food of a new creation, food for eternal life. Defenders of the Western custom emphasised that infants are free from temptation, so they do not need the help of the Eucharist in the fight against evil. The first theology links the Eucharist rather with the grace of holiness, the second with the grace of works.

4. The diversity of liturgical disciplines is also reflected in pastoral ministry. In the churches that administer all three sacraments of initiation to infants, there is less awareness that anyone, not only a priest, can baptise someone in life-threatening circumstances.

5. The original attitude towards the other party's otherness was characterised by aggressive reluctance on both sides. However, the allegation of a deviation from the truth appeared only in Eastern theology. This is not some particular merit of Western theology but is due to objective reasons. Western theology, by its very nature, could not sharply stigmatise a custom, the tradition of which was indisputable.

6. At the Florentine Council, which clearly distinguished heresies from legitimate differences, the communion of infants was placed on the list of the latter. However, as the Florentine solutions were not widely accepted, they increased the original diversity of positions. In the Orthodox Church, it is still generally considered dogmatically unacceptable not to grant communion to infants. The position of Orthodox theology has become established especially during anti-Uniate polemics. In the Western Church, on the other hand, the admissibility of the Eastern custom is now clearly proclaimed, however, quite often its own custom is considered to be more appropriate. This teaching was officially confirmed by the Council of Trent.

7. Uniate theology, in defending the legitimacy of Western custom, basically uses classical Western argumentation, which sees in the Eucharist above all the source of works and graces.

8. In the post-reform period, especially in the polemic after the Brest Union, Catholics of both rites often invoke the communion of infants as a testimony to the legitimacy of communion in one form.

9. The Uniate opponents of the Latinisation of the union most often did not take a clear position on the western influences on the Eucharistic spirituality of the Uniate Churches. The subject of their criticisms were, by their very nature, those manifestations of Latinisation which have no connection with dogma. The silence about transformations in Eucharistic spirituality expressed rather the conviction that these changes were correct. Partly, however, it could have been tactical silence. History also knows of the silence caused by the disregard for theology, which was replaced by official orders and repressions during the liquidation of the union.

10. Using the example of the communion of infants, the difficulty of carrying out a strict borderline between the catholicisation and the Latinisation of the Eastern liturgy is revealed. With regard to Eucharistic customs, this distinction depends on the extent to which the doctrine of concomitance and the liturgical consequences drawn from it in the Western Church belong to the essence of Catholicism, and to what extent they are only a specific feature of Western spirituality. Traditionally, the first alternative was rather accepted, but in the twentieth century there were opinions in favour of a second solution.

The Dogma of Salvation in Jesus Christ, Presented in Various Ways in Prophesying and Explained in Theology*

The salvation of man by Jesus Christ is the core of the Christian message. Jesus is the Saviour of mankind and His very name was given to Him by the Heavenly Father's, as proclaimed by an angel. The fact of salvation can and must be said to be fortified by dogmatic certainty, derived from the universal and consensual proclamation by the Church of what was previously contained in the Scriptures.

It may come as a surprise that with certainty of fact there is a large discrepancy in the description of how salvation was achieved and how it becomes our property. There are different, quite different ways of presenting this truth, and these differences can be seen both in the *Catechism's* proclamation of the Church and in professional theological studies. The subject of the present article will be the different forms (catechism and theology) that still coexist in today's consciousness of faith: the older ones, anchored in the transmission of the *Catechism of the Council of Trent*¹ and developed within the framework of traditional theology and the more recent ones developed within the framework of the Council and post-conciliar *aggiornamento*, visible in the catechisms² and in theological reflection.

* STV 31(1993)2.

¹ *Catechismus ex decreto ss. Concilii Tridentini ad parochos Pii V Pont. Maximi editus*, Patavii 1757.

² The bibliographical data will be provided later in the appropriate places.

Post-Trent Proclamation of Salvation

This form was expressed both in the *Catechism of the Council of Trent* and in theological studies. The *Catechism* discusses this issue in several places:

First, when explaining the second article of the *Apostles' Creed*: "in Jesus Christ, his only Son, our Lord."

The faith expressed in this article is the foundation of our salvation and redemption. The biblical basis for this assessment is the text 1J 4:15: "If anyone acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, God lives in them and they in God." Confirmation may also be the praise of Peter's confession contained in Mt 16:17.

The *Catechism* sees the historical and thought context of Christ's work of salvation in Adam's sin and its unfortunate consequences for the whole human family. From the state of ruin in which mankind fell, none of the people, not even of the angels, could lift it up. There is only one solution left: the infinite power of the Son of God accepting the weakness of our flesh that could remove the infinite power of sin and reconcile us with God in his blood. The very name Jesus, given to the Child at God's explicit command, signifies, and announces in Him, the Saviour. This name, known in the Old Testament, belongs to the Son of God in a special way, because *to the people of all times, sitting in the darkness of death and entangled in the cruel bonds of sin and the devil, brought light, freedom and salvation.* He also acquired for them the right of inheritance into the kingdom of heaven and reconciled them to God the Father³.

When discussing the next article (*who was born of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary*), the *Catechism* says that the Son of God became a man so that we could become sons of God⁴. Of the incarnate Son of God it is said that the Apostle calls him the new Adam, in whom we are all called to life, who has become the cause of grace and glory⁵. The *Catechism* does not enter into a more precise definition of the relationship between incarnation and our salvation, nor does it give us an explanation of how we become sons in the Son and at what moment and by what act Jesus Christ becomes the cause of grace and glory, at the same time gaining for Himself the right to the title of New Adam.

When discussing the fourth article of the *Apostles' Creed* (*suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died and was buried*) we first meet the question: what was the reason that the Son of God undertook such a cruel torment. The *Catechism* tells those who ask about the cause to answer that it is made up

³ *Catechismus...*, op. cit., 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 48.

of human sins and misdeeds from all previous and later history. The Son of God, the Saviour, in his Passion was oriented towards this (*hoc spectavit*) in order to redeem and destroy the sins of all times, i.e. to make sufficient and abundant reparation for them to the Father (*cumulate et abunde*)⁶.

On the second question: What benefits and favours the Passion of Jesus brought us, the *Catechism* responds with the statement that the Passion brought us: liberation from sin, freedom from the tyrannical power of the demon, repayment of the penalty due for sins, reconciliation with the Father by a beloved sacrifice, opening the blocked access to heaven⁷.

The *Catechism of the Council of Trent* sees also the salvific dimension of Christ's resurrection, although it places it only in fourth place among the reasons why the very fact of resurrection was necessary. The previous reasons are: 1) the exaltation of the Lord; 2) the revival of faith and 3) the strengthening of hope. After stating these we learn that the resurrection was necessary also because of the completion of the mystery of our salvation and redemption. Through death, Christ freed us from sin, and by resurrection he restored to us the essential favours that we lost through sin. One of these favours is the resurrection of the body which in the resurrection of Christ has its causative and exemplary cause. For the biblical justification of the salvific dimension of the resurrection, the texts of Rom 4:25 and 1 Cor 15:21 are cited. The theological justification for the relationship between the Lord's resurrection and our resurrection the *Catechism* sees in that the humanity of Christ serves as a causative tool for God in the whole salvific work. "That is why, we read, Christ's resurrection became a certain instrument in making our resurrection."⁹

From the texts and thoughts they contain, we can see that the *Catechism of Trent*, using the message of the Bible, was able to point to many aspects of Christ's salvific work in its light. This applies mainly to death and resurrection, with a slight emphasis on the salvific effects of the very fact of the Incarnation.

The incarnation has been included, in accordance with the Anselmian-Thomistic concept, as a necessary condition for salvific death, and more specifically as a requirement for the full atonement of God's justice for the sins of the world.

⁶ Ibid., 58.

⁷ Ibid., 61.

⁸ Ibid., 74.

⁹ Ibid., 73: "Quare eius resurrectio instrumentum quoddam fuit ad resurrectionem nostram efficiendam."

The *Catechism* uses the notion of *satisfaction* (reparation) in discussing the sacrament of reconciliation, seeing in it the third essential part of the Church's sacramental penance. First of all, there is a short definition of satisfaction, understood as compensation for the harm done to another person. The highest degree of satisfaction is contained in the death of Jesus Christ on the cross, through which all our debts against God have been set off, even assuming that God wanted to deal with us according to the strict rigours of the law¹⁰. No creature was able to make such an atonement, and therefore, as John the Apostle testifies, "He Himself is the atonement sacrifice for our sins, and not only for our sins, but also for the sins of the whole world" (1J 2:2).

The *Catechism* describes Christ's atonement as: "full and sufficient satisfaction, fully and justly responding to the accounts of all the crimes committed in this world; its importance also makes human acts meaningful before God, without which it would not be worthy of the slightest attention."¹¹ From the words of the *Catechism* we can see that the doctrine of *Christ's salvation places within the framework of the Anselmian concept of Atonement, which aims to clarify the relationship between the Saviour's work and the situation of the Saviour. The reward given to God for us and in our name is the essence of Christ's action. The act of atonement should include all the consequences of the crucifixion listed above, such as liberation from sin, freeing from Satan's tyrannical power, etc., as well as all the consequences of the crucifixion. And where to put the salvific effects of the resurrection?* The *Catechism* mentions them, but does not elaborate on their explanation. Silence on this subject – similarly as on the Incarnation – is a weakness of the presentation of faith discussed here.

The discussed catechism lecture turns out – at closer look – to be a constituent adaptation to the pastoral needs of the Anselmian-Thomistic concept of salvation. Within this framework, the fundamental role is played by the death on the cross which in itself is the full offsetting of our debts to God and the acquisition by merit of all salvific favours¹².

The Resurrection in the concept of Thomas is treated as *the completion of the work of salvation*, which is to be understood in the sense that just as Christ saved us from all evil by the abolished Passion, so by the glory of the Resurrection

¹⁰ Ibid., 304.

¹¹ Ibid., 305: "Haec igitur plena et cumulata est satisfactio, scelerum omnium rationi, quae in hoc saeculo commissa sunt, pariter eequaliterque respondens: Cuius pondere hominum actiones apud Deum plurimum valent, ac sine eo nulla prorsus aestimatione dignae haberentur."

¹² STh III, 48, a. 1 c; Cf. comment: C. Billuart, *Cursus theologiae (Supplementum)*, *Opus posthumum*, Wirzeburgi 1760, 443-448.

he lifted us up to all good, according to the words of Paul: He was delivered over to death for our sins and was raised to life for our justification.” (Rom 4:25).

Developing the above thought of Thomas, C. Billuart, a commentator for Thomas¹³¹⁴ says that it is not to be understood in the sense that the resurrection has merited justification, nor merely that it is the model of our justification but that if Christ had not risen we would not have attained the righteousness merited to us by the Passion. For it was decided in God’s ordinances that the Holy Spirit should not be given, that the apostles should not be sent with preaching, nor should the fruits of the Passion be applied to us except after the resurrection, as the words of the Scriptures testify: “Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer and on the third day rise from the dead, and that repentance for[a] the forgiveness of sins” (Lk 24:46); and “the Spirit had not been given, since Jesus had not yet been glorified” (J 7:39).

The juxtaposition of the teachings of *the Catechism of the Council of Trent* with Thomistic theology shows that their ways of thinking were close, or even overlapping each other. It is therefore hardly surprising that the school theology of the post-Trent period, using the findings of such authorities, followed the marked paths, presenting a soteriology of atonement deserving as the most correct and complete lecture of faith in the salvation of Jesus Christ¹⁵.

In the theological textbooks of the post-Trent period, attention was paid in the first place to the person of Jesus Christ and his living structure (Christology), and only in the second place to his salvific achievements for the good of man (soteriology)¹⁶. Jesus Christ was seen as the Mediator by the power of His own being, revealed in one divine-human person. He is a bridge between people and God.

After this initial arrangement of Jesus Christ as a mediator, the post-Trent theologians moved on to a more detailed description of His salvific function for the benefit of the people¹⁷. There are two trends in this description: 1) specific to Latin Roman schools, and 2) associated with Northern European

¹³ STh III, 53, a. 1 ad 3.

¹⁴ C. Billuart, op. cit., 460.

¹⁵ L. Ott, *Précis de théologie dogmatique*, Paris 1955, 267-277.

¹⁶ Cf. F. Dziasek, *Jezus Chrystus – Boski Posłaniec, I Traktat chrystologiczny*, Poznań-Warsaw-Lublin 1962; *Jezus Chrystus – Zbawcze Misterium, II Traktat soteriologiczny*, Poznań-Warsaw-Lublin 1962.

¹⁷ A good description of the textbook soteriology of the pre-conciliar period is presented in: H. Kessler, *Die theologische Bedeutung des Todes Christi. Eine traditions-geschichtliche Studie*, Düsseldorf 1970, 11-18.

centres¹⁸. The textbooks of the “Roman” tendency taught that Jesus saved mankind by his passion and death, interpreted in Thomistic categories of atonement, merit, sacrifice and redemption. In the way of addition (*Scholion*) it was said in these textbooks that also “descent into hell,” resurrection and ascension have some salvific meaning. Textbooks from northern centres usually presented a slightly different order in the lecture on soteriological doctrine. Salvation was presented as a process realised in the three functions of Jesus Christ: as prophet, king and priest. The first rose to the surface in teaching, the second in glorious rule, and the third in sacrificial torment and glorious heavenly worship. The most important element for our salvation is the priestly function, and the main effort to explain theology has been concentrated around it. In the very explanation of the salvific significance of Jesus’ death, the two tendencies do not actually differ, seeing in it the atonement, merit, sacrifice, and redemption.

It is worth noting that already in the pre-conciliar period attempts were made to combine the salvation of mankind with the whole event of Christ, encompassing the whole human existence of Jesus Christ, from the Incarnation to the glorious exaltation.

2. Dutch Catechism (“De Nieuwe Catechismus”) as an Attempt at a Breakthrough in Soteriology¹⁹

The *Dutch Catechism* places the matter of human salvation against the background of widespread human misery, which gives rise to a sense of emptiness, pain and misery. A person living in the world does not enjoy a state of sufficient and certain happiness. One can only long for such a state and really misses it. Some ideological doctrines (Marxism, humanism), as well as the great world religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam), are coming forward with a cure for this situation. “The Catechism discusses the soteriological proposals of these ideologies and religions, stating that they are fundamentally inadequate.”²⁰ This is particularly evident in the proposal of secular soteriology which wants to link liberation from life’s deficiencies exclusively with the progress of knowledge and

¹⁸ H. Kessler calls this second tendency “German” theology. It seems that this term tightens the scope of this tendency, which was not alien to Polish theology.

¹⁹ I use the Italian version of the Catechism: *II Nuovo Catechismo Olandese, Torino-Leumann 1969. This version includes the translation of the original as well as: Dichiarazione della Commissione Cardinalizia del 15 ottobre 1968 and Supplemento al Nuovo Catechismo.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 325-333.

the development of civilization. The *Catechism* notes that the message of progress can make a bitter mockery of a human being at critical moments of life. "Try to talk about the progress of mankind – we read in the text – to someone who has a daughter mortally wounded in front of him in a road accident."²¹ Progress can – and often actually does – have even more tragic consequences in terms of the suffering and death of millions.

Does Jesus Christ free us from this unhappy condition? The *Catechism* sees the answer to this question in an old Christian statement: Jesus is alive. It declares victory over sin and death. For the ailing father it carries a message: Your daughter will live and will live in her own personal reality. Without resurrection, our faith loses its meaning, making us people worthy of pity and, at the same time, deceivers in the most important problem of humanity. Jesus' resurrection means that the works undertaken on earth will find their fulfilment in glory²².

From the Gospel's message we learn that we have been saved not only by Christ's resurrection, but also by his death. How to understand that death can save someone? It is a mystery that cannot be entirely expressed in words, even if the heart grasps what it is all about. However, it is necessary to stop at this point in order to move away from the one-sided concepts with which this truth has managed to integrate. Unilateralism can be seen in such an approach to salvific death, in which death serves to rectify the violated juridical order, where a misdemeanour is painfully punished. The *Catechism* departs from this view, replacing the juridical order with a personal layout. This system of negligence towards God is repaired by apology and active fulfilment of love, i.e. a noble life in which God has a liking. The Father expected such a life from Jesus and will meet with such a life. A beautiful life led Jesus to a violent death, before which He did not retreat, remaining faithful to His chosen path. In this way, says the *Catechism*, Jesus attained forgiveness for us, and about death, as an expression of supreme obedience, we can say that it was wanted by God²³. It is difficult to say, however, that God waited until the blood flowed and that it was only this blood that soothed Him.

The authors of the *Catechism* recall from the New Testament those words which describe the process of our salvation. These are: redemption, reconciliation, justice, blood, sin. Do they really serve – as some people want – to express the idea of a bloody restoration of the order?

²¹ Ibid., 336.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 338: "In questo senso possiamo dire che la sua morte fa parte della volontà del Padre."

Jesus “redeemed” us by His death. This word reminds us of the freeing of Israel from Egypt. This means that the people have become God’s property anew. Similarly, through the death of Jesus, we begin to belong again to God through a renewed covenant.

In the New Testament we continue to read that through Jesus’ death we were “reconciled” to God. A careful reading shows that the New Testament does not say that God has reconciled himself to us but that we have reconciled ourselves to God. It turns out that there was no need to reconcile an angry God with man but only to lead a wicked man to God. Here too it is a matter of renewing the covenant. This renewal is accomplished through God’s “righteousness” which is not limited to the strict requirement of punitive retribution but is manifested in God’s creative power, which makes us righteous and good.

Then we have the word “blood.” During the last supper the Lord spoke: “for this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins” (Mt 26:28). The word “blood” is extremely important for understanding Jesus’ work. It refers to the blood of the covenant of Sinai: a sacrifice was made there for Yahweh, while the blood that already belonged to God was used to sprinkle the people. Blood is a gift from God to Israel: one and the same blood (read: life) in God and in people. The fraternity of blood creates a kind of kinship²⁴. In this arrangement, the blood of Jesus is not so much a gift to God, but rather a gift from God to people. Jesus gives His blood to us, and God’s blood becomes our blood. We become close to God as part of a new covenant in blood.

Finally, we encounter the word “sin” at St. Paul’s in this context: “God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God.” (2 Cor 5:21). What does the text want to say? Most likely, Jesus joined our world, marked by sin and death. He became a part of this world in order to give us his holiness here. He becomes subject to the curse, as hanging on a tree, to free us from the curse over our curses²⁵.

According to the authors of the *Catechism*, all these expressions signify Jesus’ obedience, His devotion to the cause until his death. They do not say that God needed Jesus’ suffering as a substitute punishment for us²⁶. Rather, God needed His life as a substitute for love in our name. This love had to pass through death, and that is why we can say that we were saved (redeemed) by Jesus’ death.

²⁴ Ibid., 339.

²⁵ Ibid., 340.

²⁶ Ibid.: “Non significano perciò che il Padre abbia avuto bisogno delle sofferenze di Gesù come punizione sostitutiva al nostro posto.”

In summing up his arguments, the *Catechism* asks the question: can we express in short words the way in which the Lord saves us? He attacks evil and sin at the very root, when he becomes obedient until death. In this obedience the true Good Man is revealed. His Spirit tries to prolong this goodness in us, making what is called a new birth in man. The new birth puts mankind in the face of the duty to work to overcome sin and misery. On this way a man united in solidarity with Christ can come to the glory of the Resurrection, that is, to victory over all forms of evil.

The version of the doctrine of salvation in Jesus Christ presented by *Nieuwe Katechismus* provoked very different reactions, from words of appreciation to severe criticism²⁷. Among the critical voices, the first and most important is the assessment contained in the *Declaration of the Cardinal Commission* of 15 October 1968²⁸. The *Commission*, without assessing the catechism concept as a whole, points to those elements which it lacks and which should be present. In the *Catechism*, the essential elements of the doctrine of reparation, which are part of the faith, must be laid out without any doubt, as the Commission demands. In support of this request, the *Declaration* quotes biblical, patristic and magisterial texts in which – in the opinion of its authors: there is a teaching of compensation. Compensation is closely linked to the concept of merit, about which, according to the Commission; we are taught by our faith and therefore merit must also be included in the description of Christ's salvific work. By his Passion, the Saviour compensated in the eyes of his heavenly Father for all the sins of the world and made grace be restored to mankind as the favours merited to him by his Head²⁹.

The text of the *Catechism*, corrected in accordance with the above recommendations, can be found in the *Supplemento* appended thereto³⁰. The meaning of this improved version is synthetically expressed by its last sentences: "Holy, innocent and without blemish (cf. Hebrews 7:26) – not affected by any punishment by the Father himself – accepted his sinful brothers as their mediator (cf. 1 Timothy 2:5) that death which was for them the wages of sin (cf. Rom 6.23). In this way he repaired before God all their crimes and merited the fact that

²⁷ Cf. *Report über den Holländischen Katechismus. Dokumente – Berichte – Kritik*, Freiburg/Br 1969.

²⁸ *Dichiarazione della Commissione Cardinalizia sul "Nuovo Catechismo"* ("de Nieuwe Katechismus"), in: *Nuovo Catechismo Olandese*, Torino 1969, 3-12.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 7f.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 46-48.

God's grace was given anew to mankind, which (mankind) itself in the person of its Head contributed to its restoration."³¹

The amendments introduced at the request of the *Commission* have, as can be seen from the sentences quoted, made the lecture on soteriology in the "New Catechism" similar to traditional structures in which the pillars are the ideas of reparation and merit. Needless to say, the lecture has lost much of its attractiveness which does not automatically mean that it loses value. One has to be very cautious with valuing assessments at all which results from the fact that all theological descriptions with great difficulty come close to the deepest sense of the mystery of salvation. It is not easy to assess the degree of this approach, and thus it is difficult to issue censorships valuing individual concepts.

Theology of the Post-conciliar Period on Salvation

The Second Vatican Council is undoubtedly a turning point in Catholic theological thought. In fact, this applies to all issues, even those that were not explicitly addressed in the teaching of the Council. The recommended, or only permitted, new methods of studying the content of revelation and the ways of interpreting it in history have led theologians to new statements that had not previously been predicted but which reach very deeply into the content of the salvific message.

Contemporary theology, as M. Flick notes³², accepting the revealed message of salvation achieved by the cross, evaluates with a great deal of criticism the juridical patterns used in various theories of "alternative compensation" presented. Special resistance is faced with concepts that emphasize the influence that Jesus would have on His heavenly Father to forgive mankind its guilt. These concepts – even if they could refer to some biblical texts – are essentially anthropomorphic images of God, seen together in the qualities of mercy and justice. It is absolutely impossible to say that the emphasis placed by Paul on the "righteousness of God," which shone in the passion and death of Christ, is the one which reveals itself in the release of the innocent Christ into the hands of his enemies³³.

In the Old Testament, *God's justice means first and foremost faithfulness to God's promises made within the framework of a covenant. God remains faithful to the covenant even if the other side is unfaithful: He announces a new covenant to transform the human heart into faithfulness, so that the people will*

³¹ Ibid., 51.

³² M. Flick, *Croce*, in: *Nuovo dizionario di teologia*, Milan 1977, 268.

³³ Ibid.

also become righteous. This happens in the New Covenant when Christ, dead but resurrected for our salvation, becomes the source of the Holy Spirit for his Church, who enables the faithful to follow a similar filial attitude as the Saviour revealed. In the Gospel, therefore, "God's righteousness" is revealed not because God demands compensation of the sinful debt but because in Christ all the salvific promises are fulfilled.

The love of God, which is revealed in the salvific process, is completely different from human love; humans strive for the values they lack; the Divine shares values with others because it has their fullness. The love through which the Father gives the Son so that the world may live is not "own" love, offended by sin and seeking reparation, but an altruistic and creative love, overflowing, seeking the right reception. Christ's role in the work of reconciliation is not to give the Father what he does not have and what he wants to receive, but to receive what the Father has and what he wants to communicate. "In the opinion of M. Flick, the "love of Christ towards the Father (and with the Father towards the world) is the clearance through which the faithful and creative love of the Father penetrates the world, is received with dignity in this world and fulfils in it the role of a constant source of love."³⁴

What role – with the vision of salvation outlined above – grants a crucifix death? In his answer, the author quotes three reasons that seem to speak for the necessary inclusion of the cross in the process of our salvation. First, the cross appears as a natural consequence of the condition of the Son of God, incarnated in a world dominated by sin. The God, incarnated spontaneously and naturally, felt in solidarity with the brothers and sisters tormented and enslaved in this world and, as a consequence of this solidarity, sought to renew the face of the created world. He wanted a new order, according to God's love plan. This undertaking, realised in the words of the message and in liberating actions, evoked hatred and active resistance from a world dominated by sin and evil. The Jews and the pagans spoke out unanimously against Jesus, obedient to the selfish aims of their own particular reasons. If we accept as a real phrase: the "Father wanted the cross," then it must be understood in the sense that the cross was part of the general expectation of the faithful love of the Son, ready for everything in the fulfilment of God's³⁵ salvific role.

The second reason, which seems to demand the cross, lies in the fact that it is the existential condition for the appearance of this filial love thanks to which

³⁴ Ibid., 269.

³⁵ Ibid.

the love of the Father is accepted in the world. Mature and developed love is not only a spontaneous impulse but is a conscious and responsible commitment of the person, even devotion to another person. This personal involvement is virtual as long as it is not enforced by the circumstances. In Christ, this ultimate surrender to the Father – and by the will of the Father also to mankind – takes place only on the cross (cf. J 15:13). In suffering, Christ learned “obedience,” i.e. it was only there that his perfect love for the Father was expressed (Heb 5:8). The Father “wants” the cross, but not for himself, he wants unconditional, concrete and total love, including its causes, conditions and consequences. Christ on the cross accepts the Saviour’s calling³⁶.

The third reason for the cross seems to be the fact that the cross is a clear testimony to the highest value of God’s will for which everything is worth sacrificing and that in the service of the brothers and sisters man achieves his full development. At Calvary, therefore, an unprecedented event took place, namely, a testimony of love for the Father and for the brethren, which infinitely prevails over the false testimonies of our sins, and thus “restores” the latter³⁷. This “restoration” is not about taking something away from creation and handing it over to God, but, on the contrary, it allows God to pour out his fullness into a creation that does not have it.

Closing the lecture on our own concept of the truth about salvation through the cross, M. Flick notes that when we want to express the change made by Christ the Saviour in the world, we must use the terminology appropriate to describe reconciliation between people. In this situation, the following terms are useful and legitimate: The “redemption” and “satisfaction.” However, it must be immediately added that these expressions must be purged of everything that could obscure God with a mist of shortage, selfishness or predilection in evil, even if only physically. The expressions used must be compelled to convey the Father’s attitude conditional upon having the fullness and the purest love enlivened.

The author attaches a methodological-practical warning to the substantive reflection which boils down to not falling into a mistake similar to the one committed by followers of Anselmian theory. They were too sure that their theory was exhausting the message of salvation through the cross. Nor can such an attitude be adopted in today’s concepts, since they also do not exhaust to the end the mystery of the cross, which, as St. Paul testifies, always escapes any assessment of the wisdom of this world (1Cor 1:18-31).

³⁶ Ibid., 270.

³⁷ Ibid.

The discussion of the soteriological thought of M. Flick shows that he focused his attention on the salvific significance of crucifix death, seen in systems different from those usually adopted after Anselm or Thomas of Aquinas. From this lecture emerges the indispensability of the death on the Cross for our salvation, although its function must not be reduced primarily to the payment of our sinful debts or the equivalent merit (*de condigno*) of God's favours to us.

The renewed theological lecture on the salvific significance of the whole mystery of Jesus Christ – and not only his death – can be found in the writings of another Roman theologian, namely J. Alfaro, professor of Roman Gregoriana³⁸. The starting point for his reflection is the statement that the fundamental theme of all the New Testament writings – while maintaining significant differences in approach – is the announcement of the definitive completion and disclosure of God's salvific work in Jesus Christ and of the call to people to participate in this mystery through a free decision towards Christ and through Christ towards the salvific love of God³⁹. This theme is outlined in the synoptics, matures in Paul's statements, and reaches its relative fullness in John's works⁴⁰. Patristic theology, taking advantage of biblical inspirations, saw the salvation of man as participation in the mystery of Christ, and through him in the mystery of the Holy Trinity⁴¹. From the reflections on biblical and patristic thought, the author comes to such conclusions as to the relationship between the mystery of Christ and our rebirth by grace: It is conspicuous that all patristics is a profound and essentially Christlike concept of grace; Patristic theology presents itself at this point as a faithful follower of neo-aesthetic thought⁴².

The above conclusions have a right to be a guideline for today's theological thought, seeking an adequate way of expressing the truth about salvation in Jesus Christ. The doctrine of Scripture, taken over and interpreted by Tradition, is the only reliable source of information about the contents of the faith for theology of all times – and therefore also for us. Theology must not deviate from this source under the threat of losing its proper tasks.

The basic idea of Tradition can be seen in the conviction that the Incarnation is the same as the divinisation of Christ's humanity, and in and through

³⁸ J. Alfaro, *Cristologia e antropologia. Temi teologici attuali*, Assisi 1973, 46-155; esp. 79-113.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 46-83. There are so many pages devoted to J. Alfaro's analysis of biblical data.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 83. A detailed presentation of the biblical and patristic texts cannot be rendered here; moreover, the author is not original in these areas, which is understandable, if only because they do not belong to his speciality.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 105.

it the divinisation of the whole human race takes place. The grace of Christ identifies with the Incarnation as a sovereign and absolutely free act of God. It is the grace of God's filial attitude of Man-Christ, i.e. His personal relationship with God as His own Father. Christ's humanity has been divinised by virtue of the act of the Incarnation, which means that Christ's grace identifies itself with the Incarnation and therefore, from its very essence, has a Trinitarian character, i.e. it contains within itself Christ's personal reference to the Father and to the Holy Spirit.

The incarnation, as it assimilates the human being through the Word, is realised gradually in the human existence of Christ, starting with the Incarnation, finding its peak in death and reaching its fullness in the resurrection. The gradual completion of the Incarnation coincides with the gradual divinisation of the humanity of Christ, fully divinised only in the Resurrection. Incarnation, death and resurrection are three fundamental stages of one and the same mystery, namely, "becoming human like us" of the Son of God⁴³.

In the divinisation of Christ's humanity through the Incarnation is initially contained (*radicalmente*) the divinisation of people. Patristic theology saw the Incarnation in itself as a forgiving grace for all mankind. Incarnation by its very essence is an act of solidarity between the Son of God and people: by becoming a man like us, He makes us sons of God. In the divinised humanity of the Son of God, all people were destined for filial adoption. The grace of a Christian is the grace of divinisation, which in turn is nothing more than participation in the divinisation of Christ's humanity through the Incarnation. This leads to the conclusion that the grace of a Christian cannot be thought of outside the Incarnation, because grace identifies itself with divinisation, and this in turn identifies itself with the Incarnation. The grace of Christ is reduced to the sonship of God, and our grace is a filial adoption, or sonship in the Son: *fili in Filio*.

The salvific and divine meaning of Christ's death and resurrection is justified by the fact that people are included in Christ. Here we deal with the mystery of Christ's inclusion in our death and, on the other hand, the inclusion of people in His victory over death. This victory is made available to us by the power of the Holy Spirit, to whom mankind was endowed after Christ's glorification.

It follows from the above suggestions of patristics that grace is not merely a liberation from sin, but first and foremost a divinisation. The dependence

⁴³ Ibid.: "Incarnazione, morte e resurrezione costituiscono le tre tappe fondamentali di uno stesso mistero: il farsi uomo come noi del Figlio di Dio."

of man's divinisation on the Incarnation of Jesus Christ is absolute: the event of Jesus Christ is in itself our salvation, and Christology becomes soteriology⁴⁴.

It is worth noting that Greek and Latin patristics, in order to express the state of our salvation in relation to the work of Christ, uses such notions (of biblical origin) as: "community of life," "participation," "solidarity," "inclusion" (corporate personality). These terms clearly belong to the area of interpersonal relations, exceeding the scope of the order described by the causal categories⁴⁵.

The ideas, alive in patristic theology, mentioned above, began to descend into a state of oblivion in the Middle Ages. The incarnation ceased to be attributed with salvific significance without seeing in it the source of divinisation, and the grace itself was not seen in the perspective of Christ alone (connected only with Christ). Christ's mediation began to be reduced to the atoning and compensating dimension of his death and to the instrumental causality of his humanity. The post-Trent Scholastica has reached a complete separation between the Incarnation and grace; it lacked the salvific dimension of the Incarnation and the Resurrection⁴⁶. It is only in recent decades that they have tried to refer to a rich patristic tradition, although it is difficult to say that this reference is sufficient. Much remains to be done⁴⁷.

Part of the work waiting for the theology is taken up by J. Alpharo himself in the work "Christ the sacrament of God."⁴⁸ It starts with the statement that the Incarnation is the definitive surrender of God to man, that is, the supreme act of God's grace. In the process in which the Son of God assimilates humanity, God reveals and gives Himself as the Father of the man of Christ, and in Christ the Father of men. The mystery of Christ is to unite the divine person with an authentic human being: the man Jesus became personally the Son of God. This sonship of God is an un-created grace (*gratia increata*) that embraces the whole human reality of Jesus and places it in a filial relationship with the Father. This is achieved through the Incarnation, in which God gives Himself to the man Christ as Father (the Son's own person boils down to receiving substance from the Father: *sussistente ricevera*). Giving oneself to God as the Father of Christ is the basis of all God's giving to people. The Incarnation, the possibility of which is based on a personal mystery in God, is a fundamental grace on which all

⁴⁴ Ibid., 106.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 107.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 108. The author believes that there is still no good reason to explain the departure of medieval theology from patristic thought. The very departure is described as "deviation."

⁴⁷ Ibid., 109.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 132-141. Cristo sacramento di Dio.

other graces depend and in which all other graces participate. Uncreated grace, i.e. the surrender of God in the process of Incarnation, is responded to by the human nature of Christ by created grace (*gratia creata*), which takes the form of divinisation of his humanity⁴⁹.

God the Father, the ultimate source of the salvific order, predicted and decided that the Incarnation is the way of salvation for all people, and not just the divinisation of the humanity of Jesus himself. Through the Incarnation God becomes the Father of Christ: the eternal birth for its personal end has the man Jesus. In the Son, who has become a man, God extends his fatherly love to all people (Eph 1:5). The Son of God, through his authentic humanity, is united with the entire human community to the extent that the Father recognises us as his sons.

Becoming a man, the Son of God accepted our mortal destiny as his own in order to make us partakers of his glorious destiny through his death and resurrection. Incarnation implies, by its very essence, the solidarity of the Son of God with the whole human family. The salvific value of the Incarnation is based on this solidarity. In Christ, the Son of God incarnate, God said His definite “yes” to our salvation⁵⁰.

In the Incarnation, the Son of God accepted our human existence (not only nature), subject to the law of death. Death is contained in the very act of acceptance of human existence. This fate, written down in accepted nature, was approved without hesitation by the sinless Jesus in obedience to the Father and in love for people, His brothers and sisters. Christ’s death was not an accidental result of the Incarnation, but the pinnacle of authentic “being human” of the Son of God. Not only death itself, but also its free acceptance in loving obedience to the Father was implied in advance in the Incarnation. Death itself belongs to the human condition of Christ, and its filial acceptance corresponds to his attitude as the Son of God. As a man, Christ had to taste the bitterness of death, and as the Son of God, he was obliged to sacrifice his life in filial obedience to the Father’s will. The Incarnation included Christ’s destiny to sacrifice his life in obedience to the Father and for the salvation of people. From this we can see that the priestly function of Christ finds its basis in the very ontical constitution of the Son of God incarnate. The grace created by Christ (divinisation of humanity) expressed itself in urging Him to offer His sacrifice to the Father for His brothers and sisters. Death is the final phase of the “figure of the servant” of the Son of God, that is, his acceptance

⁴⁹ Ibid., 133.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 135.

of our existence, marked by the law of sin and death. On the cross, the highest degree of solidarity between the Son of God and sinful humanity is revealed and realised. The universal salvific value of Christ's death for all mankind is anchored in this solidarity; Christ sacrificed his life to the Father as the Head and sole Priest of all mankind. Through the cross, the Son gives himself completely to the Father in response to the Father's devotion to the Son in Incarnation⁵¹.

By giving his Son to death for the salvation of mankind, God declares and makes his grace definitive. In Christ's death, God gives us His Son, and in the Son He gives Himself to us. The cross is the highest effective sign of the Father's salvific love, which should be understood in the sense that even God cannot give a greater sign.

If Christ, as a true man, should have tasted the bitterness of death, then, in turn, as the Son of God, He could not ultimately remain under His authority. By his free and absolute acceptance of Christ's death he broke its power. The Incarnation was of itself directed to the death of the Son of God and through death to His glorious resurrection. In the resurrection, the divinisation of Christ's humanity is finally completed: from that moment he becomes "Lord" as a participant in the glory and power of the Father. In the Resurrection the process of assimilation of human nature by the Son of God closes: it began in the Incarnation.

Christ's belonging to the human community as its Head gives the resurrection a universal salvific value. Christ was glorified as the firstborn among the other brothers and sisters, so his adoption includes the inclusion of other people in it⁵². In the Resurrection, the human existence of Christ achieves a new way of life, called *aeternitas participata*. The Glorious Lord lives and works outside of time and space, which means that His work is not subject to limitation of space and time.

The glorification of Christ in the resurrection gives him the power to send down the Holy Spirit on people. The Spirit acts in the human heart, evoking in it a filial attitude towards God. The Holy Spirit unites us with Christ and His life included in the life of the Holy Trinity. So through Christ, in the Holy Spirit, we share in God's inner life⁵³.

From the presented arguments of J. Alfaro we can see that salvation is directly and almost necessary connected with the Incarnation of the Son of God, understood as a whole, i.e. spread over all stages of the union of the Divine Person with human reality. Thus, our salvation in its objective fulfilment (*redemptio*

⁵¹ Ibid., 137.

⁵² Ibid., 139.

⁵³ Ibid., 140.

obiectiva) depends on the overall “event” of Jesus Christ. The salvation contained in the “event” of Jesus Christ is offered to man as a gift and an opportunity which he must make use of, assimilating it through his own attitude and the acts born out of it (faith, love, baptism, sacraments, etc.). This assimilation can be called subjective salvation (*redemptio subjectiva*).

The soteriological concepts (catechism and theology) presented above will be well complemented at the end with comments by J. Galot, author of an extensive volume of Catholic soteriology. “To the question: Why did you come Christ? It seems to impose – *as the author believes* – a clear answer in its simplicity: Christ came for the salvation of people. In fact, this short answer covers such a complicated reality that it cannot be comprehended in a single collective view. The work of Christ contains a multitude of aspects which must be strongly sought, while at the same time striking a balance between the different points of view, which are treated as complementary and mutually reinforcing. Too often, however, in soteriology there are definitely simplified, one-sided solutions, and thus insufficient.”⁵⁴

I do not know whether J. Galot’s opinion on simplified solutions cannot be referred to those mentioned in this article. However, a degree of unilateral simplification seems appropriate and close to them. One could even risk claiming that without simplifications – and even without a certain one-sidedness – it is impossible to talk about the truth of salvation at all. Confronted with human reason, it surpasses it to such an extent that there is nothing left for it but to confine itself to listing selected aspects of the mystery of salvation, and thus to submit to some necessary one-sidedness. This forced one-sidedness must be remembered and taken into account by the theologian in his reflection on salvation. This will protect him from the presumptuous certainty of the full adequacy of his own concepts⁵⁵.

⁵⁴ J. Galot, *Gesù Liberatore*, Firenze 1978, 445.

⁵⁵ The article stops at the threshold of the “Catechism of the Catholic Church,” published a few months ago (the Polish version is still not available). It is a conscious decision, dictated by the need for a separate and exhaustive study of the soteriology of this important document.

Sensus Fidei as a Gift of the Holy Spirit to the Church*

The proclamation of the Marian Dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption triggered a deeper theological reflection on the following topics: *sensus fidei* the people of God in the development of dogmas¹. An additional motive for reflection on this subject was ecclesiological renewal, especially related to the theology of the laity. This concerns the relationship between *sensus fidei* and the prophetic function of the baptised.

On the one hand, in a strict sense *sensus fidei*, being the property of the subject endowed with the grace of faith, love and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, makes it capable of perceiving the truth of faith and of ascertaining its truthfulness. The above view results from the analysis of the act of faith in a believer. On the other hand, we meet with reality *sensus fidelium*, which tries to express the “state” of beliefs of believers in relation to a specific doctrine and leads towards *consensus on fidelium* whether *universus ecclesiae sensus*². *Intima spiritualium*

* STV 43(2005)1.

¹ We only note here that the theological thought, especially in the first half of the 20th century, explaining the ways that dogma developed, oscillated, to say the least, around *via speculativa* or *via affectiva*. The theologians who attached great importance to *sensus fidei* in the development of dogmas include: F. Main-Sola, M. Blondel, J.V. Bainvel, L. de Grandmaison, P. Rousselot, L. Charlier, R. Draguet, A. Garde il. In addition, mention should be made of D. Koster, who emphasized, rather in too extreme a way, that only *sensus fidei* can guarantee that the truth is in Revelation. P. Schultes had already noticed that the sense of faith can be the following “*vis impellens ad definitively nem*,” but not its criterion. G. Filograssi, who made a significant contribution to the definition of the dogma of the Assumption, pointed out that “*Via speculative mainspossidet momentum aut saltem magis visis – bile quam via sensus fidei; haec nititur experientiis subiectivis et personalibus, illa offert rationes obiectivas quas omnes examinare valent.*” G. Filograssi, *Traditio divino-apostolica et Assumption. M. Virginis*, “Gregorianum” 30 (1949), 470.

² DS 1637.

rerum quam experiuntur intelligentia, as *sensus fidei* is described by the Second Vatican Council³ has a clear meaning in modern theology.

The immediate aim of the following reflections is therefore to recall the essence, nature and meaning of *sensus fidei* in the life of the Church. This is all because it increasingly mistakenly identifies its “sense of faith” with “public opinion” or “referendum.” It is therefore necessary to “confront” the nature of this precious gift with the notion of “public opinion,” which has recently claimed not only opinion-forming values, but also the right to regulate the doctrine of the Church.

Concept and Theological Foundations

Terminological attempts to describe the discussed reality abound in a number of the following terms: *sensus fidei*, *sensus fidelium*, *sensus christianus*, *sensus Ecclesiae* etc. Sometimes they are used as synonyms. However, some people see differences in meaning between these terms. The existence of many concepts to define this reality indicates the multitude of aspects, as well as the open nature of the topic.

E. Marin-Sola was the first to introduce the idea of the “sense of faith” into the scholastic concepts of dogma development. The book *L'evolution homogenee dogma catholique*, when discussing the development of dogmas, prefers to use the term *le sens de foi* (*sensus fidei*) instead of *le sens de fidèles* (*sensus fidelium*)⁴. C. Balić use the words *Il senso cristiano* (Christian sense) or *Il senso della fede* (sense of faith). Other terms are, according to him, less adequate or even ambiguous⁵. Y. Congar in *Per una teologia del laicato* stresses that the expressions *sensus* or *consensus fidelium*, *sensus Ecclesiae*, *sensus catholicus*, *sensus fidei*, *chiistiani populi fides*, *communis Ecclesiae fides* are not entirely unambiguous. They depend not only on historical conditions, but also on different

³ DV 8.

⁴ E Marin-Sola, *L'evolution homogenee dogma catholique*, Fribourg 1924, vol. 1, 385: “pour écarter le péril d'en faire le monopole des simples fidèles au détriment des théologiens, des évêques et du pape.”

⁵ Stresses that “ad ogni modo deve essere ben sottolineato che noi diciamo costantemente «senso» cristiano o di fede: e non già sentimento «religioso: giacché il termine senso» ci riporta alla mente e – come abbiamo detto – presuppone un deposito intellettuale; mentre il termine sentimento di sapore modernistico désigna piuttosto la parte affettiva, la quale generalmente inclina al vago e al cieco.” C. Balić, *Il senso cristiano e il progresso del dogma*, in: *Lo sviluppo del dogma*, Roma 1953, 113.

points of view⁶. H. Vorgrimler notes that *sensus fidei* can mean a specific kind of specific cognition, derived from faith, as well as an individual consciousness enlightened by the faith of each believer. *Sensus fidelium* points to a community consciousness of faith, differing from *consensus fidelium*, which is the unanimity of believers born out of a sense of faith with regard to the specific content of the faith itself⁷.

the New Testament texts serve as a theological basis of *sensus fidei*. They emphasise that the work of the Holy Spirit is to understand the truths of faith. It is enough to mention: 1 Corinthians 2:16 – knowledge of the “plan of Christ;” Colossians 1:9 – “spiritual understanding;” Ephesians 1:18: “bright eyes of the heart.”⁸ This issue was not alien in the first centuries of the Church⁹. Tradition has often spoken of the “eyes of faith,” the “eyes of the heart,” the “eyes of the spirit.”¹⁰ Definition *sensus fidei* appears for the first time in Vincentus of Lerin¹¹. The first significant reflection on the epistemological value of the sense of faith in the context of Tradition and the Church was carried out by Melchior Canou *De Locis theologicis*¹². The nineteenth century, together with the deepening of the understanding of the mystery of the Church, brought further reflections on this issue. We should mention J.A. Mohler¹³ from the school in Tübingen as

⁶ Y. Congar in: *Per una teologia del laicato*, Brescia 1967, 402.

⁷ H. Vorgrimler, *Dal sensus fidei al consensus fidelium*, “Concilium” 21 (1985), 16; cf. O. Rush, *The Reception of Doctrine*, Rome 1997, 172f.213f.300f.

⁸ Cf. also J 14:17; 16:13; Phil 1:9.

⁹ For example, cf. K. Federer, *Liturgie und Glaube*, Freiburg/Schw 1950; O. Martil, *La tradición en san Augustin a través de la controversia pelagiana*, “Revista española de teología” 2 (1942), 54; J. Franzelin, *Tractatus de divina Traditione et Scriptura*, Rome 1875, 74-76.96f.; D. Koster, *Volk Gottes im Wachstum des Glaubens*, Heidelberg 1950, 68-70.

¹⁰ It is enough to mention the expression of St. Augustine: *Habet namque fieles oculos sitos* (PL 33, 458); St. Thomas of Aquinas emphasises: “Per lumen fidei vident esse credenda.” Sth III-II 1, 5, ad 1. In addition, terms are used: “ekklesiastikón phrónima,” “sensus ecclesiasticus et catholicus,” “sentire cum Ecclesia.”

¹¹ Vincenti Lirinensis, *Commonitorium Primum*, PL 50, 669.

¹² Cf. e.g. 3,4: *in ecclesia communis fidelium consensio*; 3,3: *Communi fidelium consensione*; 4,4: *Ecclesia in creciendo errare non potest*. M. Cano, *De Locis Theologicis, Liber IV*, in: *ibid., Opera I*, Rome 1890.

¹³ J. Mohler, *Die Einheit in der Kirche oder das Prinzip des Katholizismus*, J. Geiselman (ed.), Köln 1957; *idem, Symbolik oder darstellung der dogmatischen gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten*, J. Geiselman (ed.), Darmstadt 1958.

well as representatives of the Roman school: Perone¹⁴, Passaglia¹⁵, Francelin¹⁶, Scheeben¹⁷. In addition, J.H. Newman made a special contribution to the subject matter under consideration, stressing that *sensus fidei* is “a kind of instinct or *phronema* deeply anchored in the Mystical Body of Christ.”¹⁸

With the renewal of ecclesiology, the action of the Spirit of Truth is emphasized, both in the Magisterium and in the people of God. *Sensus fidei* belongs to all the People of God. It is significant that almost all the comments to the Constitution on God’s revelation *Dei Verbum* do not analyse the relationship between Christian experience¹⁹ and *sensus fidelium*²⁰. Nevertheless, the timeliness

¹⁴ Perone, *De immaculato Concepta B. V. Mariae concepta*, an dogmatico decreto definiri possit, disquisitio theologica, Rome 1847.

¹⁵ Passaglia, *De Ecclesia Christi commentariorum libri quinque*, Ratisbonae 1853-1856.

¹⁶ *Tractatus de divina Traditione et Scriptura*, Rome 1875, ed. 2.

¹⁷ Francelin, *Theologische Erkenntnislehre*, Freiburg/Schw. 1953.

¹⁸ J.H. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine*, New York 1961, 73; cf. J. Walgrave, *Il saggio di Newman su “la consultazione dei fedeli in materia dottrinale.”* “Concilium” 21(1985)4, 40-50.

¹⁹ ¹⁹ The understanding of the idea of “Christian experience” explains, for example, G. Moiola: “«Esperienza» si precisa [...] come un’esperienza di un pervenire del soggetto alla «realtà-verità» per l’adeguamento o il collocamento in essa; ed è esperienza del passaggio alla realtà-verità per la forza della provocazione (accolta) che viene dalla realtà non illusoria, ma apparente, non interlocutoria, ma «vera». Propriamente questo è il campo di quel «supere la realtà» che è «esperienza»: ed è un campo dove non la «differenza» ma la giustapposizione del «soggettivo» e dell’«oggettivo» mostra, al soggetto stesso, la sua problematica chiarezza; e dove il «supere» non può più essere né intellettualisticamente né «contemplativamente» ridotto. Vi si è verificata e vi si va verificando, infatti, una unificazione originale (e in qualche modo originaria?) tra «conoscenza» e «amore»; tra «contemplazione» e «azione»; tra «teoria» e «prassi.» Esperienza cristiana, in: *Nuovo dizionario di Spiritualità*, S. De Fiores, T. Goffi (ed.), Rome 1985, 536-537.

²⁰ ²⁰ The caution of the Church and theologians is understandable because, in the past, the concept of “experience,” which has been manipulated by modernism, has distorted the idea of revelation and the concept of faith. The reaction of the Church in this respect. Cf: *Lamentabili* (3.07.1907), ASS 40 (1907), 470f; *Pascendi dominici gregis* (8.09.1907), ASS 40 (1907), 596f; *Sacrorum Antistitum* (1.09.1910), ASS 2 (1910), 669f. On the concept of experience and *sensus fidei* see A. Bertuletti, *Il concetto di ‘Esperienza’*, in: *L’evidenza e la feta*, G. Colombo (ed.), Milano 1988, 112-181; E. Schillebeeckx, *Il Cristo. La storia di una nuova prassi*, Brescia 1980; K. Rahner, *Grundkurs des Glaubens. Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums*, Freiburg 1976; H.U. von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit. Schau der Gestalt*, Einsiedeln 1965; J.-B. Metz, *Zur Theologie der Welt*, Mainz-München 1968; G. O’Collins, *Fundamental Theology*, New York 1981 (chapter II). D. Vitali notes that “la difficoltà maggiore risiedeva nel concetto stesso di esperienza, che, dopo la tassativa esclusione dalla teologia manualistica, imposta dalla condanna del Magistero contro il modernismo, necessitava, e ancora necessita di una chiarificazione e di incorre tto inserimento

of the Second Vatican Council became increasingly more apparent after the Second Vatican Council, together with *sensus fidei* in the context of other theological issues such as the hierarchy of truths²¹ and the concept of reception in the Church²².

Vaticanum II refers many times to the idea of the sense of faith and to concepts close to it: *sensus fidei*²³, *sensus catholicus*²⁴, *sensus christianus fidelium*²⁵,

nella teologia cattolica. Questa difficoltà è stata avvertita acutamente al Concilio; nelle discussioni in aula, alcuni Padri conciliari hanno opposto gravi obiezioni al termine, pacentando il rischio di cadere in teorie moderniste. Il dibattito è ancora percepibile nella formulazione del testo, che corregge il termine «experientia,» proposto originariamente nello schema, nella proposizione intima *spiritualium rerum quam experiuntur intelligentia*,” D. Vitali *Sensus Fidelium, Una funzione ecclesiale di intelligenza della fede*, Brescia 1993, 23.

²¹ UR 11. Theologian J. Alfaro emphasises, that “«Modus,» ex quo insertio Indus textos provenit, tüten orem explicationem praebet: «Quamvis procul dubio omnes veri testes revelatoe eadem fide divina tenendae sint, momentum et pondus earum differt pro nexo earum cum historia salutis et mysterio Christi.»” J. Alfaro, *Problema theologicum de munere theologiae respectu magisterii*, “Gregorianum” 57 (1976), 71; cf. also. U. Valeske, *Hierarchia Veri ta turn*, München 1968, 28f. See more on this subject: C. Dumont, *Y a-t-il une hierarchie de valeur entre les vérités de foi?*, “Unam Sanctam” 26 (1964), 157-161; G.H. Tavard, *Hierarchia veritatum: a preliminary investigation*, “Theological Studies” 32 (1971), 278-289; M. Cardona, *La “Jerarquía de las verdades” según el Concilio Vaticano II, y el orden de la real*, in: *Los movimientos teológicos secularizantes*, Madrid 1973, 143-163; E. Schlink, *Die “Hierarchie der Wahrheiten” und die Einigung der Kirchen*, “Kerygma und Dogma” 21 (1975), 1-12; D. Carroll, *Hierarchia Veritatum: a theological and pastoral insight of the Second Vatican Council*, “Irish Theological Quarterly” 44 (1977), 125-133; W. Hryniewicz, *La hiérarchie des vérités, Implications oecuméniques d’une idée chrétienne*, “Irenikon” 51 (1978), 470-491; G. Thils, *Hierarchia veritatum*, “Revue Théologique de Louvain” 10 (1979), 208-215.

²² For more on the subject, see Y. Congar, *La “Réception” comme réalité ecclésiologique*, “Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques” 56 (1972), 369-403; M. Garijo, *Der Begriff “Rezeption” und sein Ort im Kern der katholischen Ekklesiologie*, in: *Theologischer Konsens und Kirchenspaltung*, P. Lengersfeld, H. Stobbe (ed.), Stuttgart 1981, 97-109; E. Kilmartin, *Reception in History: An Ecclesiological Phenomenon audits Significance*, “Journal of Ecumenical Studies” 21 (1984), 34-54; Th.P. Rausch, *Reception Past and Present*, “Theological Studies” 47 (1986), 497-508; W. Beinert, *Glaube als Zustimmung. Zur Interpretation kirchlicher Rezeptionsvorgänge*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1991; H. Fries, *Rezeption. Der Beitrag der Gläubigen für die Wahrheitsfindung in der Kirche*, “Stimmen der Zeit” 209 (1991), 3-16; A. Antón, *La “Recepción” en la Iglesia y Eclesiología*, “Gregorianum” 77 (1996), 57-96.437-469; O. Rush, *The Reception of Doctrine*, Rome 1997.

²³ LG 12, PO 9. In addition, in a way that *implicite* refers to the sense of faith in the Constitution *Dei Verbum*, no. 8 in the context of factors influencing the development of dogmas, speaking of a “deep, experiential understanding of spiritual matters.”

²⁴ AA 30.

²⁵ GS 52.35.

*sensus christianus*²⁶, *sensus religiosus*²⁷ *sensus Dei*²⁸, *sensus Christi et Ecclesiae*²⁹, *instinctus*³⁰. In the central place of the dogmatic Constitution on the Church, which explains the meaning of the Church as the “people of God,” there is a reference to the ordering of believers to Christ: “all the faithful, equipped with such great means of salvation, in all life situations and in every condition, are called by the Lord, everyone on his own path to perfect holiness, just as the Father himself is perfect.”³¹

Number 12 of the Constitution *Lumen Gentium* is the basic text in which the Council attaches particular importance to the sense of faith in the study of revealed truths. The number opens with an introductory paragraph emphasizing the participation of the People of God in the prophetic *munus* of Jesus Christ. This participation implies the witness of Christ through a life of faith and love. *The faithful as a whole, having been anointed by the Holy One (cf. 1 John 2:20 and 27), must not get lost in the faith, and this particular characteristic is revealed by the supernatural sense of the shelters of all the people when “from the bishops to the last of the lay faithful” [St. Augustine], it reveals its universal compatibility in matters of the shelter and customs. For thanks to this sense of the shelter, awakened and sustained by the Spirit of truth, the People of God under the guidance of the holy office of teacher – after whom, faithfully following, he no longer accepts the word, but truly accepts it (cf. 1 Tes 2:13) – he remains unshaken by faith once given to the saints (cf. Jd 3), penetrates it more deeply with the help of a just judgement and applies it more fully in life.*

The second part of number 12 of the Constitutions deals with the question of charisms. The Holy Spirit guides and sanctifies God’s people through the sacraments, ministries and charisms. The latter, as indicated by 1 Corinthians 12, 7 are intended for the community. Anointing with the Holy Spirit through which the people of God participate in prophetic *munus* of the Christ, leads to *indefectibilitas in credendo*. This *indefectibilitas* is expressed in *sensus fidelium*. *Sensus fidei* is expressed in *consensus universalis* of the People of God *de rebus fidei et morum*³². The basis of *sensus fidelium* is the Spirit of Truth,

²⁶ GS 62.

²⁷ NA 2; DH 4; GS 59.

²⁸ DY 15; GS 7.

²⁹ AG 19.

³⁰ SC 24; PC 12; GS 18.

³¹ LG 11.

³² God’s people have only that “activity” which is expressed in a universal consensus on matters of faith and customs. *Vaticanum II* is here a clear repetition of *Vaticanum I*. See U. Betti,

which internally enlightens the community of believers³³. The Council does not stop just at infallibility of *in appreciation*, fitting for the Magisterium, but also emphasises the infallibility of *in credendo*³⁴. The entire faithful receive from the Holy Spirit a supernatural sense of faith.

The Second Vatican Council developed the doctrine of St. Thomas of Aquinas, according to which the Church of Christ is founded on faith and the sacraments. The Council, referring extensively to Scripture, characterises the Church as the “new people of God,” the “messianic people” and the “community of life, love and truth,” of which the sacrament of baptism is a constitutive element. Lay people are one body in Christ and *with regard to the dignity and common to all the faithful in their work of building up the Body of Christ, true equality reigns among all*³⁵. Through baptism and confirmation, lay Catholics participate in the priestly, prophetic and royal functions of Christ. The charismatic aspect of *sensus fidei* deserves our attention because the response of the faithful to the staff of faith has its roots in the Holy Spirit³⁶. *Sensus fidei* is a charism that applies to all members of the Church. By his power the Church in her universality, which is manifested in the consensus of faith (*consensus fidei*), distinguishes and updates the object of faith in life, in constant harmony with the Magisterium of the Church³⁷.

La trasmissione della divina rivelazione, in: *La costituzione dogmatica sulla divina Rivelazione*, G. Favale (ed.), Torino 1967, 255-261; L. Pacomio (ed.), *Dei Verbum. Genesi della Costituzione sulla Divina Rivelazione*, Torino 1971, 73-89; R. Latourelie, *Teologia della rivelazione*, Assisi 1980, 472-478.

³³ This activity is negative: the behaviour of the Church from error or infallibility; and positive: the guarantee that the Church has the truth.

³⁴ See on this subject: Y. Congar, *Infailibilité et indéfectibilité*, “Revue de sciences philosophiques et théologiques” 54 (1970), 601-618; G. Philips, *La Chiesa e il suo mistero*, Milano 1975, vol. 1, 156f; H. Holstein, *Hierarchie et peuple de Dieu d’après Lumen Gentium*, Paris 1970, 121f; K. Rahner, *Il magistero della Chiesa e l’odierna crisi dell’autorità*, in: *Nuovi saggi*, IV, Rome 1973, 415f.

³⁵ LG 32.

³⁶ On the theme of charisms, see: G. Rambaldi, *Carismi e laicato nella Chiesa. Teologia dei carismi comunione e corresponsabilità dei laici nella Chiesa*, “Gregorianum” 68 (1987), 57-101; *Uso e significato di ‘Carisma’ nel Vaticano L’Analisi e confronto di due passi conciliai sui carismi*, “Gregorianum” 56 (1975), 141-162.

³⁷ W. Beinert, *Bedeutung und Begründung des Glaubenssinnes (‘Sensus fidei’) als eines dogmatischen Erkenntniskriteriums*, “Catholica” 25 (1971), 293; cf. B. Lonergan, *The Assumption and Theology*, in: *Collection, Papers by Bernard Lonergan S.J.*, F. Crowe (ed.), New York 1967, 76; idem., *The Assumption and Theology*, in: *Vers le dogme de l’Assomption*, Montréal 1948, 411-424.

Nature Of *Sensus Fidei*

Theologians describe *sensus fidei* as a supernatural ability to understand the truth contained in Revelation, even if it is not expressed in the following ways *explicitly*. The object of revelation is present in the faith of God's people. *Sensus fidei* appears as one of the factors in the development of dogmas, which not only allows us to abide in the truth, but also leads to the truth³⁸. The sense of faith is seen as a form of instinct, as a certain intuitive perception, which is situated deep in the reality of the Mystical Body of Christ. *Sensus fidei*, guided by the Holy Spirit, on the one hand leads to the rejection of an error, and on the other hand it is able to "synthesise" individual aspects of a particular truth of faith.

Sensus fidei is a peculiar form of personal cognition that precedes reflective cognition. It is the fruit of faith, the staff and the Holy Spirit who acts in believers through gifts and charisms. In this way believers can get to know and understand the truths of faith better³⁹. By the power of faith, man receives the ability, the "awareness," the sensitivity to God's things. It is about a kind of "light" and orientation towards everything that belongs to an object, a space of faith⁴⁰. Faith can become a source of reflection on which the development of theological cognition depends. Moreover, in this way you can rediscover truths that have been forgotten. A believer who lives intensely on faith does not so much notice a certain "dry" number of intellectual statements or formulas, but rather meets the living News, the Reality in which he believes. St. Thomas expresses this perfectly in the statement: *Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem*⁴¹.

³⁸ G. Biondo, *Il sensus fidelium nel Vaticano II e nei Sinodi dei Vescovi*, Rome 1989, 31.

³⁹ J. Alfaro, *Cognitio Dei et Christi in I Jo*, "Verbum Domini" 39 (1961), 90; B. Lonergan, *The Assumption and Theology*, 76. Z. Alszeghy rightly observes: "L'impulso della grazia produce una inclinazione insieme intellettuale e affettiva, in modo tale che è inutile domandare se un determinato fattore riguarda l'intelletto o la volontà, poiché tutto si svolge ad un livello così profondo dell'esistenza umana, in cui non ha senso applicare la distinzione delle varie componenti della psiche umana. Z. Alszeghy, *Il senso della fede e lo sviluppo dogmatico*," in: *Vaticano II: Bilancio e prospettive venticinque anni dopo (1962-1987)*, R. Latourelle (ed.), Assisi 1987, 149.

⁴⁰ L. Scheffczyk emphasises: "Questa fede e il permanere stabilmente nella verità di Gesù Cristo, il sentirsi legati alla Sua parola e alla Sua persona, l'adottare e l'essere adottati da ciò che è la via, la verità e la vita" (Gv 14, 16). È comprensibile che solo una tale vera, viva e profonda fede [...] può progredire sino a quella maturità, a quell'intuito spirituale e a quella capacità di giudizio che sono chiusi nel «sensus fidelium»." L. Scheffczyk, *Sensus fidelium: testimonianza della comunità*, "Communio" 97 (1988), 124.

⁴¹ Thomas Aquinas, S. Th II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

A Christian, through an authentic life of faith, is able to make judgements according to *connaturalitas* (conformity, appropriateness) in matters of revelation. The more he is “immersed” in God, the deeper he can understand and understand his mysteries⁴². In other words, *habitus* the supernatural faith, being a certain “conformity” with the revealed object, enables the believer to know the revealed truth, different from that which is obtained through speculative theological reasoning. It is therefore necessary to speak of an inner coherence between the sense of faith and the life of grace.

Sensus fidei, as the ability to come into contact with the revealed things, is by its nature directed towards the object of revelation and convinces the faithful as to its credibility. However, it should be remembered that it does not protect absolutely from creating false visions about what constitutes the deposit of faith. Moreover, it does not lead to the formation of a “new revelation.” Furthermore, it does not replace rational motives⁴³. Instead, it is the concrete “ability” of a believer who lives in closeness to Christ. Through a sense of faith, the believer is able to spontaneously and globally perceive the truths of revelation. He participates, so to speak, in the “thoughts” of Christ (*nous* 1 Corinthians 2, 16), in the “consciousness” of Jesus (*ennoia*, 1 Pt 4, 1). *Sensus fidei* is the ability to perceive in general and in detail the meaning and value of all that is the object of faith.

The sense of faith is not a cognitive process of a discursive, formal or abstract nature. However, it is an internal, experiential and affective cognition. *Sensus fidei* makes the believer distinguish whether the values derived from tradition are “consonant” with the deposit of faith. The Christian “experiences” the mystery in which he participates. In the light of grace he recognises the Word of God. *Sensus fidei* is, as emphasised the Instruction *Domini Veritatis*, a property of the theological faith which, as a gift from God, allows personal adherence to the Truth and therefore cannot be mistaken. This individual faith is also the faith of the Church, because God has entrusted the Church to guard the Word, so what we believe in is what the Church believes in. *Sensus fidei* entails, by its very nature, a profound conformity of spirit and heart with the Church, ‘*sentire cum Ecclesia*.’⁴⁴

⁴² Thomas Aquinas, S. Th II-II, q. 45, a. 2; q. 1, a. 4 ad 3. It is worth mentioning that the encyclical *Humani generis* also indicates this *connaturalitas*: AAS 42 (1950), 574.

⁴³ Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, *Lo sviluppo del dogma*, 111: “Chi ha questo senso, scopre più facilmente i principi che devono essere applicati in un caso determinato, e con maggiore spontaneità riconosce le virtualità del dato rivelato. Il senso della fede permette così di afferrare il ragionamento in una forma accorciata, globale ed implicita, senza che i singoli passi della deduzione e della riduzione diventino distintamente consapevoli.”

⁴⁴ *Donum Veritatis*, in: AAS 82 (1990), 1565.

Sensus fidei, in the full sense of the word, requires the gifts of the Holy Spirit, especially the gift of wisdom and knowledge. In the area of salvific truth, the Holy Spirit enlivens the Mystical Body of Christ through the gifts given to individual believers in the sacrament of Confirmation. It is the Holy Spirit that directs the believer to the direct object of faith and to everything that has been revealed in relation to him. Therefore, the Holy Spirit, in giving its gifts, is the foundation of the *sensus fidei*. The sense of faith is a living ability that can only be formed and sustained in its living realization. This fulfilment also includes the impulse of heart, devotion and faith lived out in prayer. The sense of faith is not a mere intellectual ability, but the fruit of a fully human attitude of faith, a word that lives in the hearts of the faithful⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ For further details, see O.H. Pesch, *Istinkt und Glaubenswille*, "Catholica" 16 (1962), 69-77; H. Hamman, *Die neueren katholischen Erklärungen Dogmenentwicklung*, Essen 1965, 242-262; J. Beumer, *Glaubenssinn der Kirche als Quelle einer Definition*, "Theologie und Glaube" 45 (1955), 250-260; J.W. Glaser, *Authority, Connatural Knowledge, and the Spontaneous Judgment of the Faithful*, "Theological Studies" 29 (1968), 742-751; J. Sancho Bielsa, *Infalibilidad del pueblo de Dios. "Sensus fidei" e infalibilidad organica de la Iglesia en la Constitution "Lumen Gentium" del Concilio Vaticano II*, Pamplona 1971; W. Beinert, *Bedeutung und Begründung des Glaubenssinnes ("Sensus fidei") als eines dogmatischen Erkenntniskriteriums*, "Catholica" 25 (1971), 271-303; *ibid.*, *Das Finden und Verkünden der Wahrheit in der Gemeinschaft der Kirche*, "Catholica" 43 (1989), 1-30; W.M. Thompson, *Sensus Fidelium and Infallibility*, "American Ecclesiastical Review" 167 (1973), 450-486; F. Dumont, *Remarques critiques pour une theologie de 'consensus fidelium'*, in: *Foi populaire, foi savante*, Paris 1976, 49-60; J.M.R. Tillard, *Le 'Sensus Fidelium'. Reflexion Theologique*, in: *Foi populaire, foi savante*, Paris 1976, 9-40; L. Fernandez De Traconiz, *Sensus fidei: logica connatural de la existencia cristiana. Un estudio del recurso al sensus fidei en la teologia catolica de 1950 a 1970*, Vitoria 1976; *ibidem*, *La teologia sobre el 'sensus fidei' de 1960 a 1970*, "Scriptorum Victoriense" 29 (1982), 133-179; 31 (1984), 555; 6 (1988), 33-58; *ibidem*, *Recurso al 'sensus fidei' en la teologia catolica de 1950-a 1960*, "Scriptorum Victoriense" 27 (1980), 142-183; 28 (1981), 39-75; H. Wagner, *Glaubenssinn, Glaubenzustimmung und Glaubenskonsens*, "Theologie und Glaube" 69 (1979), 263-271; E. Schillebeeckx, B. van Iersel (ed.), *Rivelazione e esperienza*, "Concilium" 3 (1978), 13-191; K. Rahner, *Offizielle Glaubenslehre der Kirche und faktische Glaubigkeit des Volkes*, in: *Theologie in Freiheit und Verantwortung*, K. Rahner, H. Fries (ed.), München 1984, 15-29; J. Kerkhofs, *Le peuple de Dieu et il infallible? L'importance du 'sensus fidelium' dans l'Eglise postconciliaire*, "Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie" 35 (1988), 3-19; J. Dobbin, *Sensus Fidelium Reconsidered*, "New Theology Review" 2 (1989), 48-64; P. Scharr, *Consensus fidelium. Zur Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche aus der Perspektive einer Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit*, Würzburg 1992; D. Vitali, *Sensus Fidelium. Una funzione ecclesiale di intelligenza della fede*, Brescia 1993.

The Substance of *Consensus Fidelium*

It is true that the sense of faith is one of the factors in the development of dogmas because it allows us to recognize the Word of God in those statements that come from revelation in the plane of homogeneous evolution. However, the difficulty remains as to how to determine *sensus fidelium* of Christians, or simply Catholics, who all over the world are characterised by significant cultural differences and divisions?

As in the past, the problem is also growing in modern times, when not all of the Church assesses questions of faith in the same way. A belief in the correctness of a new formulation of a particular truth of faith can be achieved on the basis of *sensus fidei* of the whole Church. The sense of faith through belonging to the inner life of faith of every believer, however, is not directly accessible. It can only be reached by *consensus fidelium*. In the context of the terms *Universitas fidelium* and *sensus fidei*, as applied by the Constitution *Lumen Gentium*, the difficulty of defining this consensus of the whole Church on the level of faith and customs arises (*de fide et moribus*).

In connection with the above reflections, F.A. Sullivan indicates a theological difficulty. After *Vaticanum II*, it is emphasised that many elements of sanctification and truth, as gifts of the Church of Christ, are also found outside the Catholic Church. Is it still possible to think about the infallibility of Catholics *in credendo*, if a certain truth of faith is not approved by other Christians? Perhaps, then, a broad consensus among the other most important churches and Christian communities should be taken into account. Perhaps only such a consensus would satisfy the conditions of infallibility *in credendo*?⁴⁶

Another difficulty, of a practical nature, is recalled by G. Sala, who emphasises that the “quality” of God’s people, who are entitled to infallibility *in credendo*, leaves a lot to wish for. The dissonance between official Catholics from statistics and those practising and living in faith is getting greater and greater. Moreover, the phenomenon of “partial identification” of individual members of the community with the Church is spreading. These circumstances pose

⁴⁶ F.A. Sullivan, *Il Magistero nella Chiesa cattolica*, Brescia 1986, 28. The author tries to answer: “credo sarebbe ancora in armonia con la dottrina del Vaticano II attribuire infallibilità nella fede alla chiesa cattolica romana anche quando il suo credo non venisse condiviso da altri cristiani. L’affermazione: la Chiesa di Cristo «sussiste» nella chiesa Cattolica significa che tutte le proprietà essenziali della Chiesa di Cristo sussistono anche nella chiesa Cattolica.” *Ibid.*, 29.

a danger not only to the anti-Catholic, but also to the anti-Christian infiltration under the apparent name of God's people⁴⁷.

It should be remembered that the truths of faith considered by the faithful refer rather to a concrete existential situation. It is difficult to talk about speculative deliberations. Moreover, the faithful are generally lacking in this "vigilance, intellectual sensitivity," which would make it possible to clearly resolve the question of continuity between certain statements of faith and those arising from the Revelation. The internal judgement is not realised immediately, but rather slowly, tightens and deepens over time. Therefore, one must be restrained in stating that we are dealing with reality *sensus fidei*. History teaches us that while there have been cases in which God's people, through their faith, rejected, for example, the heresy of Arianism while it was accepted by many Church representatives, there are examples of departure from the true doctrine of the Church of large masses of people on the other hand.

Nevertheless, there are criteria for determining the authenticity of the doctrine proclaimed on the basis of the sense of faith of the whole Church. Here we should indicate the text from Letter to Romans 12, 6: *And according to the grace given to us, we have various gifts: be the gift of prophecy – to be used in accordance with faith*, and the Gospel according to St. Matthew 7, 16: *You will know them by their fruits*. The first passage indicates that the spontaneous acceptance or rejection of a particular doctrine should be judged on the basis of the Revelation. Then we can be sure that the decision comes from the Spirit of truth is authentic, is by God's will. In the second case, the proclamation of the truth with one's life, which confirms the fulfilment of God's will, should mobilize one to observe God's law. It should become a motive for 'producing good fruit'.

Sensus fidei leads to unquestionable certainty only if the whole Church from bishops to the last of the lay faithful is convinced of the truthfulness of a particular doctrine. The more common this compliance is, the closer we get to absolute certainty. However, it must always be remembered that the spontaneous approval of a certain doctrine does not yet determine its truthfulness. Not always *vox populi* is *vox Dei*. Consensus becomes a criterion of truth when the community of believers continues (a permanent state, can be extended significantly over time) in a positive conviction of a particular doctrine. Moreover, they are aware of all the aspects of it, considers all the arguments against it, considers all the consequences.

⁴⁷ G. Sala, *Magistero*, in: *Dizionario Teologico Interdisciplinare*, Torino 1977, vol. 2, 426.

Sensus Fidei and Public Opinion

Recourse to *sensus fidei* is becoming increasingly more frequent today. Another element is answering the question whether the “expansion” of referring to this reality goes hand in hand with a proper understanding of it? Many questions arise here: Do you think *sensus fidei* – *fidelium* is public opinion? Is it possible to treat a referendum (so popular today in “usurping” decisions on fundamental issues, often beyond human competence) as an expression of *sensus fidelium*? Is it possible that this supernatural ability to study the mysteries of revelation by God’s people is in contradiction, or at least in competition, to the decisions of the Magisterium of the Church?

We have already mentioned that the ultimate addressee of Revelation is the Church as God’s people, embracing the hierarchical community and the laity. It includes infallibility *in credendo* based on the deep unity of the Church, which turns out to be *a people united by the unity of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit*⁴⁸. The College, including the Bishop of Rome, successor of Peter, with the power of apostolic succession, has authoritative power, infallibility *in docendo*. It is up to it to define and interpret authentic doctrine.

We are dealing here with a question that is quite topical today, referring to the so-called “authority of the faithful” in the articulation and development of the doctrine of faith⁴⁹. Indeed, among post-conciliar issues, which are also being addressed today with increased force, is the above mentioned issue. Is it possible to say that the classical term “Magisterium” contains the reality that is connected with the “doctrinal authority” of the faithful? Maybe in order to overcome the “assisting and caring Church” scheme, this term, as its supporters argue, will express the will to make the faithful not only passive addressees who accept the teachings of the Magisterium of the Church, but also those who have an active role in clarifying and developing the truths of faith? Can there be a risk of detachment, a kind of “doctrinal competition” between the Magisterium and the faithful?

⁴⁸ LG 4.

⁴⁹ The “doctrinal authority” of the faithful is the term that seems to come from areas of German theological thought (*Lehrautorität*) and differs from the “magisterium” (*Lehramt*). J.B. Metz and E. Schillebeeckx emphasise that “Volendo superare lo schema di «Chiesa assistenziale» (la gerarchia insegna, i teologi spiegano, I fedeli ascoltano e obbediscono), esso include ed esprime la volontà teologica di fare dei fedeli non più i «destinatari passivo-recettivi del magistero ecclesiastico», ma i «soggetti vivi nella compagine ecclesiale» con ruolo attivo «nell’articolazione e nello sviluppo della fede.» Editoriale, “Concilium” 21 (1985), 11.

Today we are witnessing many “temptations” on the part of the laity towards the interpretation of the above issues. Certain groups of people, in the name of their own popularity, aspire to decide about changes in many matters concerning the life of the Church. What is more, these groups stress that the conviction of the public or the results of the referendum are sufficient motivations for change also on a doctrinal-disciplinary level. It is becoming popular to think that the expression of the will of a particular group of people is *hic et nunc* idea of their faith. The above reflections raise the question of how this problem should be understood.

The Second Vatican Council and most theologians accept the fact that something can be “discovered or deepened” by the faithful⁵⁰ and recognises the obligation to consult the faithful about certain truths. Nevertheless, it excludes any compromise between the normative function of the Magisterium and the function of the witness of the people of God. It should be strongly emphasised that it is a mistake to refer to the sociological argument that the opinion of a large number of Christians should be a direct and adequate expression of the supernatural “sense of faith.” In fact, the opinions of the faithful cannot be simply, uncritically, identified with “*sensus fidei*.” The ideas that circulate in God’s people are not always and not all of them are coherent with faith. All the more so because they can be easily created and suggested by public opinion, manipulated so much by the contemporary media. The enthusiastic adhesion of a certain group to an idea does not always mean it is true. *Sensus fidei* does not coincide, does not identify with public opinion.

It is therefore necessary to stress that a voice of public opinion, a kind of referendum, cannot pretend to call itself *sensus fidelium*. All the more because it cannot be considered competitive with the Magisterium of the Church. Rightly notes in his excellent article the already mentioned L Scheffczyk: *Those bound only by ‘private’ faith; those who profess “christianismus vagas,” or are ready to identify themselves only partially with the Church, they cannot carry out “sensus fidelium” [...]. The sense of the faith cannot be equated with the dominant tendency in theology and Christian thought. The sense of the faith does not result from the decision of the majority either*⁵¹.

In the Church there is no room for “arrogance of self-dogmatisation.” All those who call for the “democratisation of the Church” must respect the

⁵⁰ LG 12. For an active testimony of the faithful see: A. Acerbi, *Due ecclesieologie. Ecclesio-logia giuridica ed ecclesio-logia di comunione nella “Lumen gentium,”* Bologna 1975, 510f; G. Thils, *L’infaillibilité du Peuple chrétien “in credendo.” Notes de théologie post-tridentine,* Louvain 1963.

⁵¹ L. Scheffczyk, *Sensus fidelium*, 124.

community dimension of faith⁵². It is a mistake to identify *sensus Ecclesiae* z *consensus Ecclesiae*. Moreover, it is necessary to “anchor” in the Tradition of the Church, to realise the principle of Vincentus of Lerin *Quod ubique, quod semper; quod ab omnibus, creditum est*⁵³. Only in this way can God’s people, faithfully following the Magisterium of the Church and remaining unwavering “with faith once given to the saints,” effectively and genuinely move towards God⁵⁴.

From the foregoing considerations it results that *sensus fidei* must be situated in the context of the community of the Church. The Spirit of Truth, which is present in all the baptized, is realized in the prophetic function of Christ and the Church as *via empirica* of the living Tradition of the Church⁵⁵.

The sense of faith, as a particular ability to understand and define revealed truth, should be seen as a help in recognising authentic doctrine, and not as an act that will ratify the teachings of the Church’s Teachers’ Office on a juridical level. The Magisterium’s power of office is only a guide to the sense of faith in the Church. It is his competence to defend the authenticity of the revealed doctrine, and in particular those truths that are related to the devotion of the faithful. However, before the Magisterium makes a decision, it is necessary to follow the living Tradition of the Church. The most important decisions of the Magisterium are not arbitrary, they are motivated and based on the faith of the Church.

⁵² J. Ratzinger, *Democratizzazione della Chiesa?*, in: *Democrazia nella Chiesa. Possibilita, limiti, pericoli*, J. Ratzinger, H. Maier (ed.), Rome 1971, 55: “[...] è strano che oggi non di rado quei circoli che propugnano con tanto calore la democratizzazione della Chiesa dimostrino così poco rispetto per la fede comune delle comunita e vedano in questa voce della maggioranza dei credenti solamente la liberta apparente, immanente al sistema, che attraverso il loro sforzo critico deve essere dimostrata come non-liberta. L’arroganza dell’autodogmatizzazione che qui traspare non puo essere uno strumento di salvezza per il futuro della Chiesa.”

⁵³ Vincenti Lirinensis, *Commonitorium* c. 2, in: PL 50, 640.

⁵⁴ LG 12. See on this subject: J.B. Metz, E. Schillebeeckx (ed.), *L’autorita dottrinale dei fedeli*, “Concilium” 21 (1985), 11-124; M. Seybold, *Kirchliches Lehramt und allgemeiner Glaubenssinn*, “Theologie und Glaube” 65 (1975), 266-277; A. Dulles, *The Two Magisteria: An Interim Reflection*, “Catholic Theological Society of America Proceedings” 35 (1980), 155-169; H. Fries, *Sensus fidelium. Der Theologe zwischen dem Lehramt der Hierarchie und dem Lehramt der Glaubigen*, in: *Theologie und Hierarch*, J. Pfammater, E. Christen (ed.), Zurich 1988, 55-77; D. Wiederkehr, *Der Glaubenssinn des Gottesvolkes – Konkurrent oder Partner des Lehramtes?*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1994.

⁵⁵ S. Pie-Ninot, *Sensus fidei*, in: *Dizionario di Teologia Fondamentale*, R. Latourelle, R. Fichella (ed.), Assisi 1990, 1133-1134. Cf. Z. Alszeghy, M. Flick, *Lo sviluppo del dogma*, op. cit., 112: “Il magistero esteriore della chiesa non basta per dare la fede, e molto meno per dare l’intelligenza della fede, senza il magistero interiore dello Spirito; ma, dall’altra parte, proprio la comunione con il magistero gerarchico e il clima propizio per ricevere dallo Spirito il senso della fede, che a sua volta non e altro che la capacita di ottenere un’intelligenza piu completa della stessa dottrina predicata dal magistero gerarchico.”

Just like *sensus fidei* of the whole Church requires a decision of the Magisterium in order to achieve a full and authoritative definition, so the Magisterium is placed in the context of the faith of the whole Church and updates itself in the community of the Church. Only the Magisterium has the dignity of authority deciding on the “fruits” of the sense of faith. Authoritative intervention of the Magisterium is necessary to determine whether or not the doctrine considered in the Church belongs to the deposit of the revealed. Neither the laity itself nor its individual members have any active doctrinal authority in the area of *de fide et moribus*. It cannot reach out to the results that the development of dogmas is aiming at on his own.

The awareness of the faith of the whole Church in the face of a certain revealed truth can be said to precede the act of the Magisterium. Of course, this does not mean that everyone faithful, before the definition, should believe *explicite* in this truth, as revealed by God. The Magisterium defines the awareness of the faith of the universal Church and at the same time communicates it to those who have not yet come to this conviction⁵⁶. It is possible, in certain respects, to speak of priority *sensus fidei* of believers, to the Magisterium and theology. This is, however, a priority understood as conformity in faith on the part of all believers, which also includes shepherds and theologians. Neither juridical sense nor absolute values can be attributed to this priority.

When considering the issue of *sensus fidei* as far as the development of dogmas is concerned, it can be said that if the people of God have primacy in the order of purpose, the Magisterium has priority in the order of authentic interpretation of God’s truths. For the faith of God’s people achieves its precise, confident and binding expression only when it is defined by the Magisterium.

The distinction between “infallibility *in credendo*,” in other words passive, and “infallibility *in docendo*,” active, does not mean separation or division between hierarchy and lay Catholics. It is about a common exchange relationship, a relationship in which a higher order is realised in mutual cooperation⁵⁷. Between these types of infallibility there is mutual permeation⁵⁸.

⁵⁶ Cf. W. Knoch, *Bóg szuka człowieka. Objawienie, Pismo Święte, Tradycja*, translated by: B. Szlagor, M. Szlagor, Poznań 2000, 112f; A. Anton, *Il compito ‘ecclesiale’ e ‘scientifico’ del teologo nell’Istruzione ‘Donum Veritatis’*, “La Civiltà cattolica” 148 (1997), vol. 3, 375; A.G. Aiello, *Sviluppo del dogma e tradizione*, 352.

⁵⁷ Cf. L. Scheffczyk, *Sensus fidelium*, art. cit., 122.

⁵⁸ When *Lumen Gentium* speaks of the infallibility of the Church, referring also to the infallibility of the faithful, who are part of the people of God, it does not contradict the hierarchical vision of the Church, clearly shown in chapter III. We can talk about the infallibility

In Conclusion

In order to understand the meaning of the sense of faith, it is necessary to distinguish between *sensus fidei* (a person's ability to believe), *sensus fidelium* (competent to the Church as *congregatio fidelium*, and is based on *sensus fidei*) and *consensus fidei – fidelium* (points to the unity of the Church, which is expressed in a common confession of faith, *credo*).

Sensus fidei is expressed as intuition or understanding of faith. This means the potential ability of a person to hear God's Word addressed to them and to accept it as God's Word. This makes it possible for members of the Church to "grasp" the revelations. This charism or ability to discern was given to the whole Church by the Holy Spirit. It is one of the ways in which the faithful bear witness to their faith and discover the tradition of the Church. The history of the development of dogma shows that God's people also contribute to a deeper understanding of the truths of faith. *Consensus fidei* has always had value in Catholic theology. The testimony of God's people helps to recognise the revealed truth.

The Holy Spirit gives believers the ability to understand the supernatural truth revealed by Christ. In this way supernatural reality is becoming increasingly better known and expressed more precisely through new language formulations. *Sensus fidei* is born from the Christian experience of participating in the life of grace, and leads to a clearer understanding of the mystery than logical discourse is able to do. The theology of *sensus fidei*, stressing the active role not only of *Ecclesia docente*, but also *discente*, has enlivened reflections on the Church as a "living organism" whose global growth, especially in faith, is realised in the vital function of the whole organism.

In order to make a reliable judgement on issues that affect the sense of faith, it is necessary to appeal and to base it on the teaching of the Magisterium of the Church. Only then the understanding of revelation through *sensus fidei* can be expressed through linguistic expression in a way that is certain and appropriate to the reality being expressed.

Between *sensus fidei* and the teachings of the Magisterium of the Church there are mutual relationships. *Sensus fidei* needs the Magisterium, similarly the teachings of Magisterium should also take into consideration the fruits of *sensus*

of the faithful *in credendo*, but not about the magisterium of the faithful. In addition, the basic distinction between the infallibility of the faithful and the infallibility of the Shepherds of the Church is expressed in this, that the former are infallible *in faith* and the latter *in teaching*. Mutual interdependence is realised here.

fidelium. We can therefore speak of the interpenetration of these two realities. “Mutual reciprocity” – the coordination between laity and Shepherds of the Church must lead to many benefits, including the proclamation of revealed truth.

Sensus fidei seems to point to people who are above all “poor in spirit.” It is true that God often gives to simple people, but deeply believing, the ability of the “eyes of faith” of supernatural reality. After all, Jesus Christ Himself says: *I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have covered these things from the wise and prudent, and revealed them to the simple ones. Yes, Father, because that was your liking* (Luke 10:21). Indeed, a true believer has this wisdom, even without profound theological knowledge. The more intensely a person lives a spiritual experience, the more fruitful he or she will participate in the sense of faith. At times, however, too much detachment of *sensus fidei* from the need for systematic intellectual formation is sought. It is necessary to be aware that a person open to the grace, instructed by the teaching of the Magisterium, the teaching of theology, is thus in a more advantageous situation in relation to the charism of *sensus fidei*. For man “juxtaposes,” analyses facts and words, and understands them according to his own experience and his cognitive abilities, according to the principle: *ad modum recipientis recipitur*. The Holy Spirit helps to evaluate what is understood. However, it does not miraculously replace a proper understanding of facts and words, which are, after all, the subject of this judgement⁵⁹.

Post-conciliar theology places *sensus fidei* above all in the context of the infallibility of the whole Church. In addition, it sees it as a charism handed down from the Holy Spirit to the Church. Considering *sensus fidei*, as “intuition,” “instinct” or “autonomous judgement” we do not mean irrational aspect. However, theologians emphasise that it is not possible to overestimate *sensus fidei*, too much, because it has its limitations. It is difficult to define a consensus of faith. The faith of much of God’s people is, unfortunately, weak, limited, prone to one-sidedness, and certainly cannot be the foundation for precise deliberations, although it does inspire them in a way.

⁵⁹ So a specific postulate and task emerges. Continuous efforts should be made to promote the religious culture of the laity, the promotion of theological knowledge. In this way, man, recalling the words of John Paul II from the Encyclical *Fides et Ratio*, by faith and reason, using the gift of *sensus fidei*, rises towards contemplation of the One Truth, God Himself.

Part IV –
Moral Issue

Moral Aspects of Laity in the Organization of the Roman and Catholic Church*

Introduction

The laity in the Catholic Church means the same as laypeople who have no special holy orders within the organization, except two sacraments, namely: Holy Baptism and the Holy Confirmation, which, applying in the soul of man an indelible mark (the sacramental character), thereby give him an absolute mission to fulfil¹. By mentioning the moral aspects of the laity, we would like to point out that we disregard discussing in this place the special structure that it might have in the future of the Catholic Church. This side of the laity is one of the constitutive elements of the Church; its explanation and determination, therefore, belong to the teaching of the Church². We are interested in the question of whether the laity, laypeople in the Church, as a numerically dominant part of the People of God, regardless of its substantial or specific form of existence in the organization of the Catholic Church, has a special, to some extent self-fulfilling mission to comply, or is it only — as one of the lay auditors at the Council expressed himself — a bridge between the church (probably in the sense of Hierarchy) and the rest of the world.

* STV 5(1967)1. Paper presented at Ecumenical Week in Warsaw, November 1964.

¹ LG 31. Cf. P. Dabin, *Le sacerdoce royal des fideles*, Paris 1941, 201ff, 314ff, 314ff; Y. Congar, *Jalons pour une theologie du laicat*, Paris 1953, 498ff, 529ff; R. Poelman, *Peuple de Dieu*, "Lumen vitae" 3 (1965), 454f.

² Cf. P. Dabin, *op. cit.*, 7ff.

Mission of the Laity

If, however, the laity has a special mission to fulfil in the world then the realization of this mission implies a right action not only physically but also above all morally because it is about the participation of laypeople in the work of the salvation of the world. Speaking, therefore, of the moral aspects of the laity, i.e., its dynamic side, we take into account the role of laypeople in carrying out the mission of the entire Catholic Church around the world.

No matter how this role was understood in the Church over the past centuries, — today, when the world shimmers with Christianity, more and more, people distance themselves away from God in many aspects, becoming only in a more refined manner, because it is supposedly “scientifically” justified, similar to the people whom the Apostles of Christ carried the good news, — today, when one often hears about the need to re-read the Gospel of Jesus Christ, not elsewhere, but in the sources of Revelation, one should look for basic notions about the role of the laity in the organization of the Catholic Church³.

Certain notions about the future and mission of the Church, and thus the laity, have already been left by Christ in His parables, as in the parable of the mustard seed and the yeast⁴.

The first of these parables is a prophetic vision of the Church’s profound growth in space and time, the second of which seems to relate primarily to the total control of the soul by grace. The thought of the real attitude of the Church’s mission to a universal extent is suggested by Christ’s parable of the good shepherd. “I am a good shepherd, says Christ... I know my sheep, and my sheep know me” — it is a constituted sheep-flock. However, here the good Shepherd has more to say: “I have other sheep that are not of this fold. I must bring them in as well, and they will listen to My voice. Then there will be one flock and one shepherd”⁵. For many contemporary Catholics, the full meaning of these words of Christ made a mark, perhaps, only when one saw in nature or on television, learned from the radio or the press about the great variety of continents, us, nations, represented by the gathering of participants of the Second Vatican Council. In the meantime, this saying of Christ about other sheep was only a consequence of the fact that the Word became flesh, that the Son of God became a man only without any specifically emphasized local, racial or national

³ Chapter IV of LG is instructive in this respect: *De laicis*, 37ff.

⁴ Mt 13:31-35.

⁵ J 10:14.16.

qualifications⁶. This fact is the visible basis of His power over all human flock. Therefore, in the missionary mandate before his ascension, Christ only confirms this truth when He speaks these words: “All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore, go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit... And surely, I am with you always, to the very end of the age.”⁷

From the words of Christ, it appears that God’s will is for the Church to reach the whole of humanity with its influence. It would be the fulfilment of the parable of the mustard seed. However, it seems that the normal condition for realizing that God intends to preserve the truth contained in the Parable of the Leaven, “a woman took and hid in three measures of flour until it was all leavened.”⁸ The point is, therefore, that God’s power will penetrate the depths of people declaring their belonging to Christ. This applies not only to clerics but also, and above all, to lay Catholics. The test of the effectiveness of the teachings of God given to the listeners is the dynamic acceptance of them, by them. The role of the laity in the Church means not a passive attitude towards the missions of the Church of Christ⁹, but exceedingly active one that Christ mentions when He speaks: “Let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father who is in heaven.”¹⁰ Laity, therefore, somehow must contribute to the growth of mustard seeds into a powerful plant or even a tree and become a leaven of access to God for all humankind. Before that, however, one must feel responsible for this work¹¹. The idea is that previously subjected to the action of the leaven of the Gospel, in turn, became leaven in the modern world, giving witness to Christ with their own lives¹². This would indicate that the mission of the laity in the organization of the Church is primarily of a moral, dynamic, practical nature. “Above all” however, does not mean “entirely.” The fact that at the Second Vatican Council, as each session followed, the number of female and male lay auditors also grew, demonstrating

⁶ Cf. M. Lagrange: *Evangile selon Saint Jean*, Paris 1925, Introduction, CXLIV; 280f.

⁷ Mt 28:18-20. Cf. Cl. Filion, *La sainte Bible*, vol. 7, Paris 1925, 191f.

⁸ Mt 13:33. Cf. S. Thomae Aquinitis, *Catena aurea in Quatuor Evangelia*, Taurini 1915, vol. 1, 237.

⁹ Cf. R. Muller, *Der Laie in der Kirche*, TQ 130 (1950), 184ff; N. Rocholl, *Vom Laienpriestertum*, Paderborn 1940, 94.

¹⁰ Mt 5:16. Cf. S. Thomae, *Catena aurea...*, op. cit., 80ff; R. Poelman, *Peuple de Dieu*, “Lumen vitae” 3 (1965), 460ff, 476ff.

¹¹ LG 37. Cf. A. Carre, *Le sacerdoce des Laics*, Paris 1960, 149ff, 157ff.

¹² LG 31.34. Cf. G. Delcuve, *Faut-il encore annoncer l’Evangile?*, “Lumen vitae” 3 (1965), 513ff.

that in some cases, when it comes to the introduction of the principles of the Gospel and even of the natural law, secular participation becomes in some sense indispensable¹³. It is known that, for example, the issues of Scheme XIII require the cooperation of entire groups of scientists: biologists, physicians, sociologists, psychologists, etc. in order for the Church to decide on some matters in a way that most closely matches the needs of the age of humanity, while at the same time keeping God's creative concept unchanged.

Content and Scope of the Mission of the Laity

However, despite the precious contribution of the laity to the work of renewing the Church and adapting the work to the requirements of the present, the above activities of the laity include, for understandable reasons, only a small group of laypeople. In the meantime, the laity in God's intentions and the understanding of the Church of the preacher are all Christ's followers living in the world, and therefore not separated from the life of this world, from its progress or decadence. In any case, laity means laypeople living in Christianity in the world as is, at the given moment¹⁴.

However, it is not clear what the moral aspect of the laity as a whole of lay Catholics in the world expresses. For a while an intellectual elite may be an irrevocable help to the Hierarchy in solving some of the doctrinal or practical problems that have already arisen as a result of the progress of the natural sciences, changes in the living conditions of people on earth, the entire laity will always be below this level. This circumstance, however, does not exacerbate the situation in the Church. It will not be a mistake when one says that the laity, as a whole, in the words of Saint Peter the Apostle, is "a royal priesthood, a holy people, a nation belonging to God."¹⁵ For this reason, the laity, in this sense, is somehow related to the issue expressed by Christ on missionary leave.

In fact, the verbal function of Gospel teaching was entrusted to him, with small exceptions, to the Apostles and their successors, bishops, and priests. We know, however, what were the results of this teaching, if it does not become a leaven of creative change for the better, especially in the life attitude and practice of the laity. Moreover, the fact is that at the present moment, the Church, based on the details of Revelation, has matured in the conviction that

¹³ LG 33.

¹⁴ LG 36.

¹⁵ STV (1967)1.

the laity who implements the principles of the Gospel in his secular life is an indispensable element of the salvific work of the Church as a whole, that is, the Hierarchy along with the laity¹⁶.

There is a Latin saying, *verba docent, exempla trahunt* — words instruct, illustrations lead. One should not think that saying in places, times, ways, means of action, etc., in particular circumstances, refers mainly to the Hierarchy, the clergy. Even tens of thousands of bishops and priests and several hundred thousand monks and nuns do not constitute a large number of Good News sowers against more than three billion people living on the globe. However, nearly six hundred million Catholics and several hundred million Christians of other religions are already a substantial number in the apostolate of the true God in the world.

Moral Aspects of the Laity

It is not an exaggeration to say that the laity has a particular independent function to fulfil in the Church, namely teaching through example, attracting others to Christ through a full Christian life on a daily basis¹⁷. Life, on the other hand, is not an abstraction from authentic human life in the world, for it consists of both family life, as well as work on a farm, in a factory, in an office or school, in a hospital or in the theatre, etc.¹⁸ So this is an honestly and comprehensively human life, with the holy light shining upon the grace of God's supernatural childhood, which St. John the Apostle in his first catholic letter speaks about¹⁹. Because the truth about this eldritch grace applies to all people, for God has called everyone to the Holy order, regardless of whether the call was completed in someone, whether it is a state of nearer or further potency for many, we can imagine how capable it is to change our attitude towards other people. Since God is the Father of us all, we are all brothers, regardless of the place we occupy on the globe, the colour of our skin or belonging to this or another nation.

The reality of God's fatherly economy for people should penetrate to the consciousness of the laity, in order to become the driving force of its proper functioning in the Church. Specifically, it is enough for lay Catholics to realize

¹⁶ LG 33. Cf. G. Delcuve, art. cit., 515f.

¹⁷ LG 36.

¹⁸ Cf. LG 34.

¹⁹ Look what love the Father has shown us: we are called children of God and we are indeed them. 1J 3:1.

their direct earthly goals in their various ways of life and daily work, guided by the light of faith and inseminated with love towards God and all people.²⁰ This is indeed a great acronym in terms of Christian life, but it contains rich content. Love, especially the supreme, which Saint Thomas Aquinas describes as *friendship with God, and the God of all people made in His image and likeness*, may be the impulse of the most diverse activities. Before that, however, it unites all Christians into one great loving family. In the Acts of the Apostles, the first history of the Church of Christ, Saint Luke points out that “many believers had one heart and one soul, and none of them had their own name but they shared everything.”²¹ With the right proportion to the needs of present times and the changed living conditions in which mankind found itself in twenty centuries after Christ is coming into the world, this way of behaving of the original Christians is to become the norm of conduct of the contemporary laity in the Church. It will be proof of mission fulfilment through him.

In the first letter to the Thessalonians, St. Paul the Apostle writes that the Thessalonians, for their part, became followers of (Paul) and Christ, accepting the word, despite all the aggravations, with the joy of the Holy Spirit. In this way, they became an example for all believers in Macedonia and Achaia. Furthermore, the Apostle of Nations clearly indicates that the word of the Lord, having come out from them, resounded not only in Macedonia and Achaia but that the news of their faith in God has come everywhere and to the extent that — “we do not need to talk about it anymore.”²²

Then follows the enumeration of deeds, the source of which was the belief in the true God accepted by the Thessalonians.

By translating the above into the modern Christian language, one could say that although it is true that faith is the indispensable foundation of authentic Christian life, its vitality is demonstrated only by the implementation of its principles. This vitality of the faith of the laity may sometimes — as in Thessalonians — even release Hierarchy from excessive effort in verbal teaching. For the behaviour and actions of its followers will speak in a victorious way for the truth of God as the object of faith, and for its necessity for the development of a thoroughly humanistic life here on earth and for the happiness of future life.

²⁰ Cf. A. Carre, op. cit., 164ff.

²¹ Acts 4:32.

²² 1Tes 1, 6-8. Cf. Cl. Fillion, op. cit., 428f.

Vital Aspects of the Laity

The manifestations of the vitality of the supernatural faith are the different facts made by its followers. What are these facts, Christ himself points out, describing the upcoming final judgment over people. Then He will tell the righteous: "For I was hungry, and you gave me food; I was thirsty, and you gave me drink; I found myself in exile, and you received me; I was naked, and you clothed me; I was sick, and you visited me; I was in prison, and you came to me."²³ When asked, when it was, He will answer: "Truly I tell you: Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of Mine, you did for Me"²⁴. Here is the effect of the laity; the will of Christ is clear: there must be facts. For "as the body without a spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead."²⁵

The applicability of this program in present times is not necessarily to be manifested only in the form of deeds of mercy, of which we have referred. Present times, without changing motives or goals of action, require a broader approach to this matter. Today, nakedness, hunger, thirst, homelessness, illness, and slavery are not covered by individuals, but whole nations, millions and hundreds of millions of people. Therefore, the forms of coming to them with the help of different ones should have features. However, to avoid this, if the Gospel of Jesus Christ is to become the constitution of Christian life then it is down to the laity. Above all, it is because the clergy and the nature of its vocation and the spirit of the times do not seem to become too involved in activities that require from Christian nations both significant technical preparation and enormous capital and hands to implement large-scale assistance²⁶.

This is the contemporary form of the apostolate of the laity, but the soul of her are the words of Christ the Judge contained in the above-cited answer:

²³ Mt 25:35-36.

²⁴ Mt, 25:40.

²⁵ Jak 2:26.

²⁶ The words of the above-mentioned Dogmatic Constitution on the Church are significant in this respect: "In quo officio universaliter adimplendo laici praecipuum locum obtinent. Sua igitur in profanis disciplinis competentia suaque activitate, gratia Christi! intrinsecus elevata, valide conferant operam, ut bona creata secundum Creatoris ordinationem Eiusque Verbi illuminationem humano labore, arte technica civili que cultura ad utilitatem omnium prorsus hominum excolantur, aptiusque inter illos distribuantur, et suo modo ad universalem progressum in humana et Christiana libertate conducant. Ita Christus per Ecclesiae membra totam societatem humanam suo salutari lumine magis magisque illuminabit". Const. 41-42, s. 36. Por. L. Hoang Gia Quang, *Une Eglise cherche a adapter son message*, "Lumen vitae" 3 (1965) 546f.549f.

“Whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of Mine, you did for Me.” This answer is characterized by universalism in the approach to man: no boundaries, no place, no time, no distinctions between people, no limitations as to the way or object of action: whatever you have done. Therefore, the field of the laity’s activity cannot have any limitations: all that is needed is awareness of the contemporary state of affairs, the knowledge of the Gospel and a sense of responsibility for the Church established by Christ. From this, the appropriate internal attitude of the laity will grow, under the requirements of human nature and the precepts of the Gospel, as well as the deeds flowing from this point.

It seems that John Fitzgerald Kennedy accurately captures these moral aspects of the layman, the first Catholic president in the history of the United States of America, when he turned to the modern world with a question: “Can we create a world-wide grand alliance of North and South, East and West, which will create better living conditions for humanity?” The answer to this question was as follows: *Let us begin.*

A Perspective of Moral Theology on the Problem of Tissue Donation and Organ Transplantation*

The Problem

The development of medicine in the quarter-century after WWII and especially the medicine of the last few years has found its culmination in successful attempts at transplanting kidneys and the heart; this has become the subject of vivid and hot disputes. Organ transplantation, which has become the basis for the emergence of a new established medical specialty called transplantology, has become the subject of the considerations, discussions and polemics of numerous scholars, the subject of many symposia, conventions, medical congresses, and not only medical ones. The discussion has gone far beyond medical circles. It has deeply affected public opinion throughout the world, found a wide response in the mass media, and become the subject of fascination of various scholars; it has also inspired many professional publications and journalist pieces. The discussion, however, has not been dominated by scientific-technical issues but by clearly moral ones. Questions are constantly raised as to whether and if human organs should be transplanted, how should we assess transplantations already carried out from a moral evaluative position, and what position should be taken in relation to further actions of medicine in this field. These questions are still valid and continue to be formulated, and attempts are made to answer them from different positions and axiological perspectives.

Moral theology has so far distanced itself away from discussions on the subject indicated herein. Unfortunately the opinions of Catholic moralists are missing part of it. This may come as a surprise because it is a matter of a clearly ethical nature, although, it is so deeply disturbing for a wide range of intellectuals. Those who have so recently been accused of too frequent and too punctilious

* STV 10(1972)1.

interference in human life valued with the use of a ready-made system of assessments and norms, now appear to be holding back from taking a position on the case. Admittedly one can indicate a mere few serious attempts to investigate this subject in the theological literature. One could ask why this is happening. What is the reason for this surprising restraint, or even shyness of Catholic moral theologians, with regard to the consideration of such a contemporary, vivid and disturbing problem?

It seems that the post-Conciliar movement, increasingly more clearly popular in moral theology, focuses the attention of its adepts on basic assumptions, somehow the starting points of this theological discipline. The concept itself, its functions and important tasks are subject to thorough analysis and severe criticism. This is what makes some moral theologians give up, at the same time temporarily, from the ambition of such a close interfering with life which is expressed by the moral evaluation of a particular phenomenon. Life itself, however, does not absolve us from this obligation. However, abandoning the function of evaluating human life in a normative manner by means of specific types and ways of acting negates the essential value of this theological discipline, undermines the very sense of its practicing. Recognition of the need to consider the problem of transplantation, in view of the absence of serious theological research studies in this area, prompted me to put forward the above-mentioned problem. It is to be considered from a theological position, so it will be necessary to refer to the sources that are appropriate for it. The aim of these analyses will be to consider, as thoroughly as possible, whether it is possible to reconcile the transplantation of human bodily organs with the Christian understanding of man, his existence and important earthly tasks, as well as vocations concerning eternal life. What underlies the Christian vision of man and his life is the message of the Revelation but it is also shaped by human thought explaining this message in the light of modern knowledge about man. Assuming such an anthropological vision, enriched with the moral source of the Revelation, the phenomenon of organ transplantation should be addressed.

As the subject of assessment one supposes to assume a fact which belongs to the field of medical practice. For people who think superficially such an assessment seems simple because the surface of the fact itself is regarded as simple by them. In fact, this is different. The matter is not simple at all¹ since it implies several different aspects. It is not surprising then that these various

¹ Cf. J. Ziegler, *Moraltheologische Überlegungen zur Organtransplantation*, TThZ 77 (1968), 153.

aspects of the assessment will have to be distinguished one by one in succession. First and foremost, however, there is a need to define the nature of the phenomenon under evaluation and to clarify what in fact constitutes the essence of the procedure of transplanting human organs. The clarification will present how the transplantation phenomenon has been evolving over time and the character of the objections it provoked. These will also be the first points of the present considerations. Later, in the article, we will consider successively, starting from the most important ones, moral problems that are associated with organ transplantation. They determine the more detailed aspects constituting the issue whose final and comprehensive solution can therefore be achieved only in the conclusions gathered at the end of the discussion.

Growing Phenomenon

Surgical transplantations of the living tissue of one human being to another do not yet have a long tradition². It was preceded by successful blood transfusions from one patient to another, as well as surgical operations of the transplantation of tissues and organs performed on animals.

Blood transfusion, performed widely today, has a history of several dozen years. The first attempts, undertaken as if at random, were not carried out without human casualties. However, the basic discovery of Wiener, significantly extended by Hirschfeld, regarding blood groups and the role of the so-called antigen allowed for the removal of the essential risks associated with transfusion. This has initiated what has become massive use today and is a blessing for tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of patients, who have been saved thanks to the transfusions. The surgical transmission of living human tissue was preceded by transplantation performed on animal organs. It was initiated 50 years ago by French scientist A. Carrel, Nobel laureate, already known in the world thanks to his experiments of breeding outside the body of live tissue taken from the animal body. Carrel conducted heart transplant surgery. He performed a heart transplantation, at the Rockefeller Institute, of a heart implanted in the neck of a dog enlivened with blood by joining the donor's dog blood vessels to the veins and carotid artery of the recipient dog. The successful procedure revealed the technical possibilities of surgical transplantations of living organs. Balley

² Regarding the history of transplantation, cf. W. Ruff, *Die Transplantation von Organen*, StZ 191(1968), 155.

and Shumway's research developed these achievements to a great extent. The first one succeeded in transplanting the entire heart-lung system taken from one dog in the place of the previously removed system of the donor dog in 1953. The second, in 1960, a successful operation saw the replacement of the heart in the living body of a recipient dog. These operations, in terms of their technical aspect, could have been applied to the human body without major changes. It became even more realistic because simpler transplantations had also been carried out on humans.

Surgical transplantation on humans were initiated with transplantations of skin patches, tendon or bone parts, transferred from one place to another place of the same patient's body. It was about corrective, in a sense cosmetic, treatments carried out on mutilated or deformed, exposed parts of the human body, especially facial or congenital ailments or induced during war or as a result of unfortunate accidents. However, they did not raise any serious objections or opposition. On the contrary, the plastic surgeons removing or mitigating deformities have done great and undeniable favors to their patients. They contributed to improving their well-being, cured their psychological injuries, sometimes helped them to restore their desire to live. A witness of these efforts and achievements in science and surgical art was Pope Pius XII who held a specific position in this matter as a proponent of Christian morality³. He did not express any fundamental objections to these kinds of treatments, on the contrary, he emphasized their positive aspects. The only doubts raised by him referred to possible abuses with regard to conducting scientific and medical experiments on people⁴.

The transplantation of tissues from the body of one individual, animal or human, to the body of another one was undertaken almost in parallel with the above-described treatments. An important moment in this process were successful attempts to transplant the cornea of the eye. This type of transplantation had not been condemned or even more seriously challenged by the wider public. Extremely sensitive to emerging phenomena concerning human life and current moral problems, Pope Pius XII took a position on transplantations in an allocution addressed to members of the Italian Association of the Cornea Donors on May 14, 1956. The Pope considered the transplantation of the cornea in the two above-mentioned cases to be morally blameless. He explains his position and justifies it in a similar way with regard to both forms of transplantation.

³ Cf. the speech of Pope Pius XII of 4 X 1958 to the participants of the 10th Congress of the Italian Plastic Surgery Association. AAS 50 (1958), 952-961.

⁴ Cf. AAS 48 (1956), 459-467.

The point is that taking the cornea from a donor in both cases is not an instance of a violation of any rights, so it is not harmful to anyone. For the animal from which the cornea is taken is not the subject of any law at all, while human corpses are no longer subject to the law because they cannot be considered a human person.

When proclaiming the acceptability of corneal transplantation, Pius XII indicates in his allocution the wider issue of transplantation bearing in mind the treatments and surgeries known at this time. The moral problem outlined by the Pope consisted in the fact that transplantation did not cause injury, neither was it harmful to the donor of the transplanted tissue nor to its recipient. With regard to the discussion on the moral situation of the recipient, Pius XII warns against introducing elements retrieved from bodies which belong to the different species, into the human body. Namely, it is about attempts to transplant sex organs from an animal, which the Pope rejects as morally despicable and unacceptable.

The development of transplant surgery, however, had been constantly moving forward, supported by the achievements of all medicine and modern technology. This led to the first successful attempts to transplant entire organs, the first ones being kidney transplantation.

In situations where the function of both kidneys stops and a patient is near to death, the solution is to find a willing donor ready to offer one of his two healthy kidneys. Successful transplantation encouraged more doctors to continue the procedure. There were increasingly more patients at risk of death due to a lack of a healthy kidney as well as willing donors, centers and surgeons ready to carry out a transplantation. Several thousand such operations had already been undertaken in the world, the vast majority successfully with patients enjoying life even for a few years after transplantation.

However, the evaluation of these transplantations was not so unequivocally positive and approving, as opposed to the evaluation of previous types of transplantation. Kidney transplants started to be condemned and censored, doubts and reservations were raised about it, both by public opinion, as well as by medical specialists and thinking humanists. There were voices of criticism heard here and there that questioned the moral right of surgeons to undertake this kind of medical interference. The voices of the sceptics and defeatists were superseded, however, by the reactions of wide approval and even genuine appreciation for the unquestionable achievements of transplant surgery.

On the wave of successes achieved in the field of kidney transplantation, attempts to transplant other organs: lungs, liver and the pancreas have unfortunately not gained such widespread acceptance and fame. Moreover,

their results, despite the hopes placed in them, and even the first enthusiastic evaluations of the press and publicists, turned out to be unsuccessful and have remained as such to this day.

Finally, on 3 December 1967, a fact occurred that engendered the sense of excitement across the whole globe: Dr. Ch. Barnard managed to transplant a man's heart from another human being in Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town. The receiver of the implanted heart was Louis Washkansky and the donor was an 18-year-old girl, Denise Darvall, who died as a result of a car accident. Extremely bold, difficult, risky, extremely exhausting for a few dozen health care workers, the operation was successfully completed, a great success of modern medicine. It moved the public, ignited the emotions of people and even divided public opinion. Many people have recognized it as a fact worthy of respect and admiration. It raised hopes and optimism of many potential recipients of a healthy heart. However there were also quite different opinions.⁵ Immediate criticism began to be raised, sceptical voices calling for prudence and warnings, even total disapproval. There were also protests and demands for a strict ban on this type of surgery, demands to cease carrying out transplantations considered to be harmful. A team of surgeons from Jacksonville under the direction of Dr. Hardy had already in 1963 carried out two heart transplantations: one taken from human corpses, the other from a living chimpanzee.

Despite the unfavourable effect, they paved the way for the success achieved in the case of Washkansky because they showed cardiac surgeons the technical possibilities of this type of transplantation. The successful surgery carried out on Washkansky confirmed and popularized this belief. The success achieved by the team of Dr. Barnard was not challenged even by the death of Washkansky, which occurred after living for 15 days with a transplanted heart. After Washkansky, came Philip Blaiberg, who after having received the heart of 23-year-old Clive Haupt, who died of a brain haemorrhage, survived even longer. Though heart transplantations began to become increasingly more popular, many turned out to be unsuccessful and doctors were unable to keep alive many patients with a transplanted heart. However, many recipients of healthy hearts felt as if they were revived, reborn to a new life for a longer or shorter period of time. The successes and failures of heart transplantation aroused anew not only a great interest in public opinion, but also emotional reactions, provoking disputes.

⁵ Cf. for example J. Wejroch, *Wątpliwości rosną w miarę wyjaśniania*, "Więź" 12(1969)2-3, 104-108.

Public opinion was not only clearly polarized, but it also fluctuated, changing from enthusiasm to harsh condemnation and vice versa⁶. The direction of this polarization was often determined by the life expectancy of the people who had been subject to heart transplantation. However, this life expectancy was not generally long, sometimes months, exceptionally 2 years. The obstacle to achieving full success was the so-called immune barrier that inevitably led to the rejection of the transplant as a foreign object in the body.⁷ Nevertheless, as a result of successful transplantation, a number of people close to death lived days, months, and even, as in the case of 40-year-old American Donald Lee Kominski from Michigan, over two years. It is not known if Kominski is still alive at the time of writing but on 5 December 1970, he had survived for two years, felt good, had a normal social life, could go for walks, and even did minor DIY work at home.

Proponents and advocates of transplantations in general, and heart transplantations in particular, have a lot to be proud of when they refer to the examples of Blaiberg or Kominski. It is only the beginning of the expected successes of transplantology. They are convinced that the complete overcoming of the immunological barrier with the help of so-called immunosuppressants, anti-lymphocyte serum or other means not known of yet today, is just a matter of time. But this fact unfortunately does not convince opponents of transplantation.

On the contrary, what is today a source of joy for transplantology enthusiasts and what raises their hopes for the future, at the same time reveals a threatening perspective to transplantology antagonists and raises anxiety. At the same time, they argue that the crux of the matter lies not at the level of the technical aspect of performed operations, nor more or less perfect surgical art, nor even the effectiveness of current methods or methods expected in the future, but the holistic, human, humanistic perspective of transplantation endeavours and their achievements. They believe, with full conviction, that there is a different, non-immunological barrier. Namely, their human and Christian conscience is concerned and outraged. Thus they have acute accusations and insistent concerns with regard to transplantology. The variety of reservations and the seriousness of the arguments put forward require, therefore, careful consideration.

⁶ Cf. J. Ziegler, art. cit., 170.

⁷ Ibid., 161.

Significance of the Problem

Some of the reservations, sometimes even formulated as severe disapproval, do not have any serious justifications. They are simply a cry of reluctance, an expression of a negative emotional attitude, a manifestation of verbally inexpressible feeling that something inappropriate is happening. Professor L. Manteuffel, an eminent cardiologist, confesses that the thought of heart transplantation arouses disgust in him⁸. He admits that it is difficult to justify but he regards the method of transplantation as an act of humiliation of human dignity. Intuition makes him regard it as a specialization which is erroneous in its very assumption, at the same time arousing anticipation that the distant effects of transplantation may turn out to be unfavourable.

Reluctance or even disgust with regard to the transplantation of human organs, or even the tissues of the donation itself, is associated – in the case of some of opponents – with autopsies and the utilitarian treatment of some of parts of corpses after autopsies⁹. Reverence in relation to the body of deceased people, a special manifestation of respect towards it, is not easily reconciled with any attempt to dispose of corpses in utilitarian manner. Thus they regard the exploitation of the body of a recently deceased or dying person as a profanation of these deep feelings that should be evoked in every human being, especially believers, by the mystery of human death. Admittedly, they realize that today, in hospitals, corpses are dissected after death and organs are harvested, e.g. for histological examination, but they consider transplanting these organs to human beings as a blameworthy and outrageous procedure of utilization the body after death. In justifying their disapproval, which is essentially emotional in its nature, they refer to suggestive comparisons and analogies. When it comes to treating the human body in a utilitarian manner, they ask what makes us different from cannibals or the “ingenious” rulers of the Nazi extermination camps, who used the mass of bodies of murdered victims in order to make soap out of them, using human skin for lampshades or bindings for photo albums. Even if these analogies are not taken too seriously, the reservations in relation to the treatment of human organs, especially of the heart, as a useful object, and therefore only as a means, even if one assumes that they shall be used in a proper and noble manner, still remain valid. For many people, the body is more than a material thing, and the heart is treated by them with special respect and in a unique way. It has often

⁸ Cf. *Etyczne aspekty transplantacji serca. Sprawozdanie z konferencji nauk.*, “Etyka” 4 (1969), 40.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.27.

been suggested that the most important source of reservations and resistance with regard to heart transplantations are clearly expressed or tacitly assumed religious reasons, and in particular those that are represented by Christians.

It is quite understandable if one considers how deep the phenomenon of the idealization of the human heart is embedded in the tradition and rituals of the Catholic Church. It should be noted, however, that the inspiration associated with it, which is the source of the attitude condemning the procedure of the utilization of human organs, is rather broader in its nature and concerns the human body in general. This is at least the case with regard to the Catholic Church, where pietism for human corpses is very lively and deep, and there have been no serious reservations about heart surgery or blood donation. It is known, however, that blood transfusion is still a procedure that is considered absolutely unacceptable by certain Christian communities. So if it is not acceptable to collect and transfuse human blood, is it completely understandable to extend moral reservations and objections to heart transplantations since it is so closely connected to the blood? The most serious accusation against people who carry out heart transplantation is that they contribute to the death of the person who is a donor of the transplanted organ.

Transplantation, in order to be effective, imposes a series of strict requirements, including the fact that the collected heart should be able to continue to survive in the body of the recipient. This heart must be alive, so it is necessary to transplant it at a strictly defined time, otherwise irreversible decomposition processes occur that prevent its revival in another body. The removal of the heart in order to perform its transplantation becomes a definitive factor indicating the end of life, it extinguishes in an inevitable and irreversible way the still smouldering spark of human life (though perhaps invisible to the eye of observers and the instruments of doctors).

One should therefore not delude oneself, heart transplant contributes to death, so it is a lethal activity, it is an act of killing a human being. And as such it is an act that violates the basic right of every person, it is an act of injustice and crime, which can be considered a great, fundamental offense against God, the giver and Master of human life. Human life is sacred and inviolable, and therefore every activity that jeopardizes it, no matter what form, should be condemned and forbidden.

The above-mentioned objection, formulated in such an exaggerated way, is repelled by supporters of transplantation with indignation, while appealing to the best intentions of the people who carry out transplantations. Nobody, they claim, causes death, and no one wants to contribute to it; on the contrary, everything is aimed at healing, maintaining life, keeping the donated organ

alive in the body of a recipient, who is close to death. However, the opponents do not give way, refining only their arguments, with louder accusations.

Nevertheless the matter must be evaluated objectively, not affected by even best intentions of the graft contractors. As undoubted fact they consider the death of the one from which the heart is taken, and many premises justify that this fact makes those who retrieve a heart from a donor responsible for his death. At best, they might be accused of not making every reasonable effort in order to save a dying life, to keep it alive as long as possible. Doctors retrieving a heart from a donor do not, however, undertake those efforts. The protection of life and health should always be a criterion of their vocation, a source of respect for their profession and the great trust of patients granted to them and their interference in human life. The possible defence of the transplantation procedure which they undertake with the help of the argument that the organ donor will not live anyway, because he or she cannot live for this or that other reason, is not only incapable of convincing anybody but it also undermines the teleology of their profession and vocation.

Medical specialists who are more familiar with this case refer the objection put forward here against those who remove the heart in order to transplant it from the donor to the fact that they do not endeavour to maintain the lives of dying patients and to the uncertainty with regard to determining the moment of definitive death, indicating how well developed so-called cardiopulmonary resuscitation is. The point is that both from the point of view of common opinion, as well as when one takes into account the newer achievements of medicine, the external symptoms of the loss of life are not yet evidence of the actual, definitive death of a human being. Clinical death, indicated by the phenomenon of cessation of the heart-lung function, i.e. respiratory arrest and cardiac arrest, cannot be equated with physiological (biological) death, occurring only some time later. Medicine knows many cases of resuscitation, that is, bringing back to life people who are (seemingly) dead, people who have been diagnosed with respiratory arrest and have lost heart activity.

The use of artificial lung-heart apparatus contributed to their resuscitation and helped restore their lives. A vivid, spectacular example of such a resuscitation was the procedure – carried out several times – of the restoration to life out from clinical death of the great Soviet scientist, Professor Landau, who suffered a car accident.

It is those very possibilities of resuscitation that become the cutting edge of criticism of the opponents of transplantation. Those in whose hands the patient's extinguishing or even already extinguished life is should protect it to the end with the help of, for example, resuscitation procedures, and not deal a final blow by means of harvesting an organ from the body.

That is why in the case of their failure they must be blamed for murder even if they did not actually aim to kill the victim. It will not be absurd, anyway, to raise the objection with regard to surgeons performing heart transplants, suggesting that they actually want the death of a dying man, they want it, they are preparing for it, and little is needed to directly cause it. The circumstances of these transplants are so particular that the situation of the surgeons who harvest a heart from a donor is characterized not only by the broadly understood fact of them waiting for an opportunity, but also when the time of transplantation is coming, by waiting for the death of the patient, simply waiting for a chance to take someone else's heart.

Professor W. Forsmann, a great scholar, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1956 for his outstanding achievements in the field of experimental surgery, in order to show the wickedness of heart transplantation presents a suggestive picture of two operating rooms where a transplant operation is to be performed. In one lies a dying patient who is waiting for a team of excited and impatient doctors equipped with surgical lancets. And it must be remembered that not only are the surgeons waiting for the death of the potential donor of heart, but they are also waiting on the potential recipient and his family. The expected death of the first patient for the latter group represents hope and a chance for a new life.

Should one not in these circumstances be afraid of attempts aimed at shortening this time of waiting, attempts to cause or accelerate the moment of death, or at least the premature recognition of death?¹⁰ Opponents of transplantations express the fear that the threat of waiting for the opportunity of taking someone else's heart may increase with the improvement of the technique of implementing these procedures, by making them less risky, simpler and cheaper. There is a risk that in such a situation the number of people willing to be a recipient of someone else's heart will increase significantly which will mean that every patient who is in hospital and who has a healthy heart could become an object of the expectations of people who are reluctant to protect his health and life.

Needless to say, this will seriously widen the scope for various abuses; the registration of potential heart suppliers and transactions related to them may become a daily occurrence. A significant reason for the strong opposition to transplantology are economic and social conditions. Experts in this matter are concerned about the large and increasing costs of organ transplantation and

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 16, 37.

expenses related to the further treatment of recipients, which may have undesirable general social consequences. In order to become aware of the importance of this problem, it is worth referring to certain calculations made by competent experts. Professor K. Gibiński emphasizes the importance of calculations carried out in France. 35 billion francs would have to be spent on all those who need a kidney transplant in that country along with a 10-year treatment program associated with it.¹¹ The costs in Great Britain are comparable, as a result of calculations made by Professor De Wardener in London where it was established that they would have been around 3,500,000 to 16,000,000 pounds a year over the next 10 years, not to mention the necessary investments¹².

These are huge sums, and they are supposed to cover the treatment associated with only one type of transplantation, namely kidney transplantation. It is not without fear that economists, authorities, and even professional doctors struggling with social medical problems are eager to take a look at this problem. Expenses for medical treatment and medical care are subject to specific limitations when it comes to the budget of all countries. Therefore, making transplantology a priority and providing it with necessary financial and human resources, etc. could become a serious threat to the functioning and development of other branches of medicine, for medical care, disease prevention and even, in a broader sense, social welfare. Transplantation, as rightly claimed by its opponents, requires huge financial expenditures which must be continued in long-term post-operative treatment. One cannot transplant someone's kidney without providing him with long-lasting and expensive care.

Due to the fact that we cannot afford it, we should stop this costly, luxurious journey that is leading us to catastrophe. When one has to choose between the treatment of a relatively small number of patients waiting for a transplant and treatment, and even the protection of life in general and the health of large masses of society, choosing the latter cannot pose a serious difficulty from the point of view of thinking people. There is a very thin boundary between such a decision and a complete condemnation of transplantology. However the calculation of the costs required by organ transplantology is not just an economic problem. The necessity to choose one option over another makes it possible to classify this problem into a category of problems that are of a thoroughly moral or socio-moral nature. It is in the name of moral reasons that opponents of transplantations actually protest against the financial expenditures allocated

¹¹ Ibid., 37.

¹² Cf. *Etyka i problemy transplantacji. Sprawozdanie z sympozjum w Londynie w dn. 9-11 III 1969*, "Etyka" 4 (1969), 167.

to these procedures. The problem of choice seems here to be a macro-ethical issue. It may, however, have its own micro-ethical aspect when in terms of the limitation of the possibilities, and hence the number of transplants, doctors themselves are responsible for favouring a particular type of treatment and to choose one option over the other.

Financial, technical and other constraints must put people responsible for decisions in the field of transplantation in a situation of choice. Here the moral problem of prioritizing becomes extremely difficult and disturbing. If only one heart can be transplanted – for various reasons, e.g. when there are no more technical possibilities, or simply no more donors – and there are many potential recipients who are close to death and who are waiting for the only chance of staying alive, there is a necessity to choose. Any such choice seems unfounded, unjust, ethically unacceptable. Therefore, one should not, at all, put doctors in such a situation. This can only be achieved by removing organ transplantations from the list of possible and acceptable interventions carried out by them. The abovementioned objections against organ transplantations that have been indicated by specialists and wider circles of thinking people can be considered as objections regarding the type of medical intervention directly discussed. However, there are also reservations that emphasize the side-effects of these interventions and those that relate to transplantology only indirectly which appeared somehow on the margins of its hitherto successes and failures.

However there is no need to consider them here in more detail. The transplantation of organs, especially the heart, implies, according to these accusations, a wide possibility of abuse, among which only some have been indicated above. They are most visible in the field of medical and extra-medical experiments, concerning man, his life and death, his personality, feeling and thinking. Modern science and technology have put in the hands of people, including doctors, huge resources and possibilities, almost divine creative power which can be (and sometimes is in fact) a source of abuse, becoming a power capable of destroying and harming people. It appears that people are not mature enough to use this power in a morally decent way, and admittedly this power is constantly developing.

Today medical knowledge and the medical art also have such dangerous power at its disposal but unfortunately many of its adepts are not mature enough to use it in a reasonable way. It is therefore necessary to stop the process of increasing their power and the especially dangerous power over human life and death and the power to exchange parts of the human body. In terms of the continuation of surgical transplantation surgery and improvement of its methods, thinking observers of today's situation who are aware of the anticipated

progress of transplantology are, not without reason, afraid of attempts to transplant the brain undertaken by contemporary medicine. All the horror and gruesome nature of these actions concern the most sensitive point of human personality; namely it is exposed to the danger of complications and changes, revealing a disturbing perspective of transforming consciousness and losing one's own consciousness in order to replace it by the other's.¹³ The problem of certain personality changes has existed from the very beginning of the history of transplantation. It has become especially visible in connection with heart transplantation. However, it is regarded as not too threatening in the field of the latter type of transplantation, as everyone admits.¹⁴ In the case of possible brain transplantation, it becomes a worrying and threatening perspective. Concerns related to medical experimentation on humans go much further, although their relation to the progress achieved in the field of surgical transplantation is much looser. Concerns arise especially in the perspective of carrying out artificial (i.e. outside the human body) organ cultures, especially the brain and human foetus.

This perspective, even presented with restraint, without exaggeration typical of science fiction, in all its horror, has a fundamental impact, even if not entirely explicit, on shaping the opinions of opponents of transplantations, although it is connected with them only in a loose manner. The whole collection of objections addressed to surgical organ transplantations has been outlined here. A certain reconstruction was carried out, while difficulties and oppositions, previously scattered in fragments have been collected together and deliberately granted the most far-reaching form of objections. In this way, an arsenal of possible weapons that could be used against transplantation was created.

It is not difficult to notice, however, that it is a weapon of various calibre. The elements collected here that create a negative picture of the discussed phenomenon reveal a great variety, they have a different meaning.

The weight of the charges raised is very different. Some of them seem to be exaggerated at first glance, others seem to be of little importance. In order to assess them justly, it is necessary to go even deeper and, above all, to get out of the closed circle of negative factors. In the process of deepening the perspective, it is worth taking into account, at least at the starting point, the difficulties and reservations with regard to the problem of transplantation which are addressed by public opinion. However, it is necessary to select specific and relevant elements to subject them to a more comprehensive criticism (not limited only

¹³ Cf. *Etyczne...*, op. cit., 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

to calumnies). It seems that it would not be justified, in terms of methodology, to begin with possible abuses that appear almost everywhere. They should be taken into account to some degree but only subsequently, and the more serious of them (by nature more distant) should be postponed at the end of further argumentations. Important issues, i.e. those that relate to specific and key ethical concerns in the field of organ transplantation – as it is easy to discern in the above discussion concerning the objections – are not numerous. The response to these accusations allows us to formulate a critical, in-depth, appropriate position in relation to what is crucial in the phenomenon of transplantation. When it has already been achieved, it will be supplemented with remarks regarding the risk of possible abuse and will help us provide an answer to the general question posed at the beginning of these investigations enabling us to make a comprehensive moral assessment of the discussed phenomenon.

Organ Donation

Difficulties and reservations in relation to the donation of organs for the purpose of transplantation, even if they are not completely irrational, are basically implied by the position of defence of the donor's endangered sake. However, they are usually overcome by indicating the perspective of helping another man in great need, even despite the risk of incurring some damage. However, the positions are not always easy to reconcile due to both a lack of proper data concerning the donor's actual harm, and the lack of clear awareness of what the situation of another person in need is and what the necessity of helping him/her implies in terms of new possibilities and obligations. From the point of view of the Christian moral doctrine, it is a kind of interpersonal situation, in which the principle of love applies as the basic premise¹⁵. It includes, in some aspects of this matter, the power and content of the task expressing justice. Guided by love to a fellow human being, complemented with respect to justice, one must seek a solution to the problem. However, the implications of love are broad because they may concern many completely different matters. It should therefore be applied to the group of goods discussed here, having in mind the so-called order of charity (*ordo caritatis*) expressing the hierarchy of values defined in the Christian vision of human life.

¹⁵ Cf. D. Walther, *Theologisch — ethische Aspekte einer Herz-transplantation*, ZeE 13(1969)1, 52-58.

The nature of the matter simply requires reflection on the evaluation of a certain moral situation, today not at all exceptional, on a specific type of human activity. Namely it requires the application of a certain moral doctrine to a given type of action. This doctrine should therefore be formulated as more specific normative indications. We are not having them at our disposal in a completed form, although we have assumed serious premises which will enable us to define it. One needs to expose it here – of course within the limits determined by the scope of the present considerations. On the other hand, one should be well aware of the actual situation and of this rather new and specific phenomenon.

The view of the situation in the perspective of the application of certain norms and moral judgments turns out to be complex and two separate variants should be distinguished in it. One should qualify in a different way – from the point of view of moral implications – the act of the donor when he or she decides to donate, through transplantation, his/her only organ necessary for him/her to live, compared to the case, in which he/she donates one organ of a pair, such as one of his/her two kidneys. This fundamental difference requires considering both cases separately.

The conscious donation of one's only organ which is necessary in order to stay alive, e.g. heart or one properly functioning kidney, represents a classic case of the decision to commit suicide. In such a form, it must be rejected and condemned from the point of view of Christian morality.¹⁶ It is not possible, as part of these considerations, to justify the moral principle that is not specific to the given case but to a general and undisputed one. However, if it was assumed, someone could try to undermine its application in a given case referring to the reasons of a potential donor here which are different to those concerning acts considered as typical suicides.

There is indeed something in this picture that prevents us from classifying it as suicide. The motive of sacrifice makes us recognize it as belonging to a higher order of action when compared to the situation of provoking one's own death because of hard experiences or the fearful anticipation of unfavourable facts in the future. Some may even consider it as an act of heroism, greater than Camusian heroism, and Prometheism. However, it is always a case of contributing to one's own death, and in the perspective of the Christian vision of life – an attempt to appropriate the right reserved for God Himself. For some

¹⁶ Cf. A. Regan, *Man's Administration of his Bodily Life and Members, the Principle of Totality, and Organic Transplants between Living Humans*, "Studia Moralia" 5 (1967), 183-186.

Christians, this may seem difficult, having the features of suicide, heroism that they can find in the salvific passion of Jesus Christ, or what the most faithful and greatest believers, martyrs, sacrificial victims have demonstrated to the world. We had a telling example of this attitude in the unquestionable heroic deed of Father Maksymilian Kolbe in the Auschwitz extermination camp. The analogy here is however apparent. Jesus Christ was not a suicide like his heroic followers were not suicides although they consciously and voluntarily accepted the deaths imposed on them by perpetrators. The situation of Father Kolbe is also incomparable to the situation of a donor offering his healthy heart to another dying man. An alternative to Father Maksymilian's sacrifice in Auschwitz was the murder of a prisoner by the Nazis while in the discussed case the alternative is natural death, the death of a sick man whom no one can help anymore. The readiness of the hero of Auschwitz to accept death was not itself the reason for the crime because this crime was already happening. On the contrary, the readiness with which we are dealing with the case of transplantation, if accepted by surgeons, will make them murderers.

In turn, it remains for us to examine the moral aspect of the problem of the donation of one of a pair of organs. It is no longer the problem of suicide or homicide but it should be considered in terms of serious damage or injury incurred to the human body. Its solution no longer imposes itself in such a unequivocal and evident way, so it is not surprising that it was, and to some extent still remains, a controversial matter, even in the opinion of Christian moral theologians.¹⁷ As the major premise of this difficulty one can assume the same principle, which makes us utterly disapprove of any suicide attempts, namely, arguing that man is not the master, but only the ruler of this great gift, which he has been granted, the gift of life.

The great tradition of moral thought made us treat partially vital goods, parts and organs of the human body, just like life itself and submit their fate and destiny to the Creator of life Himself.¹⁸ The minor premise of this difficulty is the obvious contradiction of simple intuition and common conviction with the suggestion that the donation of live human tissue in contemporary transplantations procedures could be considered a simple act of self-harm. It is undoubtedly that the mutilation of oneself in the moral tradition of Catholic thought was

¹⁷ Cf. the discussion with A. Regan and J. Kunicic; A. Regan, art. cit., 179-200; J. Kunicic, *De organorum transplantatione*, "Studia Moralia" 5 (1957), 155-177; A. Regan, *The Worth of Human Life*, ibid. 6 (1968), 207-249.

¹⁸ Cf. W. Ruff, art. cit., 156-158.

universally assessed as an act of evil and wickedness¹⁹. One can assume with great probability that such a conviction is held not only by the believers of the Catholic Church and it could be supported by non-trivial arguments. Some Catholic moralists have gone so far as to reject self-injury, claiming that it is an act that is inherently evil and therefore never permissible.

However, they tried to precisely define what should be qualified as such a severely evaluated act of self-injury. Certain cases of harming one's own body were not included in this qualification, just as certain types of not telling the truth went beyond the definition of a lie that was always condemned, or else, to use another example, specific facts of appropriating someone else's belongings were not judged to be immoral because they do not fall within the concept of theft.

There was generally no doubt about the moral evaluation of the surgical treatment. Self-mutilation necessary for one's own body, in order to protect one's life or health was considered fair and acceptable. The theoretical moral justification of this kind of mutilation was quoted in the official teaching of the Church (*Casti connubii* Encyclical) by Pope Pius XI formulating the so-called the principle of totality (*principium totalitatis*), to which he referred many a time and whose content was elaborated by his successor Pius XII. The latter, developing the implications of this principle in a speech to the XXVI Congress of the Italian Association of Urologists on 8 October 1953²⁰, laid down the conditions, formulated criteria for the fairness of amputation of parts of human body and of anatomical and functional mutilation carried out by doctors.

Generally speaking, they consist in determining whether such mutilation is really necessary and whether there is a serious chance of curing the patient as a result of such a treatment. The concept of self-injury qualified negatively did not include in the traditional Catholic moral doctrine other damages performed on one's own body, in the case of a collision of goods and duties. This applies not only to situations occurring during the war. Considering the situation of a man who was innocently imprisoned, chained to a prison wall, the moralists were inclined to grant him the right to cut off his hand if that act would contribute to regaining his freedom.

In recent times, when medicine has already achieved considerable success in the transplantation of human tissues, Pius XII in some of his speeches, e.g. the one addressed to the participants of the Congress of Histopathology on

¹⁹ Cf. A. Hamelin, *Zasada całości (principe de totalité) i swoboda rozporządzania sobą*, "Concilium" (1966-1967)1-10, 203-206.

²⁰ Cf. AAS 45 (1953), 673-679.

13 November 1952 contributed to the positive moral evaluation of transplantology²¹. When taking advantage of medical interventions known at the time, one should, as he warns, observe the principle of totality which can be interpreted in an extended way, namely in the sense that body parts are subordinated not only to the body itself, but also to the totality of human individual.

On the other hand, it would not be acceptable to understand this principle in the sense that one can also regard the community, even the supernatural community of the Mystical Body of Christ as this superior totality. Such a rather narrow interpretation of the principle of the totality presented by the Pope with regard to transplantation made some moralists (e.g. Healy) maintain the conviction that donating one's living organs to others is a kind of self-mutilation and should be evaluated negatively. However, most Catholic theologians did not follow their line of reasoning but they opted for the already proposed²² (and justified by those interested in osseous tissue transplantation) the thesis that transplantation of tissue from one person to another should not be completely rejected as impious. These theologians have used very different arguments, referring to the sometimes overly broad interpretation of the principle of totality which provoked objections due to both their obvious non-compliance with the criteria defined in the teachings of Pius XII as well as the harmful and dangerous consequences to which too wide interpretation – extended on the level of social goodness – of this principle can lead²³.

However, the difficulty emphasized here was successfully overcome and it would not be easy to find a Catholic moralist today who would completely reject tissue transplantation, even in the form of organ transplantations, recognizing them as mutilation carried out because of impious reasons.

It was not without reason that the position against the transplantation of organs, of even minor correlative transplantations, let alone blood transfusions has been reduced to absurdity by demonstrating its alleged wickedness. We know, however, that they have not been condemned, not even by the otherwise severe and critical Pope Pius XII, who expressed his legitimization and support for them.

In light of the absurd consequences implied by the position that defends the far-reaching principle of “inviolability” of the right of an individual to have his/her own body at his/her disposal, it is not difficult today to refute the objection addressed to the consent of the organ donor, and which holds that the

²¹ Cf. AAS 44 (1952), 786-788.

²² Cf. B. Cunningham, *The Morality of Organic Transplantation*, Washington 1944.

²³ Cf. A. Hamelin, art. cit., 203-206; A. Regan, *Man's...*, art. cit., 186-194.

donor has no right to decide because only God is the absolute master and the only administrator of the parts and organs of the human body. Without questioning God's right to human life and body, it would be difficult to deny man the right to manage his life and body in a prudent way, guided by love. This justifies not only the possibility of a reasonable initiative in managing the gift of life but also the need to include this good in the hierarchy of values in general, to dispose of all goods that are a God's gift and at the same time the task of every human being²⁴.

Bearing in mind the hierarchy of values, one must explicitly recognize that bodily goods are not the most important ones. Therefore, in the defence of other, higher goods, it is necessary to sacrifice not only one's bodily parts and organs but also life. Considering the aspect of intersubjective relations, it would be right to defend the principle that for the salvation of your neighbour you can, even under certain conditions, sacrifice the good of your own body, including life.

However, such a sacrifice of one's own vital goods for the life and health of another person cannot be justified. Therefore, the argument that defends transplantation, asserting that what should be undertaken for oneself should also be done for others, must be considered inadequate and insufficient. This principle is correct when there is no obvious and serious damage being done by an act of helping others. The subject of this damage was thoroughly analysed. It was not without reason that it was considered a key to resolving the problem in terms of moral evaluation. On closer examination, it appears that one can seriously weaken or even question the balance of losses and profits presented here. Even in terms of vital goods, this balance is not completely unambiguous, in the sense of losses suffered by a potential donor. Of course, the opinion of specialist doctors must be decisive in this respect. This position was expressed (considering kidney transplantation) by some prominent foreign surgeons but also Polish specialists in kidney surgery and Professor Orłowski and Professor Nielubowicz confirmed its correctness and expressed their support for it.²⁵ They do not deny that the donation of a healthy kidney is a big loss for the body but failure to do so may prove to be an even greater loss. In order to break the immune barrier, doctors transplant only kidneys offered by members of the closest family. Often it is the mother who makes this precious sacrifice for her fatally sick child. If it was not accepted, or if it was not offered, the real threat

²⁴ Cf. J. Ziegler, art. cit., 155-159.

²⁵ Cf. *Etyczne...*, op. cit., 22.32.

of the death of the child could arise which in the context of mother's awareness that the child's life was to be saved would become more dramatic and harmful to her health than depriving her of one of her healthy kidneys.

This non-elaborate example reveals the perspective of a different balance other than the one that spontaneously imposes itself and which includes only one aspect – the good of health and life on the side of the donor. A sacrificial gesture of giving up one's own organ cannot be measured in the category of vital goods only (*bonum vitae*). It is granted its proper dimension in the category of personal goods. Its full justification is achieved at the level of deeper personal values, spiritual values, both in terms of the donor and the recipient. True, deep self-love can, in the act of donation of a healthy organ to another person, find its deep affirmation and enhancement because this gift is not only an expression of love but it enriches the human being and improves him internally at the same time. Certain damage to the welfare of the body is compensated here, perhaps with a great surplus, by a particularly valuable enrichment, in terms of spiritual values. It contributes to an increase in the value of the person to whom the whole body and its parts are subjected²⁶.

It would be futile to question whether it is fair to donate an organ for transplantation due to a certain "inviolability" of a person in relation to the requirements of the good of others. The reasons underlying the objection may be justified here, since personalistic reasons must prevent the absolutization of the good of others in relation to legitimate interests of each human person.

However, one should always take into account that the closest relation with other people is implied by the very concept of a person. This relationship also implies some assignment of the vital goods of one person to the same class of goods of others, especially relatives. From the point of view of a thinking person this is clear in terms of a natural community between people. For a Christian, this becomes even more apparent when he takes into account of the dimensions of the supernatural community in which the Christian person stands in close real relationship to others within the totality of the Mystical Body of Christ²⁷. The body belongs to a person and should serve it and be subordinated to it.

The human individual is not a predetermined, static reality; he undergoes a process of being, transformation, development, he can achieve new qualities and improve himself. Moreover he is not isolated from others in this process. Only in relation to others can a person fully realize himself, his value and his

²⁶ Cf. A. Regan, *Man's...*, art. cit., 194-199.

²⁷ Cf. J. Kunčić, art. cit., 170-175; J. Ziegler, art. cit., 163.

limits. In relations with others he becomes himself. He becomes a complete person when he can give himself to others and sacrifice himself. By offering good to another person, by enriching his subject with a certain “you” he elaborates his sense of personality, enriches himself, develops his own “I”. It is not a pure gift, but to some extent debt repayment. The human individual considered in the entire process of his becoming a complete human being has obligations to many other people, also in terms of his vital goods.

When he offers something to others, he repays his debt. This is particularly evident with regard to cooperation in families, in which the donation of an organ occurs most often. However, it does not limit itself to this sphere, yet it finds its legitimization in wide scope of relationships between people. The basic solution of the presented issue, i.e. whether it is decent and morally acceptable to donate your own organ for transplantation has already been achieved in a positive sense.

However, some aspects of the solved problem should be taken into account, some circumstances that can affect the fundamental moral view of the matter. This particularly concerns whether the gift of the organ donation is always justified, does it sometimes take on the form of strict obligations, or if it is the object of a commercial transactions. Organ donation is a matter of great importance and implies paying a huge price on the part of the donor. It can be justified only by giving important reason, i.e. a necessity and real need on the part of the recipient.

One could ask whether, only in the case of the extreme needs of the other human being and thus guided by the intention of saving someone’s life, is one allowed to donate an organ necessary for saving the life of another person. Contrary to some of Kunicic’s reservations raised here, it is possible to refrain oneself from making such far-reaching demands. It would be decent and noble indeed to donate one of our healthy eyes to someone who cannot see if such transplantation were possible and would guarantee restoring the recipient’s ability to see. A considerable difficulty in deciding whether one should donate one’s organs, as well when assessing the acceptability of this type of surgery, is the increased danger of loss of life by the donor himself. A problem may however arise, whether it is morally justified, and therefore fair, to expose oneself to the risk of losing one’s life, and by donating the organs for transplantation, to save the lives of others. The answer must undoubtedly highlight the legitimacy and importance of removing any unnecessary risk during such a procedure. The existing risk and the possibility of losing one’s own life cannot, however, undermine the acceptability of donating the organ. Preventing potential danger is a duty of physicians who, moreover, minimize the risk of death by reducing

it to a fraction in case of the most serious of organ transplantations, namely kidney transplantation.²⁸

Risking human life is not only a frequent, simply everyday phenomenon when it comes to human behavior but can become an act of total sacrifice which is a consequence of love, such love whose admirable perspectives were presented in the teaching and life of Jesus Christ.

The content of the above considerations, in the course of which we assumed that it is necessary to legitimize the moral acceptability of donating an organ for transplantation makes the issue of commitment to this type of sacrifice almost pointless. Organ donation cannot be imposed by anyone. This is, by its very nature, the object of non-binding, yet voluntarily undertaken sacrifice, an act belonging to the category of heroism. We evaluate it like a jump into the water or a fire undertaken in order to save a man exposed to death, however, we cannot oblige anyone to do it. One would even have to, as postulated by doctors interested in this matter, avoid any moral constraint here. This perspective has influenced the aforementioned Polish surgeons performing kidney transplantations making them never, in their medical practice, suggest any of their patients that they could offer their healthy kidneys for transplantation purposes.

They are rightly worried that their proposal could put a potential donor in a situation of constraint. One could only question whether they are making the right decision, always trying to discourage potential donors to donate their organs.

While qualifying the act of donation of one's healthy organ as an act of heroism and demanding that a donor should be granted total freedom of choice when performing it, it is necessary to take into account such, maybe very special and exceptional situations, in which these actions appear as having a clear, though hard to express, feature of moral obligation. It is imposed by love marked by justice, sometimes called pietism, originated in the circle of family and the national community. To understand this problem, it is worth returning to the already mentioned remark that a mother facing the risk of losing the life of her own child and the possibility of saving it through her gift of the donation an organ for transplantation feels a kind of moral obligation to make this gift to her child. However, the situation should be reversed to reveal the proper aspect of the obligation. The mother who gave life to the child is not obliged to give it again. This kind of duty could be however attributed to the child if his

²⁸ Professor Nielubowicz illustrates this problem with a clear example: "It is more or less the same risk that every one of us faces who arrives at work by car every day at 20 km." *Etyczne...*, op. cit., 31.

mother were in danger. It would be a special opportunity and a chance to pay off a certain, usually irreparable debt – the gift of life. The child's obligation to pay such a debt exists in equal measure with regard to the father.

Based on a sense of pietism, interpreted in broad context – which would be difficult to explain here – one could still apply this principle to representatives of the good of the nation, its most valuable and most indispensable representatives. Namely that in some specific situations the higher well-being of the fatherland, of the republic, could take the form of a certain internal dictate of conscience, morally forcing its citizen to make a sacrifice of one's own healthy organ²⁹. However, this is an exceptionally delicate matter, requiring additional analyses and considerations, so it would be appropriate to treat the solution given here only as an opinion and hence merely a hypothesis. In order to exhaust the issue of the possible reasons which legitimize our commitments, one should take into account the special vocations to the sacrifice granted to us by God, the so-called the charismatic vocations. They are binding, though purely personal, and completely unattainable to other people and not subject to categories of generalizing assessment.

When one takes into account the special and irreducible dimension and the value of human organs, it would be difficult to regard as fair and decent the actions that would make them an ordinary object of trade agreements. The damage done to the body by organ donation cannot be compensated even by large sums of money. The idea, however, of legalizing trade transactions concerning the donation of organs in accordance with the model of the stock exchange arouses revulsion and 'firm' opposition. This does not mean, however, that no financial aspect should be taken into account when considering the transplantation issue. It returns insistently when one takes into account the costs of transplantation itself and post-operative treatment, in many cases chronic and extremely expensive. It is a matter in all respects justified that the donor does not have to bear these costs. And if precisely because of his sacrifice serious material hardship arose for him, the principle of justice requires that the recipient help him, if possible, to overcome those financial difficulties.

²⁹ A. M. Hamelin tries in a different way, namely by applying the aforementioned principle of totality to the social good to justify the sacrifice of one's own organ for the benefit of others. Cf. art. cit., 206-210.

Recognition of Death

With respect to the transplantation of individual organs and those necessary for life, especially the heart, the moral problem is focused on the issue of recognition of death. An unquestionable premise, not only in the circle of Christian life and Christian moral doctrine, is the claim that organ donation should be made only after the recognition of actual death of the donor, never earlier. It is not acceptable to do so with regard to a living person, even if in an agonizing state because it is tantamount to contributing to his death and thus can be undoubtedly regarded as a case of homicide in disguise. Catholic ethics have for centuries put forward a one and unchanging norm that no one has and can never have the right to deprive an innocent person of life; innocent meaning someone who is not that person's current aggressor. It is God's holy and inviolable gift. The mark of invulnerable sanctity carried by the life of every man, also one incurably mentally ill, infirm and old, an unborn child, it is God's gift, sacred and inviolable. Also the life of a dying person carries this special sanctity, so we do not have the right to shorten it, even by applying procedures of euthanasia.

When considering medical activities, it is worth emphasizing that the principle of the inviolability of life here concerns the work and activities of a physician in a special way due to his special calling as a defender of life. Like all people, he never has the right to deprive man of life or shorten a human life. As a doctor, he should protect this life in a positive way, by healing the sick people and preventing the emergence of diseases. Not only Christian revealed ethics but also general human natural ethics included in the teleology of the medical profession, the expression of which can be found in many records of human wisdom, among others in the Hippocratic oath, created by a Greek doctor, the father of European medicine³⁰.

Affirmation of the inviolability of human life requires transplant antagonists to question the fairness of removal of vital organs necessary for life, especially the heart. They want to demonstrate with the help of quite suggestive argumentation that there is no question in this case, that is living organs are actually retrieved not from a dead body, but one still alive. When any exaggerated aspect of this argument is removed, it ultimately amounts to highlighting the difficulty in determining the moment of death.

It would not, however, be right to deny the existence of this difficulty or to underestimate it. The participants of the international congress of surgeons,

³⁰ Cf. W. Szenajch, *Przysięga i Przykazanie hipokratesowe*, Warsaw 1931.

cardiologists, biologists and theologians debating for several days from 11 January 1969 in Florence had to confront themselves with this difficulty in all its clarity. The world's most prominent representatives of the scientific disciplines focused mainly on the issue of the boundary between life and death, in relation in particular to the spectacular successes of resuscitation. As emphasized there and elsewhere, the multiplicity and diversity of definitions of death lie at the root of the difficulties. The point is that human death can be understood differently, and therefore the time or the time zone of death can be established in many ways. Therefore, when someone with the help of a specific criterion of life and death regards a moment or condition as a moment of death, someone else, using a different criterion, may reject this way. When a biologist speaks about life, he usually has in mind the life processes of tissues and cells, or simply vegetative life. The cessation of these processes is, from his perspective, a criterion of death.

However, the life of an organism, especially the human body, is something immeasurably more complex, but at the same time much more fragile. The criterion used by biologists indicated above turns out to be completely inadequate in relation to determining its end. Although a man lives a vegetative life, it does not constitute his specificity and uniqueness. Man ceases to be alive when he ceases to live with the whole of his body, even if some tissues still have the ability to live. Cells harvested from cadavers may be cultured as living tissues outside the body, under appropriate conditions. They can live outside the body for a very long time. They are able to outlive, as Prof. K. Rowiński observed, a 120-year-old man³¹. However, it would be difficult to regard them as human life as such. When it comes to transplantation, death should be taken into account not in the biological sense but in the anthropological sense. Therefore, it is not a question of determining the death of an organism in the sense of the cessation of all life phenomena in it, and thus the function of tissues and cells, but determining the death of the organism as a whole³².

The condition of man, in which it is impossible using the medical means available today to stimulate the symptoms of life in the body as such, is undoubtedly a condition that for the purposes of certain medical actions, such as autopsy, can be considered a state of death. This in turn also opens up the possibility of retrieving and transplanting the needed organ. The life of the whole organism is closely related to the performance of certain organic functions. Some of them are indispensable for maintaining life, and their cessation causes death.

³¹ Cf. *Etyczne...*, art. cit., 33.

³² Cf. P. Röttgen, *Organtransplantation*, WuW 23 (1968), 167.

Recognition of this detention of organic activities can therefore be considered as death. For a long time, the normal functioning, on the one hand, and cessation of proper operation of the basic the cardiopulmonary system in the human body, on the other hand, was assumed in medicine as the criterion of life and death. Thus the cessation of breathing and cessation of a heartbeat, and thus blood circulation, was regarded as the decisive criterion for recognizing clinical death. Recently this criterion has been considered insufficient. Its validity has been undermined by the aforementioned successes of resuscitation.

Just as it seems reasonable to look for constitutional premises for the specificity of human life in the human brain, it is also legitimate to look there for premises to establish the boundary between human life and the death of the human body. The brain is not only the bodily basis of human consciousness and its spiritual activities. It is also decisive for the integration of the body and life as a whole. So when the proper functions of the brain definitively stop, the human body also ceases to be alive, and death occurs.

The death of a human must be related inseparably and ultimately to the death of the human brain. Its decomposition, caused by the interruption of metabolic processes within its structure, is tantamount to the end of its earthly existence, even if some organs are still able to perform their functions, or even in partial form. The above criterion of human death is widely accepted, and not only among representatives of medicine. If there is a discussion on this subject, it concerns sufficient tests confirming brain death. There are possibilities and ways to determine the death of the brain. The rationale of this statement refers to clinical and electrophysiological symptoms, to the existence or atrophy of cerebral circulation. Encephalograph data is an irreplaceable source of information in this regard. It would of course be an illusion, lack of realism or hypocrisy, not to see certain limitations in these methods. Admittedly they contain non-trivial elements of uncertainty. However, it would be a great mistake to underestimate their value. In spite of their imperfection, they are practically considered a sufficient basis for recognizing death.³³ There are cases of violent and tragic deaths, for example during a railway crash. When the passenger's brain suffers significant injuries, its death clearly indicates the body's death. However, the heart or kidneys do not have to be destroyed. If these organs are removed in proper time, they can be artificially kept alive and possibly transferred to another person.

³³ Cf. *Etyczne...*, art. cit., 33.

Organ removal in such situations is implied by absolute certainty that the “donor” is dead. The matter of vital importance in such situations is only immediate action because transplant organs may undergo irreversible changes that may cause irreversible disintegration. However the kidneys retain their lifespan longer and can be removed even within a few hours after clinical death and be successfully transplanted. The situation is more complicated in the case of the heart because here surgeons only have minutes. Under ordinary conditions, brain death can be established within a few minutes after clinical death. Brain waves decrease, the electroencephalogram shows defined flatlining, and irreversible changes take place within the brain tissue. Then there is no possibility of sustaining the life of the body, even with the use of resuscitation. Other organs, even the heart, undergoing appropriate resuscitation procedures, can be donated for transplantation and remain in operation for a long time. Under normal conditions of death, definitive death is indirectly confirmed by establishing irreversible changes in the brain tissue. Although absolute certainty cannot be expected in this regard, one must admit that we are not able to achieve such certainty in everyday life either.

In situations imposing the necessity to act immediately and requiring us to undertake definite decisions, we look for conditions sufficient to acquire so-called moral certainty. The higher necessity of saving lives requires making certain decisions, even in case of the absence of knowledge of all theoretically possible implications of specific decisions. This is also the case with recognition of death after noticing signs of brain death.³⁴ Death or saving the life of another person, who is waiting for a transplantation may depend on a statement confirming death, a judgement based on moral certainty or practical certainty. When settling a case of recognition of death within a reasonable time one should not overestimate the importance of the possibility and alleged necessity to prolong resuscitation procedures. It is unquestionable that you can achieve the long-term functioning of the lungs and heart thanks to resuscitation. However, it is not possible in such a case to determine whether these sustained bodily functions take place in a living body.

Reanimation is considered an emergency measure in medicine, that is there is very limited scope of cases in which there is an obligation to apply them. One cannot oblige the doctor to prolong for an indefinite time resuscitation efforts, despite lack of effects. Pius XII clearly taught that a doctor has the

³⁴ Cf. R. Kautzky, *Postęp techniczny a problemy etyczne medycyny współczesnej*, “Concilium” 1-5. 1969, 316-318.

moral right to abandon these efforts if they prove to be useless and no one would have the moral right to accuse him of killing the patient in such a situation.³⁵ Surely, a calm expectation, and thus a prolongation of whole procedure after finding clinical death, increases the certainty that the latent life of the body will cease. However, such a waiting time may mean that a given organ will not be suitable for transplantation anymore, thus taking away the last chance of saving the life of a sick person waiting for this gift. It is a fact that cannot be omitted by the defenders of an attitude of “waiting” as long as possible for the actual death of the donor that any increase in certainty as to the fact of his death in the same way contributes to reducing the potential effectiveness of transplantation.³⁶

Until recently, early recognition of death was of no more importance – in a positive sense – to the life or death of another human being. The possibility of organ transplants necessary for life has completely changed this situation. You cannot wait too long because the life or death of another person is at stake. R. Kautzky gives a suggestive picture in order to weaken the position of those who in an extreme way understand the obligation to “wait”: to prevent the extinction of the smoldering flame of life.³⁷ A fire truck car drives through the city streets. Its speed may endanger or kill a passer-by. The driver of the car knows this, driving at high speed, and yet, if someone falls under his wheels, the driver cannot be considered a killer. The reference to the above image leaves much to be desired and the analogy is quite loose. Its importance however consists in the fact that it emphasizes the idea that suffering death in order to save someone else’s life is not only unintentional but even completely accidental, although in the overall balance it is regarded only as a sad but unavoidable eventuality. Allowing for the possible death of a patient cannot be considered tantamount to murder. On the contrary, it should be considered fair and acceptable when it comes to defense of the great value of human life. In the discussed case, it constitutes only a margin of risk associated with possible sacrifices incurred in the name of a noble and great work of medicine: the defense of human life.

³⁵ Cf. Speech of Pope Pius XII to the Congress of Doctors and Scholars from November 24, 1957 dedicated to the issue of resuscitation, AAS 49 (1957), 1027-1033

³⁶ Professor Orłowski describes how carefully one makes sure in his clinic that the organ to be transplanted is taken from a person who actually died. Death is confirmed by three independent doctors who do not participate in the transplantation. “Only after the confirmation of death is a kidney is removed. The negative aspect of this procedure is the fact that after such a time the kidney is often not suitable for transplantation.” *Etyczne...*, op. cit., 23.

³⁷ Cf. R. Kautzky, art. cit., 318.

Rationale of Pietism

It may be assumed that it is possible to transplant the organs necessary for living from the body of the deceased – through transplantation – to another body, and thus without causing anyone's death, however, this procedure is sometimes considered unacceptable due to the lack of respect for human corpses. The reservations formulated above featured a special kind of respect that we address the corpse with, an almost religious respect and that which has its origin, most probably, in religion. According to these reservations one is not permitted any kind of utilitarian treatment of human corpses, in whole or in parts. It is indeed a fact that the human body is addressed by Catholics with special respect. However, respect for corpses is not the property of Christians alone, but is shared by followers of many other religions as well as non-believers. The Christian religion refers to a few reasons justifying this respect, setting a moral postulate to maintain it.

They are related to the value and dignity of the human body in general, based on the mystery of the Incarnation, connected with the Christian hope for the resurrection of the bodies of the dead, in an eschatological perspective in particular. Christian moral doctrine has always prohibited the profanation of corpses; it required that they be buried in a meticulous way, and the cemetery, a place of eternal repose, was treated as sacral, almost on par with temples and with the sanctuaries of divine worship.

The Christian tradition created various rituals demonstrating manifestations of respect for corpses, as well as in various ways understood the problem of their profanation. The Catholic Church throughout its entire bimillennial history maintained the habit of burying dead people and allowed cremation only in exceptional circumstances. Only recently have the regulations regarding church sanctions in relation to those who expressed the will to be cremated and not buried after death been eased. Even in modern times, strict prohibitions on performing autopsies were in force. They resulted only from pietism for the human body, whose disarming after death was regarded as a simple act of desecration. The problem of the utilization of corpses did not exist in the past, there was simply no perspective of using the body. Exceptionally, one could imagine a situation in which lost travelers from broken ships resorted to cannibalism out of starvation. Well, in this situation there was only a clear prohibition of depriving someone of life, while the possible intake of the body of the deceased was not considered controversial, it was not stigmatized as an act of moral offense. The use of certain parts of the body of people dying in the Nazi extermination camps was a vivid example of the issue of the utilization

of bodies, shocking the general public of the world which reacted violently against the barbarity of such acts.

The use of human corpses in post-mortem examinations for the purpose of training future doctors and for medical research has been practiced for a long time all over the world and does not cause major objections on the part of the public. Only a clear objection of the deceased himself, expressed before his death, or his immediate family if his death does not raise any suspicion, can stop doctors from performing autopsies. The utilization of human corpses in the form of autopsies is nowadays not considered a desecration. Of course, it must be clearly stated that pietism for corpses requires proper behavior, which is respectful, in relation to corpses undergoing the autopsy. Retrieving an organ from a corpse and its storage in a dissecting room for laboratory and training purposes was not stigmatized as an abuse. There are also no serious reasons to question the fairness of transplants because of the suspicion that the corpses are not treated with due respect. The accusation regarding the utilization of organs of the body becomes groundless when one takes into account precisely the servile, utilitarian character of each organ in relation to the living body which would be saved thanks to them. The organ that served the body during life, removed after death and passed on to another body, may continue to fulfill its role. Its character does not change, only the object with regard to which it fulfills its role. The previous entity does not lose anything because it does not need this service. Serving life cannot be considered a disgraceful act. The Christian religion does not raise any serious objections with regard to heart transplantations related to the fact that the transplanted organ is serving a new body. The idea of service and love, so present in Christianity, associated with the heart in general, and the heart of Jesus Christ in particular, seems rather to favor transplants. Sharing with others, the gift of goodness, sharing your heart, serving it to other people are not shameful acts, but on the contrary, they are acts of nobility and goodness. Even when the deceased has refused to give his heart to someone, transplantation should not be considered an unacceptable act. One can easily accept the default consent of the latter. In the case of the explicit opposition of a dying person, his/her will should be respected, and only in exceptional cases, when considered unreasonable and groundless, can this opposition be ignored. The tradition and the position of public opinion are very important in a given case. One has to respect them because in the field of morality tradition is a factor of great importance.

Practical Difficulties and Possibilities of Abuse

It is not without reason that opponents of kidney and heart transplants emphasize the great financial costs of these operations as well as those related to the further treatment of recipients. Nevertheless, it must be clearly stated that this economic factor cannot be significant in assessing the fairness or unrighteousness of the transplantation itself. Only the medical professions of economically and technically developed countries can afford such activities. Poor countries are disadvantaged in many areas which is why wealthy nations face the obligation of supporting developing countries.

These poor countries, however, do not have, at least temporarily, a moral problem of the acceptability of human organ transplants. The issue of preferences in the field of state funding of particular branches of medicine is a problem of the economic and social policy, not free from moral aspects. In general, it would be unjustifiable, or even unacceptable, to allocate large amounts of tangible and intangible resources to experimental medicine, and in particular to organ transplantation if this would be a great loss for general medical care or general social care. Indeed, it would be immoral to prioritize saving the lives of a few people by using extremely expensive means of saving life and treatment while depriving many other patients of ordinary help and medical care. Therefore, taking financial possibilities into consideration must highlight the decision to undertake organ transplant operations, especially on a larger scale. The inadequacy of funds is a serious circumstance that can make such operations an immoral act. However, it must be clearly stated that this is not a sufficient reason to reject and condemn organ transplants in general. Considering today's state of medical science and art, human organ transplants are regarded as emergency treatment measures. According to principles adopted for centuries in moral theology, no one is obliged to apply such measures. In the past, all kinds of surgical procedures were considered to be of this kind, even those considered as easy and non-risky today. Until recently, moral theologians released patients from the obligation to make decisions on a surgical operation referring to the otherwise recognized principle that emergency measures do not apply in the case of dilemmas of the conscience. Today the situation has changed radically. Nevertheless, organ transplantation has to be considered as an emergency measure for several reasons. The obligation to use them on a macro or micro scale cannot be taken into account at all. However, this does not mean, of course, that it is necessary to condemn and reject their use in general. Applying them, on the other hand, may be to some limited extent something necessary and recommended due to the further progress of medicine,

in other words medical knowledge and medical art. Measures and activities that are considered extraordinary nowadays due to the progress of medicine may become ordinary in the future.

It would be unreasonable, therefore, not to take advantage of them, even if only to a very limited extent, as far as human resources and material capabilities are concerned. With limited possibilities of transplantation, the problem of preferences and the selection of priority and secondary procedures is faced by doctors who perform them. This is, as we have seen, a difficult and regrettable issue. Granting one person a chance of life is often tantamount to taking away this chance from others. Thus doctors often have to hesitate when choosing. Even in case of the best result of the operation and saving the life of a person with a transplanted organ, they may sometimes suffer from a feeling of guilt due to somehow condemning others to death. This may explain far-reaching demands not to put a doctor at all in the situation of such a choice. However, it is worth considering several important premises that will allow us to resolve this painful undoubtedly and difficult problem that nevertheless can possibly be solved rationally in a different way. First and foremost, it should be noted that although there may be many who are in need of a healthy heart or kidney, they have no right to receive the organ only because of this need, nor are they obliged to apply for it. Since retrieving the organ from someone else's body is a special, extraordinary, even exceptional measure. The second extremely important moment is that the mere admission of death is never and cannot be equivalent to murder. The doctor is often placed in a situation in which he experiences the limitations of human interference in saving life and must allow the possibility of death as an inexorable necessity. When patients are dying and nobody can do anything about it, the doctor should do everything possible to save them. If it is not possible for the doctor to give those patients a chance to live, he cannot be blamed for their deaths. It would be good if he had in his hands an additional chance to save the life of someone who was "condemned" to death, saved by the gift of a transplant. He can, and he even should take advantage of this opportunity, and it would be unforgivable for him to waste it. A loaf of bread that could save one man from starvation when many die of hunger should not be destroyed because of an alleged injustice that other hungry people will be deprived of it. A loaf of bread could be somehow divided evenly among the many hungry people. It is impossible, however, to endow many patients in need with one heart or a kidney. Therefore, surgeons performing transplants must make a choice. In professional literature and journalism, there has been quite a broad discussion among doctors themselves and among moralists concerning the

situation of making this kind of choice. Those discussing the issue are aware of the difficulties faced by a physician forced to choose specific patients for whom he is willing to apply an exceptional medical measure. They generally agree that one should endeavor to facilitate the doctor's choice, the decision should be dictated primarily by medical reasons, if they exist. R. Kautzky, admitting the need to take into account extremely different circumstances, believes that the most important premise should be the probability of curing the patient.³⁸ M. Sokołowska complements these conclusions stating that apart from professional medical premises one should also include certain (though not precisely defined by her) "indications and contraindications of social nature"³⁹. Participants of the symposium held in London on 9-11 March 1966 considering the problem of kidney transplantation, widely discussed the setting of priorities.⁴⁰ Transplant specialists provided the rationale for choosing a patient for transplantation. They admitted that they would rather choose mature, mentally healthy people, those whose treatment gives greater hope for recovery, and finally those who, as fathers or mothers of families, have to raise small children. Also, socially useful people would be more likely to become organ recipients in the first place. The popularity of this principle would be indicated, by a practice, generally approved in the moral consciousness of a society condemned during the last war to extermination, aimed at especially saving intellectuals and writers. The outstanding Polish writer Z. Kossak was reportedly saved from extermination in Auschwitz in this way, on account of a certain 'preference'. It is difficult to determine universally important preferences when it comes to the moral choice of a doctor. Ultimately, the determinants should be their own awareness and sense of responsibility. Their decisions, however, are not able to please many, they may even be wrong for many reasons. As noted by R. Kautzky, quoted above, "sometimes in special circumstances the medical judgment will be debatable, moreover, retrospectively, it may even turn out to be wrong. But ultimately, this is the case with every medical decision, and this circumstance cannot release the doctor from taking responsibility for making that decision."⁴¹

If, ultimately, the doctor is credited with the right and the obligation to make decisions, it only increases the respectability of his profession and his vocation but at the same time increases his responsibility. The contemporary

³⁸ Cf. R. Kautzky, art. cit., 314.

³⁹ Cf. *Etyczne...*, art. cit., 42.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Etyka...*, art. cit., 168.

⁴¹ Cf. R. Kautzky, art. cit., 315.

progress of medical science does not reduce, as Professor Gibiński observes, the role of choice which is made by the doctor himself. The scope of his freedom constantly increases and will increase in the future which also results in an increase in the importance of his decisions, and unfortunately also the significance of his eventual error. This statement implies “the need to require from doctors high, highest moral-ethical qualifications”⁴².

Thus, a physician’s professionalism, his professional prudence and moral responsibility may be the last word in making decisions regarding the performance of organ transplants and with regard to the selection of patients who are to be endowed with a chance of a prolonged life as a result of this medical method. The doctor should only be careful to avoid making a too hasty choice and selecting specific patients for transplants only because of possible benefits which he might expect for himself. He must be guided by a love of the sick, or mercy supplemented by a certain subtle sense of justice.

To sum up this discussion, we must deal with some difficulties related to the prospect of the further development of transplant surgery, for which organ transplantation already performed can only be a stage for undertaking further-reaching transplantations. This perspective is a matter of concern for many. We have already seen above what they fear most. Experiments on “cultivating” humans in some other organic conditions and personality changes as a result of brain transplant surgery are the most far-reaching possibilities and indeed a nightmarish prospect. There is no reason to disregard concerns about making further possible experiments on the human body carried out by medicine in general, and surgery in particular. Nevertheless, it would be pointless to see only the dark sides of the progress of medicine and judge its future in this respect only in terms of possible abuse and abnormalities in its development. Medicine has made great progress over the last decades and is now serving, with far more elaborated measures and resources than ever before, people in the field of treatment or disease prevention. At the same time, there is hope based on serious assumptions that it will fulfill its task better and better as its capabilities develop. Its dark aspects should be clearly disclosed so that we can prevent them if possible. This would require separate, far-reaching analyses, which is, however, not a subject matter of these considerations. For the purposes of these considerations, it is enough to state that the possibility of abuse of those elements of knowledge and medical art that have been elaborated on by constantly developing transplantation efforts in the

⁴² Cf. *Etyczne...*, art. cit., 39.

field of human organs, cannot negatively affect the fundamental assessment of these efforts. Abuse can occur everywhere. Even the best and most sacred can be abused. Taking into consideration potential abuses which may occur cannot paralyze efforts aimed at the progress and improvement of human life. Nor can it, however, make us regard such incidents as moral offenses, if there are no grounds for it. Organ transplants are not the cause – what is the most important thing in morality – but only at most an opportunity for abuse. By nature, they are a chance to prolong life and improve health, which, if it does not contribute to the acceleration of the death of a donor, can be considered morally good. At the same time, they provide an opportunity for medical progress. This is an ambiguous opportunity, since it implies a dark perspective of abuse. However, this cannot and should not affect our opinion on transplantation itself. The risk of organ transplant abuse is of course not limited to the future.

Today there is a risk of abuse in this area, and it is of various kinds. As transplant surgery progresses, the risk can only increase. There is no possibility or need, in the course of these considerations, to analyze more thoroughly the possible abuses related to today's state of transplantology. The most serious cases have been clearly indicated in this work, or have been revealed by the way, in the course of the above-mentioned arguments. It is enough here to warn against them in general, or, along with lawyers and specialist physicians, to call for undertaking all efforts in order to prevent them occurring, e.g. by imposing on practice of transplantation a set of more detailed legal norms. Moralists are more willing to interpret norms in the terms of a code of medical ethics. The danger of abuse in this area of medical practice – as indeed in others – is always real and serious. Doctors are people and experience human lusts and weaknesses. They are often mistaken, and in this way, sometimes irretrievably, tend to cause a lot of harm with regard to their patients. What is worse, they succumb to their passions which blind their ability to make rational judgements and can contribute to causing a lot of harm. In the field of transplant medicine, ordinary human flaws – magnified by their tragic consequences – such as ambition, desire to get publicity, experimental passion, and human antipathies pose a major threat. The postulate to fight with these flaws and not to succumb to them, in order to prevent possible abuses in this area, is the final, general indication of a moral nature presented here.

Conclusion

The main objective of the present article was to show what is the crux of the moral problem of transplanting human organs and how it should be resolved from the point of view of Christian morality. The issue posed by contemporary medicine reveals several aspects, therefore it cannot be resolved too hastily. The formulation of the general position on the fairness of transplantation required consideration of several specific issues implied by the general view of the phenomenon under discussion. Considering the situation of the donor, from whom the organ to be transplanted to someone else is taken, leads to the conclusion that retrieving the organ from the body of a deceased person cannot be regarded as impious or immoral.

Similarly donation of one's organ, whose transplantation is not necessary to maintain someone else's life, should also be considered as morally correct. In the case of the donation of an organ necessary for maintaining the life of the donor, one should regard the act as morally condemnable, mainly because of the cooperation of the recipient with doctors, which aims at inflicting death on an innocent person. In certain specific situations, the donation of one healthy organs (from a pair), which is necessary to maintain the life of another person may turn out to be an obligation dictated by family love or the love of the fatherland. The greatest number of reservations and difficulties in the field of organ transplantation concern the issue of the recognition of death, especially in connection with the successes of resuscitation. One should bear in mind the ambiguity of death criteria in the ongoing discussions, from tests of death in a biological sense, through clinical death, ending with the recognition of the death of the brain. Despite the existing discrepancies in opinions, it is possible to declare the death of someone with full responsibility at a time when there is still the possibility of harvesting an organ from that person and transferring it to someone else. A judgement of this type is not and cannot be issued with absolute certainty.

For the goals set in a given situation, it is completely sufficient and can fully justify undertaking transplantation activities. Conscientious consideration of the discussed case allowed the author of present article to conclude that the possible admission of the possibility of death in a given case cannot be identified with the deliberate act of taking someone's life. The final conclusion of this key part of the investigation turned out to favor organ transplantation in the sense that it does not have to involve the accelerating the death of the donor. Practical difficulties with regard to organ transplantation, connected in particular with the need to establish specific preferences as to the selection

of organ recipients on both a macro and micro ethical scale, are not sufficient arguments which could make us firmly reject their implementation. They can be, however, overcome under certain conditions. They are not, in any case, a decisive argument in favor of rejection of organ transplants in general. Also, possible abuses cannot be regarded as such an argument. It must be admitted that their occurrence is possible, and may pose a serious threat in this regard. Nevertheless, cases of abuse can accompany and indeed they do accompany all human activities, even the most noble in moral terms. In the face of the possibility of abuse, in the discussed area of medical activities, associated with a special kind of risk, it is necessary to appeal to doctors that they should maintain a great sense of responsibility and a noble moral attitude.

The Concept of the Person as “Subject” and “Place” of Morality According to Paul Ricoeur*

Introduction

The general character of morality, at least as it is in Paul Ricoeur’s reflection, places particular emphasis on an approach that could be expressed in the notion of an *acting person*¹. What deserves special attention is, first of all, the experience of the *person as a person*, or more specifically, the reflection *on the person as an experienced person*. This leads to the need to consider the phenomenon of a person on two levels: *structure and mystery*². The latter could not be explained without emphasising the intentional character of human consciousness.

The need to describe the structure of the person, and even more so the level of his mystery, however, leads Ricoeur’s reflection to a specific “stage of humility”³ in which it is no longer so much a matter of giving exhaustive answers

* STV 38(2000)1.

¹ It should be noted that Ricoeur does not distinguish too strongly between person and morality. For morality is not talked about in any other way than in the context of an active person, while a person considered in a phenomenological key can only remain at the level of intentionality, since any project without implementation is of little importance to Ricoeur. In this context, it is important for morality not only to desire (*je veux*) but also to be able to realise this desire (*je peux*).

² It is worth mentioning that for Ricoeur structure always means a method and never a sufficient philosophical concept. The second of the mentioned levels of reflection on the person, the level of mystery, is a manifestation of the conceptual heritage taken from G. Marcel, who undoubtedly influenced Ricoeur’s reflection. It is therefore a question of a certain identification of a person. In the first sense of the word, to identify is to define something in order to be able to communicate this “something,” “to someone.” Therefore, before an attempt is made to identify the subject itself, one should first identify “something” of the subject, and this “something” is experience – cf. P. Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris 1990, 39 (further cited as SA).

³ This “stage of humility” concerns nothing more than reflection itself but also the subjective claims of the human person. In Ricoeur this was expressed by the following way: *Cogito exalté – Cogito humilié – Cogito blessé*.

(this, especially at the level of mystery, is impossible) but rather of signalling the need to tell the story of oneself, the narrative. Such a story, however, would not be fully communicable, and what is worse, it would remain entirely subjective if it had not been inscribed in the hermeneutical circle of *explanation-understanding*. This in turn gives rise to a new way of expressing the person through his or her *de-* and *re-*composition⁴. In this system, the former is a description of what can be called experience or something experienced, while the latter means not so much a return to what is primordial as a first and fundamental admiration of the human being but rather a re-reading of experience based on negation understood as exceeding what is currently experienced.

However, such an understanding forces us to ask ourselves what makes a person remain the same person despite his or her dynamic and thus changing character? Only in this context can we speak of the personal character of morality. The aim of this article is therefore to show the person as an experienced person, and at the same time as a “place” of *par excellence* of moral experience. It is a kind of *empowerment of subject*. The subject understood in this way shows a double dynamism: an inner one expressed in the dialectic of identity that takes place around two key concepts: *idem*, as what is present, given to the subject and *ipse*, as what is to be created in a dynamic confrontation of the various phases of one’s own experience; and external, appearing in the temporal relationship that constitutes the person – exceeding the current experience based on the future rooted in the conviction of the positive character of the primordial state of human existence. Such a vision of the person is important for morality because it gives not only an opportunity to reconstruct the identity of the person in a changing spectrum of experience, but also, in a sense, to reconstitute the person.

Person as a “Subject” of Moral Life

In such a formulation, the aim is to show the person as a subject, and his/her actions as a subjective act. In other words, it is important to highlight what is indicative of the person and what is at the same time perceived by that person. The first thing that appears to a person is the experience of something, or more precisely something through oneself: the experience of *oneself in something*⁵.

⁴ Narrowing the reflection to two stages is a specific reflection of Ricoeur’s triple mimetic function: *pre-configuration – configuration – refiguration*.

⁵ The closest intimacy of a subject is its nature. It is a person who in the first place is this “something” of “someone” – cf. P. Ricoeur, *Filozofia osoby*, Kraków 1992, 34. The need for

It is the person, as the subject of moral life, who, on the one hand is able to overthrow all temptation to absolutize human autonomy, and on the other hand, it is only in this person that the process of restitution of the new subjectivity can take place⁶. However, in what exactly does the subjective character of the person manifest itself? The answer to this question will be sought first by considering the circumstances of the person and then, on the basis of the conclusions drawn, his/her new subjectivity.

Experienced Conditions of a Person: Limitation and Evil

In the initial phase of Ricoeur's work which outlined the foundations of *Philosophy of the Will* it became obvious that the ontological structure of human existence was influenced by two important factors: *guilt* and *transcendence*. What is more, it is the experience of guilt, and not the experience of the primordial affirmation of being that becomes the starting point of the morality that a being creates. It is possible because the experience of guilt is accompanied by the conviction that it does not destroy the fundamental structures of existence. What is more, the tension between guilt and constant transgression makes the first moral decision to free oneself⁷.

experience stressed by Ricoeur is confirmed by the Christian Revelation itself. For it presupposes in a believer a certain knowledge and experience. It can even be said that if experience had been one of the possible planes of interpersonal communication, then there would have been no access to the knowledge of the mystery of Jesus Christ and his incarnation – cf. L. Ladaria, *Wprowadzenie do antropologii teologicznej*, Kraków 1997, 12. In this experience, a person as a subject has a special character because it cannot be lost from the field of vision even for a certain universalisation necessary in the process of creating concepts. It is a reversal of orders from the identification of a person considered in the perspective of specification or classification in favour of their individualisation – cf. SA, 39f. Ricoeur took this inversion from P. Strawson, *Individual. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*, London 1959. In chapter III of his book he shows that the concept of a person is primordial in relation to other concepts.

⁶ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le conflit des interprétations. Essais sur l'herméneutique I*, Paris 1969, 222f (further cited as *CI*). It is in this spirit that Ricoeur will be able to express himself about man as a speaker, actor, narrator of his own history and finally as a responsible man – cf. idem, *Lectures 2. La contrée des philosophes*, Paris 1992, 204 (further cited as *L 2*).

⁷ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la volonté, I. Le Volontaire et l'involontaire*, Paris 1950, 1988, 7.30.180-186 (further cited as *VI*). Indirectly, a similar juxtaposition of "guilt – transcendence" can be seen in the presentation of the current state of the world and man as expressed by the Second Vatican Council – cf. GS 1.

The basic experience of a person is therefore the experience of evil. Regardless of the starting point of a person's social or economic status, he or she starts his or her existence from the experience of a certain limitation, the first point of which is tragically experienced and compensated dissatisfaction, failure to fulfilment. However, what makes talking about evil and limitations meaningful is the fact that man does not agree with evil⁸. Therefore, before an acceptable concept of a person is drawn up, it is necessary to reconstruct the states that he or she originally experienced and indicate the *places* where they were crossed.

Who is a man? This question of *Psalms 8* returns especially when a person experiences states of non-fulfilment with which he does not want and cannot accept. It is in this context that evil becomes a dynamic factor in the moral life of man. On the one hand, man experiences barriers, on the other hand, the mysteriousness of human nature looks for constant *relations to...* Life is thus subject to constant contestation and affirmation, originating in the imagination⁹. However, this is not the end of the problem of human experience. It is true that the possibility of moral evil is enshrined in the constitution of human existence (the idea of the Enlightenment even proposed to liberate man by Reason while remaining only on the human plane). But can evil be finally explained by reducing it only to the idea of limitations?¹⁰

What Ricoeur finds particularly difficult, if not impossible to explain on the basis of traditional theodicy, is the fact that there are three statements: *God is Almighty, God is Absolute Good, but evil still exists*¹¹. In order to explain the above contradiction, one needs a more developed thought which Ricoeur calls

⁸ What seems to be a phenomenon in the reflection on man is not so much the existence of evil, but rather the question of where the evil comes from and why me? H. Seweryniak discusses this problem in more detail – cf. idem, *Korzenie zła: Wyzwanie Paula Ricoeura*, ChS 20(1988)6, 87-101.

⁹ Tout devient. [...] Ce qui est, c'est seulement ce qui devient. *In this way, the temporal order is not the only order in which the human subject can be considered. It seems that this order is outlined by Ricoeur's eidetic order – cf. VI, 402. It is he who is the first object of imagination – "Imagination de l'innocence n'est pas autre chose que la représentation d'une vie humaine qui réaliserait ses possibilités fondamentales sans aucun écartes entre sa destination originaire et sa manifestation historique" – P. Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté II. Finitude et Culpabilité. I. L'Homme faillible, Paris 1960, 1988, 161 (further cited as HF).*

¹⁰ Cf. HF, 149. Reflections on something "external" to man can be found in the article by J. Marion, *Zło we własnej osobie*, in: *Zło w świecie*, Kol. ComP 7, Poznań 1992, 84-98.

¹¹ P. Ricoeur, *Le mal: un défi à la philosophie et à la théologie*, in: *Lectures 3. Aux frontières de la philosophie*, Paris 1994, 211-233, cited from p. 211 (further cited as L 3). This text was originally published in Geneva in 1986. E. Burska's Polish translation was published under the title *Zło. Wyzwanie rzucone filozofii i teologii*, Warsaw 1992.

onto-theology. The starting point for such an in-depth reflection is the distinction between evil experienced at very different levels: sin, suffering and death¹². When evil is portrayed on the symbolic plane, it can be considered either as a result of sin and the punishment due for it, or, in Augustinian terms, as a deficiency in existence. However, the problem becomes more complicated when one goes from the plane of the symbolism of evil to its specific form, such as for example suffering. Then a new relationship is born: the evil committed (*mal commis*) and the evil suffered (*mal souffert*) which in the case of the committed evil and the punishment accepted for it can focus on the same subject. Then man becomes simultaneously acting (in the committed evil) and experiencing (in the accepted punishment). It is only in this sense that evil allows us to consider it not only as a symbolic or metaphysical evil but also as a moral evil¹³.

However, experienced evil does not exhaust the problems of evil in general. In the above-mentioned planes it can be better described. On the other hand, the problem of the specific unity of the human condition which can be expressed by the term *mystery of iniquity* is still recurring. This in turn shows that evil can be experienced on an individual level, while the explanation can only be found on a wider plane which can be the plane of spirit or being. This, however, forces us to return to the analysis of the planes of expression about evil. Thus, before attempting to describe the ways of transcending the evil one experiences, one should fully reconstruct the ontological state of the human

¹² P. Ricoeur, *Le Mal*, op. cit., 212. *The problem posed by Ricoeur in the Symbolism of Evil remains to be solved, namely, how is it possible to move from the evil possible to the real?* – cf. P. Ricoeur, *Philosophie de la Volonté II. Finitude et culpabilité. 2: La Symbolique du Mal*, 167 (further cited as SM). *It seems that the answer is human nature, or more precisely human imperfection.* M. Philibert comments on this as follows: "A 'Imperfect man' is an attempt to rethink in the most precise way the mystery of the not-free will – the free will which is connected and discovers that it has always been connected..." – M. Philibert, *Paul Ricoeur czyli wolność na miarę nadziei. Szkic o twórczości i wybór tekstów*, Warsaw 1976, 65. *Ricoeur himself calls frailty a "constitutive weakness."* This is expressed in the following words: "Quel est [...] le dieu) humain du mal, son point d'insertion dans la réalité humaine? C'est pour répondre à cette question qu'a été écrite l'esquisse d'anthropologie philosophique placée en tête de l'ouvrage: cette étude est centrée sur le thème de la faillibilité, c'est-à-dire de la faiblesse constitutionnelle qui fait que le mal est possible" – P. Ricoeur, *Introduction to Philosophie de la volonté II, II*.

¹³ *What makes evil moral evil is imputation, accusation and condemnation.* "Imputation is the attribution to the subject of an act that is subject to moral evaluation. Accusation is characterised by the act itself as a violation of the ethical code that applies in the community. Condemnation means a conviction under which the perpetrator of an act is found guilty and deserves punishment. At this point the moral evil is imposed on suffering, as punishment is inflicted suffering" – SM, 212-213.

condition, i.e. to specify more precisely what human imperfection¹⁴ is, without forgetting, however, that the problem of evil will always remain a scandal for speculation and a constant task for faith¹⁵.

The question can be asked: what place is occupied in Ricoeur's anthropology by the model of human imperfection? Two types of reflection can provide answers to this question: *phenomenological* and *existential*. The first one shows a wonderful, although unreal (in the sense: not experienced) eidetic description of the human will. The second one shows the enslaved and confined will. The intermediate link is an *imperfect person* who is at the same time a synthesis and mediation of what is ideal and what is experienced¹⁶.

It seems difficult to transgress evil at the philosophical level. It can only show the weakness and limited role of philosophical anthropology. He may indicate a person as the "place" of surrendering to and transgressing evil. But what is the person itself? What is the value of considering the ontological roots? It seems that such questions can be answered by first showing that the task of philosophical reflection is not to explain the experienced evil but rather to give it sense. This in turn means not so much demonstrating the rationality of evil but rather showing that giving meaning would mean not-recognising the irrationality of evil¹⁷.

In this context, it is important to recall the plan that Ricoeur drew up in order to reflect on human imperfection. It is a faithful reflection of the one

¹⁴ Cf. *SM*, 213f; *L 2*, 237f. Consideration of the problem of human imperfection is by no means the answer to the question of where evil comes from but rather a fuller presentation of the human place of evil, the possibility of its existence – cf. K. Świątek, *Ricoeurowska antropologia ułomności*, *SF* (1987)10, 150.

¹⁵ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le scandale du mal*, "Esprit" 46(1978)7-8, 57-63. The motive for Ricoeur's speech was the debate between him and B. Dupuy, E. Lévinas, E. de Fontenay and J. Halperin on the *Scandal of Evil*.

¹⁶ A good commentary on the Philosophy of the Will cycle can be found in article of E. Mukoid, Ricoeur Paul, *Philosophie de la volonté*. I: Le volontaire et l'involontaire, II: 1: L'Homme faillible, 2. La Symbolique du mal, in: *Przewodnik po literaturze filozoficznej XX wieku*, B. Skarga (ed.), vol. 5, Warsaw 1997, 352-363.

¹⁷ Ricoeur, in justifying the problem of imperfection, puts forward two hypotheses: the first is to show that the problem of imperfection can be reached not only through the analysis of myth or symbol, but also through experience. The second shows that the first point of human experience is the experience of disproportion in itself – cf. *HF*, 2lf. Explaining evil, however, will have the character of a scientific explanation (involving the principle of noncontradiction), but will be limited to proving that evil, although inexplicable, does not necessarily mean that it is irrational. It is rather "rational in other way" – cf. V. Melchior, *Mysterium iniquitatis*, Kol. Comp 9, Poznań 1992, 225-235.

which set the direction for the analysis of the first volume of *Filozofia woli* (*Philosophy of Will*), and expressed in the three-part perspective of *decision-making, action, and consent*¹⁸. A similar three-part diagram is also presented in the *Imperfect Man*. It concerns *cognition, action, and feeling*, accompanied by a triple synthesis: *transcendental, practical, and affective*. Each of the planes mentioned above is subject to internal logic: *infinity of meaning, finite perspective, and emerging disproportions*. However, the pathos of human misery and imperfection is overcome by the transcendental method which by directing it towards an object allows the problem of imperfection to be introduced on philosophical grounds and thus makes the reflection more objective, or, as Ricoeur wants – *objectal*, since it is not only about cognition in the objective sense but also a way of being of things¹⁹.

So how to express the idea of imperfection? Above all, by emphasising the fact that it is a demonstration of the mediation character of human existence. It is the suspension of man *between God and non-existence*¹⁰. This human imperfection makes moral evil possible by following a pattern from the occasion (concrete) to the beginning (*origine*), from the beginning to the possibility²⁰²¹. It has already been said that the pathos of human misery can be overcome through triple synthesis. It is therefore necessary to show the characteristic features of each of them.

The first operates within human cognition and can be called a synthesis of transcendental imagination. It is based on something between the infinity of meaning and the finiteness of perspective. The effect of this synthesis is the objectivity of things, and the intentional unity of the object of cognition²². The

¹⁸ In the first stage, Ricoeur presents the decision, considering its intentional nature as expressed in the project (cf. VI, 41-53). The project, however, as previously signalled, acquires importance only at the moment of implementation. This requires the involvement of the subject itself, since to decide is not only the *décider*, but above all the *se décider* (cf. VI, 54-64). Finally, decision-making is nothing more than a pure description of the subject's reaction to the project but it also refers to the psychological side – the motive, and the ethical side – the value (cf. 64-81). The second stage of reflection is action. It is characterised by a tension which could be most simply expressed in a statement: *Je peux – je veux* (cf. VI, 187-318). Finally, the third stage of consent reflects the dialogue between necessity, objection and consent (cf. VI, 319f).

¹⁹ In the analysis of the *Imperfect Man* it is worth paying particular attention to the description of the pathos of poverty and an attempt to exceed it in the transcendental method. Cf. also K. Świątek, art. cit., 151-152, and E. Mukoid, op. cit., 357.

²⁰ Cf. HF, 149.

²¹ Ibid., 157.

²² "Ce qui était mélangé et remis pour la compréhension pathétique de l'homme s'appelle maintenant «synthèse» dans l'objet et le problème de l'intermédiaire devient celui du «troisième

second (practical) synthesis also takes place between infinity and finiteness. In this case, however, infinity does not concern the notion of meaning, but happiness as the horizon of human actions. At its other end is the finite perspective of human character. Everything is linked by respect for the person as a constitutive element of the person²³. Finally, the third synthesis concerns feelings. Ricoeur starts with Platonic understanding of the term “heart,” which is a place where feelings and anxiety dwells at the same time. Inscribing this plane into the perspective of the finite and infinite one can say that on one side there is real and complete happiness, and on the other side there is individual pleasure. It is this feeling that combines pleasure and happiness, and just as the reason is an openness to the cognitive whole, so the feeling will become an openness to the whole perspective of happiness. In other words, feeling reveals the identity of thinking and feeling, thus personalising reason²⁴.

The imperfection in its clear description, however, does not explain the existence of real evil. It is at most a constitutional possibility of its existence. It explains the existence of evil at the level of *opportunity*, *origin* and man’s *ability* to do evil. As an “opportunity” it is a peculiar place of the least resistance of man to evil. As “origin” it is a reminder of the constitution of human existence. It is its constitutional ability for evil to emerge that makes evil real. Finally, as an “ability” to do evil, there is an imperfection as a condition for the becoming real of what is brought about by the dynamics of evil to which man succumbs²⁵. In this way, starting from a clear description of the defect, Ricoeur leads to the

terme» que Kant a appelé «imagination transcendente» et qui atteint réjlexivement sur l’objet” — HF, 25; cf. also *M. Philibert*, Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, 67; *E. Mukoid*, *cit. art.*, 359.

²³ *The human person experiences, on the one hand, the infinite nature of the desire for happiness and, on the other hand, the finiteness of character. The mediation element between these states is respect: “Tous les aspects de finitude «pratique» que l’on peut comprendre à partir de la notion transcendente de perspective peuvent se résumer dans la notion du caractère. Tous les aspects d’infinitude (pratique) que l’on peut comprendre à partir de la notion transcendente de sens peuvent se résumer dans la notion de bonheur. La médiation (pratique) qui prolonge celle de l’imagination transcendente projetée dans l’objet, c’est la constitution de la personne dans le respect. C’est à montrer la fragilité de cette médiation pratique du respect dont la personne est vis-à-vis cette nouvelle analyse”* — HF, 67; see *comments to the text* — *M. Philibert*, Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, 68; *E. Mukoid*, *op. cit.*, 359-360.

²⁴ *The second way of mediation in order to keep one’s identity in a divided being is feeling: “D’un côté c’est la raison, en tant qu’ouverture sur la totalité qui engendre le sentiment, en tant qu’ouverture sur le bonheur. En retour c’est le sentiment qui intériorise la raison; il me révéla que la raison est ma raison, car par lui je m’approprie la raison. [...] Brey, le sentiment révéla l’identité de l’existence et de la raison, il personnalise la raison”* — HF, 118.

²⁵ HF, 157-162; cf. also *E. Mukoid*, *cit. art.*, 360-361.

possibility of real evil, and thus possible evil because man becomes not only the "place" of evil but also responsible for its appearance²⁶.

Guilt as an Expression of Responsibility for Evil

It is not the mere fact of committing evil but its awareness and acceptance of responsibility for it creates a sense of guilt in a person. Not without significance is its semantic analysis²⁷. The language of confession is more objective than experience because by feeling the situation and imagination one assimilates the motivations and intentions of the confessing consciousness. This assimilation is not a "feeling," it is rather "experiencing" in a neutral way, as Ricoeur says, in a way of "as if," it means as if the researcher were in the confessing consciousness. Imagination, however, does not find better material for analysis than symbolic language²⁸. This is what led Ricoeur to adopt a kind of "way back," to primary and secondary symbols²⁹.

The way to reach the essence of guilt is therefore the language of confession. However, guilt does not exhaust the whole range of confession. For confession also includes blame and sin. Blame, on the other hand, is rather a certain subjective feeling. It presupposes personal recognition of the evil

²⁶ In this respect, the confrontation of the two texts of *Człowiek ułomny*, from p. 9, and pp. 157-162 may be interesting; cf. also P. Collin, *L'héritage de Jean Nabert*, "Esprit" 56(1988)7-8, 122.

²⁷ Ricoeur realises that the simplest model that comes to mind when reflecting on guilt is the model of sin, especially original sin. However, he believes that what is most rationalised must be used to explain the problem. I therefore propose a starting point from what is at the opposite end, much more subjective and internal, namely the analysis of the language of confession that the sinner makes – the following text by P. Ricoeur is an inspiration and the subject of direct commentary in this part of the work: *Culpabilité, éthique et religion, Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais sur l'herméneutique, I*, Paris 1969, 416-430 (further cited as *CI*). Polish text *Wina, etyka i religia*, *ConcP* (1970)6-10, 10-22.

²⁸ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Culpabilité, éthique et religion*, art. cit., 416-417. The first feeling associated with the experience of guilt is, on the one hand, the casual character of the opportunity that made evil possible, and on the other hand, the experience of disproportion in man forces him to look for a way to reintegrate himself – cf. E. Doucy, *Culpabilité*, in: *Dictionnaire d'éthique et de théologie morale*, M. Canto-Sperber (ed.), Paris 1996, 343.

²⁹ See the part of *Symbolika zła* dedicated to the meaning of the symbol – *SM*, 167-306; cf. also E. Mukoid, art. cit., 362. Symbols and myths as ways to transcend evil deserve a broader elaboration. However, the volume of the article forces us to make certain abbreviations of thought which in this part of the reflection should not obscure the understanding of the whole problem.

committed and is readiness to accept punishment for it. It is an assumption of responsibility, in the sense of recognising not only the specific act committed but also the consequences of that act. Ricoeur reflects this subjective character of guilt by metaphorically evoking two images: *weight* and *tribunal*³⁰. This has two consequences: on the one hand, to preserve the difference between sin and guilt, and on the other hand, to distinguish clearly between guilt and meticulous awareness. Semantics, therefore, confronts the researcher with two conclusions: first, guilt is not as broad in scope as the language of confession – but it is subjunctivisation and interiorization of the experience of evil; second, guilt left only on the semantic plane leads to scrupulousness, which Ricoeur defines with a strong word – pathology³¹.

It is therefore necessary to place guilt in contexts other than semantic ones. Ricoeur proposes two: *ethical* and *religious*. These orders are particularly necessary, since a person who experiences a constant imbalance as a model of his imperfection commits a fundamental sin consisting in losing his vocation to unity and becoming entangled in multiplicity. This does not mean, however, that all the evil that exists comes from man. However, it is a warning that all evil that exists “can be” for man³².

Ethically, Ricoeur links guilt to two categories: freedom and duty. In such a context, the acceptance of freedom means at the same time recognising oneself as a source of evil. This leads to specific definitions of both evil and freedom. Evil is evil because it is the work of freedom. Freedom is freedom because it permits evil. This in turn leads to the definition of a relationship between freedom and evil. For if it is freedom that makes evil real, that is to say committed,

³⁰ Cf. SM, 256f. *The singularity of the metaphor of the internal tribunal as “internalised objectivity” Ricoeur is expressing as follows: “Le tribunal est une institution de la cité; transposé métaphoriquement dans le for intérieur il devient ce que nous appelons la “conscience morale”; la culpabilité est alors une manière de se tenir devant une sorte de tribunal invisible qui mesure l’offense, prononce la condamnation et inflige ta punition; au point extrême d’intériorisation, la conscience morale est un regard qui surveille, juge et condamne; le sentiment de culpabilité est la conscience d’être inculpé et incriminé par ce tribunal intérieur; finalement elle se confond avec l’anticipation de la punition; en bref, la culpabilité, en latin culpa, est l’auto-observation, l’auto-accusation et l’auto-condamnation par une conscience dédoublée”*— CI, 419-420.

³¹ For sin is an objective state – one can talk about committing or not committing evil. Guilt, on the other hand, assumes a certain gradation. This means that a person may be fundamentally a sinner, but more or less guilty. On the other hand, meticulous consciousness is the juridical overemphasis on the state of sinfulness, which leads to legalism. The text of St. Paul (Rom. 7) is a good commentary to this – cf. CI, 420f; cf. also SM, 258f. On the subject of meticulous consciousness see also E. Mukoid, *Filozofia zła*, op. cit., 238 and E. Doucy, *Culpabilité*, art. cit., 343.

³² Cf. F. Ferreira, *Zło a odpowiedzialność moralna*, ComP 10(1990)3, 80.

then it is a proof of the existence of freedom. In this context, Ricoeur raises the important question of what makes an entity guilty and therefore responsible for a specific act? And he replies that what determines the attribution of responsibility by a subject is the fact that the subject considers itself to be an existence that "could" do otherwise³³.

This "could" is a very important emphasis as from it can be deduced the character of the obligation expressed in the statement: "You can, therefore, you must." But does this exhaust all the ethical issues of evil and guilt? It seems not. Without going into the details of Kantian analysis, it is enough to say, as Ricoeur, that the guilt in ethics is reduced to a double limitation: knowledge of the beginning and the possibility as the incapability of freedom. "You can, therefore, you must" means that evil is what on the one hand man could not have done, and on the other hand it is what appears to be a previous slavery, and it is this that makes man commit evil. What is needed, therefore, is a different perspective from the ethical one, one that would allow us to return to the beginning and, at the same time, give hope³⁴.

The religious language in which the problem of guilt can be considered is above all the language of hope and eschatology. The freedom considered at this level would also be a "desire for the possible." And it becomes possible through the Resurrection which shows concretely the things overcome by Christ. Also the problem of the consequences for evil which are an element of guilt stands in a different light. That is why, in the perspective of the Resurrection if there is still talk of punishment it is more in the sense of a remembrance and not a court act. And Paul's categories "despite" and "how much more." (cf. Rom 5) make the religious question no longer primarily a question about the source

³³ However, such a statement may be made only after the act has been committed. Then, from the perspective, a person can say about oneself "I could have acted differently." Here come out well known in morality kinds of consciences: pre- and post-action consciences. For by acknowledging himself guilty, man confirms that he is the one who will bear responsibility, and earlier, it is in the present that he takes responsibility for the act which he has committed before – cf. *CI*, 423f. At this stage, a certain deficiency can already be observed. Man makes oneself responsible "towards" the conscience as a witness, recognises the consequences of the act. On the other hand, one feels in such reasoning a certain deficiency of reference to objective truth – cf., for example, *CCC* 1777. This is the key to freedom "towards..." truth, other freedoms, values; the combination of freedom and responsibility can be properly set – cf. A. Molinaro, *Twórczość i odpowiedzialność sumienia*, in: *Perspektywy i problemy teologii moralnej*, Warsaw 1982, 131f.

³⁴ Cf. *CI*, 425-426. About a similar perspective says I. Kant – cf. id., *Religia w obrębie samego rozumu*, Kraków 1993, 66f.

of evil but about how to incarnate it in the hope of promise. Such a reversal of order can only be undertaken by faith³⁵.

Ways of Transgressing Evil

Analysing Ricoeur's concept of evil and the plane of its explanation, it is impossible not to ask a question about Nabertian inspirations in Ricoeur's philosophy. This is particularly noticeable when it comes to the concept of evil³⁶. J. Nabert's philosophy is based on three concepts that are the key to understanding the whole thought. These are: *absolute*, *experience* and *reflection*. Already in *Éléments pour une éthique*, there is a term of the primary or absolute affirmation being, if not yet a conviction about the existence of the absolute – God, then at least a certain aspiration of the nature of man to the absolute. This aspiration to the

³⁵ A text that somehow summarises Ricoeur's concept of evil is presented in the Conflict of Interpretation. We read there: "Paraphrasing St. Paul, we dare to say: where evil 'is abundant,' hope 'is superabundant,' we must therefore have the courage to include evil in the epicentre of hope; in a way we do not know, evil itself works together to bring the Kingdom of God closer. This is how he looks at evil – faith. A look at faith is not a moralist's view; a moralist contrasts the evil predicate with the good predicate; he condemns the evil, attributes it to freedom, and finally stops at the boundary of the unfathomable; for we do not know how it could have happened that freedom became enslaved. Faith does not look in this direction, its problem is not the beginning of evil, but its end; and this end, together with the prophets, incorporates the economy of promise, together with Jesus, into the doctrine of God coming, together with St. Paul, into the law of superabundance. This explains why the perspective of faith on events and people is, above all, kind. Faith in the final analysis admits that the man of the Enlightenment is right, for whom evil plays a role in the great epic of culture because it educates man, not a Puritan because he never manages to pass from condemnation to mercy: imprisoned in the ethical dimension he is not able to look from the perspective of the kingdom that is coming" – CI, 429-430, *op. cit.* – P. Ricoeur, *Podług nadziei: odczyty, szkice, studia*, S. Cichowicz, Warsaw 1991, 275f (further cited as Pn). *On the new interpretation of punishment in the context of superabundance*, cf. id., *Interpretation du mythe de la peine*, CI, 348-369, *Polish ed.* *Interpretacja mitu kary*, Pn, 237-260. A. Houziaux, *Pour une déjinition du discours théologique*, *EThR* 72(1997)4, 557f, also points to the central category of "Kingdom which is coming" in theological language.

³⁶ It is worth noting that Nabert's works were close to Ricoeur's, if only because of the fact that he wrote forewords to them. This is particularly the case of three works by Nabert published during his lifetime: *L'expérience intérieure de la liberté*, Paris 1923, *Éléments pour une éthique*, Paris 1943; in the second edition can be found the foreword by P. Ricoeur, and finally *Essai sur le mal*, Paris 1955, 1970 (commented twice by Ricoeur in 1959, and re-lecture in 1992, and the posthumously published work *Le désir de Dieu*, Paris 1966, also with the foreword by Ricoeur.

absolute can be seen in experience. It can be understood through reflection³⁷. It becomes a method, which gained full maturity in the form of hermeneutics in Ricoeur's thought³⁸.

The second important point of J. Nabert's philosophy, which should be remembered when reflecting on evil in Ricoeur's thought is the term of an *unjustifiable*. In Nabert's vision of evil, whether physical or moral evil, it is always something that cannot be justified on the one hand, and something that must be justified on the other. This is all the more urgent because evil appears to be an element that hinders the development of human existence. Without going deeper into the analysis of Nabert's philosophy, it can be stated that the conceptual treatment of *unjustifiable* experience shows that a distinction must be made between the evil experienced in the plural, and the real evil, which dwells in free will itself³⁹.

After these initial assumptions, Ricoeur's proposals to justify evil should be looked at more closely. They are by no means an attempt to answer or fully justify evil. They are only levels of expression which may contribute to a greater rationality of the deliberations undertaken⁴⁰. The first stage is the level of myth. In it, Ricoeur refers to the notion of *sacrum*, understood in the spirit of R. Otto as a *tremendum fascinatum*. It is an unquestionable reference to the reflection on myths presented in *Symbolika zła*. It was there that Ricoeur, listing four types of myths, showed at the same time their "ideological" function, i.e. combining the cosmos and ethos⁴¹. Myths understood in this way have three important

³⁷ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Préface. Eléments pour une éthique*, L 2, 225-236; cf. also E. Mukoid, *Filozofia zła*, op. cit., 27f, and F. Chirpaz, *Nabert Jean. Essai sur le mal*, in: *Przewodnik po literaturze filozoficznej XX wieku*, vol. 3, B. Skarga (ed.), Warsaw 1995, 305-310.

³⁸ Cf. P. Collin, art. cit., 119-128, in particular p. 126. Ricoeur also testifies to his understanding of reflection as hermeneutics in his article *L'acte et le signe selon Jean Nabert*, Cf pp. 211-221, where he explicitly states that he understands reflection as hermeneutics. He writes: "Parce que nous nous ne sommes pas immédiatement en possession de nous-même, mais toujours inégaux à nous-même, parce que, selon l'expression de l'Expérience intérieure de la liberté, nous ne produisons jamais l'acte total que nous rassemblons et projetons dans l'idéal d'un choix absolu, — il nous faut sans fin nous approprier ce que nous sommes à travers les expressions multiples de notre désir d'être. [...] Pour employer un autre langage, qui n'est pas celui de Jean Nabert, mais que son oeuvre encourage: parce que la réflexion n'est pas une intuition de soi par soi, elle peut être, elle doit être, une herméneutique" — *ibid.*, 221.

³⁹ Cf. J. Nabert, *Essai sur le mal*, op. cit., 48; cf. also E. Mukoid, *Filozofia zła*, op. cit., 93f.

⁴⁰ Ricoeur proposes five levels of speech in speculation on evil: the level of myth, wisdom, anti-gnostic gnosis, theodicy level, and finally the level of "broken" dialectics.

⁴¹ *The role of myths Ricoeur expressed as follows*: "Myths say [...] that man is not the source of existence, that evil is the past of existence, but God is the future of existence. The consequence

functions: first of all the concentration in themselves of the whole of the human condition, that is, the positive and the negative; then, the incarnation of the individual experience of evil in a broad etiological context; and finally, the unifying function to integrate the excess of explicative patterns. What has influenced Western thought in the process of integration is the story of decline in the Bible, which Ricoeur expresses with the concept of the Adamic myth. This myth has long been at the basis of all theodicy trying to answer an eternal question: *Unde malum?*⁴²

The next level of speculation on evil is the stage of wisdom. The essence of this stage is to reduce the question about evil from the objective plane to a plane that could be expressed in questions: Why me? Why each of us? Why a particular person? This stage also reveals serious deficiencies in the idea of retribution trying to explain evil. An example of the inadequacy of existing explanations is the problem of the suffering of the righteous, or suffering of the innocent. In the example of Job, Ricoeur sees a very significant thing: Job's change lies in the fact that the evil experienced and the evil committed cannot be reduced to a common denominator. From now on, suffering means excess. As Ricoeur says: *to suffer is suffer too much*. The idea of excess mentioned above comes back here: *despite..., how much more...* Bringing it to the plane of suffering one can say that it is not the suffering person who is rooted but the complaint itself. In other words, suffering wants to show that love for God can be effective in spite of suffering, even if it is read as "unduly" suffering⁴³.

[...] only a confession of God's holiness and a confession of human sinfulness could claim the right to remove this possibility" – SM, 326, *quoted from the Polish ed. p. 169*.

⁴² Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le Mal*, op. cit., 215f. The purpose of the Adamic myth is to clear people of their responsibility for evil, or at least to restore their proper responsibility for evil. Ricoeur's treatment of the Adamic myth is as follows: considering the ancient myths concerning the figure of the King, he transfers them to the figure of the Son of man and the Lord of the Gospel. This makes both evil and creation gain a certain "novelty." A further consequence of such an approach is the liberation of history from the ritual-cult way of interpreting evil. Finally, there is a transition from the cosmic Enemy to the historical Enemy. This makes it necessary to demythologise the cosmic evil before a proper mythologization of human evil (re-mythologization) can be carried out. The last important consequence of the Adamic myth is the distinction made between radical and primary. This is a fundamental issue for anthropology, since man appears to be the beginning of evil, but only within the creation, while his absolute beginning already lies in the creative act of God – cf. SM, 348-350.375.

⁴³ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le mal*, op. cit., 216-218; cf. id., *Filozofia...*, op. cit., 62f. The words of St. Paul may be a kind of summary of the problem of suffering that goes far beyond the scope presented by the Book of Job: "For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us" – Rom 8:18f.

In the anti-gnostic gnosis phase, evil appears in a slightly different context. In order to understand it better, it is necessary to refer to the concept of St. Augustine. In his deliberations, he starts with the dualistic criticism of the concept proposed by gnosis and fights the existence of evil as a substance. For Augustine, evil is simply a lack of existence⁴⁴. In his fight against gnosis, however, Augustine himself succumbs to a different kind of gnosis, namely, by combining in the idea of original sin two heterogeneous notions: biological transmission and the individual counting of guilt⁴⁵. However, Ricoeur uses the concept of original sin to show how much it is a false rationalisation of evil, if at all, as a rationalisation of evil, on the one hand, and how much it is a real symbol, on the other⁴⁶.

The fourth phase considered by Ricoeur concerns theodicy. What can be described by this term? In his opinion, in order to use the term "theodicy," three conditions must be met. First, when the formulation of the problem of evil aims at unambiguity⁴⁷. Next, when the aim is to protect God from responsibility for evil. Finally, when the arguments used in the reasoning refer to the principles of noncontradiction and systemic integrity⁴⁸. It is precisely in this context that *onto-theology*, i.e. theological term of *God* associated with metaphysical terms such as *nothingness*, *first cause*, *purpose*, *infinity*, seems valuable. The starting point for Ricoeur's reflections is reference to the theodicy presented by

⁴⁴ *Augustine expresses this as follows*: "Evil [...] is not something natural, but all that is called evil is either sin or punishment for sin" – St. Augustine, Exegetic scriptures against the Manichaeans, in: PSP, vol. 25, Warsaw 1980, 83. *In another place he speaks of evil as a lack of good*: "After all, we do not feel it in any other way organoleptically because it would not have happened if we had not done it. Evil is not a creature either but it is called a loss of goodness" – *ibid.*, 267.

⁴⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 320f; P. Ricoeur, *Le mal*, op. cit., 218-220.

⁴⁶ In his article devoted to the analysis of the concept and meaning of original sin, Ricoeur puts forward three conclusions: 1) We have no right to speculate about original sin. It is rather a certain addition to the Adamic myth, something similar to the consciousness and confession of guilt, be it through Israel or through the Church. 2) We have no right to speculate about the evil that already exists, taken out of the context of the evil that is done by us. This is the mystery of sin: We do it, we bring it into the world, but at the same time it is already here. We enter into it through the birth. 3) Finally, we have no right to speculate either on the evil committed or found, except in the perspective of the history of salvation. In this context, original sin is nothing more than an anti-type – it is a juxtaposition of sin and grace (Rom 5:20) – cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le «péché originel»: étude de signification*, CI, 265-282; conclusions from p. 282.

⁴⁷ *The sentence which was already quoted earlier*: The God is good, the God is almighty, but evil still exists.

⁴⁸ P. Ricoeur, *Le mal*, op. cit., 220f.

G.W. Leibniz. In addition to the principle of noncontradiction, it introduces the principle of sufficient reasoning. It means that if certain failures are attributed to theodicy, it is only because reason is not able to cover the entire balance sheet of good and evil. Evil, understood in this way, is combined with metaphysical optimism. This dimension makes the other dimensions of evil less important⁴⁹.

In the same plane a slightly different vision is proposed by I. Kant. For him, the most important question is not where evil comes from, but why do we commit it? Thus it transfers the problem of evil from the metaphysical plane to the moral plane, from the theoretical plane to the practical one.

Evil is no longer sought outside of man but in human imperfection itself. Imperfectness in turn calls reason to seek increasingly better understanding of evil. And although reason first of all discovers its own cognitive boundaries, the mere transfer of reflections from the metaphysical to the anthropological plane is a serious achievement. This is well expressed by statements about the “irresponsibility of God” and the “humanisation of evil.”⁵⁰

In the same phase of theodicy you can also put the thought of G. Hegel. It proposes specific dialectics between the human nature of evil and the development of the spirit, inscribed in a holistic system. It shows that what can be given up completely is only the spirit, but in the course of time it is not possible to express it in an absolute way. This, thus, makes it possible to justify evil. The timeliness of evil also causes that in comparison with the absolute spirit, it is as if reduced⁵¹.

In this way Ricoeur moves on to K. Barth’s proposal, which is a replica of the one given to Hegel and is called *dialectique brisée*⁵². In his *Church Dogmatics*⁵³ Barth proposes a theology that would give up the idea of a system. This somewhat strange term for the dialectic proposed ultimately is brought down to the fact that evil is shown as a reality irreconcilable with either the goodness of God or the goodness of creation. However, such a dialectic can only be realised if one “starts thinking differently.” This means that nothingness (*Das Nichtige*) is a reality which Christ has already been overcome on the cross. From now on it is no longer possible to speak of the power of evil. Victory over it is not a question

⁴⁹ The key to Leibniz’s reflection on evil are three elements: God’s goodness, human freedom and the origin of evil – cf. G. Leibniz, *Essai de theodicée: sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal*, Paris 1969. This Christian optimism was expressed by Leibniz in his metaphysical reflections in the following formula: “uti minus malum habet radonem boni, ita minus bonum habet rationem mali” – as cited in J. Cardozo – Duarc, *Problem zła w filozofii współczesnej*, ComP 10(1990)3, 33.

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 34f; P. Ricoeur, *Le mal*, op. cit., 222f.

of the future, but it is something that has already been achieved. Evil exists only as a denial of God, as something that exists only in such a way that God does not want. It is the *opus alienum* as opposed to the *opus proprium* of God. It is probably an interesting theory, if only because it exceeds the classical view of evil as an absence of goodness or existence (St. Augustine). It seems, however, that apart from a specific "dreaming," this theory can be abandoned and the fact that he sees in God the existence of a certain "left wing," which can also be understood in the key of old theories about the demonic sphere of the deity⁵¹.

A summary of the problematic issues of evil in Ricoeur's thought requires a certain synthesis between thinking, acting and feeling. As has been shown, one cannot expect a solution to the problem of evil from the plane of thinking. However, this plane can be useful on another ground, namely *action* and *feeling*. In action, evil is something that should be combated. It is therefore a matter of proclaiming such an activity that would reduce the amount of suffering in the world⁵². It also makes man more responsible for evil in the world. He does not attribute it only to God but knows that its scope depends on action in the ethical and political field⁵³. In the emotional field, Ricoeur offers a solution taken from H.S. Kushner. It is expressed in three stages: firstly, to stop blaming oneself; secondly, to stop blaming God; thirdly, to start believing in God in spite of evil because then there is a chance to see the purifying sense of suffering⁵⁴. The point is therefore, on the one hand, not to believe too easily in the necessity

⁵¹ *It seems appropriate to quote Ricoeur's original text for a better illustration of Barth's dialectic:* "Brisée en effet est la théologie qui reconnaît au mal une réalité inconciliable avec la bonté de Dieu et avec la bonté de la Création. [...] Tel étant le point de départ, comment penser que les théodicées classiques? En pensant autrement. Et comment penser autrement? [...] le néant, c'est que le Christ a vaincu en s'anéantissant lui-même dans la Croix. Remontant du Christ à Dieu, il faut dire qu'en Jésus-Christ Dieu a rencontré et combattu le néant, et qu'ainsi nous connaissons le néant. [...] Si nous croyons qu'en Christ Dieu a vaincu le mal, nous devons croire aussi que le mal ne peut plus nous anéantir: il n'est plus permis d'en parler comme s'il avait encore du pouvoir, comme si la victoire était seulement future. [...] Le néant aussi relève de Dieu, mais en un tout autre sens que la Création bonne, à savoir que, pour Dieu, élire, au sens de l'élection biblique, c'est rejeter un quelque chose qui, parce que rejeté, existe sur le mode du néant. [...] Le néant est ce que Dieu ne veut pas. Il n'existe que parce que Dieu ne le veut pas" — P. Ricoeur, *Le mal*, op. cit., 226f.

⁵² An example of such a reduction of evil in the world can be the fight against the pathology of power. Ricoeur writes: *Identifying myself with what I own, I become the property of my possessions* – *Pn*, 147. Also the rejection of any unnecessary ideology and fear can reduce the evil in the world – cf. *ibid.*, 196f.

⁵³ Cf. P. Ricoeur, *Le Mal*, op. cit., 230.

⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 231-233.

of the existence of evil, absolving oneself of all activity consisting in fighting it, and, on the other hand, not to fall into a utopia of faith in the disappearance of unbearable suffering⁵⁵.

A Person as a “Place” of Morality: Identification Process

Speaking of the person as “subject” and “place” of morality, one points to its fundamental character. Ricoeur points very clearly to this character of a person understood as a “place” of morality. For him, a person always remains a “combination” of finiteness and at the same time infinite openness. This is expressed in the statement: *ouverture finie*. The place is the person in the sense that he or she sees what is “there,” but he or she sees it “from here.”⁵⁶ On the other hand, referring to the antique understanding of the notion of a person as a mask worn by an actor, one can say that – following this image – it is no longer about a mask but about the actor himself. It can also be said that if morality would be an evaluation of “what is being played,” then the person is the source and the starting point of the play itself⁵⁷. In this sense we understand the person as the “place” of morality presented in the following deductions. It is expressed in the question: Who is the one who is the “place” of morality? In order to answer this it is necessary to examine first of all what is the manifestation of this “who” and then what are the consequences of “in what” manifests the person, for one’s new subjectivity?⁵⁸

⁵⁵ S. Kowalczyk correctly expresses this: “There are limits to knowing the meaning of suffering, but in the light of Revelation it is certain that suffering plays an important role in the mysterious economy of God’s salvation. Suffering is the kind of evil which, through man’s inner effort, may ultimately turn out to be a good” – *id.*, *Podstawy światopoglądu chrześcijańskiego*, Warsaw 1980, 115.

⁵⁶ Ricoeur expresses this as follows: *Je vois toujours la-bas, mais d’ici* – cf. *id.*, *Histoire et Vérité*, Paris 1990, issue 3, 339 (further cited as *HV*).

⁵⁷ “This can be expressed in other words, that action is proportional to who man is. This confirms the well-known principle of moral theology *agere sequitur esse*. A similar position is presented by A. Szostek – cf. *id.*, *Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości. Rozważania etyczne*, Lublin 1995

⁵⁸ The purpose of this part of the reflection is not to refer to extensive literature on the person in general. For a better understanding of the subjective character of the person in Ricoeur’s thought, it is sufficient to recall the views of the philosopher who had a significant influence on the subjective understanding of the person, which is N. Hartmann. He understands the person as the bearer of values and non-values – cf. *id.*, *Ethik*, Berlin 1926. It also emphasises a new understanding of the “I” as something that can be known when it is contrasted with the object

In order to understand Ricoeur’s concept of a person, it is firstly necessary to identify him or her, to say “this one” about him or her. For this purpose, the distinction made by P. Strawson between individualisation and identification is valuable. This makes it possible to establish the starting point of a person being considered as one of the “things” placed in a specific spatial-temporal area⁵⁹. The second important step is to give “this thing,” taken out of a series of things of a certain class a name. It is thanks to this that the next stage of moving from individualisation to identification begins⁶⁰.

However, Ricoeur poses another question to broaden the understanding of the person’s concept. For if in the process of individualisation certain individuals are separated from the whole class to which they belong, the question remains as to how to make the transition from the individual in a very general sense to the individual, which is each of us? Following R. Strawson, Ricoeur proposes to use the idea of fundamental properties (*particuliers de base*), which are: the fact of being a *physical body* and the fact of being a *person*. Hence, the understanding of a person as a physical body is shown as the most primary concept of a person. In building a person’s concept, however, there is a certain transcendental deduction because before assigning certain empirical properties to a person, it is first necessary to establish a certain pattern of thinking, within which the person could be defined⁶¹.

of cognition. For it is only the consciousness, which opposes its objects, that becomes graspable for itself as the “I” – cf. id., *Das Problem des geistigen Seins. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Geschichtsphilosophie und der Geisteswissenschaften*, Berlin 1933.

⁵⁹ The notion of a person as a “thing” requires clarification. It means not so much the instrumentalization of a person but rather a statement at the beginning that the person is considered to belong to a certain class. In this way, on the one hand, it belongs to a certain class, which can be described as “man,” and on the other hand, it appears as “this one,” a single one opposing the rest – cf. SA, 41.44. On the other hand, the first horizon of occurrence of a person is the spatial-temporal horizon taken over from Strawson – cf. B. Chwedeńczuk, *Strawson Peter Prederik. Individuals*, in: *Przewodnik po literaturze filozoficznej XX wieku*, vol. 4, B. Skarga (ed.), Warsaw 1996, 382. It was this horizon that determined the special role of distance and narration in Ricoeur’s philosophy.

⁶⁰ Ricoeur notes, of course, that the proper name completely exhausts its meaningful potential. However, it allows you to confirm that the described thing is separated from the rest of the class – cf. SA, 42; see also P. Guenancia, *L’identité*, in: *Notions de philosophie, II*, D. Kam-bouchner (ed.), Paris 1995, 563-634.

⁶¹ It should also be stated that the person considered in the key of “fundamental properties” is not yet a subject capable of telling about oneself. It is rather “something” about which it is told – cf. SA, 43-44.

Before a further description of a person is made, it seems appropriate to outline the basis and conditions for identification outlined by Strawson, which Ricoeur refers to in the subtext of his theory. P. Strawson places his research on identification in the context of descriptive metaphysics. The term “identification” itself may mean alternatively either *referring to something* or *pointing to something*. In turn the only *effective indication* is the *identifying indication*. It is done directly, or not directly. It may take place for the “first time” (as this thing here), or “again,” or (as still the same thing). Referring to the idea of *particuliers de base* we can say that for Strawson it is material bodies that are the basic *concrètes*⁶².

Since identification is something so important, the question may arise as to what the subject of morality is, or more precisely, while remaining on the plane of earlier reflections, what is the subject of *autoidentification*. It seems that this subject is not “I” (*je*), but “being oneself” (*soya*). So what should the identification of the subject, which is *soya*, look like? It seems that it should start with the act of existence and place the subject in the whole context of its activities. Only in the subject understood in this way will it be possible to reconcile both identity (referring to the “I”) and difference (accentuating the “being oneself”)⁶³.

So what is the most basic subjective understanding of the person in the mind of P. Ricoeur? First of all, the person as an identified individual appears already at the logical level. As a logical subject, some predicates are attributed to it. The logical plane, however, is not sufficient because it does not sufficiently emphasise the characteristics of the person who identifies it as “this one.” It is, therefore, an indication not so much of a subject in the strict sense but rather of the existence of some possible subject, which is indicated by the process of *ascription*⁶¹.

⁶² Cf. a broader study of the work of P. Strawson, B. Chwedeńczuk, *Strawson Peter Prederik. Individuals*, op. cit., 378-386.

⁶³ Ricoeur so expresses it in one of the works: “Réfléchir [sur la personne – J.S.’s note] c’est recouvrer l’acte d’exister, la position du soi dans toute l’épaisseur de ses oeuvres” — cf. id., *De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud*, Paris 1965, 52. A similar position is expressed by Ricoeur when he talks about discovering and studying the effort of existence, which is on the one hand, the dynamism of desire and, on the other hand, the effort — cf. *CI*, 324. B. Skarga’s standpoint, which does not hide Ricoeurian inspirations in her own thinking, can also testify to the perception of identity in *soi* rather than in *je*. This is particularly evident in the part of the work in which she considers the issue of the identity of the *I*. In her opinion, the work of Ricoeur [*Soi-même comme un autre* – J.S.’s note] is the “Bible of the problem” — cf. B. Skarga, *Tożsamość i różnica. Eseje metafizyczne*, Kraków 1997.

The second stage of the presented concept of identification of a person is the fact that a person who can be described as "the same thing" can be assigned two types of predicates: *physical* and *mental*. In this case physical means the fact that a person shares a certain common destiny and existence with material bodies; mental means everything that separates a person from the body. It remains to be determined whether these two types of predicates could be placed on a common plane. In relation to the body one can see a kind of ownership by a person. In this sense, one would deny the unity of body and soul accepted by Christian thought, and return to unauthorised dualisms⁶⁴.

The third element of a person's concept points to a certain gradation that occurs between physical and mental predicates. Following P. Strawson, Ricoeur wonders if mental predicates are not the "particularity" of this person. This particularity would be all the more important because such an identification would not be so much a saying about a given thing "the same," but rather it would concern the indication of the same sense of mental predicates attributed either to a particular person or to anyone. The difference between *soi-même* and *autre que soi* is emphasised here for the first time. This creates an assignment method that would look like the following: "someone" would mean "I," "someone else" would mean "you." It would point not so much to the subject of the ascription, but rather to the "common sense" which can be attributed either to "me," "you," "him," and "anyone." This introduces another important element, which is the *altérité*, i.e. what is "other than me," what "is not me."⁶⁵

The above analyses lead to a double finding. On the one hand, they point to a person as a logical subject, and at the same time showing the common sense of mental predicates allows us to state that a person as a subject can be *me, you, he, anyone*. On the other hand, there remains a certain uniqueness which

⁶⁴ Cf. SA, 50f. Attention should be drawn to a certain apparent contradiction. When one speaks of man as a spiritually bodily being, as unity, one can recall the contrast between spirit and body that is present in the writings of St. Paul. The contradiction, however, seems to be apparent, since the "body" for St. Paul means another side of sin. For man is not seen as a neutral essence, but as a man in a concrete situation towards Christ: a situation of acceptance or rejection. Therefore, it would be a methodological mistake to draw from the teachings of St. Paul about sin and weakness of too far-reaching anthropological implications – cf. L. Ladaria, op. cit., 65.

⁶⁵ It should be noted, however, that if something can be attributed to another, it means that it is tantamount to admitting that the latter is also capable of attributing something to itself. This is one of the elements of the Ricoeurian understanding of "soi-même comme un autre" – cf. SA, 51-53. The interpretation of the term "assignment" was taken by Ricoeur from P. Strawson – cf. id., *Individuals*, op. cit., 108.

cannot be generalised. This is the *altérité*, the “otherness from me,” which does not allow the difference between *je – toi; soi – autre que soi* (between “I – you,” and what is “me” and what is “other than me”) to be blurred⁶⁶.

New Moral and Ethical Foundations of a Person’s Constitution

Previous reflections have shown the person as a subject to be talked about, to which reference is made. Now we should see the person in a new context, i.e. as the subject who is able to proclaim oneself because it is this understanding that gives rise to the moral implications of the concept of the person. In this way, the reflections are shifted to a pragmatic plane taking place in a situation of conversation that takes place between the “I” and “you,” where the specified “I” talks to the specified “you.” In order for the mentioned “I” to enter a situation of conversation and self-communication, it must have the ability to define itself beforehand⁶⁷.

The next level of subjective analyses becomes the theory of acts of discourse. Ricoeur following J.L. Austin evokes a certain class of performative acts, a good example of which is a promise. Austin expresses this with the eloquent title of his work *How to Do Things with Words*, which the French publisher translated as *Quand dire, c’est faire*⁷². The particularly important role of the promise shown in this work stems from the fact that to say “I promise” is to promise in a causative way, that is to get involved in doing something later, towards someone else, what is being done now (what is promised now). One should also say that “I promise” or even more strictly “I promise you” is not the same as saying “he promises.”⁶⁸ If, therefore, at the level of the promise “say

⁶⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶⁷ *This is expressed by Ricoeur as follows:* “pour l’enquête référentielle, la personne est d’abord la troisième personne, donc celle dont on parle. Pour l’enquête réflexive, en revanche, la personne est d’abord un moi qui parle à un toi. La question sera finalement de savoir comment le “je-tu” de l’interlocution peut s’extérioriser dans un “lui” sans perdre la capacité de se désigner soi-même, et comment le “il/elle” de la référence identifiante peut s’intérioriser dans un sujet qui se dit lui-même. C’est bien cet échange entre les pronoms personnels qui paraît être essentiel à ce que je viens d’appeler une théorie intégrée du soi au plan linguistique” – SA, 56. B. Skarga points to the need to emphasize the position of the “I” as not only a logical and linguistic subject, but above all experience, *Id.*, *Tożsamość i różnica*, op. cit., 163f.

⁶⁸ Cf. SA, 57f. This is because, for example, “I” and “you” are substitutable. The “he” category looks different – see Z. Kloch, *Benveniste Emil, Problèmes de linguistique générale*, in: *Przewodnik po literaturze filozoficznej XX wieku*, vol. 3, B. Skarga (ed.), Warsaw 1995, 32-34.

something" is tantamount to "do something," it can be said that speaking should be thought of in terms of an act. As mentioned above, there is an interchangeable relationship between "you" and "I." It is a kind of "unity" to such an extent that all processes taking place in the process of announcing certain contents also cause the same process to take place in a partner to whom one announces something. This is what leads to the aforementioned category in Ricoeur's philosophy, which he calls *altérité*⁶⁹.

It should also be stressed that the "I" in the process of declaration is the first indicator of declaration; it means the one that defines itself in each declaration containing the word "I". It is the first indicator of the declaration process. The question is what the other indicators of this process are. Ricoeur points to three: "it," "here" and "now." "It" indicates an object located in the vicinity of the announcing subject. This means that the announcing person and the person indicated as different do not allow themselves to be identified⁷⁰. "Here" indicates the location of the talking subject. It opposes another location which can be expressed by the word "there." In other words, "here" is the "ground zero" for the subject; all other places are considered in terms of: near, far⁷¹. "Now" means an event that is contemporary to the speaking subject⁷². The above analysis shows that both place and time play a significant role in the process of self-determination by a subject. It also shows that it is not possible to talk about oneself differently than just about a subject speaking and having a concrete spatial and temporal existence. It is at this stage that they find the

⁶⁹ *It seems justified to refer in this argument to the original text of Ricoeur: "L'énonciation qui se réfléchit dans le sens de l'énoncé est ainsi d'emblée un phénomène bipolaire: elle implique simultanément un «je» qui dit et un «tu» qui le premier s'adresse. «J»affirme que' égale «je te promets que.» Brey', énonciation égale interlocution. [...] Toute avancée en direction de l'ipséité du locuteur ou de l'agent a pour contrepartie une avancée comparable dans l'altérité du partenaire" – ibid., 59.*

⁷⁰ Cf. SA, 61.

⁷¹ Cf. ibid., 61-70.

⁷² Ricoeur refers to the analyses presented in his earlier work, namely Volume III *Temps et récit*, where he situates "now" between the creative phenomenological experience of time and any moment of cosmic time. He states that this "now" is a way of inscribing phenomenological time, i.e. the time of description of current experience, into cosmological time, which, in his opinion, was an invention for the creation of the calendar. In this way "now" becomes "dated now." Without this, the attempt to define the present would remain on the plane of pure reflection. A second consequence can also be deduced from this. When an entity tries to determine its time position in a given event, it can always be determined in relation to "dated now" – cf. P. Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit*, vol. 3, Paris 1985, 190f; cf. also SA, 61.70.

full meaning of the questions “who?” and “who is talking?,” standing at the beginning of the process of determination – what Ricoeur calls identification.

Finally, we can point to an important element of the “I-you” relation which is the body – “*corps proper*.” In this context, the “I” has a double meaning: firstly, it means a particular person; secondly, it begins to point to a certain boundary between this subject and the “rest.” The subjectivity of the “I” is expressed not only in relation to the other, but also in relation to what can be called “mine.” In this way, the “I” and a person with a specific personal name, born in a specific place, means the same thing that is announced. A special place is occupied by the category of “own body.” It has a dual function. On the one hand the body belongs to the world, it is a specific organ, on the other hand it is “my” body, so it does not belong to typically external objects, about which the subject speaks⁷³.

Summary

The concept of the subjectivity of a person presented in this article has shown that man as a subject appears in constant references and relations in which his existence is embedded. On the one hand, it escapes the determinism of nature, on the other hand, it reveals a certain crack between its nature and action. This leads to the conclusion that even if a person is characterised by individuality, it is not a *separate* existence. It seems justified to return to the question of what makes a person, in spite of both external and internal variability; they remain the same or otherwise what builds and what destroys the subjectivity of the person? The question thus posed reveals the first threat to human subjectivity which is the fact of the existence of evil. For it is not only something external to man but also something that makes man both the “place” of the appearance of evil

⁷³ Cf. SA, 70-72. Ricoeur has already pointed to the special importance of the body in the early period of his creative work. According to him, the body is a kind of border between the “I” and the world. In this we can see the development of his original thought, which shows the body as an organ that allows the person to feel, to experience. The body is, at the same time, a border, as if the last point of a person’s going “towards” the world because when deprived of objectivity, it becomes increasingly more a revelation of subjectively lived existence – cf. VI, 83. Also the relationship between physicality and time in Ricoeur’s thoughts is one of the essential elements present in his thoughts from the very beginning of his work. This was expressed by pointing out two essential elements, and at the same time the determinants of the human condition *in-carnation* and *temporalité* – *ibid.*, 83. The body, in spite of its distinctiveness, has never become the cause of dualism in the vision of man. Ricoeur himself warned against the danger of such an approach – HV, 201.

and responsible for evil⁷⁴. While staying in Ricoeur’s philosophy characterised by a dialectical movement one can already see in the language discussing evil a threat to certain “deposits of hope” present in his thought⁷⁵. For the religious language to which Ricoeur ultimately reduces the problem of evil is the language of hope and eschatology. Freedom also takes on a new meaning in this context. It is no longer just something that has been enslaved but above all something that is a “desire for the possible.” A possible freedom is the Resurrection. In this perspective, even evil and suffering can find their ultimate meaning, and the subjective character of morality does not threaten to fall into subjectivism. Moreover, it is in the name of such subjectivism that morality demands for the subject this “otherness,” the *hope* that comes from the Resurrection.

⁷⁴ In order for evil to become an object of moral reflection, it must be recognised not only as something that affects a person from “outside,” which makes him a sacrifice, but above all as something that, without destroying the fundamental structures of the person, could be defeated.

⁷⁵ In fact, according to Ricoeur’s concept of the double negation of evil, one can only speak of evil in the perspective of its transgression.

Global Or Universal Morality? The Importance Of Hermeneutics In The Era Of Transformations*

Hans Kung in his work “Weltethik” stated that “ethics is not something super-human and divine, but in its essence very practical and rational. It is simply something that guarantees people’s dignity and survival. It is a set of rules for all people living in the world.”¹ However, this raises the question: is it possible to develop a set of rules and institutions based on these rules, which would guarantee the functioning of moral life on a global scale? Even if such a set of standards could be created, will they be global standards because of their universality, or will they retain their universality regardless of the number of people living according to these standards? The answers to these – as it seems – fundamental questions about the nature of morality and the meaning of hermeneutics in the era of transformations will be sought in this article.

The distinction I made in the title between global and universal morality seems justified because people living by the principles of so-called universal morality (or better – based on universal values) are not always supporters of globalisation processes. In the new global economy system, on the other hand, every person who remains on the side of globalisation processes is shown as defeated in the perspective of development and progress. Does this mean then that the morality that would accompany the processes of globalisation would also have to take over its global character in a necessary way? This is an important question because by assuming the affirmative answer, it should be noted that morality would lose one of its essential characteristics, which is freedom of choice².

* STV 42(2004)1.

¹ Quote from T. Pyzdek, *W kierunku nowego świata*, HD 72(2002)1, 31-47.

² Cf. *ibid.*

The attempt to define morality built under the pressure of globalisation processes is all the more important because the division into global and universal morality appears to be a very simplified division, dictated more by the need to organise phenomena than by a real understanding of the nature of the problem. An example of a slightly narrow approach to these issues can be the understanding of the world proposed by Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations*. In his opinion, “the world is in a sense divided into two worlds, but it is a division between the West, civilisation that has been dominant so far, and all the others that have little in common. In short, we are dealing with one Western world and many non-Western worlds.”³ The conclusion that can be drawn from this description seems simple: in the process of a specific rivalry of types of morality in the modern world, the best “product” does not have to win.

The rivalry process itself is also worth describing. It is accompanied by a struggle for autonomy, especially of culture and politics. However, this is not so much a struggle for the right to a creative process of defining one’s own areas of activity but rather a process of detraditionalization of culture (this is particularly relevant in the case of European culture). It is precisely the role of tradition in the process of globalisation that is particularly important because it refers to time, very concrete, which is the place where values are revealed. In practice, this would mean that the transmission of values beyond a specific tradition is a message, at most certain imperative forms, which are lacking in concrete content⁴.

The observation of modern society also shows that it is a specific system of cooperation of individual entities and that in order for it to function properly it needs rules that are universally acceptable and exclude coercion in their introduction and implementation. This would mean the evolutionary and empirical way of creating values and on their basis moral norms. Such an approach to morality would have its weak points. Undoubtedly, the vision of the world

³ Cf. R. Czarnecki, *Unifikacja czy pluralizm. Uwagi o globalnej autonomii Wschodu i Zachodu*, “Dziś” (2000) 5, 55-64. T. Pyzdek speaks in a similar spirit and states: “Globalisation is perceived by a large part of the world’s population as a phenomenon of the West.” id., art. cit., 24. In turn, A. Szostek, pointing to the changes in the last decade, draws attention to the change in the significance of the East-West political division in favour of economic division: “bogata Północ – biedne Południe” (“rich North – poor South”) (cf. id., *Kto zyskuje, a kto traci na globalizacji?*, “Ethos” 15(2002)3-4, 165.168.

⁴ Cf. J. Kurczewska, *Przeszłość, tradycja i globalizacja w Europie*, “Studia Polityczne” (2000)1. *Special Issue on the Tenth Anniversary of the ISP PAN*, 97-108.

based on the universal satisfaction of human needs and man's detachment from the enslavements of the past is apparently very appealing. In practice, however, the more ideal this vision is, the more unreal it is, since it also assumes an ideal vision of the nature of man and society, and not an anthropological truth about human beings⁵.

Is there a need for a new morality for a new era, or is there a need for a continuous return to moral action that refers to universal sources of evaluation?⁶ The first possibility, albeit fresh and seemingly more adapted to new phenomena, turns out to be a minimalist and limiting programme, especially when compared to the second proposal contained in the Christian morality system⁷.

This draws a specific path of methodological research, according to which one should first trace those values that can be extracted from the observation of moral life, the plane of which are globalisation processes, and then, analysing the proposals of a certain universalisation of values and norms, try to find a proper hermeneutical key in building a commonly accepted morality at least as far as the way of justifying norms is concerned.

The intuitive pre-assumptions that accompany this reflection can be reduced to three points. It seems that in the modern world there are processes of special changes of ethical paradigms on two planes. The first is the socio-cultural and economic dimension of globalisation, the second concerns the revolution in biotechnology. The first questions the essence of freedom (by the specific necessitous nature of the proposed changes). The second, referring to the technical imperative, questions what constitutes the essence of humanity itself – its combination of two irreducible levels: structure and mystery. It seems therefore particularly important to analyse the contemporary vision of man, who is the subject of all morality, and therefore also of the one we ask about in this reflection. It seems that it is not in the observation of social life, but above all in man himself, that one can discover what can be the basis of universal morality. This leads to the need to adopt a hermeneutical and dialectic

⁵ Cf. A. Walicki, *Moralność polityczna liberalizmu, narodowa moralistyka i idee kolektywistycznej prawicy*, "Znak" 49(1997)7, 21-37; L. Ostasz, *Ku etyce uniwersalistycznej i zarys teorii wartości*, Kraków 1994, 199; A. Grzegorzcyk, *Racjonalizm europejski jako sposób myślenia*, "Wspólnotowość i postawa uniwersalistyczna" (2000-2001)2, 5-8.

⁶ It is worth mentioning that some authors completely exempt themselves from such questions, recognising that the "novelty" of globalisation processes is in fact an old myth, not only in the moral but also in the economic dimension – cf.: P. Hirst, G. Thompson, *Globalization in Questions: the International Economy and Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge 1996.

⁷ Cf. I. Bokwa, *Czy chrześcijaństwo ma przyszłość?*, "Wrocławski Przegląd Teologiczny" 9(2001)2, 19-27.

pathway expressed in a sequence: “negation, negation of negation, primary affirmation,” which can be described as follows: if so-called modernity of its form of morality is taken as the plane of negation, and postmodern morality as the negation of negation, what type of morality would be born at the level of primary affirmation, as the end of the dialectical path? This dialectic path seems to lead nowhere. Therefore, without abandoning the dual path (global and universal morality), we will ultimately accept as a methodological choice a return to the sources of affirmation of being, since morality is sought for a particular type of being, which is man⁸.

Global Morality

The remarks made above suggest that the core of the reflection will be focused on human issues. The question can be asked whether this is not an excessive narrowing down of the problematic aspects? In support of my choice I will recall the words of John Paul II, spoken to the participants of the Fifth Symposium of the Conference of Bishops of Europe in October 1982. He said, “Today in Europe there are currents, ideologies and ambitions that are considered alien to faith, if not in direct opposition to Christianity. However, it is interesting to show how, starting with the systems and choices intended to absolutize man and his earthly achievements, it has today been possible to discuss man himself, his dignity and inner values, his inner certainty and desire for absoluteness.”⁹

Commenting on these words one can say that reducing moral searches to the essence of man is in fact a search for *something more*, because man cannot be closed only in his purely human perspective.¹⁰ The necessity of *something more* does not only refer to the content of the values themselves but presupposes norms of concrete action, thanks to which the good cannot only *be* – in an ontological sense but can *become* – in a moral sense.¹¹

Where, then, lies the particular problem of the specification of global morality? The morality of necessity, combined with the process of globalization,

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*; A. Mirski, *Wkład współczesnej psychologii do badań nad etyką uniwersalną*, in: *Ekologia ducha*, J. Krakowiak (ed.), Warsaw 1999, 127-143; I. Bokwa, art. cit., 19-27.

⁹ Cf. *Europa jutra. Jana Pawła II wizja Europy*, A. Sujka, Kraków 2000, 37. Cf. also W. Pan-nenberg, *Jak myśleć o sekularyzmie?*, A., P. Łąccy, “W drodze” 357(2003)5, 58.

¹⁰ Cf. M. Rusecki, *Co to są wartości chrześcijańskie?*, in: *Problemy współczesnego Kościoła*, ed. id., Lublin 1997, 517.

¹¹ Cf. L. Ostasz, op. cit., 22-25.65.

is aimed at *wellbeing*¹². The latter, even at the level of pure etymology, means *the good of being, the good-for-existence*. It is not enough to define the good in a subjective sense (to want good); it is also necessary to define the very nature of being. What, then, is the being itself and its goodness within the framework of global morality, lived especially in our cultural circle?

In his book Europe, Norman Davis wrote that “what characterises our understanding of goodness and existence is our belief in the particular secular variety of Western civilisation, in which the “Atlantic Community” is the summit of progress and development for humanity. Anglo-Saxon democracy, the rule of law as shaped by the Grand Charter tradition and the capitalist free market economy are considered to be the highest forms of good.”¹³

To the full description of the global morality context, a brief hermeneutical description of the very concept of “globalisation” should be added.

There are some words of admiration that show globalisation. For example: *Never before have people heard or known so much about the rest of the world. For the first time in the history of the world, humanity is united by a common vision of being. [...] And the second example: For the first time in the history of mankind, everything can be produced and sold anywhere in the world.* These two quotations show that on the one hand the phenomenon of globalisation is not a new phenomenon (religious wars, Pax Romana, Proletariat), while on the other hand contemporary processes focus particularly on economics and politics, carefully avoiding the problematic issues of values and morality derived from them¹⁴.

Globalisation in this sense is undoubtedly a sign of the times¹⁵. It takes place on three planes. The first is characterised by moral neutrality, the second is positive, the third is negative. Regardless of these divisions, globalisation raises some difficult questions about the very essence of the phenomenon, namely whether it is an expression of a global crisis and collapse or just a cultural change; whether it is a diffusion of values or a changing role of culture; whether it is a fluid combination of economics with human rights and fundamental freedoms; or are these two hermetic worlds, the latter of which have no greater

¹² Z. Zdybicka describes globalisation as the latest ideology and the latest form of the modern way of “making humanity happy.” Cf. Z. Zdybicka, *Globalizm i religia*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 50(2002)2, 25.

¹³ Cf. R. Czarnecki, art. cit., 59.

¹⁴ Cf. M. Michalik, *Globalizacja etyki – wyzwanie czy paradoks*, “Wspólnotowość i postawa uniwersalistyczna” (2000-2001)2, 33. Cf. also Z. Zdybicka, art. cit., 23.

¹⁵ Globalisation is a sign of the times, especially in terms of form, not the very essence. For the essence is no longer alien to biblical culture – cf. P. de Benedetti, *Globalizzazione al negativo e al positivo nel pensiero biblico*, RTM 34(2002)135, 335-338.

significance, apart from a purely declaratory one?¹⁶ Not only ambivalent but also directly negative aspects can be pointed out in this process. These include the excessive unification of manifestations of social life expressed in extreme standardisation¹⁷, the manifestation of those forces that are particularly damaging to the weakest¹⁸, the pursuit of domination and subjugation, certain mechanisms that result in numerous conflicts of interest and social conflicts¹⁹.

The other side of globalisation covers certain centrifugal tendencies which are becoming increasingly more noticeable. This is reflected in the intensification of ethnic and religious conflicts²⁰. It is also accompanied by stratification and marginalisation. All this raises the question of the role and place of the individual in a world which is undergoing globalisation²¹. Modern transformations are undoubtedly conducive to strong individuals, deprived of fear for the future, not showing features of external steerability²². As Zygmunt Bauman notes, openness to these individuals is expressed in relativism, pragmatism and privatisation. However, the individual assumes a very fragmented vision of the world. This, in turn, demands pragmatism. In such a vicious circle where the privileges of the individual are still followed it is very easy to accentuate an individual who does not necessarily have to meet the necessary criteria of the subject of moral life. It also gives rise to a life not so much in the key of *being together* but rather in the key of *separation and isolation*²³.

¹⁶ Cf. P. Nguyen Thai Hop, *Globalizacja: perspektywy i ryzyko*, "Społeczeństwo" 8(1998)1, 59-75; cf. also M. Ripinsky-Naxon, *Ekologia globalna i transformacja świadomości*, in: *Ekologia ducha*, J. Krakowiak (ed.), op. cit., 87-91; M. Kempny, G. Woroniecka, *Wprowadzenie. Globalizacja kulturowa i religia dziś*, in: *Religia i kultura w globalizującym się świecie*, M. Kempny, G. Woroniecka (ed.), Kraków 1999, 7-24; T. Pyzdek, art. cit., 31-47.

¹⁷ Cf. H. Skorowski, *Znaczenie wartości chrześcijańskich w dobie współczesnych przemian cywilizacyjnych*, "Saeculum Christianum" 9(2002)2, 262.

¹⁸ A special role for the Church in this – cf. H. Sanks, *Globalization and the Church's Social Mission*, "Theological Studies" 60 (1999), 625f.

¹⁹ Cf. M. Michalik, art. cit., 34; A. Szostek, art. cit., 168-169.

²⁰ Cf. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, 8.

²¹ Cf. J.A. Sobkowiak, *Globalizm gospodarczy i polityczny – szansa czy zagrożenie dla pokoju?*, in: *Pacem in tenis. Dar Boga powierzony ludziom. Materiały z sympozjum teologicznego*, Stoczek Warmiński, 31 V 2003, J. Kumała (ed.), Licheń 2003, 47f; see also A. Cramp, *Economic Ethics*, in: *New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology*, D. Atkinson, D. Field (ed.), Leicester and Downers Grove 1995, 115-121.

²² Cf. A. Szostek, art. cit., 171.

²³ Cf. Cz. Porębski, *Co nam po wartościach?*, Kraków 2001, 186; cf. also P. Starosta, *Społeczne skutki globalizacji*, in: *Globalizacja*, J. Klich (ed.), Cracow 2001, 41-64; Z. Bauman, *Globalizacja. I co z tego dla ludzi wynika?*, Warsaw 2000, 57.

The relationship between culture and politics is also characteristic. The fundamental problem of culture is that globalisation leads on the one hand to cultural diversity and on the other hand to the universalisation of certain cultural patterns²⁴. A particularly dangerous phenomenon is the introduction of certain standards, which, thanks to dissemination, gain recognition for values and rules that are universally binding but which have no roots in the “here and now.” The function of shaping reality is increasingly being taken over by politics, becoming the widespread and most common dimension of social life. In the field of universalisation, it is noted that the already mentioned standardisation, on the one hand perfectly organising life, and on the other hand, devoid of any real references to reality, makes the person, when looking for references to values, refer not so much to the values themselves as to their standards and imagination²⁵.

The very discussion of values is also a threat to globalisation. In the context of European integration, it was possible to find evidence of this, for example, in the discussion on the religious and spiritual heritage that arose around the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This has shown that, on the one hand, in conditions of such serious transformation, there is a need for what could be called “common values,” while, on the other hand, only what is common to a certain minimum degree can be common²⁶.

Reflections on global morality can be encapsulated by five dilemmas that are most often put forward in relation to the subject matter. According to Paweł Dembiński²⁷, they can be presented as follows: Efficiency or dignity? Efficiency is the slogan of the market, the dignity of the person’s constitutive element; law or trust? For some time now, a lack of efficiency in the law has been encouraging widespread trust. On the other hand, during a conversation with students, creating a new decalogue for new times, it turned out that trust is a value which in everyday relations is in the background; Flexibility or fidelity? Flexibility is undoubtedly sufficient for the functioning and survival of the market. But it is not enough for the survival of civilisation; The common good or the general

²⁴ Cf. A. Szostek, art. cit., 166f.

²⁵ Cf. P. Starosta, art. cit., 41; cf. also J. Bałicki, *Marginalizacja społeczeństw krajów rozwijających się w epoce globalizacji*, “Roczniki Naukowe Caritas” 3 (1999), 95-114; Cf. M. Michalik, art. cit., 36; cf. also M. Klecel, *Moralny epilog wieku*, “Przegląd Powszechny” 116(1999)7-8, 120-130.

²⁶ J. Czaja, *Europa wartości – pytania o tożsamość Unii Europejskiej*, „Przegląd Europejski” 3(2001)2, 22-39; cf. also. J.A. Sobkowiak, *Deklaracja moralności europejskiej w Karcie Praw Podstawowych*, STV 39(2002)2, 157-175.

²⁷ Cf. P. Dembiński, *Globalizacja – wyzwanie i szansa*, in: *Globalizacja*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 19-31.

interest? At the level of general interest, we refer to the effects of actions per balance. In the case of the common good, it is not possible to offset losses and profits, especially in relation to individual members of the community; Interdependence or independence? Interdependence is a source of market efficiency and independence is a source of autonomy.

To sum up the issue of global morality, we can recall the five principles of global ethics, which were presented in the report under the title *Our Creative Diversity*²⁸ (1995): universal human rights combined with duties; democracy with elements of civil society; protection of minorities; peaceful conflict resolution and fair negotiation; equality within and between generations.

The above reflections showed that the problem of man, as announced in the introduction, did not have a broad resonance at the level of global morality. It turned out that it is rather man who is subordinated to certain processes, and the discussion about morality and values is typically declarative. An attempt should therefore be made to find certain elements of universalisation that originate in the very nature of man.

Universal Morality

In an attempt to define certain universal foundations within the European community (because it is impossible to confront incomparable or directly unknown cultures on a global scale) one can recall three fundamental ones: Greek philosophy and democracy, Roman law, Christian tradition and values²⁹. Of course, the most problematic is the *Christian* term. This is because there is an official rejection of one tradition³⁰, while on the other hand it is difficult to imagine a coherent system of values for this cultural circle, which, to a greater or lesser degree, would not refer to Christianity. John Paul II often draws attention to this spiritual richness. The second particularly important element seems to be the cultivation of the social sense, which is the foundation of human *ethics*. It is thanks to that sense man can think and act in terms of “we.” Culture is a special plane that opens man to universality. It is rooted in man’s nature and indicates his universal and transcendent dimension³¹.

²⁸ Quote for: M. Ziótkowski, *Przemiany interesów i wartości społeczeństwa polskiego. Teorie, tendencje, interpretacje*, Poznań 2000, 72.

²⁹ Cf. J. Czaja, art. cit., 22-39. Cf. W. Brandmuller, “Społeczeństwo” 13(2003)3-4, 632-635.

³⁰ Cf. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, no. 7.9.

³¹ Cf. T. Pyzdek, art. cit., 31-47; cf. also *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 34.103.

Some researchers (e.g. N. Lobkowicz) point out that *Europe is an independent reality only as a culturally united whole. Only as a creation of history [...] it has something cohesive.* It should be noted that by culture he understands *everything that inspires man in his personal individuality.* A particular form of such a culture is a culture of freedom, both of individuals and of nations, lived in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility³². However, culture cannot be a substitute for religion. Martin Heidegger made this danger clear. He wrote that a place of worship can easily replace “admiration for the creative abilities of culture *and* enthusiasm for the spread of civilisation.”³³

Here we come to the first point coinciding with the anthropological thesis put forward at the beginning. It seems that in order to discover certain elements of universal morality, it would first be necessary to realise that features such as *commonness* and *universality* do not overlap. The universal assumes anchoring in anthropology. Another important element of universality is the recognition of one’s own identity. Without it, the communication process is impossible³⁴.

The role of politics in shaping universality should be looked at further for a moment. Policy is the lowest level of implementation of ethical principles. The political project should aim not to go in the direction of pressure but in the direction of the formation of a common spirit³⁵. In a similar sense John Paul II addressed the presidents of seven European countries in Gniezno in 1997. He said, “the sublimity of political leaders lies in the fact that they must act in such a way that the dignity of every human being is always respected; create favourable conditions for the awakening of a sacrificial solidarity that leaves no fellow citizen on the margins of life; enable everyone to have access to cultural goods; recognise and implement the highest humanistic and spiritual values; express their religious beliefs and demonstrate their value to others. In so doing, the European continent will strengthen its unity, its fidelity to those who have laid the foundations of its culture, and will fulfil its temporal vocation in the world.”³⁶

Looking further, one can ask what other syndromes of universal morality can be found in the modern world. These are undoubtedly, on the one hand, increasing respect and tolerance, and, on the other hand, ethical indifference

³² Cf. J. Krucina, *Solidarność czynnikiem integrującym Europy*, “Społeczeństwo” 9(1999)1, 81-92; cf. also *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 201. Cf. L. Ostasz, op. cit., 101.

³³ M. Heidegger, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt 1950, 203. *Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve*, R. Kastoryano (ed.), Mayenne 1998, 32.

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 20; cf. also L. Ostasz, op. cit.

³⁵ A. Sujka, op. cit., 102.

³⁶ Cf. *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 100f.

and scepticism. There has also been a certain universal shift in primacy. Until recently, it was observed that morality is increasingly dominated by politics. Today, in turn, politics itself is dominated by economics. This is what is called turbo-capitalism³⁷. There is also a growing tendency towards the absolutisation of society at the expense of the individual³⁸.

So, what are the characteristics of universal morality? First of all, even if postmodernism did not negate all values, it undoubtedly liked all forms of deformation of the integral vision of man. The lack of an integral vision of man has simple consequences in accepting an objective hierarchy of values³⁹. A universal civilisation for the average European means above all a free market, human rights and individualism, what is commonly referred to as the "Davos culture."⁴⁰

Universal morality must therefore have many opposing moments in relation to that of globalisation. First of all, universalisation in morality must take account the context. Universalisation, of course, consists in the fact that it is necessary to constantly transcend this context, but transcending does not mean omitting. In practice, universalisation cannot have anything to do with standardisation. It must also take into account the need to come to the truth through compromise and a strong sense of identity. In this case, however, compromise is not a renunciation of the truth, but communication with another form of identity, which also applies to the category of truth. It therefore seems that reason is the best tool for universalisation. It is a condition for progress, but at the same time a condition for the synthesis of values. Universalisation is also a specific set of values. However, new forms of connections and behaviours as well as new cultural patterns are becoming increasingly more visible among them. They are created not on the basis of the nature of man or society, but only in an empirical and evolutionary way. A particular new form of values has become the pace of life and necessity⁴¹.

³⁷ Cf. R. Czarnecki, art. cit., 63; cf. also *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 117.

³⁸ Cf. *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 183.

³⁹ Cf. J. Bramorski, *Zjawisko zaniku poczucia grzechu w świetle adhortacji apostołskiej Jana Pawła II reconciliatio et paenitentia*, "Universitas Gedanensis" 23(2001)1, 35-46; cf. also I. Mroczkowski, *Kondycja moralna człowieka ponowoczesnego*, "Roczniki Teologiczne" vol. 47(2001) 3, 21-34.

⁴⁰ Cf. R. Czarnecki, art. cit., 55-64; W. Pannenberg, *Chrześcijaństwo i Zachód – niejasna przeszłość, niepewna przyszłość*, "W drodze" 353(2003)1, 57.

⁴¹ Cf. L. Ostasz, op. cit., 61-63.192.236; cf. also K. Papciak, *Konstruktywne obywatelstwo świata – uczestnictwo przez dialog*, "Wrocławski Przegląd Teologiczny" 9(2001)1, 129-137; J. Czaja, art. cit., 22-39.

When talking about universal morality, it is also necessary to draw attention to a certain danger. Because of the various pressures, sometimes situations are forced where typically particular values, under the influence of pressure, might gain the characteristics of universal values. This type of action undoubtedly leads to the weakening of truly universal values⁴². The role of awareness should also be recognised. Most of the values that we live by are commonly not given indefinitely in their final form. This is particularly true of the level of values, which is reflected in human rights in practice. In itself, they gain in universality only when they are respected and implemented. Values disseminated separately from the being they serve and from their awareness quickly become declarative values. Therefore, an active awareness of existence is needed for their full life⁴³.

It also seems important to recall the relationship between the common and universal nature of values. Universal values should become common, while common values, which are not universal, should not be treated as such. Commonness is something secondary to universality⁴⁴. On the other hand, further distinction (universal and objective values) brings us closer to understanding Christian values. The objectivity of values is linked either to the adoption of certain assumptions or to their existence focused on their own objectivity⁴⁵. So what are Christian values, do they have an independent object, a plane? It seems that the fundamental role of Christian values is the assimilation of all-humanitarian universals, especially in some sort of ordering and prioritising, especially in the perspective of the purpose and meaning of life. In addition, they can inspire many areas of life⁴⁶. They also ultimately relate the existence and sense of universal values to the person and his or her superior value in a certain universal axiological order⁴⁷.

What values of universal morality should therefore be developed in particular. The first value seems to be the category of the *common good*. Serving the common good ensures fairness and harmonious economic development⁴⁸.

⁴² Cf. Ibid., 269.

⁴³ Cf. Ibid., 221-225. Cf. also: V. Possenti, *Teraźniejszość i przyszłość praw człowieka*, "Społeczeństwo" 13(2003)1, 43-63.

⁴⁴ Cf. Ibid., 225.

⁴⁵ Cf. M. Ziółkowski, *Przemiany interesów i wartości społeczeństwa polskiego. Teorie, tendencje, interpretacje*, op. cit., 71-72.

⁴⁶ ⁴⁷ Cf. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, no. 25.

⁴⁷ M. Rusecki, art. cit., 517; cf. H. Skorowski, art. cit., 249-252.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 143.

In the long term, it is about universal *solidarity* first within Europe itself and then between Europe and the world⁴⁹. However, the question arises as to what kind of solidarity is it all about? It seems that it is about a sense of commitment, a combined effort, a joint effort to build a certain whole⁵⁰. In this context⁵¹, it is important to realise whether it is necessary to build such a solidarity we are clearly aware and what should make up this whole? What can be a cohesive and unifying force in creative diversity? Finally, how to outline the criteria between unity and diversity?⁵²

It should be remembered that universal morality must also have clearly defined *common values*. Only such values can form the core of a society. So it is all about – speaking the language of John Paul II – certain values of tomorrow. The Pope is particularly *concerned with religious freedom, respect for the personal dimension of development, protection of human rights from conception to natural death, concern for the development and strengthening of the family, appreciation of cultural differences for the mutual enrichment of all people, protection of the balance of the natural environment*⁵³. Also in the perspective of the new evangelisation, we can speak of certain fundamental values, to which Józef Życiński draws attention. These include: *dignity of the individual, deep attachment to justice and freedom, religious freedom, generosity, respect for work, spirit of initiative, love for the family, respect for life, tolerance, striving for cooperation and peace*⁵⁴.

Are there any values in global morality that meet the demands of universal values at the same time? A specific attempt to answer this question was made by the Religious Parliament of the World, which met in Chicago between 28 August and 5 September 1993. Its culmination was the announcement of a document called the *Message on the World Ethos*. The main thesis of this message was that there is no world order without a new world ethos. It highlights four so-called “unchangeable recommendations”: a culture of non-violence and respect for life; solidarity and fair social order; tolerance and living in truth; partnership

⁴⁹ Cf. “Abyśmy byli świadkami Chrystusa, który nas wyzwolił.” *Deklaracja końcowa Specjalnego Zgromadzenia Synodu Biskupów poświęconego Europie*, OsRomPol 13(1992)1, 46-53.

⁵⁰ Cf. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europe*, no. 110-112.

⁵¹ It is impossible to build this whole without a reference to the religious element, without a specific “globalisation of religiosity” – D. Bertrand, *Qui est ton Dieu? Tradition de l'Eglise et mondialisation*, “Etudes” 2002, November, no. 3975, 496f.

⁵² Cf. J. Krucina, art. cit., 81.

⁵³ Cf. *Europa jutra...*, A. Sujka, op. cit., 89-90; cf. also A. Mirski, art. cit., 129.

⁵⁴ Cf. J. Życiński, *Kryzys tożsamości chrześcijańskiej a integracja Europy*, in: *Pytania o duszę Europy*, Warsaw 2002, 59.

between women and men. A similar spirit was expressed by other international bodies, such as the International Academy of Humanism, especially through the document "Towards a new global humanism" published in 1999. If one tries to summarise what can be said about the premises of universal morality on the basis of certain trends functioning in the modern world, one can distinguish three outlines of tendencies. The first proclaims the independence of man from the world. This is supported by an example taken from an eastern proverb saying that man should be like a boat on the water, stay on the water, but not get water inside. The second tendency is to adapt to the surrounding world. It is a recognition of a certain direction from the world of objects to the world of subjects. The third tendency proclaims the need to change the world according to the criterion of man's needs according to his goodness and aspirations⁵⁵.

All this leads to a return to man. Maybe in the changing and globalising world there is a need not so much, or not only to read the changing situations and behaviours, but rather a full integral vision of man, and such a hermeneutical key, which would help this man understand by explaining and explaining understanding?

The Importance of Hermeneutics in the Era of Transformations

This part of reflection may be accompanied by a question about what hermeneutical key can be used to explain the contemporary world and shape the morality of the time of change?

It is obvious that man understands civilisation and the culture in which he lives in the way he perceives himself. In turn, what shaped for centuries the vision of oneself was the concept of man as an image of God. This concept, however, experienced difficult moments, especially in the face of the misfortunes in which the XX century abounded. The special issue of the *Communio* Collection devoted to the martyrs of the twentieth century can testify to this. At one point, *man as an image of God* was separated from *man as an image of suffering God*. It seems that these two forms of the same image cannot be treated separately⁵⁶.

Another problem requiring a solution is the relationship between universal morality and religion. There is a tendency to build a universal morality which,

⁵⁵ Cf. M. Michalik, *Globalizacja etyki – wyzwanie czy paradoks*, art. cit., 41-43.

⁵⁶ Cf. M. Sievernich, *Globalizacja i compassión*, www.mateusz.pl/goscie/da/waj/inne/siev_nauka3.htm.

regardless of its attitude towards religion, would have clearly defined principles⁵⁷. Otherwise, if the only basis for morality is religion, there is a danger that by rejecting a religion, man will also reject the morality built on that religion⁵⁸. This is expressed in the danger highlighted by Christian tradition, namely the danger of separating the ethical order from the salvific order⁵⁹.

Another element of the hermeneutical key shows man as the basis of universality and integration. But also in this case such a form of interpretation in detachment from the religious and moral heritage would be incomplete. Assuming that all civilisations are equal in dignity, one cannot, however, claim that they all have a common vision of man⁶⁰. Remaining at the level of anthropology, it should be emphasised that also the vision of the relationship between man and God is not uniform. It is characterised by at least two orders: Greek, emphasising man as an image of God, and Latin, focused especially on man's way to God – on action. Much therefore depends on the accepted concept of man⁶¹.

Another element of the hermeneutical key concerns the political and social sphere. It is noted that in most countries there is a simplified picture of political divisions between the right and the left, and societies between inclusive and exclusive societies. If we also assumed that the tension in the moral sphere is between the understanding of morality in the global key and the universal key, we could conclude that on the side of universality there is reason. What would then be an interpretative tool for global morality?⁶²

Another element that should be noted is the interplay between minimum ethics and dynamic ethics. It is probably not enough to save certain "common values," which in practice would only be a category of minimum standards. There is rather a need for a dynamic ethic based on the dignity of the person, which, on the one hand, would allow man to open up to culture and, on the other hand, allow cultures to interpenetrate⁶³.

⁵⁷ Pannenberg notes that: The peculiarity of our time is that the subject of morality and ethics is considered to be an important issue for society, while the subject of God is treated as an esoteric issue for theologians (...). Id., *Gdy wszystko jest dozwolone*, "W drodze" 361(2003)9, 37.

⁵⁸ Cf. A. Mirski, art. cit., 141.

⁵⁹ The danger of such a separation is pointed out by John Paul II in the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*.

⁶⁰ J. Joblin, *Aktualność chrześcijaństwa w procesie globalizacji*, "ComP" 21(2001)4, 74-87.

⁶¹ Cf. R. Czarnecki, art. cit., 56.

⁶² Cf. M. Kempny, *Czy globalizacja kulturowa współdecyduje o dynamice społeczeństw postkomunistycznych?*, "Kultura i społeczeństwo" (2000)1, 5-26.

⁶³ M. Totola, *Ekonomiczno-społeczna problematyka globalizacji*, "Społeczeństwo" 8(1998)1, 77-102.

Another key which, unfortunately, is too often passed on to the social ground is the economic principle of market expansion called the “Pareto principle.” It is based on a specifically impassable ratio of 20 to 80. This means that in each free trade and competition area, 20% is the driving force capable of pulling the remaining 80%. In many publications, warnings against the creation of the so-called “one-fifth” world can be seen today. As noticed at the time R. Ziemkiewicz in *Polityka* in “the coming decades, in the era of free flow of work, information and capital, one fifth of the population is fully sufficient to sustain civilisation development. The question arises – what to do with the rest?”⁶⁴ And this is probably the fundamental moral question posed by the principle that was supposed to shape economic reality.

Another key recalls well known and continuously functioning values such as the common good, solidarity as a *bonum commune* of the modern world, the principle of subsidiarity necessary for the full but also safe development of man and societies, and freedom understood not so much as a limit set by the freedom of another human being, but rather a freedom that derives the framework for its existence from the nature of man.

Consideration brings us to a well-known point, which is man. The question arises as to how globality and universality could be reconciled. As it has been shown, in detachment from being, both the values of global morality and universal morality do not constitute a sufficient way of justifying the moral life of man. They themselves need a justifying authority. Maybe we should look only in the person itself? In order to answer this question it would be necessary to very briefly, due to the thematic scope, trace the use of L. Kohlberg’s theory of building the morality of time of transformation. First, let’s look at the levels and stages that he proposes in his theory^{65 66}.

The aforementioned author emphasises the connection between cognitive development and moral development and believes that thinking is closely related to moral action. L. Kohlberg distinguishes three levels, while in each of them there are two stages. Thus, the pre-conventional level has two stages: the first one is characterised by the morality of punishment and obedience, the second one is characterised by the so-called individualistic point of view. At this level, the unit tries to avoid breaking the rules due to the expected penalty. Standards are

⁶⁴ R. Ziemkiewicz, *Powrót gladiatorów*, “Polityka” (1999)32, 58-60.

⁶⁵ Cf. J. Krucina, art. cit., 86f; cf. also J. Joblin, art. cit., 77; M. Klecel, art. cit., 120-130; K. Wojnowski, *Osoba i globalizm – wspólnotowość a totalizm*, “Wspólnotowość i postawa uniwersalistyczna” (2000-2001)2, 49-55.

⁶⁶ A. Mirski, art. cit., 129.132.

based on short-term interest. In the operation of an individual, hedonism and fear of the legislative power are manifested. Level two, conventional, begins with a stage the criterion of which is to be good in one's own eyes and those of others. At this level, particular attention shall be paid to the feelings and expectations of others. In the fourth stage and the second of this level, the individual notes that he or she is an element of society. A characteristic feature of this stage is the preference for the right over the good of the individual. Finally, at the post-conventional level, the individual is aware that, in addition to the values preferred by the group, there are also general values that need to be respected, and not because of the group. The sixth stage is oriented towards universal ethical principles. At this stage, the law is determined by the decision of conscience.

The first research was carried out by Kohlberg himself in 1984. He hypothesised that the structures of moral reasoning have a universal character. In his opinion, cultural differences reflect only the different pace of reaching the various stages. A year later (1985) Snarey's research conducted on 28 cultural circles as part of 46 attempts aimed to overthrow or confirm Kohlberg's theory. Studies have confirmed that in all cultural areas there are basically all stages of the method described. It can be concluded from this that *the morality of man, at least within the deeper structures, manifests the characteristics of universalism*⁶⁷. That being the case, the following question arises: Can the only source of cultural differences be found in cultural and moral isolationism? It is easy here not only to fall into the trap of ethical intellectualism, but also into the trap of the so-called "Hume's guillotine," called a naturalistic error, which would depend on the fact that something is moving out of his duty.

Global or universal morality? This question returns with varying degrees of intensity in the presented reflection. It seems that the first level of response is the appreciation of Christianity itself, especially in the perspective of hope⁶⁸. It is an essential and credible foundation for moral life⁶⁹. It refers to the nature of man, at the same time teaching the evangelical distance to it. In addition, it teaches that one cannot refer exclusively to one's Christian roots. The future should be built on the Person and the message of Jesus Christ⁷⁰.

What Johann Baptist Metz calls the *compassion* should also be highlighted. This is an attitude of elementary sensitivity to suffering, which Metz calls "a biblical

⁶⁷ Cf. Ibid., 135-138.

⁶⁸ M. Cozzoli, *Da una morale senza speranza a una morale di speranza*, RTM 34(2002)136, 501-506.

⁶⁹ Cf. W. Pannenberg, *Gdy wszystko...*, art. cit., 44.

⁷⁰ Cf. "Abyśmy byli świadkami Chrystusa, który nas wyzwolił"... , art. cit., 46-53; cf. also M. Fédou, *Le christianisme à l'heure de la mondialisation*, "Etudes" 2002, XI, no. 3973, 220-223.

dowry for the European spirit.” The *Compassión* is also the best expression of the “globalisation of Christian responsibility.” This, in turn, may be an important contribution to the work of humanisation and globalisation of the modern world.

Attention should also be paid to manifestations of pseudo-universalisation. It takes place between not allowing exceptions and generalising them. True universality demands communication. However, the question arises as to whether it is about transcultural or intercultural communication. In communication, it is also important to establish the right relationship between culture and politics. During the communist era, culture was a substitute for politics. Now politics is becoming a substitute for culture⁷¹.

So how to reconcile two seemingly different moral visions: global and universal? It seems that we are dealing with two types of consciousness: social consciousness and moral consciousness. What can unite them is human consciousness. It is in it that social and moral consciousness imply and complement each other. The dependence of moral consciousness on the social place is also important. A society is not a simple sum of individuals organised politically, socially or economically. Society has its time, its space, its reality. It is a peculiar form of contract – created by people, but crossing them.

What is the relationship between morality and society? Society finds its source in the process of transferring the whole heritage, but man does not come from society, because the living always comes from the living and lives among the living. Everything that is passed on to man (biological, cultural and moral heritage) presupposes the mediation of a reflexive consciousness; the common consciousness is in the strict sense only a metaphor.

However, we are subject to life and social necessity, which do not correspond to our individual needs and then we interpret them as a duty or responsibility. This is also how we read the phenomenon of globalisation. It shows in a particularly harsh way that a social place becomes at the same time a *par excellence* moral place. All the norms that we use in social life have the reciprocity and a minimum standard character functioning in a key: “I recommend others, others may recommend me.” In other words: moral consciousness is not less social in itself than social – moral consciousness. After all, under one condition, that one and the other express themselves in the human awareness, which in the best manner fulfils the requirements of the hermeneutic circle. For it is at the same time an explanatory understanding and an understanding explanation of the being to which every morality serves, man.

⁷¹ L. Ostasz, op. cit., 62f; Cz. Porębski, op. cit., 188; cf. also *Une nouvelle Europe Centrale*, M. Frybes (ed.), Paris 1998, 36f.

“Reconciliatio Et Paenitentia” (ReP) In the Bioethical Context*

It is not without reason that John Paul II is frequently named the “Pope of life.” Concern about each human life since conception until its natural end was one of the main features of his pontificate. He used such expressions as: “civilisation of life,” “culture of life,” “gospel of life,” “civilisation of love”. They all bear the idea of building a society based on respect towards every living human being. No other pope left so many documents on bioethical issues as John Paul II, among which the distinguishing one is his longest encyclical *Evangelium vitae* of 1995. “Respect, defend, love life and serve life – serve each human life! Only on this way will you find justice, development, genuine freedom, peace and happiness!” – he wrote in its introduction (EV 5). He not only wrote but also took action to put them into practice. That is why he instituted among others the Pontifical Academy for Life “Pro Vita” and the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Health Care Workers. He repeatedly met the sick himself, talked to them, hugged them and wrote letters to them every year.

The interests of John Paul II in bioethical theme is understandable in light of two facts. Firstly, his pontificate came at the period of an incredibly dynamic development of medical and biological sciences. The first in vitro child (Louise Brown) was born in the same year when John Paul II was elected Head of the Holy See, and the very first *Encyclopaedia of Bioethics* came out in the USA (*Encyclopaedia of Bioethics*, edited by W.T. Reich). In subsequent years the possibilities of interfering in human procreation were broadened by means of mastering techniques of artificial insemination (e.g. ICSI method), introducing possibilities of diagnosing human embryos before implantation, so-called *early embryo splitting*, by implantation in wombs of surrogate mothers, etc. Simultaneously, techniques of prenatal diagnostics were being developed. The first operations

* STV 52(2014)2.

in utero on a child in a foetal stage were performed. Incubators to save the lives of premature babies were used increasingly more commonly. In the field of genetics, research on a human genome were initiated, which resulted in the mapping of a complete human genome in 2000; gene therapy was also initiated which aimed at treating genetic diseases at their molecular level. These are just several of the thousands of new phenomena and techniques in biomedicine which appeared at the end of 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Every month and every day brought new discoveries, new possibilities and new challenges, but simultaneously new problems and questions of an ethical nature. This continues until today... Secondly, the interests of John Paul II in biological and medical issues were the results of his numerous contacts with doctors and the medical environment, which were initiated during his pastoral services in the Kraków church. Karol Wojtyła maintained close, even friendly relations with such figures as: Antoni Kępiński, Hanna Chrzanowska, Wanda Póltawska, Karol Meissner, Zbigniew Chłap, Zdzisław Ryn, Jerzy Umiasowski, Gabriel Turowski and many others. Subsequently, the pope invited some of them to cofound the Pontifical Academy for Life “Pro Vita”; he also considerably expanded his contacts with remarkable figures from the medical environment outside Poland (Jérôme Lejeune, Roberto Colombo and others). Bioethical issues were known to him at least for these two reasons. They were present in his numerous statements and documents, whether directly or not. The Apostolic Exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* of 1984 belongs to them also.

ReP and some Violations in the Bioethical Field

Considering it very precisely, we may state that the Exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* does not deal with specific categorical sins; it is not something based on old penitentials, providing a response to how a confessor should deal with each predictable case. It also shows that a sin does not constitute the essence of the proclamation of the Good News; it is only a kind of “deficit,” “accident at work.” God has not created a man to avoid sin (it would be a very minimalist vision!); he created him to exist and positively develop his talents, to reach his plenitude, perfect happiness and unity with the Holy Trinity. Simultaneously, sin appears as something real in the life of every human being; something which may inhibit this heading for God, happiness and plenitude, and even completely defeat it; something which may lead to the destruction of man and society. Under no circumstances can it be neglected. John Paul II enumerates several violations in this document which occurred particularly within recent decades. We find some deeds, among them, within the bioethical field in a broad sense.

Different Forms of Biasing the Right to Live

The pope states that in the contemporary world we deal with different forms of “treading on the basic rights of a human being, mostly on the right to live and for the dignified existence of man” (ReP 2). Here he does not directly specify which misdeeds are meant; however, it is not difficult to surmise that by means of this expression he depreciates any ways of destroying human life in its critical situations. Undoubtedly, the direct killing of innocent people, e.g. during armed conflicts is what is meant here first and foremost. In addition, he means the destruction of human life in a foetal stage as a result of abortion practices. He repeatedly took the floor on this issue, previously and subsequently. His pontificate came in the years when many countries had already passed a law legalising abortion (e.g. Eastern Bloc countries in 1950s, England in 1967, France and the USA in 1974) or they were ready to pass it (e.g. Belgium in 1990). In the document analysed by us, the pope adds that “it is even more outrageous if it is accompanied by, unprecedented so far, the purely rhetorical defence of such rights” – obviously human rights are meant here. During the pontificate of John Paul II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was supposed to be supplemented with a provision about the right to so-called “reproductive health” and the common right to abortion; eventually these wordings were not incorporated in the UN Declaration as a result of a veto of countries belonging to the so-called *Charter 77* (mainly of Third World countries) as well as of the Holy See during the WHO conference in New York in 2000¹. While writing about biasing the right to live, John Paul II possibly also meant the destruction of human embryos as a result of conducting various experiments on them as

¹ The right to abortion was not the only right postulated at this conference. Other rights, which were supposed to be incorporated in *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* are: in the perspective of “gender equality”: the difference in the roles of men and women in society are not natural, but cultural; in sexual orientation: each person is free in the selection of their sex or the possibility of its change; homosexuals should have the right to abortion; there are different family models: natural – monogamous and heterosexual; mono-parental or the relationship of two people of the same sex. The right to divorce and separation is guaranteed; within the field of health services for women: legalised and free access of women to contraception in each form; obligatory sexual education of youth in an equality perspective and free sexual orientation, excluded from parental domination and control; free and discreet access of youth to contraception, abortion and medical aid *ad hoc* in school (these rights would appertain since the age of 10); rights for “sex workers” — access to pornography, legalised prostitution. The full list of the postulates of *Women 2000* Conference can be found in: General Assembly of United Nations, *Women 2000: Gender Equity, Development and Peace for the Twenty-first Century. Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action* (in: www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5.htm — February 2012.

well as freezing them during the *in vitro* procedure, though these techniques were in the initial stages then; three years later (in 1987) the Church referred to these issues in the Instruction Book of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith *Donum vitae*. Similarly, we may suspect that the pope referred to the phenomenon of euthanasia in the afore-mentioned provision. Although the first law in this respect was passed only in 1990 (the Netherlands), however, the practices of killing some terminally ill patients in the name of inappropriately perceived compassion were already noted.

That is why the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published the Instruction Book on euthanasia *Lura et bona* four years before the edition of the Exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia*. Generally speaking, the pope in his laconic expression about “basing the right to live” warned against *any* forms of destroying human life, particularly life endangered by irresponsible actions of the representatives of medical and biological professions.

Violence and Terrorism

The second category of sin within the broadly defined field of bioethics, which John Paul II enumerates in the exhortation, is violence and terrorism (ReP 2). Most generally, what is denoted is ideologically motivated, planned and organised action with the use of violence, rape and cruelty or threat of their use towards representatives of a state authority or other political, social, ethnic or religious group or innocent, random civilians, conducted by entities or organised groups, which by spreading anxiety and fear intend to shake the existing conditions of social life and the currently existing legal order and to implement social-political disorder and the creation of the atmosphere of general danger and fear in social order². Terrorist activity has actually been observed over the course of the whole of modern history, however, it has multiplied since 1970s; it is enough to enumerate military dictatorships in Argentina, Chile and Greece, and since half of 1980s the governments in the Republic of El Salvador, Guatemala, Columbia and Peru, as well as the activity of such organisations as the *Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)*, *Quebec Liberation Front*, the Basque organisation *Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)*, *Irish Republican Army (IRA)*, the Greek *Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)*, the Italian *Red Brigades (BR)* or the *Red Army Faction (RAF)*. The most renowned terrorist attacks in the 1970s involved the kidnapping of a group of athletes from Israel during the Olympic Games

² K. Glombik, *Terroryzm*, in: A. Muszala (ed.), *Encyklopedia bioetyki*, Radom 2009, 615f.

in Munich by the Palestinian *Black September Organisation*, which ended in the unsuccessful attempt to rescue hostages and an attack on the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The subsequent years were supposed to bring new waves and ways of terrorist attacks, such as narcoterrorism or cyberterrorism. John Paul II was repeatedly appealing – particularly in his proclamations for The World Day of Peace – to cease this type of action, whose result is the death of innocent people. Meanwhile, as if in irony of fate, the last years of his pontificate coincided with the bloodiest acts of terror and violence (attacks on the *World Trade Centre* and *Pentagon* on 11th September 2001, on the theatre in Moscow on 13th September 2003, the attack on the Moscow subway on 6th February 2004 and on a school in Beslan in South Ossetia on 1st September 2004 and an attack on a crowded passenger train in Madrid on 11th March 2004). Three years after the Exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* the pope returned to this issue in his encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis*: “Even when some ideology or pursuit to create a better world are given as motivation for this inhuman practice, acts of terrorism will never be justified. The words I used several years ago seem to have preserved their significance regarding terror and the enormity of suffering: “Christianity forbids (...) resorting to hatred, murdering homeless people, to methods of terrorism” (SRS 24).

Using Torture and Unjust and Illegitimate Forms of Repression

The third misdeed specified by John Paul II, affecting human life and health is the use of tortures as well as unjust and illegitimate forms of repression (ReP 2). What is meant here is “deliberate, systematic and ruthless infliction of corporal and mental sufferings by one person or more people acting individually or by order of some authority, aiming at the extortion from a tortured person the transfer of information, testimony, revealing a secret, a specific action or done due to different reasons (used, for example as a form of punishment or revenge)”³. Unfortunately, we need to emphasise that in the history of Western Christianity, particularly in the period of Middle Ages, there were cases when church authorities allowed the use of torture (e.g. medieval inquisitorial trials approved by the pope Innocent IV in the 13th century), however, in subsequent times such affirmation of these forms of enforcing testimony, which were disparaging for human dignity, were waived; in recent decades the Catholic Church became a proponent of a decisive withdrawal from them; this standpoint was also included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): “Nobody can be

³ K. Glombik, *Tortury*, in: A. Muszala, (ed.), *Encyklopedia bioetyki*, ibid., 624.

subject to tortures or cruel, inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment” (Art. 5). The issue of the use of tortures did not become extinct, however, but it was revived in recent years with renewed vigour as a result of warfare (in former Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, Iraq or Afghanistan), while their arsenal was broadened to moral and mental torture. In 1981, in the Proclamation for the World Day of Peace, John Paul II claimed that torture, being the enforcement of testimony, constitutes a serious violation of human freedom and it is, in consequence, an infringement of human dignity (The World Day of Peace 1981, 2). Subsequently, he condemned torture in a post-synodal Exhortation *Christdeles laici* of 1988 as disparaging for human dignity (ChL 38)⁴. In the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* he classified tortures as internally evil deeds, regardless of the intentions of the performer and the circumstances of such action, always being a huge misdeed (VS 80). The negative evaluation of torture was also placed in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (no. 2297 and 2298)⁵.

War and Armaments

John Paul II regards fighting any kind of war as particularly inhuman (ReP 25) and the “accumulation of conventional or atomic weapons, arms race, at a considerable expense of funds, which would serve for relieving non-culpable poverty of people of a lower social and economic level” (ReP 2). This statement may reflect the echo of the personal experiences of the pope who faced the drama of war in his younger years. As a student he was forced to start working as a factory worker in Solvay factory in Kraków, to a conspiratorial academic and tutorial formation. During that time – on 29th February 1944 – he came close to death, having a serious accident while coming back after two working days, he was hit by a truck. A young woman who jumped out of a train to stop the traffic saved the unconscious Karol Wojtyła from being hit by other cars.

⁴ He repeated this stance in the encyclical *Evangelium vitae* (EV 3).

⁵ “Using tortures, based on physical or moral violence to obtain testimony, punish the guilty, terrorize the opponents, satisfy hatred, is inconsistent with respect of a person and human dignity.” KKK 2297. “In the past times these cruel practices were commonly used by legal governments to preserve law and order, often without objection on the part of shepherds of the Church who in their judiciary accepted the regulations of Roman law related to tortures. Despite these unfortunate facts, the Church always preached about the obligation of leniency and mercy; prohibited priests to shed blood. In recent times it became certain that these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order nor consistent with the justifiable rights of human beings. On the contrary – these practices lead to even greater humiliations. They should be abolished. We need to pray for their victims and for their executioners.” KKK 2298.

A German officer ordered for him to be taken to hospital at Kopernik Street where the patient was treated for concussion and a serious shoulder injury. The experience of war left a mark on the future pope which is observable at least in his numerous appeals for peace in the world, in his twofold invitation of representatives of all religions for the World Day of Prayer for Peace in Assisi (1986 and 2002), and his personal involvement in a truce between Great Britain and Argentina during the Falklands War when he visited both countries calling for reconciliation and negotiations between the government in 1982. Eleven years later, after the publication of the exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* he wrote in the encyclical *Evangelium vitae*: "The signs of hopes should also comprise the fact that in many sections of public opinion there is an increasing new sensitivity against war as a method of solving conflicts between and among nations and we are more actively searching for efficient ways of preventing (despite the use of violence) its armed aggressors" (EV 27).

As can be seen from the above, John Paul II was concentrating, in the exhortation discussed by us, mainly on misdeeds against life having a social nature, even human nature. This theme was developed by him three years later in the encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis*, invoking the exhortation on reconciliation and penance: "Since the current situation should be assigned to multiple difficulties, talking about "structures of sin" is justified which as I stated in the Apostolic Exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia*, are rooted in personal sin and hence they are related to the specific deeds of people who implement them, consolidate and hinder their removal" (SRS 36). While in the encyclical *Evangelium vitae* he again referred to the issue of human life: "Here we face a more vast reality which may be regarded as the genuine structure of sin: its characteristic feature is the expansion of an anti-solidaristic (accepting a form of authentic) culture of death" (EV 12) in many cases. We may then state that in *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* John Paul II outlined the first idea of a category of a "structure of sin," which subsequently became one of the most significant and the most characteristic features of the teaching of his pontificate. Mention of "structures of sin" has not gone out of date; it is also mentioned by Pope Francis in the apostolic exhortation *Evangelii gaudium* (cf. EG 59).

Sacrament of Penance as a Form of Spiritual Therapy

While considering the exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* in bioethical terms we should pay attention to another aspect. The pope focuses our attention on the sacrament of penance not only in a quasi-judiciary way (as "a tribunal

of mercy,” which assumes some form of the judgment on the committed deed, forgiveness and paying for these sins – cf. ReP 31, II), but also a therapeutic perspective. The passage below is particularly significant:

“While analysing the functioning of this Sacrament, the awareness of the Church notices in it, however, also a *therapeutic* part, or *remedial* part, besides the judiciary characteristics presented in the meaning above. It is related to the fact that the Gospel often presents Christ as a doctor, and His salvation work is often called ‘*medicina salutis*’ since the times of Christian antiquity. ‘I want to treat, but not to judge,’ says Saint Augustine of Hippo, referring to the practice of penitential ministry, and it is thanks to the medicine of confession that the experience of sin does not transform into despair. The ceremonies of penance refer to this remedial aspect of the Sacrament, to which contemporary man is perhaps more sensitive, seeing in sin what a mistake is, indeed, but more still weakness and human powerlessness.” (ReP 31, III)

I regard this extract as incredibly significant. It depicts the entire salvific work of Christ in light of not only redeeming guilt and punishment for committing a sin (“negative” aspect of salvific work of Christ), but as a remedial process – recovering again to a primary state, full health of soul, and by means of that to a rebirth of the whole man (“positive” aspect of salvific work of Christ). This dimension, developed in antiquity, became, unfortunately, marginalised particularly in the circles of Western Christianity. For many centuries there was a common attitude in theology on the redemptory character of the mission of Jesus Christ: the Son of God “paid” his Father a price for original sin and the faults of all people. Within such an understanding, the image of a strictly just God is consciously created by man, of God demanding compensation almost in the Old Testament spirit of revenge: “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”; only Son, being equal to God could pay a relevant price by his ordeal and death and “appease” Him somehow in this way. In the common awareness of many worshippers such an image of the salvation work undertaken (and simultaneously an image of the grim God the Father) is still present, which has little in common with the truth of the Gospel – Good News. Jesus is most of all a *doctor* of souls, the first *Good Samaritan*, who cares about wounded humanity, wraps it in his arms and brings it to the home of the Father⁶. His work – as John Paul II reminds us – “*medicina salutis*” has a therapeutic character. The recollection of this aspect in the context of the sacrament of penance is highly significant! A confessional is not (only) a tribunal it is a genuine and always

⁶ Cf. Origen, *Homilie o Ewangelii św. Łukasza*, 34, 3.

effective infirmary. John Paul II refers here to the initial, ancient perception of the salvific work of Christ portrayed by the fathers of the Church. Gregory of Nyssa claimed that Christ accepted a human body to cure it and bring it to an appropriate state which is its release from the effects of a sinful fall and a divinization and participation in real life⁷. He could do it because – as Saint Augustine of Hippo emphasised – was an *intermediary*, God-man⁸. Macarius the Egyptian spoke more explicitly about the therapeutic dimension of the mission of Christ: "He himself gave us the healing medicines and dressed the wounded, turning to be one of us"⁹. Jesus first prepared a patient for appropriate therapy, applying to him a preliminary treatment for a longer time by means of His word and the style of his own life, and subsequently he performed the most significant "procedure" on the tree of the cross¹⁰; its effect was the "new creation," incomparable to the primary creation because it did not only cure the entire human species but divinized it and enabled it to participate in the life of God. In any case, do we have to refer to the teaching of the fathers of the Church? Jesus himself said about himself: "The healthy do not need a doctor, but these, who do not feel well" (Luke, 5:31). Elsewhere he defined his mission, referring to Is, 61, 1n: "Holy Spirit is resting upon Me, because he appointed Me and sent Me, so that I could preach good news for the poor, freedom for the prisoners, sight for the blind, and to send the oppressed as free" (Luke 4:18). Curing the ill was one of the manifestations of preaching the Gospel, while the power of curing was within a wider scope of the entire salvific work of Christ. His miracles showed that He is God (*Kyrios*) who descended on earth with full power; the Kingdom of God came around people with His arrival.

This old-new look on the salvific work of Christ in a clinical-therapeutic light implies relevant attitudes of the minister of the sacrament of penance; John Paul II tells us about them, and we will specify them now.

Adequate Catechesis

Taking preventive decisions in the first place belongs to the essence of medicine. Analogically, a confessor before he sits in a confessional should first attempt an adequate catechesis of his penitents in relation to appropriate moral life in accordance with the requirements of the Gospel and the appropriate application

⁷ Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio catechetica magna*, XV,2-3.

⁸ Cf. Saint Augustine of Hippo, *Homilia* 20 B, *Dolbeau* 26.

⁹ Macarius the Egyptian, *Homilia* 26, 25.

¹⁰ Cf. Athanasius, *Przeciw poganom*, 1.

of a salvific source of forgiveness which is undertaken in the sacrament of penance. The entire point 26 of the exhortation was devoted to this issue: “The first means, which should be applied, is catechesis then,” writes the pope. Catechesis is supposed to concern reconciliation first of all:

“Shepherds of the Church are expected to preach *catechesis about reconciliation*. It cannot be based on the biblical teaching, particularly the Old Testament one, referring to the necessity of rebuilding an alliance with God in Christ the Redeemer and Originator of Reconciliation.” (ReP 26)

Catechesis about reconciliation should demonstrate, which conditions should “the patient with ill soul” comply with to obtain “the medicine of the sacrament” – it is, most of all, reconciliation with brothers, also with enemies. John Paul II encourages to make use of “psychology, sociology and other human sciences, which may serve for the explanation of the situations, for the proper presentation of problems, the conviction of listeners or readers to make specific decisions” (ReP 26).

Secondly, it should be a catechesis about reconciliation.

“Shepherds of the Church are expected to preach *catechesis about reconciliation*. The richness of the biblical proclamation should be a source for it here as well. Most of all, it emphasises the value of *conversion* in penance, the term of which is a translation of a Greek word *metanoia*, literally meaning authority for *transition* of spirit, which should be *directed* to God. [...] Reconciliation is not possible without the acceptance of attitudes essential for conversion, and catechesis should explain to them by means of notions and terms adjusted to the age and different cultural, moral and social conditions.” (ReP 26)

Penance also denotes remorse, which – at the medical level – is the equivalent of accepting a diagnosis by a patient. Just as the assimilation of information about a disease by a patient is (and following the activities of a doctor) the condition for an effective therapy, at the spiritual level the approval of one’s own guilt is the condition for a spiritual cure.

The approval of one’s own sin, what is more – after a more profound analysis of one’s own personality – *acknowledging oneself as a sinner*, and able to commit a sin and prone to sin, is a necessary principle of a return to God. David’s experience is an example, who “having done what was wrong before God’s eyes,” exhorted by prophet Nathan, calls: “I acknowledge my illegitimacy, and my sin is always ahead of me. I sinned only against You and I did what was wrong before You.” Jesus, in any case, puts these significant words in the mouth and heart of a prodigal son: “Father, I sinned against God and against You.” (ReP 13)

Thirdly, catechesis should concern specific deeds which a penitent should undertake to obtain divine forgiveness; in other words – in what way he/she

should do penance. "To do penance means, most of all, to restore balance and harmony shattered by a sin, to change the direction of behaviour also at the expense of a victim" (ReP 26). The pope emphasises that the genuine sense of penance is because it results from love, and not only from fear, that it is based on a tremendous effort of crucifying "an old man," so that "a new one" could be borne by means of Christ. This "new birth" may be compared to the effect of appropriate treatment, which repeatedly "gives a man the second life"; sometimes it does not do without being subject to a painful treatment.

Eventually, genuine catechesis should refer to the demonstration of the role of conscience and its appropriate formation. Conscience – in accordance with the words of John Paul II – constitutes "a kind of a moral sense, which guides us to recognise what is good and what is evil; as if it was an internal eye, a spiritual ability to see, which guides our steps on the way of good; [...] a sacred place, where God reveals a true good to us" (ReP 26). A good familiarity with the rights of a healthy and hygienic lifestyle is its equivalent at the clinical level, which allows to avoid many diseases.

Competence of the Minister of the Sacrament of Penance

After these "preventive" remarks, John Paul II proceeds to the demonstrations of the qualities of a confessor which in many points are very similar to the qualities of a good doctor. At first, he should be competent. This means that he should have "serious and accurate preparation, not fragmentary, but integral and harmonious one in many different fields of theology, pedagogy and psychology, methodology of dialogue, and mostly in a lively and communicative awareness of the Word of God." (ReP 29) This remark is incredibly significant, as it depicts a moral obligation to have the relevant knowledge of a confessor in many different branches of human life and its continuous development.

"These amenities in human attributes, in Christian virtues and pastoral skills must not be improvised or achieved effortlessly. Every priest should prepare to become a minister of sacramental penance from their tutorial years by studying dogmatic, moral, ascetic and pastoral theology (which is always one theology) as well as by studying sciences about man, methodology of dialogue, and particularly a priestly conversation. [...] He must always care about their own perfection and regeneration by permanent schooling. What treasures of mercy, true life and spiritual beaming would flow on the Church, if each priest turned out to be diligent, if each of them made every endeavour so that never as a result of inattention or because of different reasons he could be absent on his meeting with believers in a confessional, and particularly if none went there

unprepared or deprived of essential human virtues and spiritual and pastoral dispositions!” (ReP 29)

The practice to acquire a specialisation is known in the world of medicine, a participation in continual training which are mandatory if a doctor wants to think not only about his promotion but even to maintain his right to exercise the profession. There is a provision in Medical Code of Ethics, which, among others, is as follows: “Each doctor is obliged to permanently improve and perfect their knowledge and professional skills, as well as transfer them to their co-workers (Medical Code of Ethics, art. 56), while in a solemn oath at the end of the studies a young practitioner of medical sciences swears “to permanently improve their medical knowledge and inform the medical world about anything they will be able to discover and perfect.” Lack of knowledge of many confessors related to the basic fields of life, particularly sexual and marital, and bioethical issues is disconcerting in this light. Priests repeatedly hearing the confessions of the faithful do not feel the need to improve their knowledge in cases related to artificial insemination, contraceptives, prenatal diagnostics, care over terminally ill persons, transplantations and many others, which are everyday occurrences for secular people. A penitent should be convinced that he is listened to by a competent priest, who knows a problem, knows how to help and what solutions to take to deal with difficult aporia (e.g. what should be done with “excessive” embryos resulting from *in vitro* fertilisation; if and in what conditions a man who was subject to sterilisation should be granted an absolution; how to settle a married life with reference to sex; if and when a patient could be disconnected from a respirator; how to recognize a victim of paedophilia, etc.). Different forms of “schools for confessors” appear as incredibly important in this respect, which were found a short time ago; it would be advisable to wish all ministers of the sacrament of penance to make use of them, and so that subsequently they could care about continual self-education to improve their knowledge, so essential to solving difficult problems in a confessional and to help people who were in critical life situations.

Patience, Kindness and Indulgence of the Minister of the Sacrament of Penance

An appropriate approach to a penitent in the spirit of humility and kindness should be the next virtue of a confessor, remembering that he acts not on his behalf but *in persona Christi*.

“Christ, who through a confessor is personified and absolves his sins, is the one who turns out to be a *brother* of man, gracious, faithful and compassionate high priest, a shepherd ready to look for a lost sheep, a doctor who treats and

consoles, the only teacher who is truthful and teaches God's way, "a judge of the dead and the living" who judges truly, and not in accordance with pretence. [...] To effectively fulfil this service, a confessor should necessarily possess *human virtues*: prudence, discretion, the skill of understanding, assertiveness tempered with mildness and goodness." (ReP, 29)

The appropriate attitude to a penitent is opposed to any forms of authoritative, authoritarian treatment, sometimes expressed with a raised voice, and sometimes even with a basic lack of culture. A confessor should still remember that he acts as a doctor whose obligation is to patiently listen to and understand the drama of his patient, check his health condition, prescribe relevant medicine and therapy. Christ himself is a role model here, who "did not break the bruised reed," but always upraised and put a sinner on his feet, which is particularly noticeable in the history of curing the paralytic and in saving the sinful woman from being stoned to death.

That which constitutes a peculiar novum of *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* is the postulate on the use of dialogue also in relation to the confessor-penitent relation. John Paul II devoted no. 25 of his exhortation to this problem. We read in it, among others,

"The Church [...] uses a method of a dialogue to better lead people – who by baptism and confession of faith consider themselves members of the Christian community and those who are out of it – to conversion and penance on the way of a profound renewal of conscience and life in the light of the mystery of redemption and salvation, undertaken by Christ and entrusted with service of the Church. Authentic dialogue directed mostly at the rebirth of each person by an internal conversion and by penance, always, however, with the maintenance of a profound respect for conscience, with patience and gradually, is indispensable in conditions in which contemporary people live." (ReP 25)

We observe a great sensitivity of the pope in this provision; he somehow wants to recommend it to all priests. Since *metanoia* at the spiritual level is an equivalent of therapy at the corporeal level, it should take place with the use of similar methods and ways of communication, as it happens in a hospital. There a doctor is required to continually listen to a patient's report, make a diagnosis, communicate it in a tactful and comprehensible way, to cooperate with a patient during the entire treatment procedure. A confessional is "a clinic of the spirit" and confessors would benefit a great deal if they remembered about this¹¹.

¹¹ Cf. Francis, *Evangelii gaudium*, 44: "That is why, not diminishing the value of evangelical ideal, we need to accompany with mercy and patience the potential stage of the people forming

“In order to lead others on the way of Christian perfection, a minister of penance must go through it *as the first person* and, more through deeds than long education, give evidence of real experience of serviced prayer, practice of evangelical, theological and moral virtues, faithful obedience of God’s will, love for the Church and subordination of his Magisterium.” (ReP 29)

John Paul II himself gives here the most beautiful example. Being a pope, he did not lose a sense that he is simultaneously a man, weak and prone to fall, as Peter during the night when he disowned his Master. Therefore he led a very profound spiritual life; he started each day with an hourly prayer in silence; conducted the Eucharist; and regularly confessed (every two weeks). The more a minister of the sacrament proceeds in a similar way, the easier it will be for him to maintain all the afore-mentioned postulates which John Paul II put so fervently in our hearts, the pope of life and smiling. After all, each doctor is also – sooner or later – a patient. At the one hand he may perform an operation, on the other, he is operated on himself...

themselves day by day. I remind priests that a confessional should be a torture room, but a place of God’s mercy, encouraging us to do potential good.”

Sin, Penance And Confession From A Protestant Perspective*

People always realised their imperfect, sinful condition in the face of fragility and evil. Christianity, cherished with Divine revelation and believing in a permanent presence of Holy Spirit, formulated a mature and profound doctrine about human sin, and simultaneously created a penitential practice, in which a sinful man experiences Divine mercy, not to lose hope for salvation. The 16th century Reformation, as a result of which Christianity faced many divisions, simultaneously led to the creation of a vision of moral life, characteristic for itself, where there is space to understand sin, penance and grace of salvation. Viewing these issues from a protestant perspective, even if critically, may be educational and allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the mystery of human existence and the last calling with which God addresses man. This text is an attempt of reading the more important aspects of Christian teaching from a Protestant perspective. What is assumed here are the assumptions and Lutheran practice, reformed and Anglican. The last will be analysed particularly comprehensively as it seems to exceptionally focus different assumptions and currents of the Reformation in itself, giving peculiar voice to them and preserving many aspects of Catholic teaching.

About the Issues of Protestant Sacramentology

The issue of sin, penance and reconciliation with God is related – in light of Christian tradition – to the sacraments and sacramental life. In the history of Christianity serious weakness, restriction, and sometimes even the marginalisation of sacramental practices is related to the Reformation as well as

* STV 52(2014)2.

a radical emphasis of the singleness and exclusiveness of the authority of the Bible. Its testament may be found particularly in the confessions of faith, liturgical books and prayer books, which came into being in different Protestant fractions, from very Catholic in character, such as the Anglican High Church to extremely reformed, such as Calvinist or Presbyterian communities. Fierce criticism was included in the early writings of Martin Luther. They comprise: *Babylonian Captivity* of 1520, as well as the slightly earlier *The Tract on New Testament, or Holy Mass* of the same year. *Babylonian Captivity* is considered the most significant text of the creator of Reformation which influenced the shape of the Protestant vision and sacramental practice.

Luther, together with his distinct priority of the Word of God, assumed that the sacraments are evident Christly promises, which He himself connected with visible signs. This criterion led him to a conviction that sacraments are in fact only two – baptism and the Eucharist (Communion, the Lord's Supper). Because only these two signs of grace are based on clear-cut Jesus promises to absolve sins. A promise according to Luther is a key term and seems to converge, and even identical, with the Word of God. In this context we cannot regard penance as a similar sacrament, it is rather “a return to baptism” and appeals to its effectiveness. Luther emphasises in many cases that sacraments are given to absolve and thus to be saved. The Gospels confirm this clearly with relation to both sacraments¹. Penance, as the one rooted in baptism and deriving its fruitfulness from its presence is also effective in making a promise to free us from sins.

The sacraments were effective signs of the salvific promise of Christ in Luther's thinking, but Ulrich Zwingli made some modifications, and actually weakened their sense and meaning. He perceived them as indications or customs, which demonstrate if a man wants to be “Christ's soldier” and they somehow announce it to others. Although Zwingli admits that they support faith and build it, there is not such a distinct – as with Luther – indication of their salvific character, they are rather indications of communication and a transfer of information about faith and the approach of the one who accepts it. They have a rather customary character but not a clearly salvific one².

¹ Sacraments at heart are the offer of forgiveness of sin whether given in baptism or constantly repeated in the Eucharist. Thus, the sacraments are not ‘merely [...] marks of profession among men’. God acts in them.” J.F. White, *The Sacraments in Protestant Practice and Faith*, Nashville 1999, 19.

² Cf. U. Zwingli, *Commentary on True and False Religion*, Durham 1981, 181-184; J.F. White, *op. cit.*, 19f.

John Calvin, a Swiss reformer from Geneva, analysed sacraments from another perspective, although he did preserve Luther's and Melancthon's intuitions and teaching. He acknowledged their effectiveness and both the internal and external dimension. He also connoted the wording of St. Augustine of Hippo, that they are "a visible sign of invisible grace," but he justified them differently at the same time. He emphasised their significance and effectiveness because of the weakness and sinfulness of human nature. In the sacraments Christ confirms his promise of good will in man, to strengthen a man in his weak faith. In this way Lord "vouchsafes to lead us to him by means of these earthly signs [...], he gives us spiritual things in the form of visible signs."³ Calvin clearly emphasises also that the Holy Spirit opens the human heart to sacraments. A man would be blind and deaf without Him. These are effective and simultaneously necessary signs for man. Just such a pessimistic perception of human nature after original sin⁴ forced him to a radical emphasis of indispensable sacraments, in which Christ gives himself to man. It makes the Holy Spirit, who regenerates man, to be excused from signs before God for Christ's merits. Only then an excused and reborn man can become able for good deeds. A Christian should not concentrate on the very signs then, the sacraments, but on God who uses them for human salvation.

The Anglican *The Book of Common Prayer* also clearly indicates the origin of sacraments from Christ himself, particularly expressed in Article of the Faith 25 where one may find the thoughts of Luther, Calvin and Zwingli. We need to remember that particular theses and wordings were modified in this book several times and were more or less emphasised. Simultaneously we need to stress that Reformational sacramentology preserved a clear continuity with scholastic teaching, however it occurred differently with particular reformers.

³ "Our merciful Lord, according to his infinite kindness so tempers himself to our capacity that, since we are creatures who always creep on the ground, cleave to the flesh, and, do not think about or even conceive of anything spiritual, he condescends to lead us to himself even by these earthly elements and to set before us in the flesh a mirror of spiritual blessings [...]. Now, because we have souls engrafted in bodies, he imparts spiritual things under visible ones." J. Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Philadelphia 1960, 1277.

⁴ "[...] there remains always in us much imperfection and infinity, so that we always remain poor and wretched sinners in the presence of God [...]. Thus, we always have need of the mercy of God to obtain the remission of our faults and offences." [Geneva] *Confession of Faith* (1536), in: A.C. Cochrane (ed.), *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, Louisville 2003, 122. "And being blinded in mind, and depraved in heart, he has lost all integrity, and there is no good in him." *The French Confession of Faith* (1559), in: *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, op. cit., 147.

It concerned, as is known, the Eucharist and the number of sacraments. As sacraments are “the efficient signs of grace [...], they strengthen and confirm our faith in Him.” What is always important is the fact that they provide an efficient redemptive presence of the Saviour for the one who accepts it with faith. If there is lack of faith then man accepts it for his condemnation⁵. The famous Anglican theologian Father O’Donovan simultaneously points out that in this doctrine of reformers, and consequently with Anglicans as well, medieval individualism was not discontinued and the vision of the Church lacked, which would demonstrate a more community-based Christianity. We also notice an uncomfortable uncertainty in the Anglican *Articles of the Faith* which is based on an objective character of sacramental mercy and that which is subjective in the faith of the person accepting it⁶.

Calvinist heritage in Sacramentology consolidated and developed in several other trends of Protestantism. The Presbyterian Church (Kirk) of Scotland belongs to a denomination of people particularly faithful to reformed theology. Sacraments are efficient indications of Christly grace and promise, and simultaneously they point to those who were selected to take part in Christ. Baptism effectively inculcates in Christ, and the Lord’s Supper is the authentic food for the human soul⁷. Sacramentological concepts with English Puritans or Quakers formed similar Calvinist connections.

Such an outlined interpretation of the sacraments in different trends of Protestantism was significant for an understanding of penance, which lost its sacrament value for Protestants. This does not mean in any way a negligence of the serious situation of a man as a sinful being. Reformation, with its radical emphasis on the exclusiveness and effectiveness of God’s grace as the only way to salvation, profoundly emphasised the severity of sin and its disastrous

⁵ “[...] but they that receive them unworthily purchase to themselves damnation, as Saint Paul saith.” Article XXV, in: *The Book of Common Prayer* (1662), Cambridge, 622.

⁶ Cf. O. O’Donovan, *On the Thirty-Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity*, Carlisle 1993, 128f.

⁷ “These sacraments [...] were instituted by God not only to make a visible distinction between His people and those who were without the Covenant but also to exercise the faith of His children and, by participation of these sacraments, to seal in their hearts the assurance of His promise, and of that most blessed conjunction, union and society which the chosen have with their Head, Christ Jesus. [...] we assuredly believe that by Baptism we are engrafted into Christ Jesus, to be made partakers of his righteousness by which our sins are covered and remitted, and that in the Supper rightly used Christ Jesus is so joined with us that He becomes the very nourishment and food of our souls.” *The Scottish Confession of Faith* (1560), in: *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, op. cit., 179.

consequences for man: “original sin is not least an insubstantial, but such a profound corruption of human nature, that it does not leave anything healthy nor uncorrupted on the body and soul of a man, or rather in their internal and external strengths”⁸. In such a situation Christian life is a continuous way of repentance and penance, so that God could regenerate and free the sinner from spiritual captivity. Initially Luther’s thinking (in *Babylonian Captivity*) was that the absolution of sins (confession) deserves to be labelled a sacrament because it is based on a clear Christly promise. Subsequently, however, he expressed the belief that it is a rather desired and fruitful practice in Christian life, although it bears no rank of a sacrament. The very word of God works in absolution of sins and God’s promise is realised in such a way.

Referring repeatedly and critically to Catholic teaching on penance and confession, Luther admonishes, at the same time, that it cannot be regarded as encouragement to neglect confession or even abandon it. Confession is necessary for the sinful man, although – as in Roman practice – is not necessary for a detailed enumeration of sins. According to Luther we may talk about a twofold way to confession – mutual confession of sins with others to God and individual confession of sins towards a fellow man for their absolution. Each fellow man (not only a priest) may absolve sins. In both cases of confessing sins, teaching included in the Lord’s Prayer is fulfilled; Luther calls these forms of confession public, daily and necessary confession. A confession called “confidential” is also possible and useful, when a sinner seeks consolation and consolidation in worries and anxiety of the soul. If a public confession is a Christian obligation, a confidential confession towards only one brother is optional, and thus you may use it if necessary. We distinguish the human part in each confession; it is a confession of sins and the Divine when another man absolves sins by means of words of God. Confession for a Christian is then “a thing which is splendid, valuable and full of consolation.” Luther does not indicate a list of sins, which should be confessed. In a formula of absolution from *Luther’s Small Catechism* a confessor absolves from “all sins,” which is supposed to assure a sinner about the certainty of Divine forgiveness⁹.

In Anabaptist tradition the original Reformational thought deviated when the prohibition to participate in a community life was introduced there

⁸ *Formuła zgody (1577), cz. I (0 grzechu pierworodnym)*, vol. 3, 2.

⁹ Luther’s longer dilatation on the sense, ways and the fruits of confession, cf. a chapter titled: *A Brief Admonition to Confession in Luther’s Large Catechism* [electronic pdf version, 52-54]. In *Luther’s Small Catechism* he restricts himself to a short instruction about confession before a priest as a confessor. Cf. *Luther’s Small Catechism* [electronic pdf version, 8-10].

after a threefold admonition of a sinner, which was not predicted by Luther. The degree of this prohibition and rigour with reference to a sinner could be and is different in different communities (such as Mennonites, Amishes, Hutterites, etc.), but it remains in force¹⁰. The connection of penance and some form of confession with the sacrament of the Eucharist was quite commonly consolidated in a trend of reformed Protestantism which may be perceived as a heritage of medieval practice, particularly of the Fourth Council of the Lateran. Because the penitential aspect in the Eucharist was emphasised to a great degree in the late Middle Ages, it became an integral part of the canon of Eucharistic prayer. It was particularly observable, for instance, with a reformer from Strasbourg, M. Butser, whose Eucharistic rites contained as many as three confessions. Calvin expressly calls for the examination of conscience and penance at the beginning of the Eucharist¹¹. Similarly, examination of conscience and contrition were required in Eucharistic Methodist rites or in Dutch rites. The sacrament of the Eucharist thereby possessed an evident penitential character. In the Anglican ceremony of the Holy Communion after offertory a priest recites the Ten Commandments, and the congregation while kneeling down after each commandment ask God for mercy for their sins and the grace of preserving His right¹².

Luther on Repentance, Suffering and Confession

Medieval theology, in its aspiration for clarity and the precision of a lecture, developed a distinction between guilt (*culpa*) and punishment (*poena*) as results of sin. The redemptive work of Christ freed the sinful man from guilt (which becomes man's participation through baptism), but it did not completely remove punishment for sins, whose element is the inclination to sin and suffering in this or in the future life. Sins committed after baptism may be extinguished

¹⁰ Menno Simons, Dutch reformer and one of creators of Anabaptism in Mennonite version, was writing about the necessity of a radical repentance and rejection of sin: "[...] the repentance we teach, is to die unto sin, and all ungodly works, and live no longer according to the lusts of the flesh [...]. Such a repentance we teach, and no other, namely, that no one can glory in the grace of God, the forgiveness of sins, the merits of Christ, and count himself pious, unless he has truly repented." *A Foundation and Plamo Instruction of the Saving Doctrine of Our Lord Jesus Christ, w: The Complete Works of Menno Simons*, Elkhart 1871, 18.

¹¹ A very useful review of various liturgical rites, including the Eucharistic ones, cf. B. Thompson (ed.), *Liturgies of the Western Church*, Cleveland 1961.

¹² Cf. *The Book of Common Prayer*, op. cit., 237-239.

in the sacrament of repentance for which a Christian is called to avoid eternal condemnation. Absolution by a priest is then a way to regain true life in God, liberation from the effects of sin which is accompanied by a complete atonement of imposed repentance on the part of a penitent. In this context, late Middle Ages considered the meaning of suffering, also physical suffering, which accepted in humility and in a penitential spirit, a salvific one because it contracted or even removed purgatorial suffering as a result of sins. Additionally, it became similar to the suffering Christ in imitation of different saints.

Such understanding of repentance and its relation to suffering became a subject of Martin Luther's Reformation teaching. He rejected a medieval theology of repentance and his beliefs in this matter were gradually becoming increasingly radical¹³. Even though Luther initially accepted a traditional distinction of guilt and punishment, he gradually realised the necessity of a different understanding of human sin and its results, so the possibility of being free of them also. The reasons were attributable to the assumption of his Reformational soteriology. We need to also remember that with Luther (and in the subsequent Lutheran tradition) a sin did not mean specific sinful deeds, but rather *hubris*, the pride of a man, who wants "to be like God." In this sense, a man in sin, as a result of false relations to God, in his selfish way addresses himself. A being gets tempted to be like the Creator¹⁴. From a Protestant perspective, a Catholic understanding of sin situates it mainly in a (negative) relation to virtue, while in light of the assumptions of reformers we need to situate it rather in a (negative) relation to faith. Therefore, the implementation of the classification of sins is avoided, and the emphasis is on a sin as such, which causes a break in the basic relation of faith with God, loss of trust on the part of man¹⁵.

Particularly in the context of practice and abuses related to indulgences, Luther made a distinction into punishment for sin, which derived from God and from people. If a pope was powerful enough to pardon punishment for a sin, then just this one was imposed by the pope himself or by the Church based on a papal

¹³ Cf. R.K. Rittgers, *The Reformation of the Keys: Confession, Conscience and Authority in Sixteenth-Century Germany*, Cambridge (USA) 2004, 52-58.

¹⁴ "And this agrees with Scripture which describes man as turned in upon himself (*incurvatus in se*), so that not only in bodily but also in spiritual goods he turns to himself and seeks himself in all things. Sin consists in a failure to establish the right relationship to God. Which results in a wrong relationship to oneself. It is a form of egoism, a being cut off by oneself apart from God (whereas God should be the very foundation of oneself)". D. Hanipson, *Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought*, Cambridge 2001, 37.

¹⁵ Cf. J.F. Childress, *Sin(s)*, in: J.F. Childress, J. Macquarrie (ed.), *A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, London 1986, 585.

decision (for instance in a sacramental confession). The pope, however, could not pardon God's punishment, or for souls suffering in Purgatory either. The souls of the dead are only in God's hands. This meant fierce criticism of indulgences, which according to Luther caused a false sense of peace of souls among those who received them; it weakened their faith in God's grace and led to a neglect of the Christly call for repentance and conversion. Indulgences opposed to the penitential character of the Christian faith, which is evidently demonstrated by the revealed God's word on the pages of the Bible. According to Luther the result was also the fact that Christians appeased at heart did not take the cross in accordance with the Gospel's words, and it was a distinct rejection of Christly teaching. God's punishment for sins, and for the cross given from God, suffering and each life effort should be accepted and patiently endured in humility, but not to see a chance to be freed from it¹⁶.

Luther's emphasis was moved from punishment for sins to guilt. Because a man had no influence on the punishment imposed by God, he should rather seek a way to obtain forgiveness of sins. Luther realised that it may be most efficiently achieved in individual forgiveness. Hence, individual confession took an important place in his vision. Because he regarded the very awareness of sin and fear before death related to them as the greatest punishment, then the certainty of forgiveness of sins acquired in the received absolution allowed one to free oneself from this awareness and fear. The understanding of suffering as a participation in the Christly cross was the result of this. In Luther's *theologia crucis* there is no ordeal or pain any longer but rather "joy in embraces." Suffering must be perceived as a Divine call for faith. We must always see the suffering Christ in all suffering, in which God himself manifests his paternal love in this way. Luther thought that we can find God only in suffering and in the cross. The approval of suffering opens up real access to God's heart before the sinner. Thanks to suffering alone is a Christian supposed to learn trust in God's goodness. This goodness becomes a sinner's participation, particularly during private confession when he becomes free from guilt through absolution

¹⁶ "Indulgences encouraged Christians to flee suffering and self-deprivation and therefore Luther thought them very dangerous [...]. There was no release from the divine penalty in this life, and, according to Luther, it was unchristian to seek one." R.K. Rittgers, *Embracing the "True Relic" of Christ: Suffering, Penance, and Private Confession in the Thought of Martin Luther*, in: A. Firey (ed.), *A New History of Penance*, Leiden-Boston 2008, 382. Cf. R.E. McLaughlin, *Truth, Tradition and History: The Historiography of High/Late Medieval and Early Modern Penance*, in: *A New History of Penance*, 21f.

and is ensured about God's goodness¹⁷. In this way Luther, not resigning from the practice of confession, modified it. In accordance with his salvific vision, it is not remorse, a detailed confession of sins or atonement that are significant but rather the absolution itself resulting in consolation. Faith is most important here, which, thanks to the word of absolution, gaining its power and efficiency from the Gospel, arouses certainty that sins become absolved because of Christ.

Together with other reformers, in particular with Philipp Melanchthon, Luther prepared a new rite of confession. *The Augsburg Confession*, the main Lutheran book of confessions of 1530, written and issued by Melanchthon, confirmed that a private confession must be preserved because obtaining absolution of sins committed after baptism is possible only by means of confession. This means that the power of the keys is used here, which Christ gave to the Church. The absolution of sins before receiving Holy Communion is, according to Melanchthon, obligatory which is predicted by the rite of the Lord's Supper, however, an individual confession and absolution are optional, however, recommended as giving particular consolation¹⁸. If it was not yet evident in *The Augsburg Confession*, then in *The Apology of the Augsburg Confession* (1530) Melanchthon is clearly in favour of the sacramentality of confession since it is clearly revealed by Christ: "Absolution may also be called a sacrament of repentance in the true meaning of this word"¹⁹. However, eventually Luther, although in *Babylonian Captivity* he was still writing about the sacramental character of individual absolution, he accepted the existence of only two sacraments: baptism and Holy Communion²⁰.

This new rite of confession was quite quickly popularised in the developing Protestant communities. Despite certain modifications, it preserved its two-part structure – first it was an examination (verification) of faith (but not conscience), and subsequently a confession of sins and absolution. The first part was supposed to replace a traditional examination of conscience, and it was about

¹⁷ "The remission of guilt calms the heart and takes away the greatest of all punishments, namely, the consciousness of sin [...]. Private confession provided both release from a guilty conscience and confidence of God's goodness in the face of other divine chastisements." R.K. Rittgers, *Embracing the "True Relic" of Christ*, 389.

¹⁸ "The power of the keys is respected, and it is reminded how big consolation it brings for frightened conscience. It is reminded that God demands faith, so that we could believe in such voice as voice resonating from heaven and that this faith truly causes and receives absolution of sins." *The Augsburg Confession* art. XXV [electronic pdf version, 14]. Cf. R.K. Rittgers, *The Reformation of the Keys*, 119.

¹⁹ *The Apology of the Augsburg Confession*, art. XII *About penance*, 41 [www.luteranie.pl].

²⁰ Cf. R.K. Rittgers, *Embracing the "True Relic" of Christ*, 392, footnote 61.

the verification of the familiarity of Lutheran catechism. It was thought that the assertion of its significant unfamiliarity made it impossible to participate in the Lord's Supper. In a confession it was obligatory to admit one's sinful nature and confess public sins. It was not necessary, however, to confess very personal sins, a penitent could decide himself what to confess to a confessor, and what should not be mentioned, keeping it a secret. A confessor, on the other hand, did not have the right to infringe on a penitent's conscience. Such comprehended and practised individual confession also aimed at strengthening a Christian in his readiness to accept a suffering, which is revealed in his life in various ways. It should be interpreted as the fatherly goodness of God, who wants to be similar to man in this way – by his faith – to the suffering Christ himself²¹.

This Lutheran practice, clearly supported and preached by reformers in a primary period of Reformation, was fading over time, and was even rejected. In the subsequent centuries, mainly under the influence of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, and the popularisation of rationalism in Lutheran theology, individual confession declined in most Lutheran churches. In the middle of the 19th century attempts at its restoration occurred, which, however, faced many obstacles. Even Lutheran priests themselves were not its proponents because it seemed not very demanding. Because a confession was also a sign distinguishing Lutherans from Calvinists, some treated it even as a peculiar Reformational anomaly which should be abandoned. Even if sporadic attempts at its restoration occurred at the beginning of the 20th century, contemporarily Lutheranism almost has resigned from it²².

²¹ “Luther, for example, denounced mandatory, sacramental confession yet continued to insist that confession was necessary for an individual's consolation. Calvin was reluctantly willing to hear parishioners' confessions but used such discussions as opportunities to explain that his counsel was not a sacrament nor should it be.” L. McClain, *Troubled Consciences: New Understandings and Performances of Penance among Catholics in Protestant England*, “Church History” 82(2013)1, 121.

²² Cf. Mc Laughlin, *Truth, Tradition and History*, 35-37. A remarkable 19th century study on Lutheran private confession cf. G. Steitz, *Die Privatbeichte und Privatabsolution der Lutherischen Kirche aus den Quellen des XVI. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt 1854. J.F. White notices that some Protestant communities currently notice the return to sacramental practices, including confession. Cf. op. cit., 9f.

Anglican View of Contrition and Repentance According to T. Cranmer

Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury since 1533, was a prominent leader of English Reformation and an associate of Henry VIII in the rejection of papal authority in the Anglican Church. He is regarded as the main author of *The Book of Common Prayer*, the Anglican liturgy, *Articles of the Faith* and *The Books of Homilies*, which formed the Church, particularly theological and liturgical, and Anglicanism at its very beginnings. Together with T. Cromwell he brought about the popularisation of the Bible in the native language in England.

The theological Christian vision, in which Cranmer was growing up, emphasised the sacramentality of repentance and distinguished three important parts to it – remorse, confession of sins and atonement²³. His personal beliefs, forming increasingly more a form of Anglican theology, were subject to different impacts and were changing under the influence of a traditional theology, as well as under the theological assumptions of 16th century reformers. During studies in Cambridge, Cranmer was under the great influence of the prominent theologian J. Fisher, a subsequent bishop and cardinal, a martyr for faithfulness to the Catholic Church. His Augustine and humanistic vision of repentance and Christian life emphasised that the goodness of deeds and a man himself are the result of grace, and deeds help and facilitate a man in rising in goodness in God's eyes. Cranmer rejected this opportunity over time, so that deeds (penitential) could make a sinner worthier of God's forgiveness. This impossibility was supposed to result from truth that a deed cannot be good before its creator becomes good as well.²⁴ These changes occurred, among others, under the influence of the thoughts of Erasmus of Rotterdam²⁵.

Although Erasmus of Rotterdam, earlier than Luther, preached views similar to him, there were differences between them. These discrepancies were revealed at the anthropological level and concerned the seriousness of the results

²³ Cf. A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance: Renewing the Power to Love*, Oxford 2000, 35ff.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 84f.

²⁵ Erasmus of Rotterdam was a professor of theology at Queens' College in Cambridge from 1511 and it is possible that Cranmer was attending his lectures during his studies. Cf. A.F. Pollard, *Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation, 1489-1566*, London 1926, 16f. "[For Erasmus] the heart of Christianity was a pragmatic programme of love in action which sprang from a scriptural understanding of the human condition and the virtues and vices pertaining to it." A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 86. More on Erasmus' views on sin, conversion and repentance, in the light of his *Exomologesis sive modus confitendi* (1524), cf. *ibid.*, 85-93.

of the original sin which had impact on Cranmer's views. When for Erasmus of Rotterdam, in compliance with the scholastic view, original sin weakened but did not eliminate the natural tendency of a human soul to goodness (although unsettled feelings oppose to reason), Luther (based on the reading of letters by Saint Paul) was convinced that after original sin human nature was overwhelmed by egoism. Because man had opposed to God, all his desires and deeds had become internally sinful²⁶. Despite his recognition for Erasmus of Rotterdam, Cranmer declared rather for Luther in his conviction about the profound and entire corruption of human nature after original sin. We may think that Erasmus' influence on Cranmer was mainly based on making him aware of the significance of the Bible and its priority before scholastic theology. However, the reading of works by Saint Augustine of Hippo and the influence of the teachings of Luther and Osiander led him to a conviction that only justification by faith means that human deeds become good in God's eyes. A man cannot do good by himself because the prior action of the Spirit of God is necessary here. Goodness is then the aftermath of justification and its result, not something which precedes it and leads to it²⁷.

At the beginning of the 1530s, when he was to become archbishop of Canterbury, Cranmer expressly declared for the Protestant doctrine about justification by faith, and for Luther and Osiander at the same time. It was the Protestant clarification of Saint Augustine of Hippo, when the justification of a sinner by the power of *sola fide* was accompanied by granting an internal presence of the Spirit of God. It was significant for the current teaching and Christian practice of absolving sins committed after baptism in a sacrament of repentance. It is worth

²⁶ Cf. P.S. Watson, *The Lutheran Riposte*, in: E.G. Rupp, P.S. Watson (ed.) *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, Louisville 1969, 12-28.

²⁷ "Thus, by faith in Christ's redeeming work a sinner was justified, and because he was in right-standing with God he was then granted the gift of the Holy Spirit in his heart which brought forth good works in his life." A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 105. The dispute over the place and role of love in releasing sins between Osiander and S. Gardiner, an English politician and a bishop, faithful to the traditional Catholic teaching reflects the fact how gradually the Protestant understanding of justification from sins was forming, and thus *de facto* of salvation: "Osiander summarized his differences with Gardiner as a dispute over the role of love in justification. Was godly love something which penitents had to make themselves worthy to receive from God and then use worthily to be right with him, as Gardiner argued? Or was godly love something Christians received because God had already made them right with him, as Osiander argued? In part, this divergence reflected a fundamental difference about the nature of salvation. For Gardiner, Christians were to spend their lives seeking to fulfil the scriptural conditions necessary so that they might be saved. For Lutherans, the Christian life was lived as a grateful response to the assurance of the free gift of salvation." *Ibid.*, 112f.

emphasising that the theology of the autonomous English Church forming then, after a formal severance with Rome in 1534, was not clear-cut and was subject to diverse tendencies. The influential theologians close to Henry VIII comprised on the one hand the ones more faithful to the Catholic tradition – S. Gardiner, Bishop Winchester and T. Howard, Prince of Norfolk, and on the other hand supporters of Reformation – Archbishop T. Cranmer and T. Cromwell, the main adviser to the king and “general vicar” of the Church of England. The dispute concerned, among others, the necessity or freedom of individual confession and (priestly) absolution for freeing from sins. Not necessarily negating the very practice of an auricular confession, supporters of a reform emphasised the personal, subjective, trustful faith as decisive about the justification of a sinner in God’s eyes thanks to the merits of Christ’s torments.

The Bishops’ Book (Institution of a Christian Man) of 1537, whose main author was Cranmer, was the first official lecture of the theological beliefs of Anglicans. It gave voice there of a Reformation belief about the undeserved justification of man by God. Man remains sinful and can never regard himself before God as a good person. His justification occurs entirely thanks to Christ therefore and only God the Father accepts such a justified man. Such a belief was close to Luther’s thesis, expressed by Melancthon in the wording about *reputatio iustitiae Christi alienae*²⁸. In the same book, and subsequently in commentaries and explanations, made in reaction to the remarks of the king himself, Cranmer declared repeatedly for the Protestant interpretation of the theology of grace and soteriology deriving from Saint Augustine of Hippo. This Protestant reading of the teaching of Saint Augustine of Hippo, who was discussed salvation as *sola fide et gratia* was characteristic for other reformers as well²⁹.

The justification of a sinful man is an entirely free Divine work and takes place only thanks to trustful faith, which is accompanied by the renewal of will as a fruit of a gift by the Spirit of God. Cranmer was a proponent of a pessimistic vision of man called *post lapsum*, a man totally corrupted by sin, and hence unable for goodness. True goodness exists only in God and may be only a fruit of His undeserved grace, which involves man’s participation only by salvific merits of Christ.

Following Lutheran teaching, Cranmer realised that repentance comprises two elements – contrition and faith. If contrition is a painful experience and

²⁸ Cf. A.E. Mc Grath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, Cambridge 1998, 285f; M. Hint from, *Etyka ewangelicka i jej wymiar eklezjalny. Studium historyczno-systematyczne*, Warsaw 2007, 56f.

²⁹ Cf. A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer’s Doctrine of Repentance*, 211.

a struggle in conscience with the awareness of one's sin, then faith, on the other hand, brings hope and certainty of peace because it opens the human heart to a fully free grace of forgiveness³⁰. This teaching, however, was not defined in *De sacramentis*. On the one hand, we recall here the current understanding of repentance as consisting of three elements (which was also clearly mentioned by Melancthon) – contrition, confession of sins and atonement, and on the other hand, also its new, Reformational view, stressing contrition and faith is indicated. The comparison of *De sacramentis* with *Ten Articles* (1536), which became part of the *Bishops' Book* denotes these uncertainties and underspecifications of the Anglican teaching. In *Ten Articles* three sacraments (baptism, the Eucharist and repentance) are expressly mentioned, which is a clear Lutheran accent. In the case of repentance it is claimed that an auricular confession is certainly derived from Christ (and thus is a sacrament) and it is at the same time necessary for the absolution of sins committed after baptism. Slightly different accents appeared in *De sacramentis*. The need to confess sins and contrition has certainly a biblical origin (e.g. 2 Corinthians), and the will of Christ himself is behind it. Cranmer points out that there is no doubt as to the necessity to confess sins before God and before the Church to be absolved from sins. Such a confession is the best place to verify and build faith which is necessary to receive Holy Communion. But the very confession cannot be regarded as obligatory, taught by the Fathers of the Church, which are repeatedly referred to by Cranmer. Within this meaning, the absolution of sins is not only related to a sacramental absolution in confession. The assertion of a detailed confession of all sins before a confessor is inappropriate as well. It is to take place before God but faith is always more important than such a confession. Faith leads to a confession and strengthens man in his meeting with God. The release from sins occurs by means of the power of Christ's blood, and not by atonement on the part of the penitent. Cranmer expressly rejects here the practice of indulgences granted by the pope, which were supposed to release souls from purgatory³¹.

³⁰ A small treatise *De sacramentis* is particularly valuable (interesting) here, it is anonymous, but congruently attributed to Cranmer, stored in a library of archbishop of Canterbury in Lambeth Palace in London. Cf. G. Jeanes, *A Reformation Treatise on the Sacraments*, "The Journal of Theological Studies" 46(1995)1, 149-190. Original Latin text *De sacramentis* on p. 167-180.

³¹ Together with his increasingly more antipapal approach at the end of his life, Cranmer accused the pope ("Roman Antichrist") that he was controlling "discipline over each Christian in the western Church by means of an army of confessors," or that "the traditional priestly power of the keys is only an extension of the false authority of papacy." Confession became a tool of oppression and control, which was rather surprising not only regarding his previous view, but also regarding the consideration of confession by M. Luther. This inconsistency of Cranmer's

Atonement granted by Christ, through which man becomes selected (a clear Calvinist accent) is the only source of hope for a sinner. "Complete forgiveness requires only a confession [of sins] in faith and repentance," and a changed life and deeds, which cannot be regarded as atonement for sins, must be its result. These Lutheran and Calvinist accents – in the spirit of solifidianism – were occurring increasingly more expressly with Cranmer³². In this sense his main writings from this time – *Annotations* (remarks to commentaries and questions of Henry VII to the *Bishops' Book*), *Great Commonplaces* (a list of numerous reference to patristic writings for the confirmation of the Protestant theses) and *De sacramentis* – provide evidence for an increasingly more Protestant understanding of penance with Cranmer, the result of which was the popularisation of such a doctrine in the developing Anglican theology of salvation and the practice of Christian life.

Despite the reluctance of Henry VIII for Luther, Lutheran questioning of the necessity of an auricular confession for the receipt of absolution was becoming increasingly more commonly accepted, proven by a new version of the confession of faith in the form of *The Thirteen Articles* (1538) and in *The Six Articles* (1539). Cranmer managed to convince the king and parliament that an individual confession is a useful and salvific practice, and we cannot resign from it but it is not necessary for absolution of sins. What is more, his belief was becoming increasingly more reformed because he was accepting Calvin's thesis more often, rejecting the sacramentality of confession and the non-identity of faith and repentance³³. On the other hand, a partial return of the initial Anglicanism to the Catholic teaching took place in the *King's Book* (*The Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for Any Christian Man*, 1546), attributed to Henry VIII himself. In its light, the deeds performed even in the state of deadly sin (before

views was demonstrated and by the fact that he saw the practice in it, which made it impossible for the congregation to make use of "benefaction of Christ's ordeal," which the bishop of Rome was said to restrict access to. The falsity of such a (Roman) vision of release from sins was also because it did not grant "complete absolution," because what remained was a temporary suffering in purgatory, which on the other hand, "could be absolved after this life by the Roman Antichrist and his priests." Cf. A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 94.

³² Cf. G. Jeanes, *A Reformation Treatise on the Sacraments*, 184-187; A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 148-150.

³³ "Calvin, however, denied the Lutheran definition of *poenitentia*, cutting the crucial link between the sacrament and solifidianism as a result [...]. Cranmer eventually adopted the Reformed approach and decided to seek to free justification entirely from sacramental penance." A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 155f. More on contacts and the impact of Calvin's theology on Cramer cf. B. Gordon, *Calvin*, New Haven-London 2009, 251-259.

justification) could be regarded as good if they derive to some degree from faith and grace, which was rejected by Cranmer and the proponents of Protestantism. They claimed that only a justified man, thanks to pure and trustful faith, can do good. It is not faith that is the reason for justification but rather a means to receive absolution of sins thanks to the worthy death of Christ. It is not faith, however – as human work – that justifies, but God by Christ's merits. At the time of justification, salvific grace renews his will in man and qualifies it to love expressed in deeds, although post-sinful weakness and a tendency for sins lasts in man³⁴.

To emphasise the plenitude of Christ's merits for the justification of sinful people, and at the same time his independence from human deeds, Cranmer noticed a true sign of justification made by God in contrition. Because it is forgiveness of sins that renews the will for goodness in man, any good deeds – including penitential deeds, fast, prayer and charity – are the fruits of justification but not something which leads to it. There is an analogy to baptism here, a man's sin is forgiven without merits but not as a result of remorse. Hence any fasts, pilgrimages, prayers, etc. for pleading for God's forgiveness, so common in medieval times, for Cranmer are just human fabrications. All these good deeds, as well as penitential behaviours, flowing from a repentant heart, are the result of the Divine absolution of sins, and not deserving it. Contrition and repentance in this sense are certainly signs of salvation which develop in man. However, it is not because they proclaim that there is good will in a sinner and his readiness to return to God but they are the assurance about the will of salvation on the part of God³⁵. In order to confirm his thesis, Cranmer invokes the words of Jesus that "nobody can serve two Lords" (Luke 16:13). A man in sin cannot simultaneously do good because he is not in a state and power of grace. If he does good, it means that he was justified, and thus he is no longer influenced by the power of sin. Divine forgiveness occurs immediately when a man expresses his readiness to change his life. When David admitted he had sinned, a prophet

³⁴ "And these works which follow our justification, do please God, forso much as they proceed from a heart endued with pure faith and love to God [...]. For after our justification only begin we to work the law of God requireth. Then we shall do all good works willingly, although not so exactly as the law requireth, by mean of infirmity of the flesh." T. Cranmer, *Annotations*, in: J.E. Cox (ed.), *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer*, Cambridge 1846, 114.

³⁵ "Thus, Cranmer considered repentance the sure sign of salvation not because it demonstrated the penitent's good will towards God, but rather because it was evidence of God's good will towards the penitent." A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer's Doctrine of Repentance*, 204. Cf. *ibid*, 245f.

responded at once: “Lord remits your sin as well” (2 Samuel 12:13). Cranmer invoked this biblical text to indicate that David received Divine forgiveness before he started his (external) repentance.

Repeatedly referring to St. Augustine’s writings, Cranmer was increasingly more coming to the conclusion that a sacramental confession becomes unnecessary in such a view, however, justification begins in man from internal remorse, and results in faith and repentance in practice. The recognition for God’s glory simultaneously requires a recall that forgiveness of sins has its complete source in God but never in man’s will³⁶. The teaching on remorse and repentance in the life of a justified Christian became an important tool of a priestly formation of the faithful for Cranmer. The permanent readiness to the repentance of a justified man because of God’s love for man and because of love for God assured man his selection and eternal salvation. Such an explanation of Cranmer’s solifidianism was newly expressed in *Notes on Justification* (approx. 1545) and in the first *Book of Homilies* (1547), with several homilies by Cranmer himself. Good deeds and repentance in daily life confirm a genuine liberation of man from sin thanks to the salvific merits of Christ, and this means a lively and truly Christian faith, preserving the commandments and life with God. As he was repeating in the homily on faith, there is always a danger that man may deceive himself and not truly believe, only with words, but not with deeds and repentance³⁷.

In his belief in predestination, and a free, previous Divine selection comprising people intended for salvation, Cranmer was evidently closer to Calvin and Butser than to Luther. Because affiliation to a group of the selected was based on God’s will, loss of salvation was only hypothetical. However, loss of a state of grace was possible because the justified were still able to commit a sin. In this context, Divine punishment, which is experienced by a sinner, is the call to repentance and change of life. Cranmer warned at the same time

³⁶ “It is the work and glory of God alone to justify the ungodly, to forgive sins, to give life freely out of his goodness, not from any merits of ours. Satan desires that divine honour be paid to him. Therefore, the one who has attributed either justification’s beginning or its pardon to his own works, does he now blaspheme his Creator with satanic wickedness?” As cited in: A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer’s Doctrine of Repentance*, 195. Cf. *ibid.*, 189-193.

³⁷ “A man may soon deceive himself and think in his own phantasy that he by faith knoweth God, loveth him, feareth him and belongeth to him, when in very deed he doth nothing less [...]. But he that casteth away the yoke of God’s commandments from his neck and giveth himself to live without true repentance, after his own sensual mind and pleasure, nor regarding to know God’s word, and much less to live according thereunto, such a man clearly deceiveth himself.” T. Cranmer, *Homily of Faith*, in: *Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer*, 139.

that if, however, a man maintained his impenitent heart and did not convert to God before his death, God “will cross him out from his book.” Because a sin accompanies a man throughout his entire life, it is repentance that is such a sign of true seriousness and truth of life in compliance with Divine commandments and Divine mercy³⁸. Such beliefs were confirmed in *Forty-Two Articles*, another version of the dogmatic wordings of Church of England of 1553.

Earlier, when Cranmer was increasingly more often resigning from the obligation of auricular confession and individual absolution, still in *Catechism* of 1548, issued with his effort, priestly absolution is one of two – except for excommunication – ways of exercising the power of the keys deriving from Christ. At the same time in a rite of the Holy Communion general confession is sufficient, although an individual one could be possible. In the subsequent versions of the *Book of Common Prayer* of 1549 and 1552 there is a liturgical formula of a general absolution before the Holy Communion with an increasingly more visible Reformation accent, that sincere remorse and true faith on the part of a sinner are needed to absolve sins, and the result of this remorse is not to be atonement but improvement and restoration of life; although, individual confession of sins and absolution was not excluded there, e.g. during the visitation of the ill³⁹. In the *Book* of 1552 Cranmer considerably modified several wordings during the rite of individual confession: when he earlier names

³⁸ “Wherefore now let us repent whil we have time; for the axe is laid ready at the root of the tree to fell it down. If we will harden our hearts, and will not now be repentant of our misdoings, God will surely strike us clean out of his book.” T. Cranmer, *A Sermon Concerning the Time of Rebellion, w: Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer*, 201.

³⁹ In *Book of Common Prayer* of 1549 Cranmer introduced the possibility of confession during the visitation of the ill and gave a formula of absolution but it was deleted in the version of 1552. Cf. J. Gordon, *Cranmer and Common Prayer*, in: C. Hefling, C. Shattuck (ed.), *The Oxford Guide to the Book of Common Prayer: A Worldwide Survey*, Oxford 2006, 36f. R. Hooker, “an architect of Anglican theology” was writing about the peculiarity of the Anglican approach to confession and repentance: “It is not to be marvelled that so great a difference appeareth between the doctrine of Rome and ours when we teach repentance. They imply in the name of repentance much more than we do. We stand chiefly upon the true inward conversion of the heart; they more upon works of external show. We teach above all things that repentance which is one and the same from the beginning to the world’s end; they, a sacramental penance of their own devising and shaping. We labour to instruct men in such sort that every soul which is wounded with sin may learn the way how to cure itself; they, clean contrary, would make all sores seem incurable unless the priest has a hand in them.” Cf. R. Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1648), vol. 6, no. 5, 9. Cf. R. Ingalls, *SM and Grace*, in: T. Kirby (ed.), *A Companion to Richard Hooker*, Leiden-Boston 2008, 151-184; D. Kernan, *Jurisdiction and the Keys*, in: *A Companion to Richard Hooker*, 435-480.

a confessor learned in “God’s law,” now he is learned in “God’s word”; a penitent is to express not his “sin and repentance,” but his “repentance”; absolution and consolation becomes a contribution of a sinner not from a priest as “a servant of God and the Church,” but “by service of God’s word.” The call for repentance and contrition were added several times, including the act of repentance in daily morning and evening prayers, when – in accordance with Protestant teaching – we ask for repentance of sins for the one for whom they were absolved. The analogical modifications in the Protestant spirit occurred in the structure of Holy Communion. In this way the *Book of Common Prayer* in the version of 1552 is regarded as the most liturgically successful attempt at expressing Protestant teaching about justification by faith⁴⁰.

Repentance Yes, Confession (rather) Not

The diversity of reformers’ views on sin, its results and a vision of repentance was demonstrated in various aspects of this doctrine and had a different bearing on specific pastoral instructions and Church practice. The evocation of Reformational ecclesiology is important for the better understanding of the Protestant theology of sin and repentance, where – together with a radical accent on *sola Scriptura* and *sola fides* – the Church appears as a reality in the service of God’s word. Its result is the weakening of the theological significance of sacraments, a radical limitation in their number and the weakening of their role in the life of the Church and a Christian. These Lutheran accents had their evident repercussions in the wording of the English Reformation, particularly in *Articles of the Faith*. For example, Article 19 states explicitly that the Church is “the congregation of the faithful, in which pure God’s word is preached.”⁴¹ Although Article 19 states further about the exercise of sacraments in the Church, in a rite of ordinations (*Ordinal*), apart from other changes, there is a significant modification of a previous rite in a gesture of the bishop, who gives the ordained

⁴⁰ Cf. A. Null, *Thomas Cranmer’s Doctrine of Repentance*, 240-245. “As a piece of liturgical craftsmanship, it is in the first rank [...]. It is not a disordered attempt at a Catholic rite, but the only effective attempt ever made to give liturgical expression to the doctrine of justification by faith alone.” G. Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy*, London 1945, 11. The peculiar Anglican (episcopal) criticism of the practice of auricular confession, expressed in a form of letters may be found in an anonymous work: *Auricular Confession in the Protestant Episcopal Church*, New York 1850.

⁴¹ *The Book of Common Prayer*, op. cit., 619.

not the Eucharistic vessels – chalice and paten – but the Bible book⁴². We may notice here a change in the understanding of the sacraments, which are perceived as “a visible form,” which the preached God’s word takes, sacraments in this sense are included in “service of the word.” Similarly, an apostolic service is not a service of sacraments but a service of a proclamation of God’s word⁴³. In this way the understanding of human sinfulness and the justification of a sinful man is related not to the sacraments administered by the Church but rather with the faith of an individual believer who opens to God’s preached word. Luther emphasised that the acceptance of the word makes a believer a participant of everything⁴⁴. While attempting to understand a Protestant (including Anglican) approach to the issue of sin and repentance (and even the entirety of Christian moral life) we need to take into consideration a traditional accusation and suspicion of Protestants to the Catholic moral teaching related to its legalism and excessive severity. Thus, for example, English ethical or theological-moral textbooks (studies) were in principle not to discipline believers in their handling the principles of moral life but rather to be a guide and adviser to them. Even if – as in the period of the Oxford movement – the restoration of the interest of the practice of confession took place (sacramental – although Anglicanism and other currents of Protestantism reject a sacramental character of such pious practice), the stress was on the avoidance of severity in the judgment on guilt and a degree of sinfulness among penitents⁴⁵. The belief is and was behind it that it is rather the interested Christian himself who is supposed to analyse and evaluate his behaviour in the dimension of his sinfulness but not to expect such judgements from a confessor or even from the Church itself. The Church is rather an environment of prayer and understanding, which is supposed to assist and

⁴² “Then the Bishop shall deliver to every one of them kneeling the Bible into his hand [...]” *The Book of Common Prayer*, op. cit., 582.

⁴³ Cf. A. Nichols, *The Panther and the Hind: A Theological History of Anglicanism*, Edinburgh 1993, 28f.

⁴⁴ “If a touch of Christ healed, how much more will this most tender spiritual touch, this absorbing of the Word, communicate to the soul all things that belong to the Word. This, then, is how through faith alone without works the soul is justified by the Word of God, sanctified, made true, peaceful and free, filled with every blessing and truly made a child of God [...]” M. Luther, *The Freedom of a Christian*, in: J. Dillenberger (ed.), *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings*, Garden City 1961, 58.

⁴⁵ Cf. T.F. Sedgwick, *Revising Anglican Moral Theology*, in: P. Elmen (ed.), *The Anglican Moral Choice*, Harrisburg 1983, 122f. Although the Oxford movement did not particularly deal with moral theology, E. Pusey, one of its founders and leaders, himself issued *Manual for Confessors* (Oxford 1878) of the French theologian J. J. Gaume as assistance for Anglican confessors.

accompany a man in his individual way of faith and moral life, and thus his acceptance of sin and conversion in mere relation to God. At the same time, it is worth observing that a rite of the visitation of the ill in the Anglican *The Book of Common Prayer* predicts that the ill person will confess their sins, being absolved from their sins by a priest⁴⁶. It is worth emphasising that the stress on *sola fide* resulted in a kind of replacement of a confessional by one's own conscience as a place of meeting and acceptance the salvific love of God to free oneself from sins⁴⁷. This confirms how broad the changes became in not only the very doctrine but also in the practice of Christian life of a wide circle of believers. They were the result of radical ideas and the theses of the Reformation.

Despite the old accusation towards Anglican Eucharistic teaching (and because of this, also the understanding of Christianity) related to the lack of a sacrificial dimension, the famous theologian Father O'Donovan claims that it may be read from the Anglican *Articles of the Faith*. In his comment to 39 *Articles* O'Donovan indicates the presence of the sacrificial character of the Eucharist (the Holy Communion), for instance in Article 2 Christ is mentioned as the "true God and a real man," who "was genuinely suffering, was crucified, died, was buried to reconcile God with us, and to become a victim" for human sins⁴⁸. The result of such an approach to a hamartiological issue was, for instance, a clear-cut negation of the differentiation of everyday and deadly sins, which was particularly expressed in the theology of the Carolingian period⁴⁹.

The confession of sins as an individual confession, as it was already and previously emphasised, was recognised by M. Luther, although with a different accent. A confession as "the extension of baptism" is called "the third sacrament" there. Luther even advised teaching small children how to confess. A confession should always be optional and "free from papal tyranny." He expressly emphasises contrition and the confession of sins, but he definitely rejects the practice of atonement by deeds. Justification, at its assumption, and absolution of sins

⁴⁶ The formula of absolution is to a large extent concurrent with the Catholic version, although the Protestant accent is evident here when sinners are mentioned, who "truly repent and believe:" "Our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath left power to his Church to absolve all sinners who truly repent and believe in him, of his great mercy forgive thee thine offences: And by his authority committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins, in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen." *The Book of Common Prayer*, op. cit., 317.

⁴⁷ Cf. J. Grabowski, *Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics*, Washington 2003, 18.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Articles of Religion*, II: *Of the Word or Son of God, which was made very Man*, in: *The Book of Common Prayer*, op. cit., 612. Cf. O. O'Donovan, *On the Thirty-Nine Articles: A Conversation with Tudor Christianity*, Carlisle 1993, 30f.

⁴⁹ Cf. S. Nowosad, *Odnowa anglikańskiej teologii moralnej w XX wieku*, Lublin 2001, 33f.

is given to a man for free and we should not talk about “the attempts” of a man by fulfilling deeds or practices given by a confessor. Going to confession should be willing, so that we could receive a God’s gift from Him, but not to offer Him anything⁵⁰.

Unlike Lutheranism, reformed Protestantism definitely rejected different penitential practices, popular in the medieval period, such as the monastic life, pilgrimages, fasts, indulgences, etc., but also such truths as purgatory because they were related to a false concept of deserving it/them (before God), but they also encumbered the human conscience. In some Calvinist confessions of faith an auricular confession is expressly indicated as the practice devised by people which should be unequivocally rejected⁵¹. Simultaneously, it is observed that together with the rejection of an individual confession, the fight with sin is transferred in a certain way to a public and a national forum. A secular authority is assigned the “saint” character and tasks which also comprise a fight with human sins. Christians as citizens thus have (also religious) an obligation to reconcile with the authority, to follow a national law, to pay taxes, etc. Secular judges have “a sword from God in their hands, so that they could counteract the crimes against the first and the second board of Divine Commandments.”⁵²

The former archbishop of Canterbury, R. Williams, emphasises that Christian theology still searches for the more profound and relevant understanding of its subjects, and thus the very sin and a situation of a sinner, who needs the grace of God, the Saviour. In the history of theology, exceptionally abundant and remarkable writings of this kind derive from the Carolingian period. George Herbert, a priest and a poet, was one of those writers who in his profoundly

⁵⁰ “Who reluctantly goes to confession and not to receive absolution, he should leave it alone. Even more, who goes believing that he will do a good deed by a precise confession, he would rather abandon it. We admonish, however, so that you could confess and reveal your poverty not to do a good deed but so that you could hear what God orders you to say.” *Large Catechism*, 53.

⁵¹ Finally, we consider purgatory as an illusion proceeding from the same shop, from which have also sprung monastic vows, pilgrimages, the prohibition of marriage, and of eating meat, the ceremonial observance of days, auricular confession, indulgences, and all such things by which they hope to merit forgiveness and salvation. These things we reject, not only for the false idea of merit which is attached to them, but also because they are human inventions imposing a yoke upon the conscience.” *The French Confession of Faith* (1559), in: *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, 152f. This French confession of faith was prepared most probably by Calvin himself for new communities of reformed Protestants developing first in Paris and subsequently in other places in France.

⁵² *The French Confession of Faith*, in: *Reformed Confessions of the Sixteenth Century*, 158.

metaphysical and religious poetry among others portrays God redeeming humanity from its sins, thus only He “knows the value of human soul.”⁵³

The Anglican *The Alternative Service Book*, issued in 1980, contains a list of liturgical rites analogically to *Book of Common Prayer*. The act of repentance is included in two suggested forms of the Holy Communion (mass), with a possible recital of, among others, the Ten Commandments and a mutual act of repentance⁵⁴. We may notice here the wording about the confession of sins with “remorse and faith,” which is important for a Protestant view. However, the possibility of an individual confession and individual absolution are not mentioned. In the Anglican *Common Worship*, the newest series of liturgical books, the publication of which commenced in 2000, in the volume *Christian Initiation*, the formulas of penitential rites are provided⁵⁵. Both a penitential communal celebration and an individual confession with absolution are given there. An individual confession is not obligatory but advisable particularly when a believer expresses such a will. Six formulas of absolution are also provided. It is emphasised that sins are confessed before a bishop or a priest, and the act of repentance should take place after that, before absolution is received.

Although the reality of evil and moral weakness belongs to the most common human experience, only rational analysis does not allow for the rightful understanding of these aspects of the human condition. Christianity comes to man’s aid here when it sheds supernatural light on its essence and Divine origin, and at the same time on weakness and the need of grace. In view of the entire Christian tradition, Protestantism appears as an important and serious tradition, however evaluated sometimes as unilateral or extremely pessimistic. The Reformational assumptions and multi-century subsequent history of theological thought and sacramental-pastoral practice, particularly in Lutheran, Calvinist and Anglican tradition, demand careful studies and analyses, so that this aspect of human fate and supernatural destiny should be comprehensively understood.

⁵³ Cf. R. Williams, *Anglican Identities*, London 2004, 66f.

⁵⁴ Cf. *The Alternative Service Book 1980*, London 1980, 120ff and 186ff.

⁵⁵ *Common Worship: Christian Initiation*, London 2006, 227-289.

Part V –
Teaching of *Vaticanum II*

The Theological Implications of the Council's Liturgical Constitution: Changes in the Concept of the Sacrament of Anointing of the Sick*

The Council of Trent, by listing the sacraments instituted by Christ, gave fifth place to the last rites, *extrema unctio* (D 844). This is the name under which the sacrament has been known to the faithful and discussed by theology until today. The liturgical Constitution of the Second Vatican Council deals with it in Chapter 3, points 73-75, and makes the following provision: 73. The “last rites,” which can also – and better – be called the “anointing of the sick,” is not a sacrament intended for those who are in ultimate danger of losing their lives, in *extremo vitae periculo*. Therefore, the right time to receive this sacrament certainly occurs, *certe habetur*, when the faithful begins to be, *incipit esse*, in danger of death from illness or old age. 74. In addition to the rite of the anointing of the sick and the viaticum, a continuous rite should be performed in which the Anointing is given to the sick after confession and before the acceptance of the Vatican. 75. The number of Anointings must be adapted to the circumstances, and the prayers of the Anointing of the Sick rite must be adapted to suit the different categories of the sick who receive the Sacrament¹.

* STV 3(1965)1.

¹ 73. “*Extrema Unctio*’, quae etiam et melius ‘*Unctio Infirmorum*’ vocari potest, non est Sacramentum eorum tantum qui in extremo vitae discrimine versantur. Proinde tempus opportunum eam recipiendi iam certe habetur cum fidelis incipit esse in periculo mortis propter infirmitatem vel senium. 74. Praeter ritus seiunctos *Unctionis infirmorum* et *Viatici*, conficiatur *Ordo continuus* secundum quem *Unctio aegroto* conferatur post confessionem et ante receptionem *Viatici*. 75. *Unctionum numerus* pro oportunitate accommodetur, et orationes ad ritum *Unctionis pertinentes* ita recognoscantur, ut respondeant variis condicionibus infirmorum, qui Sacramentum suscipiunt.”

In points 74 and 75 we find only practical provisions, while the first sentence of point 73 gives the doctrinal principle justifying practical provisions that start with the second sentence of point 73. The doctrinal principle and the practical provisions of paragraph 73 complement and clarify each other: the doctrinal principle defines the name and proper subject of the sacrament; the practical provision speaks of the time appropriate for the administration of the sacrament.

The theological doctrine on the sacraments shows that the proper purpose is essential to the structure of each sacrament: the nature of sacramental grace is subordinate to it, and this determines the nature of the sacramental sign and even the minister. Every change made in the definition of the purpose of the sacrament should have far-reaching consequences. If, therefore, the liturgical conciliar constitution, directly or indirectly, were to specify the purpose of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick, other than the theological theories accepted so far, its decision would have not only a fundamental, but perhaps even a crucial meaning for the theology of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick. The purpose of this treatise is precisely to examine to what extent and in relation to which theological theories the liturgical constitution makes changes to the concept of the fifth sacrament. In order to fulfil such a defined idea, we need to determine in advance the direct content of the Council Decree, and then we should consider what conclusions are necessary or deductive from it.

It must be emphasised that it is not the purpose of this treatise to present all theological teachings about the fifth sacrament. After all, it is not a systematic, textbook approach, whose knowledge it presupposes, but only speaks about what – following the Council Decree – should be changed from now on in the textbook dogmatic lecture.

What, then, is the proper and direct content of paragraph 73 of the liturgical constitution, which is most important for the theological doctrine of the sacrament of the anointing of the sick? It begins with the introduction of the new name “anointing of the sick,” but does not reject the name “last rites,” which has been in common use since the 18th century and introduced by the Council of Trent in the dogmatic decree on the number of sacraments instituted by Christ. Neither does it reject, nor consider the previous name of “last rites” as wrong, for the name “the anointing of the sick” is only better than that name, and it says that the last rites can also, *etiam et melius*, be called the anointing of the sick. Leaving the current name as fundamentally acceptable is not only historically explained by the fact that it was used by the Council of Trent, which the Second Vatican Council does not want to pillory, but also has its theoretical justification in that the name “last rites” is not inextricably linked with the

medieval concept of this sacrament and therefore is not in contradiction with the new approach, initiated by point 73 of the liturgical constitution. Namely, in the Middle Ages this sacrament was originally named, in fact, the last rites because at the time at which it was given, and not because of the kind of sacramental grace attached to it; that is, because it was given at the end, after other sacraments had been received, so it was the last sacrament temporarily received in life. This custom, as well as the name "last rites," existed already in the 10th and 11th centuries, that is, before the representatives of the great scholastic community built it up with their theories: if the name existed before the theories were born, it can in principle remain after their rejection.

In turn, since in the name "last rites" the adjective "last" has actually a temporal meaning, the following conclusion is necessary: the term "last rites" is not evil, i.e. its meaning does not contradict the revealed doctrine of the proper purpose and effects of the sacrament of the sick. If it is not bad, the council had no basis for rejecting it.

The name "Anointing of the Sick" is, however, better directly because it does not tighten the timing of its provision to the last moments of life, i.e. it does not make it either in practice or in theory a dying sacrament; it is indirectly better because it frees the sacrament from all historical and theological ties with which the Council later breaks off. From the Council's comparative evaluation of the two names of the sacrament, a clear practical idea emerges: the Council wants the name "Anointing of the Sick" to replace "Last Rites" in future theological textbooks and catechism. In order to encourage this with its example, the Council uses the name 'Anointing of the Sick' in the remainder of the decree.

The most important doctrinal provision of paragraph 3 properly and directly concerns the subject receiving the sacrament and is expressed in a negative sentence: the sacramental anointing is intended not only for those who are in imminent danger of death. This decision rejects the superstitions of the faithful and the theological theories that have made the sacrament of the sick the sacrament of the dying in theory and practice. Its direct content undermines even the deepest theories of sacramental theology that the great scholastics of the Middle Ages have managed to develop. The sentence of St. John of God is irreconcilable with St. Thomas Aquinas, who claimed that the sacrament of the anointing of the sick is intended for those who leave this world, that is, for the dying, *pro statu exeuntium*²; it is also contrary to the decree of St. Bonaventure

² IV dist 23 quo 2.

that sacramental anointing should be given to the sick only when they are dying or when they are certain to die; but if it were certain that they would recover from illness, they could not be sacramentally anointed³. It is all the more contradicted by the extreme theory of Johannes Duns Scotus, according to which the sacramental anointing of the sick has its full effect only when it is given when the sick person, because of collapsing, can no longer sin⁴. Since these views of the great scholastic doctors are the conclusions of their definition of the proper purpose and grace of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick, this doctrinal provision of the liturgical constitution must indirectly weigh on the whole of their theory: part two will clarify the extent to which this is the case.

The second sentence of paragraph 3 of the Constitution begins with the *resultant conjunctiva proinde*, “therefore,” which indicates that the thought expressed in it is the consequence and conclusion of the principle expressed in the preceding sentence. In fact, it is only partly a conclusion; partly it supplements the principle previously expressed in a negative form: having said in the preceding sentence how the subject of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick cannot be tightened, the Council now indicates who its subject actually is. The definition of the subject is inextricably linked with the timing of the sacrament. The Council states, first of all, that the subject of the sacrament is every faithful person who is in danger of death because of illness or old age; and secondly, that it is the subject of the sacrament from the first moment when, for these two reasons, *incipit esse*, he is in danger of death. From this moment on, it is also the right time to administer the sacrament. It is clear that the Council only means genuine and serious danger of death. Finally, in the same sentence, the Council indicates the degree of certainty of its definition of the subject and the time of reception of the sacramental anointing of the sick: it considers both to be certain, *certe habetur*.

The definition of the subject of the sacramental anointing of the sick adopted by the Council highlights the magnitude of the opposition between the position of the Council and the theses of the doctors of the great scholastic school when they preached: “only the last moments of life are the time to receive this sacrament,” the Council decides: “the time for receiving the sacramental anointing begins with the first moment when there is a serious danger of losing one’s life because of illness or old age.”

³ IV dist 23 art 1 quo 1 ad 1.

⁴ Opus Oxon. IV dist 23 No. 3

Certainty is attributed by the liturgical Constitution explicitly only to the definition of the subject and the time of receiving the sacrament of the sick, *certe hebetur*. There is no doubt, however, that not only this, but all the doctrinal provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution are theologically certain and would be certain even if the Council had not indicated this certainty at all, even in a single word. They are certain because they meet all the conditions for certainty. Although they do not have infallible certainty in their dogmas, since the entire liturgical Constitution lacks even the slightest indication that the Council intends to proclaim a new dogma in it. What is more, the Council set itself such a pastoral goal that it ruled out in advance the possibility of proclaiming new dogmas. The doctrinal provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution, however, have true, albeit erroneous, theological certainty. In the light of the theological methodology⁵, such certainty is given to all the decisions of Councils and Popes which, although not taken as definitive and infallible, nevertheless explain the doctrine revealed by the choice between two conflicting opinions: in fact, then the Church already resolves the doctrinal dispute and thus takes the first step on the road to a final or infallible explanation of the doctrine of the revealed. The history of the text of the liturgical Constitution, on the other hand, speaks very clearly to what extent the provisions of paragraph 3 were an act of choice between two opposing theses. The original wording of the scheme was an attempt to go beyond the general formulation of the Code of Canon Law by adopting the scholastic concept of the Fifth Sacrament: "this anointing should be given only to the sick, and not to all, as the tradition of the Church teaches us, but only to those who are so seriously ill that they may be considered to be at the end of their lives. If the Council had agreed to such a definition of the subject of this sacrament, it would have made it the sacrament of the dying and discouraged many believers from receiving it. The Council wanted as many seriously ill Christians as possible to benefit from the grace of the sacrament and therefore decided to disperse prejudices surrounding the sacrament, including the fact that it is the sacrament of the dying. This pastoral consideration led the Council to completely reject the original wording of the scheme and made the precision brought by the provisions of paragraph 3 to the general norms of canon law contradict the scholastic understanding of the subject of this sacrament.

The doctrinal provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution are a clear step forward in explaining the doctrine of the revealed doctrine, even compared

⁵ Cf. I. Różycki, *Metodologia teologii dogmatycznej* (Methodology of dogmatic theology). Kraków 1947, No. 290 nn.

to canon 940 of the Code of Canon Law: "The last anointing may be given only to the faithful who, having used reason, are in danger of losing life because of illness or old age." Although the aforementioned canon considers every serious threat to life by sickness or old age to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the giving of sacramental anointing, one could still insist on a scholastic interpretation: in every serious danger to life, but not at its beginning, but when the danger to life approaches its fatal end. All theologians who supported the theories of their scholastic masters until the last few days without the slightest change had to give a similar interpretation, at least in silence⁶. Such a thing is impossible after the liturgical Constitution.

The final provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution were preceded and prepared by a study of scholars of exegesis and historians of Catholic dogmas and theology, such as M. Meinerz, K. Lübeck, P. Browe, H. Weisweiler, A. Chavasse, G. Davanze⁷. On the basis of their work, even before the adoption of the liturgical Constitution, it was obvious and scientifically certain that the intensification of the sacramental anointing of the sick to cases of hopelessness and to the last moments of their lives was not sufficiently justified in the Scriptures or in the tradition of the ancient and early medieval Church, whose laws required only a serious illness to receive this sacrament, and not a hopeless one. Also, the letter of St. Jacob 5:14, added the biblical scholars, does not speak of the hopelessly sick, but only of the bedridden or seriously ill. Until the adoption of the liturgical Constitution, Dogmatics, who were involved in theological speculation, might not have known the above-mentioned statements of biblical and dogma history and therefore could, in good faith, repeat without any change the theses of their great masters of the Scholastic period. Now that the liturgical Constitution has been adopted, the situation has fundamentally changed: the Council has rejected one of the important theorems of scholastic theories as simply erroneous, forcing far-reaching changes in these theories. Since the Council's decisions are well known, only these theologians will from now on repeat without major changes

⁶ "Non esse hanc unctionem nisi infirmis adhibendam nec illis quidem omnibus, ut Ecclesiae traditio nos docet, sed illis dumtaxat qui tam periculose decumbunt, ut in exitu vitae constituti videantur."

⁷ M. Meinerz, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Bonn 1950. K. Lübeck, *Die heilige Ölung in der orthodoxen griechischen Kirche*, Theologie und Glaube 1916, 318341. P. Browe, *Die letzte Ölung in der abenccfändischer Kirche des Mittelalters*, "Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie" 1931, 515-561. H. Weisweiler, *Das Sakrament der letzten Ölung in den systematischen Werkender ersten Frühscholastik*. "Scholastik" 1932, 331-353; 554-560. A. Chavasse, *Etude sur l'onction des infirmes dans l'Eglise latine du ffile au Xie siècle*, Lyon 1942. G. Davanzo, *L'unzione sacra degli infermi*, Torino 1958.

the teachings of the scholastic masters of the fifth sacrament, who will not take the trouble to consider the necessary consequences of the doctrinal decisions of paragraph 3 of the liturgical Constitution.

In order to reveal the necessary consequences of the provisions of paragraph 3, deductive reasoning must be used, since its most important feature is precisely the fact that the reasoning behind the conclusion is necessarily based on the accepted premises. One of the best known forms of deductive reasoning is conditional syllogism, which can be applied in two different ways: *modus ponendo ponens* consists in the fact that from the truthfulness of the predecessor we conclude that the successor is true; *modus tollendo tollens* lies in the fact that from the falsity of the successor we conclude that the predecessor is false, i.e. that the assumption is false. In the syllogism "If it rains, the earth is wet," the predecessor is "it rains" and the successor is "the earth is wet." If it is true that it is raining, it is necessarily true that the earth is wet; if it is false that the earth is wet, it is false that it is necessarily also false that it is raining. Conditional syllogism allows only these two ways of deductive, i.e. necessary, results. In turn nothing can be deduced from the falsity of a predecessor about a successor, nor from the truth of a successor about a predecessor. So, if it does not rain, the earth can be both dry and wet e.g. because it is sprinkled by humans. The application of both modes of conditional syllogism to the theorems of the scholastic theories of the fifth sacrament will reveal the necessary changes that the liturgical Constitution requires in these theories.

However, in order to be able to apply these rules of conditional reasoning to scholastic theories, it is necessary to break them down in advance into the simplest theorems and to link the noncomplex theorems with the conditional syllogisms to the doctrinal provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution and with each other.

All the scholastic theories understand the sacramental anointing of the sick as the last and a direct preparation of the soul for heavenly happiness. The last and a direct preparation takes place, according to them, in two ways: because of the time of giving and because of the nature of the grace of the sacrament.

Taking into account the concept of sacramental anointing as the last temporal preparation of the soul for eternal happiness, we receive conditional syllogism: if the anointing of the temporally sick is the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness, it should be given only in the final danger of loss of life, i.e. only to the dying and in hopeless cases. By virtue of the provision of the liturgical Constitution in point 3, as indicated above, the successor to this conditional syllogism is certainly false: therefore, the predecessor is also false. The following should therefore be put forward: *the first*

statement: the anointing of the sick is not the last and a direct preparation of the soul for heavenly happiness, i.e. it is not the sacrament of the dying.

The scholastic concept of “last rites” as the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness because of the nature of the grace of the sacrament is expressed in conditional syllogism: if the anointing of the sick on account of nature and grace is the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness, it should be given only in the ultimate danger of losing life, that is, only to the dying and in the last moments of life. Since the successor to syllogism is clearly false in the light of paragraph 3 of the Constitution, it must also be false as its predecessor. As a result we get: *the second statement*: because of the kind of grace granted, the anointing of the sick is not the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness. Both assertions must be given full theological certainty, since they necessarily and manifestly follow from a theologically certain conciliar decision.

The same basic scholastic concept of “last rites” is also the basis of the third conditional syllogism: if the anointing of the sick is, because of the nature of grace, the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness, it can only be renewed if the ultimate danger of loss of life is repeated. The successor is equivalent to a claim: in one illness one can give only one sacramental anointing, even if the illness is long lasting; unless in a long-lasting illness milder periods are intertwined with violent and very dangerous attacks – for then the sacrament can be repeated every time the illness attacks again. This is the teaching of St. Thomas, which later became a common good of Catholic theology. Unfortunately, the predecessor of conditional syllogism, on which it is based, proved to be false in light of the liturgical Constitution. According to the rules of conditional syllogism *the third statement is that* the nature of the grace of the Anointing of the Sick does not justify the impossibility of receiving it more than once in the course of one and the same illness.

The Anointing of the Sick has only one proper effect, i.e. grace; it does not cause an indestructible birthmark or an inseparable bond, such as marriage, priesthood, confirmation, baptism. If, therefore, the nature of the grace of the anointing of the sick does not exclude the possibility of repeating this sacrament in one and the same illness, the further conclusion and *the fourth statement is that* in one and the same danger of death, multiple acceptance of sacramental anointing is valid. The invalidity of the second anointing of the sick could be justified only by a type of sacramental grace; therefore, if grace does not rule out the possibility of repeating it, the repeated administration of the sacrament in the course of one illness is certainly important. This statement instructs us that the provision of canon 940 prohibiting the repetition of this sacrament

within a single risk of death is exclusively disciplinary; it concerns only the fairness of repetition. The theological conclusion constituting the fourth theorem is additionally confirmed in the history of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick, which was repeated in the rituals of the 9th and 12th centuries preserved until our times. The liturgical Constitution makes no provision for the repetition of the anointing of the sick. However, since the fundamental possibility of repeating this sacrament in one illness is beyond doubt, the Church must be expected to lift the prohibition on repeating the sacramental anointing of the sick, especially in long-term illnesses.

Although the formulation of St. Thomas is the most logical of all the scholastic theories of the “last” anointing, the doctrinal provisions of paragraph 3 of the Constitution force us to abandon his most important theorems. Aquinas reasoned: if the anointing of the sick is, because of the kind of grace given, the last and a direct preparation of the soul to receive heavenly happiness, then the grace of this sacrament is the spiritual healing so perfect, *gratia perfectae sanationis spiritualis*, that those who die immediately after receiving this sacrament go straight to heaven. Unfortunately, according to the second claim, the predecessor of Thomas’ conditional syllogism turned out to be false. Therefore *the fifth statement states that* the nature of the grace of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick does not justify the statement of St. Thomas, which says that the proper result of this sacrament is perfect spiritual healing, *gratia perfectae sanationis spiritualis*.

The two scholastic theories, Thomistic and Franciscan, together assume, as a starting point for their reasoning, that the anointing of the sick is, for the sake of their own specific grace, the last direct preparation of the soul for heavenly happiness, that is, it removes the last obstacles that may delay happiness; those that have not yet been exterminated by the grace of the sacraments previously received. They differ in their answer to the question of what these obstacles are, which have not been removed by the grace of the sacraments previously received by the sick person. The Franciscan school claims that they are common sins; according to St. Thomas, they are not sins, but remains of sins, *reliquiae peccatorum*. A detailed definition of the relevant effect of the fifth sacrament was carried out in both theories based on the following conclusion: if the fifth sacrament is, because of the nature of grace, the last and a direct preparation of the soul for heavenly happiness, its proper result is either the forgiveness of light sins, according to the Franciscan school, or the removal of the remains of sins, *reliquiae peccatorum*. This conditional syllogism also has no evidential value because its predecessor is false. So, one should state the following *sixth statement*: by the nature of the grace of the fifth sacrament, neither the Thomistic

assertion that its proper effect is to remove the remains of sins, nor the Franciscan assertion that its proper effect is the forgiveness of light sins, follows from the nature of the grace of the fifth sacrament.

The last two claims, the fifth and the sixth, should be understood strictly: they do not prove the falsity of the Franciscan and Thomistic theses, but only show that the aforementioned theses were deprived of their justification by the liturgical Constitution; they were hanging in a vacuum. Anyone who still wants to maintain it now, after the liturgical Constitution, is forced to find a new justification for it in the sources of revelation.

The concept of direct preparation for blue happiness is inextricably linked with the concept of indirect preparation. According to both scholastic theories, it indirectly prepares the soul for heavenly happiness by sanctifying grace, acquired in justification and increased either by personal merit or by receiving other sacraments. There is a necessary link between the two preparations, which stems from the nature of each: direct preparation is impossible if indirect preparation has not yet been completed, i.e. direct preparation always indicates and with the necessity that indirect preparation has also been carried out. The relationship between the two preparations, direct and indirect, provided the two theological schools of the Middle Ages with a basis for the following deductive conclusion: if the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick is, due to the nature of the grace given, a direct preparation of the soul for heavenly happiness, it presupposes an indirect preparation of the soul through the possession of sanctifying grace, that is, the sacrament of the living. This conditional syllogism was the proper basis for including the fifth sacrament in the group of living sacraments. Unfortunately, the predecessor of this syllogism turned out to be false in light of the liturgical Constitution, and therefore the following *seventh statement* should be made: the nature of the grace of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick does not justify its inclusion in the category of living sacraments.

Although the Anointing of the Sick has become a common practice among theologians, it has not become a Catholic doctrine because the Church wants to go beyond the theological schools and has therefore taught the effects of the sacrament in such a general way that it can be considered a living sacrament as well as a dead one. This sacrament, says the Council of Trent (D 927), gives grace, forgiveness of sins, relief to the sick. This deliberate general definition of the effects of this sacrament is undoubtedly closer to what the Scriptures and dogmatic tradition have told us about it.

The inclusion of the fifth sacrament in the group of living sacraments led to artificial complications in learning about its effects. For if it is truly the

sacrament of the living, only sacramental penance forgives mortal sins committed directly and directly after baptism by Christ's ordination; the anointing of the sick can be forgiven only by side and indirectly, *concomitanter et ex consequenti*, only if the sick person is incapable of confessing sins or does not remember them at all. If, however, one regains one's memory and strength needed for confession, one is obliged to submit to the ecclesiastical authority to bind and dissolve those sins that have already been forgiven by the sacramental anointing.

Now, after the liturgical Constitution of the Council, this conviction can no longer be upheld, since the inclusion of the anointing of the sick in the living sacraments leads, in the light of the liturgical Constitution, to a denial of the general principle on which Sacramentology bases the division into the living and the dead. The assignment to one of these two groups is determined by the nature of the grace conferred by the sacrament, and the assignment to them is based on the following conditional syllogism: if the nature of the grace of the received sacrament implies the possession of sanctifying grace in the recipient, it is the sacrament of the living; if the nature of sacramental grace does not require the possession of sanctifying grace in the recipient, it is the sacrament of the dead. The reasoning behind the seventh claim demonstrated that the nature of the grace of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick does not require that those receiving receive sanctifying grace. Therefore, accepting the general principle of dividing the sacraments into these two classes, it is necessary to accept the following *eighth statement*: the anointing of the sick is not a sacrament of the living, but of the dead.

Statement 8 is also supported by a very likely additional justification in the Scriptures.

The results of the sacramental anointing of the sick are described in Jacob 5:15: "the prayer of faith will save the sick and raise him up, and if he is in sin, they will be forgiven him." In the New Testament, the word "sin," used without any precise term, means, first of all, mortal sin, grave sin, or a complete sin of the kind. Speaking, for example, of the consequences of sin in general, he points to the consequences of mortal sins: sin deprives sanctifying grace – "For all have sinned and will be cast out of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23); but it is known that the glory of sanctifying grace is deprived of man only by mortal sin. Similarly, St. James, the author of the inspired Catholic letter, points to mortal sin, when James 1:15 presents the genesis and the effect of the sin: "Desire, when it conceives, gives birth to sin, and accomplished sin gives birth to death." Spiritual and physical death is only a consequence of a grave sin. Therefore, the context of the further epistle indicates that "being in sins" is to be understood primarily as mortal sins. In the immediate context of Jacob 5:15 there is nothing to suggest

that the phrase “if one were in sins” is to be understood only as light sins: that is, all the indications are that the forgiveness of mortal sins is, according to Jacob 5:15, the proper and direct consequence of the fifth sacrament.

The dogmatic tradition does not provide any definite proof for any of the two claims of the shaken alternative. After all, tradition, as the source of the revealed doctrine, identifies itself with the doctrine of the Church, and there is no document of the ecclesiastical teaching office that would explicitly include the fifth sacrament in one of the two classes of the sacraments: the living or the dead. On the other hand, distant, probable foundations are provided by tradition for both theorems. Supporters of the classification of living sacraments may refer to the decree of Pope Innocent I prohibiting the oil anointing of sick penitents because it is a kind of sacrament and penitents are not allowed to participate in the sacraments (D 99); only after public penance and reconciliation with the Church may the sick receive sacramental anointings. The regulation of Innocent I became authoritative for the decline of antiquity. In the early Middle Ages, starting in the 10th century, the anointing of the sick was considered a component of the penance of the sick, which, in view of the unpleasant social consequences of public penance, led to the sacramental anointing of the sick becoming the last rite⁸, even when public penance gave way to a private place.

The anointing of the sick, as a sacrament of the dead, directly and indirectly forgives not only light but also mortal sins, provided that the sick person does not put an obstacle to the forgiveness of sins, that is, he has repentance for sins at least imperfect, attritio. The forgiveness of sins, mortal and light, is just as proper and close to the purpose of the fifth sacrament as the grace to heal the spiritual weaknesses that are the consequence of physical weakness resulting from the illness. From now on, this certain theological correction should be made permanent to the fifth sacramental treatise.

The doctrine on the effects of the Anointing of the Sick is therefore presented in the following way after the liturgical Constitution: sacraments make what they mean. The visible sign of the fifth sacrament is the anointing with oil, a healing procedure not only for folk but also for scientific medicine. Therefore, the effect of the sacrament is to heal sometimes physically, sometimes from the illness of the body, and always from the spiritual illness of the soul; provided, of course, that the recipient of the sacrament does not obstruct it. Forward sins are a disease of the soul, light as well as mortal sins. The concept of sin as an illness is found in St. John, who divides sins, even mortal sins, into “sins

⁸ Cf. B. Poschmann, *Buße und letzte Ölung*, Freiburg and. Br. 1951, 131.

unto death," i.e. against the Holy Spirit, and sins not unto death⁹. Spiritual illness is also a spiritual weakness based on the weakness of the body. The existence of this weakness and the necessity of God's grace to overcome it are indicated by the words of Christ spoken to the disciples in the garden: "Watch and pray that you will not enter into temptation. The Spirit is willing, but the body is faint" (Mk 14:38f). If possessing a body, even a healthy one, is already the source of spiritual impotence and danger, to overcome which the necessary help of grace is necessary, the source of a particular spiritual impotence and particular dangers for the spiritual life is also a serious illness of the body. It is the grace of the Anointing of the Sick sacrament, that is the grace of healing the spiritual impotence associated with the physical impotence of a seriously ill body, which overcomes this particular impotence and the dangers it entails. For the degree of grace that an adult morally receives through the sacrament depends upon the perfection of the disposition with which the sacrament is received, the forgiveness of sins and the removal of spiritual impotence in the sacrament of the anointing of the sick becomes more complete the more zealous the sick person receives the sacrament.

If the anointing of the sick is a sacrament of the living, then only the sacrament of penance is used for the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism. But from the establishment of the same Christ, confession is necessary for the forgiveness of sins in the sacrament of Penance, and the obligation and object of confession is defined in canon 901 of the Code of Law as follows: "Whoever after baptism has committed mortal sins which have not yet been forgiven directly by the keys of the Church, should confess in confession all those whom he is aware of after a careful examination of conscience, and should reveal the circumstances which have changed the species of sin." The quoted canon leaves no doubt: despite obtaining the forgiveness of mortal sins in the sacrament of the anointing of the sick, there is still a serious obligation to present the keys to their ecclesiastical authority in sacramental confession. Only the nature of this obligation remains to be clarified: does the duty to confess mortal sins forgiven in the sacrament of the anointing of the sick come from God's law or only from the Church's law?

The answer to this question depends on whether the anointing of the sick is a sacrament of the living or of the dead; for just as the natural moral law is based on human nature, God's law for sacraments is based on the nature

⁹ Cf. M. Meinertz, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, Bonn 1950, Band II, 305; R. Schnackenburg, *Die Johannesbriefe*, Freiburg and. Br. 1953, 247ff.

of the sacraments, that is, first and foremost, on the nature of sacramental grace. It is the nature of the grace of the anointing of the sick that it is the sacrament of the dead, that is to say, the sacrament instituted by Christ for the direct and immediate forgiveness of sins for those who need forgiveness. But confession by Christ's ordination is not part of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick, that is, neither timely nor intentional, *in voto*, confession of sins is necessary to obtain their forgiveness in the sacramental Anointing of the Sick. In other words, no need to confess sins is the power of Christ's ordinance – related to the act of forgiveness through the fifth sacrament. So *the ninth thesis* is that the commandment to confess mortal sins forgiven by the anointing of the sick in sacramental confession does not come from God's law, but from ecclesiastical law.

The Church's issuing of this commandment is explained by the social importance of every human activity: just as morally good life contributes to the growth of social welfare, so bad life – through material and moral harm, through mischief – causes harm to society. The Church, as a community, has a duty to ensure that threats to the social welfare are removed. This duty is fulfilled in such a way that, in the sacramental act of confession, it judges even those evil deeds which have already been forgiven by the sacramental anointing of the sick. The commandment is also explained by the Church's concern for the salvific good of the sinner: for this reason, the Church wants to have insight into mortal sins already forgiven, in order to straighten its conscience.

If such a duty exists, it is understandable that the Church wants the sick person to fulfil it at the same time as receiving the sacramental anointing, if the Church is capable of receiving sacramental confession. For this reason, it normally provides for the combined administration of the two sacraments to the sick: penance and anointing; although it does allow the administration of the anointing itself to those who are unable to go to confession.

In the previous ritual of giving three sacraments together, the following order was in force: confession; viaticum; last anointing. Point 74 of the liturgical Constitution introduces in its place the following order: confession; anointing; viaticum. The shifting of sacramental communion as a so-called shelter finally has its theological justification in the fact that the sacrament of the Eucharist is a normal means of securing our perseverance in goodness by Christ's ordination, and we must therefore receive it at all times when the grace of perseverance in goodness is particularly necessary for us. Since the entire post-mortem eternity depends on the survival of the last moments of life, we must strengthen ourselves by the grace of the Eucharist for their happy and godly experience. Due to the nature of its grace, the Eucharist is the means by which the soul is prepared to live out the last moments of its life in a godly way. The anointing

of the sick, as has already been proven, is not, because of the nature of its grace, nor is it the last means of preparing the soul to receive heavenly happiness, nor is it a means of preparing it directly and indirectly for the salutary experience of the last moments of life – for this is the task of the Eucharist: for this reason, it is right that it should be given before the viaticum.

The order in which the “penance – anointing – viaticum,” ordered for the future by the liturgical Constitution, is not a novelty, but a restoration of the three sacraments given to the sick, which were prevalent in the early middle ages until the 12th century. In addition to the theological justification, it therefore also has a historical basis.

In the scholastic understanding of the fifth sacrament as a means of directly preparing the soul for heavenly happiness, the following deductive result occurred: If the anointing of the sick, because of the nature of its grace, is a means of directly preparing the soul for heavenly happiness, it can be given only as many times as there is a final danger of losing one's life. In other words, the Fifth Sacrament cannot be validly renewed unless, after recovery, the disease resumes and there is a very serious threat of loss of life. This necessary conclusion of the scholastic understanding of the fifth sacrament has been softened – and in accordance with the tradition of ecclesiastical legislation on this sacrament – by the provision of canon 940, paragraph 2, which is still in force: “This sacrament cannot be repeated in the same illness, unless the sick person, after receiving it, becomes adorned and falls into a new danger of losing his life.” In light of the third and fourth assertions, this prohibition on renewing the anointing of the sick during one and the same illness is of a purely ecclesiastical origin and can therefore be modified by the Church. It can be expected that the Church will allow the sacramental anointing to be repeated, especially in the case of long-term illnesses.

The change in the definition of the subject and the time of the fifth sacrament, made by the liturgical Constitution for pastoral reasons in particular, concerns the secondary issue of the entire teaching on the anointing of the sick. However, if through the necessary, deductive deduction one could detect as many as 9 theorems inextricably linked with this change; if these are new statements in the theological treatise on the fifth sacrament, if some of them concern the most important issue in the science of the sacraments, namely the nature of the grace of the sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick, then the above considerations are a telling example of how closely the various statements of Catholic theology are interlinked and how effective strict, deductive thinking is as a tool for the development of theology.

The Main Proposals for the Content of Moral Theology in the Light of the Documents of the Council's Renewal*

In the Council *Decree on the Formation of Priests*, we find the following statement on moral theology: "Particular attention must be paid to the improvement of moral theology, whose scientific interpretation, nourished to a greater extent by the doctrine of Scripture, shows the sublimity of the vocation of the faithful in Christ and their duty to bear fruit in love for the life of the world" (OT 16). This clear indication is complemented by other statements by the Second Vatican Council concerning the adapted renewal of the theological sciences¹. The issue of the renewal of theology in the spirit of the Council was also the subject of several statements by Pope Paul VI in recent years².

In addition to special statements on studies and theological sciences, many of the indications of importance for the renewal of moral theology can be found indirectly in the documents of the Teaching Church. In this case, it is not only the Council's resolutions, but also other, especially post-conciliar, documents of the Church's magisterium. All these documents are referred to collectively as the *Council's renewal documents*. In the present paper I intend to indicate the postulates regarding the content of moral theology, which stem from these documents.

* STV 6(1968)1.

¹ We find them in the following documents of the Council: DV 23f; GS 44.62; UR 4.5.10.17; OT 13-18; AG 22; GE 11.

² Cf. *Allocutio in Gregoriana Pontificia Studiorum Universitate habita*, in: AAS 56(1964), 363-367; *Allocutio coram VI Congressu Thomistico Internationali*, in: AAS 57(1965), 788-792; *Epistula Apostólica Alma Parens*, in: AAS 58(1966), 609-614; *Epistula ad card. Pizzardo Cum iam* (de theologia Concilii Vaticani II), AAS 58(1966), 877-881; *Allocutio ad eos, qui interfuerunt Conventui...* de theologia Concilii Vaticani II, AAS 58(1966), 889-896.

The Theology of God's Call

The answer to the question whether the main task of moral theology is to give a theologically valid lecture on the Christian doctrine of religious-moral life in the light of God's revelation, or whether it is to develop a set of norms of conduct, is essential in order to determine the proper object of moral theology.

Obligation or Vocation

It seems unambiguous to point to this issue in the statement of *Vaticanum II* quoted in the introduction. The scientific lecture of moral theology according to the Council is to show "the sublimity of the vocation of believers in Christ and their duty to bear fruit in love for the life of the world" (OT 16).

Showing the sublimity of the vocation in Christ undoubtedly postulates the presentation of the ideal of Christian morality, while showing the obligation to bear fruit assumes taking into account the aspect of moral obligation. So, we see, that the conciliar indication does not go along the line of adequately separable "or-or;" the description of the ideal of moral life or the definition of moral duties. On the contrary, it dictates that a scientific lecture on moral theology should show both aspects of moral life under consideration³. Therefore, one cannot limit oneself to a description of Christian morality without considering the normativity of the principles of moral behaviour. In turn the displaying of binding principles of morality requires in turn a rational justification of these principles.

The analysed statement of the Council indicates not only the need to include in the lecture of moral theology both the presentation of the ideal of morality and normativity, but also draws attention to the approach to the issue of moral life. It has been included by the Council in the categories of God's call and the duty of life's commitment on the part of man – "the duty to bear fruit in love for the life of the world" (OT 16, cf. LG 11-13.34-34; GS 18.25.92; GE 1). In this way, the Council authorized, as it were, the concept of Christian morality

³ In the absence of comprehensive documentation of the statements of *Vaticanum II*, it is not possible at least for the time being to determine what the Fathers meant by the term: "scientific lecture" (*scientifica expositio*). It undoubtedly refers to the teaching of moral theology. It was used in the Decree on the Formation of Priests. It seems, however, that indirectly at least it is also an indication for research work in the field of moral theology, since the implementation of the intended teaching depends on the results of the current state of research, and the subject of teaching moral theology depends on the concept of this scientific discipline.

as the morality of the dialogue between man and God in life. The specific feature of this dialogue is that it is a responsive morality; the morality of man's life response to God's call. The initiative of this dialogue belongs to God (cf. 1J 4:10) and manifests itself precisely in the category of invocation (cf. Rom 1:1.6.7; 8:28.30; 1Cor 1:2.9; Gal 1:6; 1P 2:9). It is not an optional call but a morally binding call for a human being to respond to life's response. Moral conduct, therefore, is conditioned by God's call, which is the result of God's saving plan, and has its justification not only in the work of redemption but also in the work of creation.

The moral theology can thus be described as the theology of God's call and man's response to life. Since the obligation to engage in life's work is indeed conditioned by God's broadly understood vocation, it seems justified to believe that the primary object of moral theology is the morally binding Christian vocation. The religious and moral duties connected with the postulate of a life answer are, as we have stated, dictated by God's call, which is manifested both in the sublimity of the Christian vocation and in the gift of man by God⁴.

Vocation in Christ

The task of moral theology in the spirit of Council renewal does not consist primarily in the scientific elaboration of a list of principles and commandments to be followed in the Christian life. Such an approach could distort the true image of Christian morality. After all, it does not reveal the inner dynamism and vital signs of personalization and dialogue of the religious-moral life of a Christian. It could also give the impression that Christian morality, while humanistic, nevertheless places more emphasis on respect for impersonal law and order than on personal involvement. In a word, it would seem that Christian morality is legalistic and minimalistic, and not personalistic and responsorial.

Nor does it meet the requirements of the Council's renewal with a view to Christian morality that does not reveal the proper place of Jesus Christ in the dialogue between God's religious and moral life and man. It is not enough to show the figure of Jesus Christ as a lofty teacher and a personal model to follow. Such an approach is too neutral and moralistic. Nor does it reflect the characteristic features of the Christian concept of morality.

Undoubtedly, moral theology, in the spirit of Council renewal, will show Christ as a great teacher of morality and an unrivalled model of moral life.

⁴ Cf. J. Puchs, *Theologia moralis perficienda. Votum Concilii Vaticani II*, *Periodica de re morali, canonica, liturgica*, 55(1966), 501.

Above all, however, he will point out that God's call is made in Jesus and that man's answer to life is also to be made in Jesus Christ.

In light of the revealed truth, man reaches God only through Jesus Christ (cf. 1Tim 2:5). So we are to be like Christ (cf. J 13:12-15; 15:10; Rom 6:1-11; 15:1-37; Phil 2:7; 1J 2:6). What is more, we will follow Jesus Christ (cf. Mk 1:16-20; 2:15; 3:13; Lk 9:59). This is more than just an outward imitation. It means sharing the fate of Christ, and thus the life relationship of man with Christ the Saviour (cf. Mt 10:17f; J 12:26). It can be said, therefore, that man's attitude towards God manifested in his religious and moral life is a postulate of life in Christ (cf. Rom 7:6; 8:2.14-16; 1Cor 1:30). He is not only the primordial and the norm, but also the foundation – the source – of Christian life, which is to be a part of his life (cf. Rom 8:29; Col 1:15-20)⁵.

The place of Jesus Christ in Christian life and morality is strongly marked in the Council documents (cf. LG 6.7.41-43; 47; AG 24; OT 8; PC 2). The Council speaks clearly of the Mystery of Christ, in which the whole history of humanity is summarised (cf. OT 14), both the human community and the life of the individual. Hence the postulate of Christocentrism is moral theology. This does not contradict either anthropocentrism or theocentrism because we are Christ and Christ of God (cf. Rom 6:11; 1Cor 3:23-15:8). On the contrary, in the Christocentric approach, the postulate of theocentrism and the postulate of anthropocentrism consistent with the notion of true humanism are guaranteed.

The phrase itself: "the calling of the faithful in Christ" (OT 16) points to the interconnection of these seemingly contradictory points of reference in Christian morality. In fact, much depends on the proper linkage of these three aspects. After all, God's plan of salvation aims precisely at making man in Jesus Christ a child of God and, through his religious and moral life, in his relationship with Christ in the Holy Spirit, he received participation in the life of the Divine Trinity.

So in such a manner God is the ultimate goal of man in the religious-moral plane. Man is the subject of moral values and norms. His conduct is an analogy which gives priority to the notion of what is moral. A characteristic feature of this behaviour is the birthmark of Christ – "in Christ." Therefore, moral theology, according to the Council, should show "the sublimity of the vocation of the faithful in Christ" (OT 16).

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, 502-505; S. Moysa, *Pastoral and Ecumenical Character of the Second Vatican Council and the Development of Catholic Theology*, STV 3(1965), 446-456; Sz. Sobalkowski, *Teologia moralna i jej stanowisko chrystocentryczne w całości nauk teologicznych*, AK 49(1948), 313-331.

Dimensions of the Vocation

The place of Jesus Christ in moral theology, and therefore the Christological birthmark of the theological elaboration of Christian morality in the spirit of conciliar renewal, is clearly dictated by the vocation of man by God in Christ. This is what summarises the sublimity of the Christian vocation.

The Council documents reveal the dimensions of the vocation of the faithful in Christ: it is a call to fraternal communion with God and with people (cf. GS 18.92); a vocation that applies to all people (cf. LG 13); the universal vocation to holiness (cf. LG 32-12)⁶; to eternal glory, and thus to supernatural salvation (cf. LG 41).

Within the framework of moral theology, therefore, it is necessary, according to the revealed word of God, to show the Christian perspective of this salvation, especially the eschatological perspective. For the Christian vocation is exercised on the basis of human history, in the pilgrim Church, in the community of the People of God waiting for parishion, but always with a keen awareness that the renewal of the world is already taking place, because a new era has already come into being (cf. LG 48). It is also important to clearly emphasize the communal character of man's vocation in God's plan (cf. GS 24) and the fact that human solidarity reaches its perfect form in the Incarnate Word (cf. GS 32).

Supernatural salvation is a gift from God and has a religious character. It is the ultimate goal, and an indispensable condition for this goal is the proper religious and moral life of man (cf. LG 11-13 31-34; OP 6; DB 15; PC 2; GE 2). In this interconnection between salvation and moral life, the Christian approach to morality in relation to religion is revealed. Moral life, however, becomes adequate for the purpose of supernatural salvation if it is animated by supernatural love (*vita caritate formata*).

The vocation of the faithful in Christ is both a gift and a moral imperative that becomes concrete in the daily life of a Christian. In light of this vocation, all that makes up his life, both in the natural order and in the supernatural order, takes on value. On the other hand, because of man's frailty and sinfulness, the Christian vocation presupposes not only continuous moral perfection, but also continuous conversion (cf. Mt 16:24) – the postulate of penance (*metanota*). Moral theology as a science of the religious-moral life of a Christian should reveal the fundamental significance of penance for this life. For in repentance the essential conditions for the continuous renewal of the Christian life are summarised.

⁶ On the territory of Polish moral theology, J. Woroniecki already drew attention to this duty twenty years ago, while sketching the program of the theology of Christian life, cf. J. Woroniecki, *Nauka o doskonałości chrześcijańskiej w seminariach duchownych*, AK 48(1948), 347.

A thorough study of the question of penance in the spirit of the Council's renewal can be found in the Apostolic Constitution of *Paenitemini*⁷. It is a valuable source for the theological-moral treatise on penance. He points to the Christological justification for Christian penance⁸. By introducing a new discipline of the fast, the Constitution presents it in the perspective of the universal obligation of penance under God's law.

The Apostolic Constitution *Indulgentiarum doctrina* is also a valuable post-conciliar guideline in relation to the question of penance^{9,10}. Particular attention should be paid to the strong emphasis on the need for moral commitment as a prerequisite for obtaining indulgences. In addition, the new discipline of indulgences is based on the theology of sin and penance.

It seems that one of the Council's demands to moral theology is to deal with the problem of sin against the background of the obligation of internal conversion to God. Consideration of the issue of penance within the framework of moral theology is also a postulate resulting from the concern to ensure that the doctrine of religious and moral life ensures the essential mark of the cross of Christ. Paul VI points out that in the evangelical words of the call: "Repent and believe the gospel." (Mk 1:15) the ideal of the Christian life is briefly summarised¹¹.

The Christian morality which has its justification in God's call is, according to the Council, an ideal of religious-oral life for all people, not just for Christians. Such is the "model" of morality revealed by God. All people participate in it not only as vocations to live in Christ, but also through the supernatural bonds that unite them with God and with the community of the People of God. Moreover, non-believers are not devoid of the gifts of grace, so they can respond to God's call to a certain extent (cf. LG 8,16; GS 22; AG 3)^{12 13}.

⁷ Cf. Paulus VI, "Paenitevnani," AAS 58(1966), 177-198.

⁸ Cf. Ibid., 177.179.181.

⁹ Cf. Paulus VI, "Indulgentiarum, doctrina," AAS 59(1967), 5-24.

¹⁰ Standard 7: In connection with the conditions of plenary indulgence, we read: "Requiritur insuper ut excludatur omnis affectus erga quodcumque peccatum etiam veniale." Ibid., 22; Standard 12: "Divisio indulgentiarum in personales, reales et locales, non amplius adhibetur, quo clarius constet indulgentiis ditari christifidelium actiones, quamvis cum re vel loco interdum coniungantur." Ibid., 22.

¹¹ "Quae verba totius vitae christianae quasi summa sunt et complexio." Paulus VI, "Paenitemini," 179.

¹² Cf. J. Fuchs, art. cit., 510f.

¹³ Cf. Sacra Congregatio Rituum, *Instructio de cultu Mysteriorum Eucharistici*, 13, L'Osservatore Romano, 31 V 1967, 3.

Place of the Sacred Sacraments

The Christian vocation includes God's call to life's response. God calls us in Jesus Christ. Our response will take place in our life's contact with Christ. Hence the need for a religious-moral commitment to the Mystery of Christ, which permeates all human history and continues today, above all, in the Church of Christ (cf. OT 14). The normal way of doing this is through the sacred sacraments. This is clearly indicated in the documents of the Council (cf. LG 7.11; SC 6). In connection with the sacraments, attention has been drawn to the issue of the sacraments, so far overlooked in theology, as signs of faith, which "not only assume faith, but by means of words and things give it growth, strengthen it and express it" (KL 59, cf. 33). The value of personal involvement in the sacramental life, i.e. the *ex opere operantis* case (cf. KL 10-12) was also highlighted.

The religious and moral life of a Christian is marked by the sacraments of initiation: Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist. Baptism as the foundation of a life-giving relationship with Christ and the Church; Confirmation as an effective sign of the strengthening of the Christian life on the path, with particular emphasis on the responsibility for the life *in* human society and the sacralization of the world; the Mystery of the Eucharist as the centre not only of the official worship of God but also of the Christian life (cf. KL 10.47)¹⁴.

The Eucharist, as evidenced by the conciliar documents of the Council, fully realizes the sacramental union of the Christian with Christ and with the whole Mystical Body (cf. LG 7.11; SC 6.47). It also reveals the sacralisation of temporal values because in this sacrament "the gifts of nature, man-made, are transformed into flesh and blood of glory" (GS 38). The Sacrament of Penance is a solemn and effective sign of reconciliation with God and the Church (cf. LG 11; OP 5).

In light of the Council's data, it seems indispensable to include the issue of sacraments in moral theology. However, this is a moral issue of the sacraments, which until now has been mostly overwhelmed by canonical and pastoral issues in textbook studies of moral theology. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate the value and necessity of the sacraments of Saint John of God for the proper development of a full human life, since they sanctify the proper use of material things (cf. SC 61), they show the passing figure of the world (cf. LG 48), they foretell and imagine a new heaven and a new earth (cf. LG 35).

¹⁴ "Eucharisticum mysterium sacrae Liturgiae immo totius christianae vitae, est vere centrum." Ibid. 1. Cf. 6.7.

Due to the importance of the sacraments for Christian morality, which is essentially sacramental morality, the issue of the sacraments is a fundamental moral theology and should be taken into account in the lecture on the fundamental principles of Christian morality, in other words, in the “principles.”

Theology of Human Life Response

Showing the sublimity of the Christian vocation as the main task of moral theology ensures its theocentric character. It is aimed at the proper illumination of man’s life response to God’s call. For God’s call demands an answer from man. This religious-moral response in the Christian “approach” is supposed to be, in turn, as stated, a subject of moral theology.

Theological Anthropology

In the category of vocation in Christ, not only is the approach of man to God characteristic of Christianity summarised, but also the Christian concept of man as an object of moral theology. Such an approach does not contradict a truth which is also recognizable independently of Revelation, that God is the Creator and the ultimate goal of man, and therefore the fundamental justification of our duty and moral norms. This is also a theological truth. In fact, however, it is important to consider man’s relationship with God as an essential basis for theological-moral considerations that Scripture and dogmatic tradition do not know man *ut sic*; they only know man created in the image and likeness of God, man who lost the dignity of a child of God through sin, but was reconciled to God through the passion and death of Jesus Christ (cf. Rom 6:11; 2Cor 5:14); in the Sacrament of Baptism he was buried and resurrected together with Christ (cf. Rom 6:4f), freed from the necessity of sin (cf. Rom 6:6.22), to live on earth in the society of the People of God in anticipation of a new earth and a new heaven (cf. Ap 21:1). This reveals the biblical richness of the content of man’s relationship with God as the basis for moral theology. Undoubtedly, the philosophically recognisable truth about man can be deduced from this set of truths, but how poor in comparison to what the revealed word of God tells us.

Moral theology examines the personality of man as the subject of response to God’s call, and analyses the relevant properties and conditions of this response. The Council’s postulate is to treat the doctrine of man and his activity properly within the framework of moral theology. As we know, so far this was limited to the problem of specific features of human activities. There is an

urgent need for a comprehensive treatise on theological anthropology, taking into account the elements of nature and grace. The basis for such a treaty and its proper formulation can be found in the pastoral Constitution of the Second Vatican Council, in the chapter on the dignity of the human person (cf. GS 12-18) and on human activity in the world (cf. GS 33-39).

The Constitution *Gaudium et spes* points to the mystery of the Incarnate Word as a justification and a *full* explanation of Christian anthropology (cf. GS 22). It speaks of the paschal mystery as the source of the value of human activity (cf. GS 38), whose ultimate goal is a new earth and a new heaven (cf. GS 39). It shows the “model” of the new man in the form of Jesus Christ. He is the New Man, the Alpha and Omega of human society and the whole universe (cf. GS 45).

On the other hand, however, the Pastoral Constitution emphasises the value of “secular” human activity (cf. GS 34), the just autonomy of earthly things (cf. GS 36) and properly understood autonomy of natural cognition and scientific research (cf. GS 50, 62). These are valuable indications for the elaboration of a theological anthropological treatise on the basis of the revealed word of God, taking into account the natural knowledge and the current state of scientific research; with full respect for all that is in man, not only divine but also human. In this way, the postulate of only anthropocentrism in moral theology, which reveals the trait of Christian humanism, will be fulfilled.

Theology of Freedom

The question of Christian freedom is inextricably linked to the treaties on human dignity and human activity. This is a comprehensive treatise on the theology of freedom from the point of view of the moral life of a Christian who is called to freedom (cf. Gal. 5:13). A theological approach to the issue of freedom is not possible without showing the essential dependence of Christian freedom on the saving action of Jesus Christ. A comprehensive treaty on freedom takes on particular importance in view of the current issue of religious freedom. Guaranteeing this freedom and exercising it properly depends on a proper view of the essence of human freedom.

The Declaration on religious freedom of Vatican Council II affirms the natural right of the human to freedom from external coercion in religious matters. At the same time, however, he draws attention to the need for proper education to freedom (cf. DH 8). The *Gaudium et spes* (cf. GS 17.59.61) also stresses the need to educate people to exercise their freedom with a sense of responsibility. The same spirit revives recent decisions of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in connection with the abolition of the Church’s index

of forbidden books. They clearly draw attention to the need for knowledge and a sense of Christian responsibility with regard to the requirements of natural law¹⁵.

The documents of the Council's renewal show a tendency not to proliferate overly embarrassing regulations. This undoubtedly requires a sense of responsibility in exercising freedom and making a personal decision¹⁶. This reveals the need for a careful formation of conscience based on supernatural prudence. This indicates the timeliness and place of the treaties on conscience and prudence within moral theology. There is no doubt that, in the light of the Council's renewal, the importance of these treaties has increased enormously.

Commitment to Love

The task of moral theology is to correctly highlight the "duty to bring fruit in love for the life of the world" (OT 16). It must therefore make it clear that the fruit of the religious-moral life must be above all love for God and one's neighbour because it effectively ensures the "life of the world." This is related to the overcoming of individualism in the understanding of moral issues and the duties of the Christian life (cf. GS 30).

The Council's statement on moral theology clearly emphasises that the goal of the Christian life is not only personal perfection, but also concern for the "life of the world." Thus, moral theology must aim at overcoming the individualistic concept of morality. It should reveal the interconnectedness of the religious-moral life, which aims at the salvation of the individual with the life of the society of the People of God and of all humanity. It should not only draw attention to the social aspects of our work, but also show the duty of a positive commitment to the apostolate. It is a postulate resulting from the communal character of the vocation of man in God's plan (cf. LG 3; AA 2f; OP 6). However, apostolic activity must always be supported by the witness of life (cf. AG 15).

The "life of the world" is above all a supernatural salvation, which is achieved through life in the world. This requires a fair commitment to the

¹⁵ In the explanation to the decree abolishing the index we read: "Sive Notificatio sive Decretum, cum fiduciam faciunt rectae conscientiae, vim legis naturalis confirmant. Magis igitur urget grave Ecclesiae officium fidelium conscientiae solleter illuminandi ac recte formandi." *Nota explicativa ad Decretum die 15 XI 1966*, Nuntius S. Congrégations pro Doctrina Fidei, 1(1967)14.

¹⁶ The following expressions are noteworthy: "substantialis observantia," "complexus di-erum," "pars notabilis," cf. Paulus VI, "Paenitemini," II, § 2, AAS 58(1966), 183; *Sacra Congregatio Concilii, Dubium*, AAS 59(1967), 229.

affairs of this world. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate that the vocation in Christ also imposes an obligation to care for the creation of human and temporal values, and that it is in this way that the faithful bear fruit of their vocation (cf. LG 36; GS 34, 43; GE 2)¹⁷.

In the Council's statement it was clearly indicated that theology shows the duty to bear fruit for the life of the world "in love" (OT 16). In this way, the role of supernatural love as a source of dynamism in the Christian life is highlighted. In the life of supernatural love, the Christian mark of the pursuit of moral perfection through following Christ is manifested (cf. J 13:34; 15:10); moreover, by clinging to Jesus Christ (cf. Rom 13:14; Gal 3:27). Moral theology, according to the Council's indications, should therefore show the dynamism of the realisation of Christian vocation in expectation of the "blessed hope and the coming of the glory of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Tit 2:13).

The dynamism of Christian love takes on a real form in a moral action enhanced by both acquired and implanted virtues. Acquired virtues ensure the operability of moral behaviour and thus their great significance for the moral life. The implanted ones improve human activity in the supernatural plane. The postulate of the renewal of the theological treatise on virtues is to reveal the place of the evangelical virtues of obedience, humility and patience in the concept of Christian morality. It is also necessary to show that an authentic Christian life above all by faith and supernatural hope. However, the most important aspect is love because in it a person gives over himself or herself, not just something that is his or her property.

The essential dependence of the dynamism of the Christian life on supernatural love raises the postulate of due consideration of the theology of love. It seems that the traditional treatise on the theological virtue of love within the framework of detailed moral theology does not fulfil this task. The theological approach to morality must make it clear that supernatural love is not only the greatest value and fundamental commandment, but above all the power that inspires the moral life of a Christian.

Legal Issue

To show the duty to bear fruit in love for the life of the world assumes the postulate of revealing the proper sources of moral obligation. It is not enough in this case to refer to the moral norms formulated in God's and ecclesiastical

¹⁷ 18 Cf. J. Fuchs, art. cit., 513-520.

commandments. The basis of moral duty is the call of God and the gift of God to man which makes it possible to carry out a sublime vocation. In this way, the fruits of the Christian life are above all a revelation of the inner energies of the human soul under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and not merely the result of obedience to a command (cf. Rom 7:5; 8:5-18; Gal 5:22f). However, moral theology, in the spirit of renewal, cannot ignore the question of moral law, since it shows the way for the proper development of religious-moral life.

The lecture on the theology of law in the spirit of the realisation of the Council's indications should reveal the personalistic features of the biblical approach to morality; the personal call to God and the human's response. Moral norms are an expression of the binding power of God's calling. In this way, the general norms serve a "dialogue" of morality between God and man. For they are the generalisation of God's will to call man to the religious and moral life. Through the norms of moral law, the voice of the calling God reaches us. In a specific case, the general rule becomes an "individual and personal call." Although God's will does not identify itself with the general norm formulated in the commandments, it is in these that it is expressed.

The theological and moral treatise on law must take due account of the relationship between supernatural values and natural values. This is a question of natural law because it manifests a moral aspect of the natural order. It is also necessary to point out the interdependence between the internal law of charity, which the Holy Spirit writes in the hearts of the faithful (*lex interna*), and the external prescriptions and norms which concretise the moral duty (*lex externa*)¹⁸. The doctrine of the law must not obscure the dynamism of Christian morality, which aims at the realisation of the sublime vocation in Christ.

Without neglecting the need to determine what is necessary in a concrete situation, we must not forget the universal vocation to holiness. The moral norm is to express a concrete task within the realisation of a vocation in life. The theology of law must therefore take into account the category of the call of God and the life response of man, in the conscious awareness that, because of the communal nature of vocation, man's response is to be carried out not only within the natural human community, but also in an organised and hierarchically ordered society of the People of God.

¹⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*, 537.

Conclusion

In the analyses to date only the conciliar guidelines concerning the basic issues of moral theology have been considered. This does not mean at all that in the documents of the Council's renewal there are no indications on many issues that are simply discussed in the detailed part of moral theology. Such a subject is the issue of religious freedom, which is linked to the treaty on faith. The Council's postulate is also to discuss the problem of the priesthood of the faithful in connection with the treatise on the honour of God (*de religione*). Moral issues of dialogue and ecumenism, including the participation of Catholics in the religious life of other faiths (*communicatio in sacris*), are awaiting elaboration. The Council's guidelines for the moralistic theologian also refer to the issue of contemporary social life, which has become the subject of the second part of the *Gaudium et spes* Constitution and were developed by Paul VI in the encyclical *Populorum progressio*.

It seems superfluous to give a complete list of conciliar indications in the area of moral theology which relate to detailed topics of this theological discipline. In the Council's renewal of theology, it is not a question of seeking new content, but of showing the "old" truths and principles in a living relationship with the revealed word of God, taking into account the needs of the human race of our time.

Return to sources in Christian education according to *Vaticanum II**

In one of the documents proclaimed by Vatican II, we read: “The pilgrimage Church is guided by Christ’s call for constant reform, which the Church as a human and earthly institution still needs” (UR 6)¹. Hence the call of Mother-Church to her sons for constant purification and renewal (GS 43) results. According to Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, the term “renewal” is less radical, but more integral and deeper than the term “reform” and indicates either the transformation of what was old or the new initiative, something like mining a treasure. *Accomodata renovatio*, on the other hand, means a renewal adapted to the consciousness that the Church has now achieved².

The question now arises how to understand renewal in relation to Christian education. It is unchangeable as to its basic principles contained in the Gospel and in the pedagogy of Jesus Christ, and constantly enriched by the educational doctrine of the Church, but it must develop, meeting also current social needs, in accordance with the principle of universalism.

Thus, the renewal of Christian education is expressed in a double movement through: 1) the return to the sources, which could be called evangelization and 2) adaptation to the present day, which could be described more briefly as Christianization³. In this article we will limit ourselves only to the first movement, presenting it in the light of the conciliar texts.

* STV II(1973)I.

¹ The number next to the abbreviation referring to a given Council document indicates its next article, that is the number.

² K. Wojtyła, *Wstęp ogólny*, in: *Sobór Watykański II. Konstytucje — Dekrety — Deklaracje*, Poznań 1968, 16.

³ Cf. S. Kunowski, *Założenia i aktualne potrzeby wychowania katolickiego*, AK 65(1962)3, 222.

The main task of the Second Vatican Council was to answer a question posed by Paul VI: *Ecclesia, quid dicis de teipsa?* and so Vatican II can be described as an ecclesiastical council⁴. On the other hand, we know that the return to sources consists in deepening the closeness to Jesus Christ, and thus a renewal of Christocentrism. However since the encyclical of Pius XI entitled *Divini Illius Magistri* shows that soteriological Christocentrism belongs to the essence of Christian education⁵ the problem arises of the ecclesiastical approach to Christocentrism and its pedagogical implications.

Christocentrism in an Ecclesiastical Perspective

The Council's Vision of the Church in Light of "Lumen Gentium"

The average Christian – as noted by J. Charytański – in the period after the Council of Trent and Vatican Council I saw in the church rather a service institution with which one can achieve individual salvation, if one believes in truth, fulfills commandments and uses the sacraments.

This attitude was not connected with the awareness of constituting the Church and being responsible for the Church⁶. However, it was the result of a certain one-sidedness in the recognition of the Church's theology, mainly caused by polemics with the Reformation. Namely, they have come to the fore in the vision of the Church: its institutionality, diminishing the anthropological element, hierarchical character at the expense of the sense of community and static quality, which led to underestimation of historical dynamism⁷.

The dogmatic Constitution on the Church, *Lumen Gentium*, the central, key document of the Second Vatican Council⁸, fulfills these deficiencies, extracting the forgotten and important aspects of ecclesiology, especially in the first two chapters (LG 1-17).

Thus, the anthropological side of the Church is strongly emphasized, which is above all an institution, but a people of God rooted among all nations,

⁴ Cf. A. Skowronek, *Soborowa wizja Kościoła*, CoTh 37(1967)1, 10.

⁵ Cf. Pius XI, *Divini Illius Magistri*.

⁶ J. Charytański, *Zadania katechizacji w świetle dokumentów soborowych*, CoTh 37(1967)3, 88.

⁷ Cf. Y. Congar, *Kościół jako lud Boży*, "Concilium" (1965-1966) 1-10, 13-37.

⁸ Cf. E. Florkowski, *Wprowadzenie do Konstytucji dogmatycznej o Kościele*, in: *Sobór Watykański II*, op. cit., 132; L. Zimny, *Tajemnica Kościoła*, AK 68(1965)5-6, 270.

including bishops, priests, deacons, religious and laity, not only saints but also sinners (n. 13).

All people are called to the Church: Christians of other religions, including those who have not yet received the Gospel, and even those who have not yet reached their “explicit knowledge of God” (nn. 15-16). In this way, the Church reveals the community of “life, love and truth” for which it was established by Christ (n. 9)⁹, and the role of the hierarchy is a true service, meaningfully called “diakonia” or “service” in the Holy Scriptures (n. 24)¹⁰. Finally, by overcoming the static approach of the Church, the Constitution shows that it is a continuation of the chosen nation of Israel, the people of the New Covenant, made with God through the blood of Jesus Christ (n. 9). Established by the eternal plan of God, the Church makes pilgrimages to the eternal fulness of time by realizing the history of salvation (n. 50)¹¹.

Christ and the Church

However, a special relationship takes place between the Church and Jesus Christ. “For from the side of the Christ dying on the Cross the wondrous sacrament of the whole Church was born” (SC 5). Christ sacrificed himself for the Church, who is his Bride and his body (LG 6-7). He is the head of this body and at the same time of his people receiving all grace and life from Him (GS 50). Therefore, the presence of Jesus Christ in the Church is in a sense his incarnation into a society in the likeness of that which took place when Christ took on human nature. This second incarnation is characterized by a continuity (*incarnatio continua*), unlike the previous one, and must be understood in the personalist sense, i.e. that Christ is not replaced by the established institution, but personally He performs the work of salvation. The Church is no longer a man’s guide to God, but is rooted in Christ, and those belonging to the Church thus

⁹ Cf. M. Chenu, *Kościół jako wspólnota*, “Tygodnik Powszechny” 18(1964)20, 1-5; M. Chenu, *Lud Boży w świecie*. Kraków 1968; J. Krucina, *Wspólnotowa struktura Kościoła*, “Znak” 20(1968)9, 1101-1115; S. Wilkanowicz, *Kościół — wspólnota podstawowa*, “Znak” 19(1967)3, 297-306; E. Pin, *O Kościele jako formie życia wspólnotowego*, “Więź” 144(1970)4, 28-36; L. Altting von Genau, *Christianizm: instytucje i społeczność*, “Więź” 114(1967)10, 36-45; E. Bianchi, *Demokratyzacja Kościoła*, “Tygodnik Powszechny” 21(1967)47.

¹⁰ Cf. O. Semmelroth, *Kapłański lud Boży i jego pasterze*, “Concilium” (1965-1966) 1-10, 27-35.

¹¹ Cf. H. Bogacki, *Misterium Kościoła pielgrzymującego*, in: *Kościół w świetle Soboru*, Poznań 1968, 53-95; B. Cierzniaak, *Misterium Kościoła wg konstytucji dogmatycznej “Lumen gentium,”* HD 34(1965)3, 145-151.

become members of the glorified Savior. The Church, therefore, means Christ who continues to live through it¹².

B.C. Butler quotes Y. Congar, who says: "Christ along with the Church does not constitute anything more than what Christ himself is, according to the same principle: God along with the world do not constitute anything more than what God Himself is, and then he cites Saint Thomas from Aquinas, saying that the Church was not only founded by Jesus Christ, but is constantly maintained by Him in its existence, especially through the Eucharist. The church is therefore Christocentric in the most complete sense of the word."¹³

Participation of Church in the Mission of Christ

Therefore, the concrete existence of individual Christians should not be understood anthropocentrically, i.e. not as directed towards Christ, but christocentrically, i.e., having its source in Christ, who is its most important foundation and source¹⁴. The incarnation in Christ through Baptism begins the Christian's existence, which consists in taking part in the priesthood, the prophetic and royal office of the Savior (n. 31), while the latter two appear to be the very expression of the former¹⁵.

a) Participation in the priestly mission of Jesus Christ already in the Old Testament, in addition to the inherited Aaronic priesthood, the whole people were described as priestly (Ex 19:5-6)¹⁶. In the New Testament, the only Mediator between God and people is Jesus Christ (No. 8); He is the only High Priest of the New and Eternal Covenant (n. 21, 28, 34, 83) and He makes his people become the people of the royal priesthood (1P 2:4- 10; Rom 12:1; Ap 1:6; 5:10; 20:6)¹⁷. Christians of the first centuries were fully aware of this fact. As a result of the rejection of the hierarchical (or ministerial) priesthood, Catholic theologians accentuated the necessity of its restoration, which resulted in the dulling of the awareness of the faithful in relation to the universal (or common) priesthood

¹² Cf. R. Łukaszyk, *Kościół jako wspólnota w Chrystusie*, ZNKUL 12(1969)3, 3-17; *Pojęcie Kościoła jako Ludu Bożego w eklezjologii Vaticanum II*, "Roczniki Teologiczno-Kanoniczne KUL" 16(1969)25; *Teologiczne spojrzenie na Kościół*, "Katecheta" 8(1964)1, 5-10.

¹³ B.C. Butler, *Tajemnica Kościoła*, Tyg. Powsz. 17(1963)41.

¹⁴ Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Idea Ludu Bożego i świętości Kościoła a posłannictwo świeckich*, AK 68(1965)5-6, 310.

¹⁵ Cf. O. Semmelroth, art. cit., 28.

¹⁶ Cf. A. Jankowski, *Kapłaństwo*, in: *Podręczna encyklopedia biblijna*, vol. 1, Poznań 1959, 652.

¹⁷ Cf. S. Schudy, *Kapłaństwo Jezusa Chrystusa w nauce Vaticanum II*, CoTh 39(1969)4, 15-32.

received by baptism)¹⁸. Meanwhile, both one and the other, although there is a significant difference between them, participate in their own way in the one priesthood of Christ (n. 10).

b) Of course, priests, bishops and the pope do not cease to participate in the common priesthood¹⁹, which, however, is a particularly valuable discovery for the theological status of lay people in the Church²⁰. For the priesthood existence is always associated with a special sacrifice²¹. The subject of the sacrifice of the universal priesthood is the whole life of the Christian: daily work, rest, patiently endured concerns. All this made as sacrifices to the Father in the Eucharistic rite with the Lord's Body becomes a sacrifice to God by Jesus Christ, to whom his devotees thus sacrifice the world (n. 34), "the holy and organic nature of the priesthood community manifests itself by the Sacraments and by virtues" (n. 11)²². Thus, sacramentology and ecclesiology constitute an organic whole.

c) Participating in the prophetic mission of Jesus Christ. In the Old Testament, the prophetic and priestly functions were separated from each other. On the contrary, Jesus Christ transmits his priestly and royal mission as the Head of the People of God²³. The prophetic task is fulfilled "not only by the hierarchy of priests who teach in His name and are legitimated by His authority, but also by the laity, whom he has established for witnessing and provided with the sense of faith and the grace of the word so that the power of the Gospel may shine in everyday, family and social life" (n. 35), thanks to accepting God's Word and remaining faithful to the extent that all the faithful cannot get lost in it (n. 12). "Every disciple of Christ has a duty to spread faith" (n.17) with the purpose of "evangelizing the world" accomplished "with both life and word testimony," which becomes particularly effective because it takes place "under the ordinary conditions of the world" (n. 35), while the testimony of life is expressed in particular by faith, love and hope (n. 12.35). Finally, the Holy Spirit makes believers capable of undertaking various functions "aimed at renewing and further useful development of the Church" by providing them with appropriate charismas (n. 12).

¹⁸ Cf. O. Semmelroth, art. cit., 27.

¹⁹ Cf. E.J. de Smedt, *Le sacerdoce des fidèles*, Bruges 1961, 21.

²⁰ Cf. K. Wojtyła, art. cit., 309.

²¹ Cf. O. Semmelroth, art. cit., 28.

²² Cf. A. Skowronek, *Kościelno-twórcza rola sakramentów*, CoTh 38(1968)4, 10; *Eklezjalna treść sakramentów*, CoTh 39(1969)3, 19-33; L. Szafranski, *Kapłaństwo hierarchiczne i kapłaństwo wiernych w sprawowaniu liturgii Kościoła*, in: *Wprowadzenie do liturgii*, Poznań 1967, 111-122; L. Szafranski, *Kapłaństwo wiernych*, Lublin 1968.

²³ Cf. J.Guillon, *Contemporary Church*, Warsaw 1965, 19.

d) Participating in the royal mission of Jesus Christ. The first pages of the Holy Scriptures present a man “created in the image of God... created to rule the world” (GS 34). After performing the saving work, Jesus Christ “entered the glory of his kingdom. Everything is in submission to Him... He granted this authority to the disciples so that they would also could participate in this royal freedom...” (LG 36). Participation in the royal mission of Christ consists in overcoming in oneself the reign of sin “by self-denial and through sacred life,” then spreading among the brothers the ideas of the kingdom of “truth and life,” “holiness and grace,” “justice, love and peace.”

Finally, it is part of this participation to improve the goods created “thanks to human work, technology and social civilization according to the objective set by the Creator...” healing the existing equipment of the world and conditions to prepare the role of the world for the sowing of the Word of God and for the message of peace (LG 36).

Pedagogical Implications of Ecclesiastical Christocentrism

The Council’s Vision of Education in Light of “*Gravissimum educationis*”

The Declaration on Christian Education entitled *Gravissimum educationis* is not a primary document of the Second Vatican Council, as indicated by the term “declaration” in contrast to the term “constitution.” It has occupied the place in the shadow of four great constitutions: on the Church, on God’s revelation, on the holy liturgy and on the Church in the modern world.

It should therefore be considered along with these basic statements of *Vaticanum II*. However not many publications discussing it were issued, and sometimes even it was regarded as disappointing²⁴. Noteworthy is the special issue of the “Ateneum Kapłańskie,” (AK) largely dedicated to the Declaration²⁵.

²⁴ Cf. Z. Klepacki, *Problemy pedagogiczne w soborowej “Deklaracji o wychowaniu chrześcijańskim,”* in: *Reports on publishing activities and scientific meetings*, Kronika Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, Lublin 1968 No. 16, 102; S. Kunowski, *Założenia ideowe soborowej “Deklaracji o wychowaniu chrześcijańskim,”* *ibid.*, 110; J. Tarnowski, *Wprowadzenie do Deklaracji o wychowaniu chrześcijańskim*, in: *Vatican Council II*, op. cit. 482; *Gravissimum educationis*, AK 71(1968)6, 397; S. Markiewicz, *Kryzys katolickiej koncepcji wychowawczej*, “Wychowanie” 5 (1965), 28.

²⁵ AK 71(1968)6, 387-471; cf. also *Erklärung über die christliche Erziehung, eingeleite von Fr. Päggele*, Trier 1966; E. Vandermeersch, *Déclaration sur l’éducation chrétienne*, in: *Documents Conciliaires*, vol. 2, Paris 1905, 153-195; *La Déclaration Conciliaire sur l’Éducation Chrétienne, appel à notre liberté. Equipes enseignantes 1965-1966* No. 2-3; A. Ancel, *Éducation*

It is characteristic for *Gravissimum educationis* that only the third part of it (nn. 1-4) refers to the issue of education, while two-thirds of it (nn. 5-12) deals with the issue of education. Such an arrangement is legitimated by the history of the Declaration, which was originally meant to be a statement about Catholic education and became a document of Catholic school renewal including universities²⁶. The basic idea of the Declaration is the right to human education attributable to all because of their dignity resulting from the fact of being a person and their right to Christian education attributable to the baptized, regarded as children of God.

Human education (GE 1) is tailored according to the individual goal, and thus depends on innate properties, sex differences, culture and native traditions. It also includes a social goal focused on concern for the common good, peace on earth and fraternal coexistence with other nations. The method of achieving such an ideal of education consists in the harmonious and full development of the individual in a spirit of freedom and responsibility with the help of a right conscience, directed at the ultimate goal, which is tantamount to knowledge and love of God. Christian education (n. 2) seeks to gradually introduce us to the mystery of salvation, thanks to which a personal change of human is to take place, manifesting in an ever greater awareness of faith and calling, praising God, especially in the liturgy and a testimony of life and hope. At the same time, social change manifests itself in contributing to the growth of the Mystical Body and the desire to shape the world in accordance with Christian ideals.

In this way, “natural values included in the full understanding of man redeemed by Christ will contribute to the good of the whole community” (n. 2). Those who are primarily obliged to be educated are parents, “because they gave life to children;” certain responsibilities and rights in the field of education belong to the state, “because it is responsible for organizing what the common worldly good requires,” finally the Church also takes part in education, using many means, “the first of which is catechization” (nn. 3-4).

The vision of education presented in the Declaration contains new elements: social aspect, freedom and responsibility, concern for the common good and for peace, respect for the progress of science and technology, the pursuit of shaping the world in accordance with Christian values, dialogue with

chrétiennedans la lumière du Concile, “La Documentation Catholique” 66(1969)15:50, 976-986; W. Seibel, J. Ratzinger, *Christliche Erziehung nach dem Konzil*, Köln 1967; J. Saintclair, *L'éducation chrétienne eu Concile*, Études, Mars 1966, 391-397.

²⁶ Cf. J. Tarnowski, *Introduction*, art. cit., 473, and F. Bednarski, *Z historii Deklaracji o wychowaniu chrześcijańskim*, AK 71(1968)6, 387-396; W. Granat, *Uniwersytet katolicki w świetle uchwał Soboru Watykańskiego II*, ZNKUL 11(1968)3-4, 24.

people with different beliefs, etc. The declaration thus expresses – in the spirit of Christian universalism – an attitude open to everything that is true and good, wherever it comes from. The educational concept of *Gravissimum educationis* can be described as an attempt to synthesize human values with Christian ones without erasing the proper difference between them.

The Place of Christ and the Church in Christian Education

The specific character of Christian education can undoubtedly be characterized above all by its connection with Christ and the Church. At the very beginning *Gravissimum educationis* emphasizes this connection, justifying the participation of the Mother Church in the development and progress of education, referring to the Divine Founder's command to "proclaim the mystery of salvation to all people and renew everything in Christ." Thus the Savior is the starting point and the reaching point of the whole of the Church's educational activity²⁷. Also, the ideal of education according to the Declaration is Christocentric, because it consists in shaping the "man redeemed by Christ" so that he would become a perfect being, appropriate to the "age of the fullness of Christ" (n. 2)²⁸. Also the result of education is to have a similar characteristic: the development of the Mystical Body, the Christianization of the world (n. 2).

The Christocentric dimension should be the main feature of catechesis, which nourishes life "according to the spirit of Christ" (n.4) and a school where the presence of the Church creates "an atmosphere imbued with the evangelical spirit of freedom and love" (n. 8). As far as the role of the Church in education is concerned, the following words of the Declaration seem the most important defining its pedagogical activity to the highest extent: "it has the task of pointing people the path of salvation and of granting believers the life of Christ and to support them with constant protection so that they can achieve the fullness of this life" (n. 3). Following the thinking of S. Kunowski, the above formulation can be referred to the threefold mission of Jesus Christ, fulfilled by His Church²⁹. The first, namely the apostolic and missionary task of the Church is to present the way of salvation to all people through the proclamation of the God's Word, and therefore has a kerygmatic character, which is associated with the prophetic function of the Savior. Here one can include these ideas of the Declaration, which refer to individuals and social groups, even outside the Church, when,

²⁷ Cf. S. Kunowski, *Podstawowe zasady wychowania w Deklaracji*, AK 71(1968)6, 422.

²⁸ Cf. P. Poręba, *Ideal wychowawczy w Deklaracji*, *ibid.*, 406-413.

²⁹ S. Kunowski, *art. cit.*, 418; cf. also J. Stroba, *Powinność Kościoła*, *ibid.*, 425.

for example, the universal right of the human person to education or the need to multiply the common good or peace on earth is announced. The method of dialogue with separated and non-Christian brothers (n.11) and the entire human community (n. 8) is indispensable for fulfilling the apostolic-missionary task.

The second educational task of the Church, in a more precise sense, is directed to the baptized and consists in granting them the life of Christ, which is connected with the priest's mission of the Savior. It is within the scope of this task that one can include the fact that the faithful are gradually led into the mystery of salvation, that is, the Christian initiation, which is more and more enlivening the awareness of the gift of faith and directed towards metanoia, internal transformation or rebirth thanks to constant cooperation with grace.

Finally, the third task of the Church is to help believers achieve the fullness of the life of Christ. It is associated with the royal mission of the Savior and manifests itself in giving "help to all people to achieve the full perfection of the human person, to the good of the earthly community in building a more human world" (n. 3). In particular, the Church's concern with regard to educators, parents, priests, religious and lay catechists (nn. 6-8.10) is particularly important. A necessary condition is religious freedom (nn. 1-2.6-7).

Education for Participation in the Threefold Mission of Christ

Since all God's people take part in the threefold mission of the Savior, the whole Church is also the subject of Christian education. We can establish such a rule based on the texts of various Council documents. The obligation to teach and educate belongs therefore to the duties of bishops (CD 12-14), priests (OT 4.6) and lay people (LG 31.33.35-36; GS 43; AA 6-7.10.29), while the educational influence should not be understood only theoretically, but it is to be regarded as a formation "in the full course of life."³⁰ Now the problem arises, how is the educational formation of the Christian, to the conscious and full participation in the threefold mission of Christ, presented according to the conciliar teaching. The source of the answers will be, above all, the Constitutions on the Holy Liturgy of God's Revelation and the Church in the modern world, as well as other Council documents.

a) Education for participation in the priestly mission of Jesus Christ. According to the *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, the priestly office of the Savior is a liturgy in which "the Head with its members performs the total public worship" (SC 7).

³⁰ Cf. A. Ancel, art. cit., 979.

Liturgical Education is therefore the main way to achieve conscious participation in the priesthood of the Savior. It will be of great importance to determine the proper concept of liturgy, which until recently was understood in a reduced and one-sided way³¹. Well, the Constitution on the holy liturgy understands the liturgy as one of the stages in the history of salvation, the center of which is the Paschal mystery. It has been announced in the Old Testament, made in the New Testament, it is realized by the liturgy in the Church until full participation in the heavenly liturgy takes place (SC 5-8)³². So the liturgy should be understood as the *gesta Dei* or saving action of Jesus Christ with His people aiming at addressing Father with the highest glory in the Holy Spirit³³. The sacraments are therefore God's deeds, and the Church is the pra-Sacrament³⁴, i.e. the "sign and instrument of internal union with God and the unity of the whole human race" in Christ (LG 1). The liturgical education will, thus, aim to awaken in Christians the awareness that during Baptism they have become essential part of the Paschal mystery, in which they died and were resurrected along with Christ (Cp 6)³⁵ and to prepare them to meet the Savior acting through the sacraments in the Church community³⁶. A necessary condition for the liturgical education of the faithful is the renewed liturgical formation of priests (SC 14-19)³⁷. It is also necessary to educate individual groups that enliven the participation in the liturgy of the entire people of God as ministers, lecturers, commentators, members of the choir (SC 29).

b) Education for the participation in the prophetic mission of Jesus Christ. Prophetic function is the service of the Word of God. It is so inseparable from God's action that in the Bible, God's every saving act, every incarnation of his saving will, is recognized as the Word of God. The most important moment of this reality is the Incarnation of Jesus Christ as the Word of the Father³⁸. Just

³¹ Cf. F. Blachnicki, *Konieczność odnowy liturgii w kontekście jej tradycyjnej koncepcji*, in: *Wprowadzenie do liturgii*, op. cit., 19-34.

³² J. Daniélou, *Histoire du salut et formation liturgique*, "La Maison – Dieu" 78 (1964), 23.

³³ Cf. J. Tarnowski, *Zasadnicze myśli Konstytucji o Liturgii św. w zastosowaniu katechetycznym*, "Katecheta" 10(1966)1, 3-11.

³⁴ Cf. B. Snela, *Kościół i sakramenty*, in: *Wprowadzenie do liturgii*, op. cit., 57-74.

³⁵ Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Liturgia a misterium paschalne Chrystusa*, in: *Wprowadzenie do liturgii*, op. cit., 75-98.

³⁶ Cf. B. Snela, art. cit., 68-73.

³⁷ Cf. F. Tollu, *La formation liturgique des futurs prêtres*, "La Maison – Dieu" 78 (1964), 91.; W. Schenk, *Rola liturgii w studiach teologicznych i w przygotowaniu do kapłaństwa*, AK 56(1964)3, 184-189; W. Swierzawski, *Duszpasterstwo a liturgia*, *ibid.*, 190.

³⁸ Cf. F. Blachnicki, *Katecheza a liturgia*, *CoTh.* 39(1969)3, 121.

as a Christian is prepared to meet God who is acting through the sacraments through liturgical education, he is also helped by biblical education to meet God revealing Himself in His Word. "For in the Holy Books, the Father who is in heaven meets with his children, mercifully, and talks with them," says the Constitution on God's revelation (n. 21). He recommends to the clergy and those who deal "legitimately with the service of spreading the Word," persevering reading and a careful study of the Holy Scriptures that will allow them to unite with it so that "none of them becomes an idle preacher of it... on the outside, and without being its committed listener on the inside" (Saint Augustine, DV 25) in the life of the Church (n. 21-26)³⁹.

c) Education for participation in the royal mission of Jesus Christ. If the liturgical education is intended to prepare a Christian for a meeting with God, who is acting especially in the sacraments, and biblical education aims at opening us to a meeting with God revealing Himself through the Word, then the formation regarding conscious participation in the royal function of Christ is expressed in education aimed at meeting with God who constantly creates the world. The omission of this last meeting would be an unjustified reduction of the vision of Christian education with its fundamental aspect. It includes discovering in the world of its creator, whose plans must be learned and realized. "The plan of God concerning the world consists in that people, by common effort, shape the order of worldly matters and constantly improve it" (AA 7). Because this order is often violated by sins, it must be constantly renewed in Christ, through Him leading to God, which is the subject of the right educational influence. Thus, the return to sources according to the Second Vatican Council is expressed in Christian ecclesiastical deepening of its Christocentrism, which creates the necessary need for liturgical education (preparation for meeting Jesus in the Holy Mass and in the sacraments), biblical education (preparation for meeting with God of Revelation) and education for dialogue with the world (preparation for meeting with God regarded as the cause of constant creation).

³⁹ Cf. K. Romaniuk, *Pismo św. w życiu Kościoła współczesnego*, AK 72(1969)3, 445-454; A. Jankowski, *Pismo św. kształtuje chrześcijanina*, "Znak" 13(1961)7-8, 913-924.

Apostolate from the Point of View of the II Vatican Council*

Introduction

The Second Vatican Council understands apostleship as all the activities of the Mystical Body aimed at making, through the spread of the kingdom of Christ throughout the world, “all people partakers of salvific redemption and, through them, directing the whole world truly towards Christ” (AA 2). The rationale and purpose of the apostolate are clear in this respect: it is about the authentic inclusion of all people in the salvific work of Christ, about the renewal of the whole reality created in the Saviour, about the actual realization of the kingdom of God on earth. The Council also leaves no doubt about the carriers of apostolic responsibility: The Church works the apostolate “through all its members,” for the Christian vocation is “by its very nature also a vocation to the apostolate” (AA 2). The unity of the mission of the Church, however, does not, according to the Council, cancel out the natural diversity of services in the mystical organism: “not all in the Church follow the same path.” (LG 32). The apostolate of the representatives of the hierarchy and of the lay faithful is necessarily shaped differently in terms of means and form, even though its essential contents are the same in both cases. Let us take a closer look at the doctrine of Second Vatican Council on the apostleship, showing it, for greater clarity, against the background of earlier views.

The Understanding of the Apostolate in the Pre-conciliar Times

The concept of the apostolate depends very much on looking at two closely connected realities: the Church and salvation. The concrete vision of the Church and the understanding of salvation have had a decisive influence on the theological concept of the apostolate throughout the centuries.

* STV 23(1985)2.

Understanding of the Apostolate in the 19th Century

In the 19th century, there was a medieval, hierarchical organisational model in the Church, which survived until the time of the Second Vatican Council. At that time, the Church was understood as a perfect community, shaped like a temporal state, but superior in some respects to the latter, because of its specifically divine origin. The Church therefore consisted of superiors and subordinates, hierarchies and lay people, and the compartment between the two groups of Christians was clear, which was motivated by the concept of salvation which was particular at that time. According to the neoplatonic vision of the world and the pseudo-dionysified concept of salvation that descended hierarchically from above, all benefits flowed from God to the little ones of this world via the power that originated – as it was claimed – from God Himself. The ecclesiastical hierarchy established by Christ was in this concept the only transmitter of salvation originating in Christ. It also excursively had an active part in the salvific work of God, while the laity could only be passive recipients of the benefits coming from God and passed on to them through this ecclesiastical hierarchy. The Hierarchy, and it alone, was the teaching Church, while the laity, together with the clergy of the lower order (not excluding deacons and priests), were only the hearing Church: if they transmitted the word of God to others, they did so by authority, mandate, or canonical mission received from the bishop¹. The hierarchy, but only the higher one, included not only the government, but also the sanctification of the faithful; it only had infallibility in teaching; the other members of the Church only enjoyed, as crystallised over time, infallibility in faith (believing). No wonder that the apostolate was connected with the higher ecclesiastical hierarchy itself: the true apostolic man (*vir apostolicus*) was in the Church the only visible deputy of Christ on earth, as he was called, the Pope². It is also understandable that in this perspective any thought about the responsibility of lay people for the Church and their apostolate must have raised a reflex objection.

¹ This range was particularly marked in the liturgy: 1° the priest who was to preach the word of God in the presence of the bishop had to approach him and ask him for permission (blessing), which the bishop gave by placing a stole on the priest's shoulders; 2° in the Missal and Breviary there were separate forms for holy bishops (and since the reign of Pope Pius XII also for popes), and separate forms for believers, among whom were also priests. At present, priests (together with bishops and pope) are commonly referred to as "shepherds" of the Church.

² Cf. e.g. Y. Congar, *Jalons pour une théologie du laïcat*, Paris 1964, 19ff; E. Weron, *Laikat i apostołstwie*, Paris 1973, 9ff.

The Pioneering Character of the Apostolic Idea of Pallotti

Against this background of ecclesiology, in Rome in the first half of the nineteenth century, Vincenzo Pallotti³ presented himself with the idea of the universal apostolate⁴. He wanted to ignite, encourage and mobilise all to the apostolate. Not being a theoretician in the strict sense of the word, he crystallised his thinking, creating a great work of the Union of the Catholic Apostolate⁵. One can also say, without exaggeration, that Pallotti's true greatness, but also his peculiar tragedy, consisted in the fact that by interpreting the "signs of the times" extremely accurately, he overtook his epoch by more than a century: he pointed out the apostolic responsibility of all Christians, which surprised his contemporaries, including representatives of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. We should not be surprised, therefore, that it was not properly and fully understood or accepted at that time. If, because of his personal connections with Pope Pius IX (Pallotti was for some time the Pope's confessor), he did not meet with a complete rejection of the preached idea, it must be clearly stated that he did not enjoy much popularity in church circles, and the fate of his work after his death did not turn out to be the best. Four years after Pallotti's death (so in 1854), the church authorities changed the name of the work he founded into the Pious Missionary Association, a name that survived until 1947.

The first victim of Pallotti's spiritual inspirations or initiatives was – so to speak – a well-known English proselyte, J.J. Newman, who, as a Catholic bishop, had already written an article about consulting the faithful on doctrine issues⁶. This great and extremely reliable thinker, who throughout his whole life sought the truth and only the truth⁷, stated, among other things that he was a great and extremely reliable thinker who in his life was looking for the truth and only the truth. In this article, based on the authority of the ecclesiastical tradition and some of its contemporary theologians, that "the faithful in their masses constitute one of the testimonies to the existence of the tradition of revealed doctrine" and that "their consensus in the Christian community

³ From the newer biographies of the Saint in Polish, see: F. Bogdan, *Na drogach nieskończoności. Życie i spuścizna duchowa św. Wincentego Pallottiego*, Poznań 1981; J. Stabińska, *Wincenty Pallotti*, Poznań 1982.

⁴ Cf. F. Bogdan, *Apostolska idea Wincentego Pallottiego*, in: *Association of the Catholic Apostolate. Jubileusz Wspólnoty Ołtarzewskiej 1927-1977*, Poznań 1977, 127-136.

⁵ Cf. H. Schulte, *Das Werk des Katholischen Apostolats*, Limburg 1966-1967.

⁶ *On Consulting the Faithful in matters of doctrine*, in: "The Ram Bler," vol. 2, p. II, July 1858, 198-230.

⁷ Cf. L. Balter, *Człowiek, który przeżył zjednoczenie*, "Biuletyn Ekumeniczny" 6(1977)2, 41-47.

is the voice of the infallible Church,” for “no one else but the pious man has this unfailing instinct which is manifested in the discernment of the mysteries through which the Holy Spirit permeates the Church with his grace, and this instinct undoubtedly rejects that which is alien to the Church’s doctrine. The universal consensus of the faithful is of great evidential importance even for the most learned theologians.”⁸

Newman did not directly touch upon the problem of the apostolate of the lay faithful in the quoted article but raised a much more important issue, which underlies all apostleship, namely the responsibility of Christians for the Church and their role in the life of the Church. Nor did he once invoke the authority of the promoter of the idea of the universal apostolate in the Church, Vincenzo Pallotti, even though he met him personally in Rome⁹. He preferred to quote extensive fragments from the work of the famous Roman theologian, J. Perrone,¹⁰ with whom he kept in touch. Nevertheless, Newman’s article was severely criticised by Church dignitaries, who accused him of thinking that “a fallible part of the Church can lead the infallible, which is absolutely unacceptable”¹¹. Also Newman was recognised as the “most dangerous man in England,” who can turn secular people against church hierarchies. It was thought that unless the lay people’s delusions were cut off in time, they would “take over the Catholic Church and wish to rule it instead of the Holy See and the Episcopate”¹². This made Newman’s situation much worse, until Pope Leo XIII, at the request of the laity, appointed him Cardinal.

⁸ Quote for: J. Guillon, *Kościół współczesny*, Warsaw 1965, 53.59.

⁹ In the years 1846-47 J.H. Newman studied Catholic theology in Rome, preparing himself as a former Anglican pastor for re-establishment of priestly ordination. Pallotti was at that time a spiritual father and confessor at the Roman Seminary. In letters written to Fr. Melia (to London) Pallotti mentions that he is a confessor of English proselytes, and in his later letters, written after 1848, he recommends to Melia such people as W. Faber, Dr. J. Newman and others. Cf. V. Pallotti, *Epistulae latinae*, Rome 1907; V. Pallotti, *Lettere e brani di lettere*, Rome 1930. These small references and the voice of Cardinal Newman himself in the information process of the Servant of God V. Pallotti (the files are in the Archives of the Generalate of the SAC in Rome) can have their deep meaning.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Perrone, *De immaculato B. Mariae Virginis conceptu*, Romae 1847.

¹¹ J. Guillon, op. cit., 24.

¹² Ibid., 13. This is the sentence of Counsellor of Pius IX, Monsignor Talbot, written in a letter addressed to Archbishop Manning.

Theological Elaboration of Pallotti's Ideas by Perrone

Who knows if J. Perrone's work, entirely devoted to the Catholic apostolate and published at a time when Newman was in the greatest trouble¹³, was not intended to help him theologically? Perrone, of course, wrote in the spirit of contemporary ecclesiology; however, he also expressed many new thoughts that can be found in almost identical terms in the documents of the Second Vatican Council. "The Catholic apostolate, he said, is the continuance on earth and the continuation of the presence of the incarnate God, Jesus Christ, who in the person of his messengers lives on and helps man in his transition from time to eternity."¹⁴ In order to understand the apostleship from the standpoint of its nature and purpose, he explained, it is necessary to take into account of the fact of original sin and its repairing by Christ: the rehabilitation of the fallen man by sin, and the bringing of him to the knowledge and love of God through the divine Saviour, constitutes the general idea of the Catholic apostolate. The apostolate, therefore, is by nature the work of God Himself who, in His immeasurable goodness, desires to save the sinful man, and every man. For the Catholic apostolate is no other than "the blessed and animating action of God's love: universal, for it spreads over all, eternal, because it spreads throughout all ages, effective, because it gives birth to flowers and fruits of eternal life and gives life to the world, enlightens it and enriches it in every way possible."

God, however, does not carry out great works of mercy alone, but with the help and cooperation of man. He selects for himself the appropriate instruments and collaborators: he sends them, fills them with his Spirit, equips them with his power and authority and with the appropriate charisms, and makes available to them all the means he has found in his eternal wisdom necessary and appropriate for the attainment of the desired purpose¹⁵, so that they may implement in time the eternal plan of his infinite love. Jesus' co-workers, the apostles, were aware that they were God's helpers, ministers of God's mysteries, servants of Christ. By defining themselves in this way, they made it clear that it is God who speaks and acts through them, they fill them with strength, they give them patience and humility – essential for apostolic work, they identify with them in a way: "Anyone who welcomes you welcomes me, and anyone who welcomes me welcomes the one who sent me." (Mt 10:40). The entire apostolic

¹³ Cf. J. Perrone, *L'Apostolato cattolica e il proselitismo protestante ossia l'opera di Dio e Vopera dell' uomo*, Genova 1862.

¹⁴ Ibid., 15.

¹⁵ Ibid.

activity would become simply be absurd if it were to be reduced to purely human activities, and if it were the work of man himself.¹⁶ Such an apostolate derives its power and effectiveness from God and is simply the realisation by the people called to it of the eternal plan of human salvation. And since the Catholic apostolate is ultimately “an extension of the apostolate of the divine Saviour himself, sent by the Father to sanctify the world,” one could say that the Church of Jesus Christ, endowed by himself with various gifts of the Spirit, and especially “love, humility, gentleness, patience and sacrifice,” is “strictly speaking an eternal and universal apostolate”¹⁷: it is he who continues the saving work in the world, maintains the unblemished truth revealed and proclaims it to the world, he who leads people to salvation... The characteristics of the Church – unity, holiness, universality, fertility – become the attributes of the Catholic apostolate.

In keeping with the spirit of the times, Perrone emphasises the unique role of the Pope and the Holy See in the Church and in the apostolate, and the particular importance of the hierarchy: The Holy See is the head and heart of the Church, the “centre of the Catholic apostolate,”¹⁸ while the visible deputy of Christ on earth, the Pope, in the name of Christ, directs the entire apostolate, sending apostolic husbands to the whole world, giving them the necessary power and authority, governing them and sustaining them in action, in hardships and dangers¹⁹; more directly watches over the apostolate and is guided by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which receives all its authority and its mission from the Pope²⁰. Despite this apparent tightening of the apostolate to the hierarchy itself, Perrone seeks to suggest on various occasions, citing the words of the apostles (1P 3:1; 1Cor 7:14, etc.), the irreplaceable role of the lay faithful in the apostolate of the Church, imbuing the world with the spirit of the Gospel, as it were, from within²¹. Does he not do this under the clear influence of Pallotti’s thoughts?

Conclusions

Newman already noted in the above mentioned article that Perrone had undergone a clear spiritual evolution towards a strong emphasis in 1847 (when Newman himself attended his lectures) on the role of the laity in the Church,

¹⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 11ff.37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 542.

¹⁹ Cf. *Ibid.*, 544ff.

²⁰ Cf. *Ibid.*, 569.

²¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, 88ff.569.

whereas a little earlier, in lectures published, for example, in 1842, he had not raised the issue at all. It is well known that Perrone knew Pallotti personally and valued him highly²². It would be reasonable to suppose, therefore that it was precisely through his conversations and contacts with Pallotti that he saw the great role to be played by the lay faithful in the Church and in its apostolate. The Apostolate too as “a work of God’s mercy which embraces all times, all places, all people on earth,”²³ seems to indicate a great relationship, if not a direct relationship, to dependence on Pallotti. It could therefore be said that Perrone, a well-known Roman theologian, contributed in his own way to the popularisation of Pallotti’s idea and indirectly to its recognition, acceptance and approval by the Second Vatican Council.

The Conciliar Concept of the Apostolate

Nowadays, after the Second Vatican Council, the issue of the responsibility of all Christians for the Church does not raise any doubts. No one is able to question – the Council’s statements are all too clear on this point – the obvious fact that the faithful as such are the Church, form the Church of Christ, and that this Church is by its very nature an apostolic community. The Council’s merit, however, is much greater. When Pope Pius XI implemented the Catholic Action fifty years ago, he noticed the pioneering character of Pallotti’s thought and officially called it the “predecessor” of the Action. Pallotti’s thought was revived after many years of being forgotten and in slumber, but it was revived within the framework of the existing church structures. The faithful laity, who at that time were officially mobilised to act, supposed to be like an extension of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and their work was to become only a help for the hierarchical apostolate. This was undoubtedly a great step forward compared to the situation of the Church in Pallotti’s time but it was not the real “breakthrough” that occurred only in connection with the Second Vatican Council.

²² Fr C.M. Orlandi states in his memoirs that in the work created by Pallotti he entered on the explicit advice of his spiritual director, Fr J. Perrone, who encouraged him to trust in the words and holiness of the Servant of God. Cf. J. Weidner, *Autobiographicae Caroli M. Orlandi notitiae*, in: Acta SAC 2 (1951-1954), 590.

²³ J. Perrone, op. cit., 11. Cf. H. Nys, *Le sdluz sans l’Evangile*, Paris 1966, 103ff; Y. Congar, *Un peuple messianique*, Paris 1975, 145ff.

The Council's Vision of the Church as the "Universal" Sacrament of Salvation

The Council not only valued the lay faithful in the Church and not only affirmed that it is they who, together with the hierarchy, form one great people of God, but, by emphasizing the servile character of the hierarchy, showed a completely different model of the Church as the "universal sacrament of salvation" (LG 48): "The Church, both in helping and in receiving much from the world, is moving towards this one, so that the kingdom of God may come and the salvation of the human race may become a reality. All the good that God's people can do to the human family during their earthly pilgrimage flows from the fact that the Church is the 'universal sacrament of salvation,' which shows and at the same time realizes the mystery of God's love for man" (GS 45). Does it not sound like Perrone's concrete thinking about the Church as "universal and eternal apostolate" echoes in these words?

By calling the Church "the sacrament, or sign and instrument of interior union with God and unity of the whole human race" (CCC 1) and by referring to it as the "universal sacrament of salvation," the Second Vatican Council sought to revive and express much more profoundly the truth of the former axiom: "extra Ecclesiam nulla salus." It did so by modifying the existing concept of salvation in two dimensions:

1° While before the Council salvation was conceived in an objective way as the achievement of an intended end and the achievement of an end (e.g. a happy vision)²⁴, the Council itself treated it more existentially, claiming that it is man's adhesion to God, the development of God's life in man, his union with Christ, his salvific death and resurrection. Salvation therefore begins, according to the concept of the Council, here on earth, and reaches its end in eternity. Since man's earthly adherence to God is always uncertain and in danger of sin, salvation will be fully realized in the future life when bodily death is overcome and "the all-powerful and merciful Saviour restores to man the salvation lost through his guilt": then man will adhere to God "with all his nature in the eternal sharing of God's immaculate life" (GS 18).

2° In pre-subjective theology, the idea of salvation, implemented hierarchically from above, was firmly rooted: The salvation "given" to mankind by God reached the lay faithful through the ecclesiastical hierarchy, whose representatives – each according to their place in the Church – were the "transmitters"

²⁴ Cf. X. Ochoa, *Index verborum cum documentis Concilii Vaticani secundi*, Rome 1967, 444f.

of salvation, while the laity were only its “recipients.”²⁵ The Council has overcome this ecclesiastic, or rather clerical, concept of salvation by emphasising the role of baptism, which is a sacrament given not only by the representatives of the hierarchy: by linking mankind most closely to the death of Christ, baptism deals a mortal blow of death to sin, while uniting man with his resurrection restoring the fullness of the dead in man through the sin of God’s life. The Christian, who is like Christ in being, “like the image of the Son, who is the first-born among many brothers and sisters” (GS 22), is capable, through the “first-beginnings of the Spirit” received in the same sacrament, of becoming truly like Christ. The salvation which he has experienced can and must bear fruit in him: the baptised man, incorporated into the paschal mystery by baptism and confirmed by the power of that sacrament, “to the death of Christ, he will go forth strengthened by hope for the resurrection” (GS 22). But not only the personal salvation of the baptised is at stake. Baptism involves man in the triple dimension of Christ’s ministry and life: in his priestly, royal and teaching function, so that every Christian may be a living part of the sacrament of salvation, which is the Church of Christ. The baptised are “consecrated by the rebirth and anointing of the Holy Spirit as [...] a holy priesthood, in order to offer spiritual sacrifices through all works proper to the Christian and to proclaim the power of the One who called them out of darkness to his bizarre light. Therefore [...] by praying and praising God together, they must offer themselves as living sacrifices, holy and pleasing to God, and everywhere they must bear witness to Christ, and to those who demand it, give witness to the hope of eternal life which is in them” (LG 10). Every Christian can, therefore, by virtue of the priesthood received at baptism of the King’s Priesthood, and must, as a real living part of the Church’s sacrament, become a sacrifice for others; he can and must also bear witness to Christ with his whole life²⁶. For, as the Council emphasises, the apostleship, which is “participation in the very saving mission of the Church,” “the Lord himself predestines all by baptism and confirmation” (LG 33).

The Holy Spirit, who is the soul and driving force behind all the apostolic activities of the Church, not only constantly accompanies and directs apostolic work, but also “sometimes, even visibly, anticipates the apostolic activity” of Christians” (AG 4). He also offers to all, even the non-baptised, “the opportunity to come, in a way known to God, to share in this paschal mystery” of Christ (GS 22). This setting of the problem of the universality of salvation by the Council

²⁵ Cf. A. Manaranche, *Quel salut?*, Paris 1969, 189ff.

²⁶ Cf. L. Balter, *Kapłaństwo ludu Bożego*, Warsaw 1982, 27ff.157ff.181ff.

does not mean at all that for people “of good will, in whose hearts grace invisibly acts” (GS 22), the Church has ceased to be the actual “sacrament of salvation.” The Council itself stresses, “based on Sacred Scripture and Tradition, that this pilgrim Church is indispensable for salvation. For Christ is the one Mediator and the only way of salvation, the One who becomes present to us in his Body, which is the Church (Mk 16:18; J 3:5) confirming at the same time the necessity of the Church, into which men enter through baptism as a gateway” (LG 14).

This fundamental and presuppositional statement, supplemented by a strong addition that there could be no salvation for those “who, knowing that the Church was founded by God through Christ as necessary, but who nevertheless do not want to either join or persevere in it,” in turn becomes for the Council the starting point for a detailed discussion of the various categories of persons in their relationship to the Church, the universal sacrament of salvation. The Council discusses in turn: belonging, communion and “ordering” to God’s people’ of Catholic Christians, catechumens, non-Catholics, Jews, Muslims and members of other non-Christian religions (cf. LG 14.16). The spiritual character of the relationship with the Church is strongly emphasised. The Council does not hesitate to affirm that even a Catholic, that is, a person “incorporated into the Church” and a living part of the “universal sacrament of salvation,” cannot achieve salvation himself unless he remains in love, that is to say, unless he “remains in the Church’s womb ‘flesh’ but not ‘heart’” (LG 14). On the other hand, the Council strongly emphasizes that Divine Providence does not refuse “the necessary help for salvation to those who, through no fault of their own, have not yet come to a clear knowledge of God at all, and who are trying, not without God’s grace, to lead an honest life. For whatever is in them of goodness and truth, the Church treats it as preparation for the Gospel and as given to them by the One who enlightens every man, so that he may ultimately possess life” (LG 16).

The Church as the Sacrament of Salvation of the World

The fundamental change in the attitude of the Church towards the world deserves special attention in this case. While in the past the Church, faithful to some formulations of Christ (J 15:20; 16:33; 17:9ff) and the apostles (1J 2:15; J 4:4), has moved away from the affairs of this world in her general attitude, the Second Vatican Council, taking into account a number of other statements of Christ (J 3:16f; Mk 16:15, etc.), stressed the great role and positive presence of the Church in the world, under the influence of the rapidly developing theology of earthly realities. After all, the Church exists in the world and for the world.

As a visible association and spiritual community, the Church “walks with all humanity and experiences the same earthly fate as the world, living in it as the leaven and soul of human society, which is to be renewed and transformed into the family of God in Christ” (GS 40). In turn being a tool of “salvation of all,” he was sent to “the entire world, as – the light of the world and the salt of the Earth” (LG 9). This salvific mission of the Church imposes concrete obligations on the whole people of God and on its individual members. If the Church is to be truly the “universal sacrament of salvation,” all her sons “must be conscious of their responsibility for the world, must cultivate a truly Catholic spirit within themselves and devote their energies to the work of evangelisation” (AG 36).

The Council does not recommend too much detachment from the affairs of this world, nor does it approve of a complete immersion in earthly interests. It considers both attitudes to be inappropriate. Therefore, it admonishes Christians to “strive to carry out their earthly duties faithfully, guided by this spirit of the Gospel.” The Council considers the gap between faith and everyday life, expressed in the conviction that earthly affairs are alien to religious life, which would allegedly be reduced to mere acts of worship and “the fulfilment of certain moral duties,” as one of the “the more important mistakes of our time.” (GS 43). In the Council’s view, there is a mutual exchange of goods between the Church and the world: The Church, above all, but not exclusively, communicates supernatural values to the world and, at the same time, benefits from the values of this world. This mutual dependence, however, must not in any way undermine the fundamental mission of the Church, which “by helping the world and by receiving much from it, moves towards this one, so that the kingdom of God may come and the salvation of the whole human race may become a reality” (GS 45).

The Internal Structure of the Church – the Sacrament of Salvation

Looking at the Church as the “universal sacrament of salvation” also determines to some extent the view of its internal structure. The Church is, according to the doctrine of Vatican Council II, the people of God and the Body of Christ (CCC 7,1), composed of many different members united by one Spirit. The image of this Body, sketched out by the last Council, however, far surpasses the vision of the Church, discussed at the First Vatican Council. In fact, when the previous Council intended to define the Church as the Mystical Body of Christ, there was no thought, in the spirit of the times, of the mutual responsibility of the members for one another and their fundamental equality with one another; rather, the first plan was to subordinate and differentiate one another. The Second Vatican Council did not cross out the hierarchy of the Church. However, speaking of the

Mystical Body, it emphasised the fundamental equality for all, maintaining that what is common is the dignity of members resulting from their rebirth in Christ, the common grace of the sons, the common vocation to perfection, the one salvation, the one hope and indivisible love. There is therefore no inequality in Christ and in the Church “because of race or national affiliation, social condition or gender...” (LG 32). All without exception “from bishops to the last of the lay faithful” have this supernatural sense of faith, of which J.H. Newman once wrote, which makes “God’s people, under the guidance of the sacred office of teacher [...] persist in their faith once handed down to the saints, penetrate it deeper with just judgement and apply it more fully in their lives. In addition, the very same Holy Spirit by (...) ‘giving to everyone, as he wishes’ (1 Cor 12:11) distributes among the faithful of all states his gifts and special graces by which he makes them fit and ready to undertake various works or functions for the renewal and further useful development of the Church (1 Cor 12:11)” (LG 12).

If, therefore, there is a certain diversity in the Church, because not everyone “follows the same path” and some “are appointed by Christ’s will as teachers, ministers of mysteries and pastors of others, yet as regards dignity and the common work of all the faithful in building up the Body of Christ, true equality prevails among all. For the distinction which the Lord has made between the ministers, saints and the rest of God’s people brings with it communion, because the shepherds and the other faithful are bound to one another by the necessary mutual references; the shepherds of the Church, following the example of the Lord, give one another and the other faithful clothing services, and the faithful willingly help together the shepherds and teachers. Thus in their diversity they bear witness to a bizarre unity in the Body of Christ” (LG 32).

This fundamental equality and responsibility of all for the Church becomes the basis of the universal apostolate, which is participation in the “saving mission of the Church” and to which “the Lord himself predestines all by baptism and confirmation” (LG 33). The soul of the Church’s apostolate is the love given and sustained by God through the sacraments (cf. LG 33). Livened by the love of God and men, all the faithful are to make Christ present (to be “*aiter Chriistus*”), to become witnesses and living instruments of the mission of the whole Church, and to “make the Church present and active in places and circumstances where it can only become the salt of the earth through their help” (LG 33). Moreover, the lay faithful “can also be called to a more direct collaboration with the apostolate of the hierarchy in various ways,” because by virtue of their implantation in the royal priesthood of Christ they are capable of “the hierarchy taking on the help of the laity in the performance of certain ecclesiastical tasks serving a spiritual purpose” (LG 33). All members of the

Church, the universal sacrament of salvation, therefore, have the honourable duty to care for the development of the kingdom of God on earth.

Conclusions

When one compares the statements of the Second Vatican Council on the basis, sources, universal duty, conditions and means of the apostolate with the inspirational thinking of Vincenzo Pallotti in this field, one can see not only an internal convergence, if not an overlap: the interdependence of these approaches, which would allow us to speak of Pallotti's real influence on the Council, but also the full conciliar approval of the pioneering ideas that were laid down, with such great difficulty, that allowed to take root for good in the consciousness and life of the Church.

An Authentic Dimension of the Universal Apostolate

Since the universal apostolate, for which V. Pallotti had struggled to obtain such an effort and to which J. Perrone devoted so much attention, has now become, after the Second Vatican Council, an indisputable fact, it is appropriate to take a closer look at this reality.

The Second Vatican Council strongly emphasizes that the apostolate as such stems from the Christian vocation itself and therefore it can never be lacking in the Church (cf. AA 1-2). If, in fact, the Church has been established to live in order to "spread the kingdom of Christ throughout the earth for the glory of the Father, to make all delusions partakers of salvific redemption and to direct the whole world truly to Christ through them," and any "activity of the Mystical Body towards this end is called the apostolate" (AA 2); it is beyond doubt that the Church herself is by nature an apostolic community which carries out her apostolate in many different ways and at various levels.

The Bearers of Apostolic Responsibility

The Second Vatican Council, thus showing the basis and purpose of the apostleship, emphasises in many places the vocation of all members of the Church: the hierarchy and lay faithful, active and contemplative religious communities (including hermits), Christian families, elderly and young people, and the lonely – to the apostleship. The bearers of apostolic duty and tasks are therefore all Christians on an equal footing, albeit in different ways. In fact, the Council

draws particular attention to the need to preserve its own specificity, which stems from its personal vocation, from the gifts received from God, from its charisms, and thus from its place in God's people and from the role that each person has in it. Since the Holy Spirit "who performs the work of sanctifying the people of God" grants to the faithful various gifts for the fulfilment of their apostolate, so that "by serving one another with every grace he has received, they may also contribute 'as good ministers of the various graces of God' (1P 4:10) to build up the whole body in love," they thus have the unquestionable right and duty to use these gifts "for the good of men and the building up of the Church, in the freedom of the Holy Spirit (...) and at the same time in union with the brothers in Christ, especially with their shepherds, who are to judge the true nature of these gifts and their proper use" (AA 3).

The fruitfulness of the apostolate, its effectiveness depends on the degree of human union with Christ, the Apostle of the Father. Eternal (DA 4): the closer an individual's union with Jesus, the deeper his inner life, the greater his contribution to the building up of the Church's body²⁷ Therefore, although "all apostolic activity must be born of love and draw its strength from it," there is a clear gradation of works of art, apostolic practices: first place are those which, flowing from the deepest, boundless love of God and neighbour, are by their very nature "capable of becoming a living expression of love itself" (AA 8). The priority among the apostolic works, therefore, is the strength of the fact that there is a variety of "works of charity and mutual assistance aimed at helping people in their various needs" (AA 8). The Church has always held these works in high esteem and appreciation.

One could also say that since the measure of a person's personal holiness is the degree to which he or she updates the royal priesthood, i.e. offers himself or herself to God as a sacrifice for others, while personal holiness has a decisive influence on all apostolic actions of a Christian, the apostolate, whose soul is personal holiness, in its essence boils down to updating the priestly dignity of Christians, i.e. to becoming a sacrificial feeding ground acceptable to God for others. The whole Christian life, the various daily activities: prayer, work, apostolic undertakings and sufferings, and even moments of rest and relaxation, if they are held in the Spirit, can become "spiritual sacrifices, pleasing to God through Jesus Christ" (LG 34). These sacrifices, combined with the Most Holy Sacrifice of Christ, are offered to God the Father in the eucharistic rite "through

²⁷ Cf. R. Forycki, *Apostolskie powołanie ludu Bożego*, in: *Powołanie do apostołstwa*, L. Balter (ed.), Poznań 1975, 144-156.

the hands of the priest” (LG 48). Therefore, the Eucharist is not only the summit and the source of the Church’s life and salvific activity (CL 10), but also presents itself “as the source and the summit of all evangelisation” (OT 5) and the whole apostolate, “for the apostolic work is intended to make all, having become children of God by faith and baptism, come together, worship God in the midst of the Church, share in the sacrifice and nourish the Lord’s Supper” (LG 10). “For the Eucharist contains all the spiritual good of the Church, namely Christ himself, our Passover, and the living bread which, through his Body, animated and animating by the Holy Spirit, gives life to men, inviting them and thus leading them to offer with him himself, his work and all things created” (GS 5). The Eucharist thus presents itself as the most effective means and the most essential content of the entire apostolate of the Church. In the course of its exercise, the Church is herself: a visible association and spiritual community, a community equipped with “hierarchical organs” and at the same time “the mystical Body of Christ” (LG 8), that is, a compact, uniform organism, albeit differentiated in the functions of its members, and in short, the sacrament of salvation.

Parish as a Privileged Area for Apostolic Work

Thinking about the Eucharist, which is “the centre of the congregation of the faithful presided over by the presbyter” (OT 5), automatically leads to a parish that is the smallest part of the local Church (CL 42; LG 23) and at the same time the privileged area of apostolic work. As the Second Vatican Council notes, the parish “provides an eye-catching example of the community apostolate, bringing together all the different human characteristics within its boundaries and implanting them into the universality of the Church” (DA 10). One could also say that it is in the parish that differences between the hierarchical apostolate, the centre of gravity which is in the various liturgical services, and the apostolate of the lay faithful, whose proper task is to pass the world from within with the leaven of the Gospel, can be best seen.

The representatives of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the parish (pastor, vicar and other pastors) are “teachers, ministers of mysteries and pastors of others by the will of Christ himself” (CCC 32). Their basic functions concentrate on shaping – by the holy power they have – the priestly people, teaching them, forming and directing them, and celebrating “in place of Christ (in persona Christi) the Eucharistic Sacrifice and its offering to God in the name of all people (LG10). All their activities must therefore, by their very nature, lead to the sacred liturgy and be manifested in it above all; only in the course of the liturgy do they make Christ’s faithful present in his triple function: The Teacher, the Priest and the

Shepherd, and in it only make him personally present in the midst of the congregation of the faithful (cf. LG 28), for “the same one who once offered himself on the cross is now offered up through the ministry of priests” (SC 7). Their apostolate is also inseparable from the sacred liturgy: it is expressed above all in the proper preparation of the faithful for its full, authentic experience – priests “teach the faithful to sacrifice divine prayer to God the Father in the Mass and to sacrifice their lives with it” (OT 5), – and in such celebration of sacred activities – with the highest reverence, concentration and depth of experience – that they are a true edification for the whole people. “Each liturgical celebration, as the work of Christ the Priest and his Body, or Church, is a most sacred activity, and no other activity of the Church can match its effectiveness in the same title and to the same degree” (SC 7). Therefore, the Eucharistic Sacrifice is presented “as the source and summit of all evangelisation” (OT 5) and is the very centre of all the apostolic activities of the ecclesiastic hierarchy.

The lay faithful, on the other hand, “by virtue of their royal priesthood, cooperate in the offering of the Eucharist; they also fulfil this priesthood by receiving the sacraments, prayer and thanksgiving, the testimony of the holy life, self-denial and active love” (LG 10). As participants in the triple function of Christ, they exercise their “apostolate through work to spread the Gospel... and to imbue with the evangelical spirit and to perfect the order of temporal affairs, so that their efforts in this field openly bear witness to Christ and serve the salvation of men” (AG 2).

Within the parish community, the main burden of apostolic work rests on Christian families, which are “the first school of the social virtues needed by all communities” and in which “a healthy human society and the Church” are first experienced (GE 3). The Council therefore obliges spouses to be “co-workers of grace and witnesses of faith for one another, for their children and for others in the household.” Their primary task and at the same time the quintessence of their apostolate is to show and confirm with their own lives the truth about the inseparability and holiness of the matrimonial bond, to strongly emphasise the right and duty of parents and guardians to educate children and young people in Christianity, to defend the dignity and the due autonomy of the family (AA 11).

The Council also assigns important apostolic tasks to young people, who become increasingly more involved in social and political life. He believes that “young people should become the first and direct apostles of youth through personal apostolic activity among their peers,” adding that even children “have their own apostolic activity. For they are true witnesses of Christ among their peers to the extent of their strength” (AA 12).

Specificity of the Apostolate of the Lay Faithful

The apostolate of lay people differs in nature from the apostolate of monks who are also burdened with care for the construction of God's kingdom on earth, adapted to the type of religious family and its way of life. While in many religious families "the entire religious life of the members must be imbued with an apostolic spirit and all apostolic activity must be characterised by a religious spirit," it is also true that "the entire religious life of the members must be imbued with an apostolic spirit" (PC 8), the specificity of the apostolate of the lay faithful is that, living in the world and among the affairs of this world, they are "in the form of a leaven, from within" contributing to the sanctification of mortality and the example of their lives, radiating faith, hope and charity, and showing "others Christ" (LG 31). The apostolate of the laity is therefore expressed not only in the conformity of their lives with faith, but also in the reliability of their work, in fraternal charity, in which "by participating in the life, work, sufferings and aspirations of their brothers, they slowly and unnoticeably prepare the hearts of all for the work of salvific grace," in the conscious involvement in the construction of human society, in which they "with Christian generosity seek to carry out their domestic, social and professional activities" (AG 13).

The apostolate of lay people can of course be individual and communal. The individual apostolate is "the beginning and the condition of every lay apostolate, including the associated apostolate, and cannot be replaced by anything" (AA 16). The community apostolate is based on and results from the individual, that is, the authenticity of life, a personal example, attitude and teaching. It also fully responds to "the human and Christian demands of the faithful, while at the same time showing the sign of communion and unity of the Church in Christ" (AA 18). This explains why it is so important in the Church. If it is organised in the form of legally approved associations, the Church respects them and provides full support for the activity they develop, while at the same time taking care to maintain a proper hierarchy of forms of work and needs. And since the proper accomplishment of the apostolic tasks requires proper Christian preparation and development, the Council has recognized this as an urgent need of our time, and at the same time as an apostolic task for all, especially for those whom the Lord Himself has made ministers of the mysteries of God.

Conclusion

The panorama of the Council's thinking about the universal apostolate, sketched out in brief, is increasingly becoming the property of the people of God: it permeates the minds and hearts, is reflected in the practice of daily life, in the initiatives and apostolic undertakings taken, in the way of thinking and acting. It would be difficult to say, of course, what the actual state of current apostolic activity in the Church is, if we had separate sociological studies. Nevertheless, it should be stated and strongly emphasised that the pioneering suggestions of Vincenzo Palottis, enriched by the experience and reflections of future generations, the contributions of Newman, Perrone and others, deepened and adapted according to the demands of the times by the Second Vatican Council, have already become a lasting heritage and property of the whole people of God, who are becoming increasingly more aware that they are by their very nature, and therefore must be in practice, a people who are eminently apostolic.

Redemption by a Renewed Creation in Christ According to the “*Gaudium Et Spes*”*

Introduction

“The Second Vatican Council, after an in-depth reflection on the mystery of the Church, addresses without hesitation its words not only to the sons of the Church and all those who call upon the Name of Christ, but to all people... He has before his eyes, therefore, the world of mankind, that is to say the whole human family, the world of all that it lives in, the world of the human race,” marked by monuments to its efforts, defeats and victories (GS 2). Another text states that “in our day, mankind, moved by admiration for its inventions and its power, often discusses disturbing questions concerning today’s evolution of the world, man’s place and task in the universe, the sense of his individual and collective effort, and finally the ultimate goal and things and people” (GS 3). The Council therefore establishes with the human family “a dialogue on these various problems, speaking, bringing light to the Gospel and providing the human race with the salvific power which the Church herself, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, receives from its Founder” (ibid.). In another place, the Constitution states that “in the light of Christ, the image of the invisible, first-born God, of all creation, the Council wishes to speak to all in order to clarify the mystery of man and to cooperate in finding a solution to the main problems of our time” (GS 10).

From the Council texts cited only selectively, one can see that *Gaudium et Spes* is the “word” addressed by the Council to the care of the whole world, and in it to all people without exception, to the concrete man, taken as a whole in his unity and totality, with body and soul, with heart and conscience, mind and will. The issue of man became the axis of the whole argument (cf. GS 3).

* STV 25(1987)2.

The pastoral Constitution, therefore, deals mainly with issues concerning man and his urgent matters. For this anthropological problem, however, he seeks a theological basis, which he finds in the Christological interpretation of man and the world.

In this context, the doctrine of Redemption, which is the central reality of the Christian religion and concerns man and the world in which he lives, is shown. Therefore, the redemption accomplished by Christ is one of the main themes that runs through the entire Constitutions. *Gaudium et Spes*, although it is a pastoral constitution, contains in its composition, at the end of each of the four chapters of the first part, points of dogmatic type. Thus, in Chapter I, number 22 is entitled: "Christ the new man." In Chapter II, we find the number 32, which has the title: "The Incarnate Word and Human Solidarity." There are two numbers in Chapter III: number 38: "Human activity brought to perfection in the paschal mystery" and number 39, entitled: "A new earth and a new sky." In Chapter IV, we find number 45: "Christ the Alpha and Omega." This is why this Constitution is perhaps the most appropriate source to provide a comprehensive response to the complex problem of redemption for man, living in the Church and in the modern world.

It should also be added that the Council's doctrine of redemption is read not only in the conciliar document finally drafted, approved by the Council Fathers and approved by Pope Paul VI on 17 XII 1965, but also first on the basis of the earlier statements of bishops and experts, expressed as demands to the future Council, which signal current theological problems that are awaiting clarification. They are contained in 27 Latin volumes: *Acta et Documenta Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano secundo apparando*¹. We then base ourselves on the four previous editions of the text *Gaudium et Spes*^{2,3} as well as the statements of the Council Fathers, which take place after each editorial office. They are expressed orally in the Council Hall, as so-called *Pairara orationes* or attached in writing as *Animad iversiones scriptaie adhibendae*, and contained in 25 volumes of *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenci Vaticani Secundi*. It is necessary to rely on this vast source material in order to be able to trace the development of the various problems of redemption, starting with their signalling in the postulates,

¹ *Acta et Documenta Concilio Oecumenico Vaticano II Apparando*, Vaticanis 1960-1973. (Abbreviation used for further quote: AD, series, volume, pars.).

² Four schematics: I Scheme of 3 VII 1964, II Scheme of 28 VI 1965, III Scheme of 13 XI 1965 and IV Scheme of 2 XII 1965.

³ *Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani secundi*, Vaticanis 1970-1978. (Abbreviation used for further quote: AS, volumen, pars.).

through attempts to resolve them throughout the process of drafting the final version of the document, to find their resonance in the numerous commentaries on *Gaudium et Spes*, of great scientific value⁴.

[This article constitutes, in a very small way and in addition very synthetically presented part of a larger work⁵, and is entitled: "Redemption by a renewed creation in Christ."]

Salvific Incarnation

In the postulants expressed before the Council concerning the problems of redemption we observe a polemical tendency in relation to the various theological trends of today that do not accept the reality of redemption⁶. They also pay attention to the reduction of redemption value today and its minimal impact on the way we think and the attitudes of modern delusions toward Earthly realities.⁷

⁴ We will limit ourselves to indicating only a dozen or so of the most basic comments: *La Costituzione Pastorale sulla Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo "Gaudium et Spes."* Testo latino e italiano con commenta e note. Rome 1967; *La Chiesa incontro al mondo. Per una lettura della Costituzione Pastorale su "La Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo". Testo della Costituzione presentato e commentato da Dionigi Tettamanzi.* Milan 1967; *La Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo. Commento alla Costituzione Gaudium et Spes,* Brescia 1966; *La Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo. Costituzione Pastorale del Concilio Vaticano II,* Torino 1967; *La Chiesa nel mondo di oggi. Studi e commenti intorno alla Costituzione Pastorale Gaudium et Spes,* Firenze 1966; *Commentary on the documents of Vatican II,* ed. H. Vorgrimler, volume five, *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. History of the Constitution* by Ch. Moeller, New York 1969; *Commento alla Costituzione Pastorale su la Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo "Gaudium et Spes",* Milan 1967; *Constitution Pastorale "Gaudium et Spes". L'Eglise dans le monde de ce temps,* Paris, 1966; *La Costituzione Pastorale sulla Chiesa nel mondo contemporáneo. Introduzione storico-dottrinale,* Leuraam 1968; *L'Eglise dans le monde de ce temps. Concile Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes,* Paris 1968; *L'Eglise dans le monde de ce temps. Constitution Pastorale "Gaudium et Spes",* vol. 3, Paris 1966; *Gaudium et Spes. L'Eglise dans le monde de ce temps. Introduction Générale,* Paris 1967; *Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil. Konstitutionen, Dekrete und Erklärungen.* Lateinisch und Deutsch. Kommentare I-II-III, in: *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche,* Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1966-1968.

⁵ All this research is included in the doctoral dissertation by the author, written under the direction of Prof. J. Galot at the Faculty of Theology of the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Cf. A.W. Sowa, *Il mistero della Redenzione nella Gaudium et Spes,* Rome 1983.

⁶ Cf. F. Claret de Langavant, in: AD, s. I, vol. II, p. V, 243; *Facultas Theologica Carmelitarum Disalceatorum,* in: AD, p. I, vol. IV, p. I 2, 321. 332. 336; B. Evangelisti, in: AD, s. I, vol. II, p. IV, 173; A. Lombardi, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VII, 311.

⁷ Cf. M. Blanchel, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 52; A. Fares, in: AD, p. I, vol. II; p. III, 178; G.P. Bartholome, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 430.

The lack of true soteriology on the part of theologians, not excluding Catholic ones⁸, was also pointed out, as well as a proposed return to the teachings of Saint Thomas Aquinas⁹. As for the issues related to the Incarnation itself, various tendencies could be observed: the first proposed to take the Incarnation and redemption separately¹⁰. Another suggestion was to treat them together as one reality¹¹ and another as a salvific Incarnation¹²¹³ or about redemption as the goal of the Incarnation.

The Council tries to meet these demands and slowly, in stages, specifies its teaching. It first treats the Incarnation as the source of human dignity. In Schema I of July 30, 1964, it attributes this dignity to the individual and to the whole created world¹⁴, but as a result of the intervention of the Fathers¹⁵, Scheme II of May 28, 1965, extends the scope of this dignity from the Incarnation to the human community and human activity, as well as to the entire history of the world¹⁶. The interventions of the Fathers after the Second Schema bring two novelties. The first is expressed in the affirmation that Christ, through the Incarnation, creates a new man who has a duty to perfect human nature, and this is the collaboration with the work of the Incarnation¹⁷. The second novelty, coming from Eastern theologians, is expressed in the suggestion to treat the Incarnation as a basis for working out the cosmic theology¹⁸.

The first Schema did not speak clearly about the Incarnation in the perspective of redemption. Although the text says that Christ is the true man who came to free himself from the bondage of sin¹⁹, there is no deeper theological precision in the text. Also the interventions of the Fathers after Scheme I emphasized that the motive of the Incarnation is the liberation of man from the

⁸ Cf. N. Jubany Arnau, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. II, 458.

⁹ Cf. S. *Congregatio S. Officia*, in: AD, p. I, vol. III, 1-17.

¹⁰ Cf. F. Longinotti, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 588.

¹¹ Cf. J. J. Weber, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. I, 413; D. Feeney, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 409.

¹² Cf. A.G. Mayer, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 292; F. Guerry, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. I, 254.

¹³ Cf. J.E. Mac Manus, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 645.

¹⁴ *Schema I*, in: AS, vol. III, p. I, 119.

¹⁵ Cf. A. Fernandez Alonzo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 353; P. Barra china y Estevan, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 723; M. Mariere, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 480; M. Pourchet, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 594-603; A. Fernandez Alonzo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 354; R. Gonzales Moralejo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 388.

¹⁶ Cf. *Schema II*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. I, 448.458.485.

¹⁷ Cf. *Plures Patres Conciliares Galliae*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 915. 918. 922.

¹⁸ Cf. P.P. Meouchi, in: AS, val. IV, p. II, 423.

¹⁹ Cf. *Schema I*, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 116.118.121.

slavery of the devil, sin and death. We also find there a clearer suggestion that proposes to look at the Incarnation as *conditio sine qua non* redemption²⁰. The Second Schema takes up these postulates and speaks more clearly of the Word of the Father which, through its incarnation, has accepted the whole created reality, and all that exists needs, invokes, each in its own way, the Redeemer²¹. In subsequent interventions, the Fathers demand that we do not ‘see in the Incarnation only the source of the beauty of human nature. They indicate that the Incarnation is primarily for redemption. The saving nature of the Incarnation cannot be forgotten²². There were also tendencies to treat redemption not as the goal of the Incarnation, but as a means of sanctification²³. However, the last editions of the text – Scheme III of 13.11.65 and Scheme IV of 2.1.2.65. – reject such an opinion and confirm that Christ came to save the world, that is, to accomplish the work of redemption²⁴. It is now necessary to look at how the final text of our document illuminates the mystery of the Incarnation in order to obtain a complete picture of it.

The mystery of redemption is presented in the *Gaudium et Spes* primarily as the work of Jesus Christ. This work was initiated by Jesus in His Mystery of the Incarnation. Christ became man and through his Incarnation gave great dignity to every man, to all human nature. Man has become a great mystery. But man as a person lives in connection with other people, lives in society. Christ, entering into human society through His Incarnation, emphasized its value, gave it dignity, and sanctified all social relationships. Also, all human activity derives its great value from the mystery of the Incarnation.

Christ, entering into history, wants to give great dignity to all human activity. Through the Incarnation, Christ took up a part of the material world, that is, the whole human body, and in it took up the whole universe, that is, the whole effect of the work of creation, and thus also the matter and all goods, temporal and earthly, thus giving them great dignity.

²⁰ Cf. J. Frings, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 562; A. Del Rosario, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 413; R. Gonzales Moralejo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 389; C. De Proveneheres, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 632; H. Routhier, in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 350; P. Barrachina y Estevan, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 723; R. J. De Roo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 530.

²¹ *Schema II*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. I, 436.465.469.

²² Cf. G. De Proença Sigaud, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 50; J. Marafini, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 412; S. Lourdusamy D lirais and we, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 382; S. Quadri, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 818; P. Parente, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 803.

²³ Cf. A. Elchinger, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 1035.

²⁴ Cf. *Schema III*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. VI, 442.

Thus, the whole mystery of man, in its full context and meaning, that is, in its personal, social and historical dimension, has received this dignity precisely through the mystery of the Incarnation, which is the source and summit of human dignity.

However, Christ did not come into the world only to give the highest dignity to man and the whole of created reality. Christ came to save it, to redeem it. Redemption is the main goal of the Incarnation. Christ was foreseen by God as the causer of the work of redemption from the moment of creation. From the very beginning we can speak of the absolute primacy of Christ the Redeemer. We have received this most wonderful, most selfless gift, the gift of the Redeemer, which should renew, divinise and unite the whole created reality, in the salvific Incarnation.

Redemptive Paschal Mystery

Christ as the Redeemer fulfilled his work in the Paschal Mystery. The first stage of this mystery is the true death of Christ. It is a substitution, and thus the substitution of Christ for sinful men, but not a penal substitute, but a voluntary substitution of someone innocent for the guilty. Christ was established as the representative of all mankind, Christ's death is death for all men, and therefore has universal value.

The second phase of Christ's paschal mystery, through which he accomplished redemption, is the resurrection. The salvific value of the resurrection is connected with the very real fact of the resurrection, which reveals to us first of all the victory of Christ over death, the transition from death to life. We are talking here about the so-called "transitional" nature of the resurrection. Through the resurrection, Christ is in a glorious state in which he has a new life, a life of spirit, forever. This in turn constitutes the lasting character of the resurrection on which its salvific value is based. The soteriological value of the resurrection extends to the man taken in his bodily and spiritual entirety, that is to say, all of human nature. The human body should also participate in redemption and be subject to poverty. Consequently, the entire material world, which is somehow enclosed, contained in the human body, is also destined for the same purpose, and is drawn to this very destiny, i.e. to the resurrection. Therefore, the resurrected body of Christ is the resurrection of the whole created visible world. So the resurrection has its cosmic aspect. It is not only Christ's victory, but in Christ it is a complete triumph of the whole of created reality. This is also the saving effectiveness of the resurrection.

The resurrection is closely connected with the Ascension. This refers to the state of Christ after the resurrection and, as such, also has its salvific value. Ascension as the planting of Christ at the right hand of God is not only the enthronement of the Messiah in his kingdom or the fulfilment of prophecies. It is an event that extends, expands and spreads due to the ultimate possession of messianic power. This power is the royal power to rule over all creation. It is also the priesthood authority of Christ who ascended to heaven after making the sacrifice of his life. He did so as High Priest at the time of his death on the cross. This priestly authority is the power of sanctification that permeates all human existence. Christ as the head of his body also has the power to give life to the Mystical Body through Ascension. Therefore, the reality of the Ascension can create a picture, that is, humanity and the universe filled with eternal life.

The Ascension leads to the realization of the last event of the salvific drama, i.e. the exaltation of the Holy Spirit in Green Week. Christ the Redeemer sent Holy Spirit into the hearts of the people. Thanks to him, the mystery of redemption will always survive as alive and effective until the final coming of Christ. The Holy Spirit inspires, purifies and strengthens people in their contact with God, securing their intimate belonging to Him. Through the sending of the Holy Spirit, the covenant between God and men is fulfilled. The realization of this covenant is very closely connected with the Church, which has been given the gift of the Holy Spirit. The Church is always born in the dynamism of expansion. The dynamism of the Church in fulfilling her universal mission comes from the Holy Spirit. It is He who continues in the Church the work of redemption accomplished by Christ. Through the many gifts, they will stimulate Christians to bear witness, which is crucial, even indispensable, in the process of the Church's growth, that is, in the fulfilment of its mission. This continuation of the Church's redemptive work through the power of the Holy Spirit will be carried out in a living and effective manner until the final coming of Christ in glory.

The action of the Holy Spirit – always rapping on the future already extends to the human individual in the first place, liberating him or her internally. This liberation is spiritual, and it is a liberation based on love. The sending of the Holy Spirit, closely connected with the resurrection, also offers us a new life. The spill of the Holy Spirit is the spill of life. This new life begins within the redeemed man who has become a new creation in the Holy Spirit and has been internally redone. The image of a human being has also been made a new reality and has become a new creation. Therefore, the sending of the Holy Spirit as the last event in the drama of redemption is the cause, the source of the renewal

of all creation. In conclusion, the soteriological value of the exile of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost lies in the fulfilment of the covenant with the Father in the fact that it is the omnipotence of the beginning of the mission and development of the Church, in the inner liberation accomplished in the Holy Spirit, in the constant exile of the Holy Spirit until the second coming of Christ and in the fact that the exile of the Holy Spirit is the cause and source of new life and the renewal of all creation.

Thus, the redemption accomplished has its multiple value. First, as the tearing apart of Satan's bondage and sin. Redemption not only took away sin, but also took away sin and its perpetrator, Satan. On the positive side, redemption is an achievement of the true freedom offered to us by Christ. A man freed from this bondage can become more fully involved in his work, always giving it a salvific value.

Another value of redemption lies in making a new covenant with the Father. This covenant was renewed by Christ as an innocent lamb. He is the sacrifice for sins. His blood resembles perfectly the blood of the covenant made with God in Sinai when God took the people of Israel for His people. In the mystery of redemption, all men became newly owned by God, the acquired blood of Christ shed on the cross.

Reconciliation with God and men is the third value of redemption, as indicated in our Constitution. This reconciliation was accomplished through Christ's death on the cross. The whole and paschal mystery freed man from the bondage of sin, which destroyed the unity of people with God and among themselves. Consequently, redemption has brought about a new unity between people and God and between themselves. It became a reconciliation.

The fourth value of redemption lies in the service of our lives. Christ merited our lives through His death and resurrection. In the death of Christ, man was freed from death. Death has been defeated. In the resurrection man receives life because the resurrection is the mystery of life.

The revelation of the mystery of love, also mentioned explicitly in *Gaudium et Spes*, can be mentioned as the fifth value of Redemption. This love is so great that it eliminates any distance between the God of holiness and the people of sin. Therefore, God gave His Son to accomplish redemption through His entire paschal mystery. The entire salvific "work" of salvation, directed towards the created reality, is inspired and carried out only by the love of the Father and the love of the Son. This love is manifested in the mystery of redemption by Christ, who offered his life for others. It also affects people who, by participating in God's love and receiving its saving fruits, should keep the greatest commandment of love for their neighbour, including their enemies.

However, before we received such a precise teaching from the Council on the redemptive paschal mystery of Christ, we had to go through a number of issues in the editorial work on the official text. It may be worth noting some of them.

In relation to the redemption accomplished by the entire paschal mystery, it could be observed that in the pre-Council theology, the emphasis was placed on the death of Christ the Priest on the cross, on His bloody sacrifice, satisfaction in a substitute way: for the whole world, but above all for delusions²⁵. In the works of the Council we also observe the development of thoughts concerning our problems. Of course, there were no problems in referring Christ's death to the mystery of Redemption. It should only be noted that the emphasis was placed on the fact that Christ died for all men²⁶. All have therefore been redeemed, and none within mankind is deprived of participation in the fruits of Redemption.

It should also be noted that in the first editions of the text, the redemptive effectiveness of the resurrection was not properly emphasized, even though the bishops demanded it in their postulates expressed before the Council²⁷. Even less has been said of this redemptive efficacy for the ascension and exile of the Holy Spirit. This resulted in a very strong intervention of the representatives of the Eastern Churches, especially I. Ziade emphasized the saving power of the resurrection that embraces man and the world²⁸. Hence the fact of the resurrection in connection with the fact of the Incarnation. According to another theologian from Eastern Europe, P.P. Meouchi, it is suffering the consequences necessary to develop a so-called cosmic theology. For the word becoming flesh united the matter with itself and in a way, it was also connected with the deity. Therefore, the resurrection of Christ is the resurrection of mankind and matter²⁹. In another of his speeches, I. Ziade also pointed to the lack of a certain spiritual vigour in the text because he did not sufficiently emphasise the central

²⁵ Cf. *Pontificium Atheneum Angelicum, facultas theologica*, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. II, 14; C. P. Mutsaerts, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. II, 504-508; E. Clarizio, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. IV, 433; J. M. Koiando, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 055; V. P. Kellenberg, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 421; R. Carboni, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VII, 609; M. Fossati, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 647. 675; J. Król, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 490-493; J. D'Avack, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 143; D. Vignacour, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. I, 433.

²⁶ Cf. Schema I, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 121.

²⁷ Cf. A. Colette, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VIII, 186-187; J. Neuhausler, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. I, 606; C. H. Helmsing, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. VI, 452; S. S. Congregatio S. Officii, in: AD, p. I, vol. III, 6.

²⁸ Cf. I. Ziade, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 535.

²⁹ Cf. P.P. Meouchi, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 423.

position of the risen Christ. Because you cannot understand the events taking place in today's world except in the light of the new creation that began in the resurrection. The mystery of the resurrection is not a second creation from nothing, but the liberation of life from the bondage of death. It is not only a continuation of a previous life or passing through death, it is a real novelty. This explains why we are already passing from the "old age" of the mortal world to the "newness" of the living world.

Nor was anything said at first about the Ascension. Neither in the first edition of the text nor in the statements of the Fathers about it could one notice any interest in the salvific value of this stage of the paschal mystery³⁰. Only recent editions of the text emphasised the link between the Ascension and the Resurrection and emphasized the role of Christ's rule over all creation³². It seems, however, that the Ascension is the phase of the whole Paschal Mystery of Christ, to which, unfortunately, only a minor significance in the mystery of redemption has been attributed.

(The teaching on the exile of the Holy Spirit was also developed, starting with a slight sign of it in the first Schema³³ and in a few statements of the Council Fathers after the first edition of the text. Schema II shows a certain enrichment of the pneumatological problem³⁵. The last editions of the text point even more often to the role of the Holy Spirit in the saving work of Christ, thus responding to the interventions of the representatives of the Eastern Churches. One of them, P.P. Meouchi, even suggests that from such a point of view and interpretation it will be possible to unite the Eastern and Western traditions³⁶. It is worth emphasising here, as in the case of the resurrection, the influence of Eastern theology on the teachings of the Second Vatican Council.

In demonstrating the value of the redemption of the violet, salvation from the bondage of Satan and sin is the focus. This would mean that the Council Fathers' thinking was "firmly rooted, anchored in the concept of redemption, understood" as, redemption from sin³⁷. The atonement and the new covenant

³⁰ Cf. I. Ziade, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 438.

³¹ Cf. *Episcopi Conferentiae Indonesiae*, w: AS, vol. III, p. V, 689; P. M. Malachias von Diepem, in: AS, vol. II, p. VII, 371; A. Bea, w: AS, vol. III, p. V, 27.

³² Cf. *Schema II*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. I, 465; *III Schema*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. VI, 452.

³³ Cf. *Schema I*, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 124.130.140.141.

³⁴ Cf. V. Costantini, in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 218.

³⁵ Cf. *Schema II*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. I, 449. 458. 465. 469.

³⁶ Cf. P.P. Meouchi, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 423—424.

³⁷ Cf. J. D'Avack, in: AD, p. I, vol. II, p. III, 150; H. Routhier, in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 350; M. Maziers, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 480; J. C. Rosenhammer, in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 349; W. R. Power,

with the Father has been marked out, and to a lesser degree. However, relatively much attention has been paid to the values of redemption, such as the service of life and the revelation of the mystery of love. We see a shift in emphasis in the understanding of the mystery of redemption from the negative aspect, that is, from redemption from sin and death, to the positive aspect, emphasising the value of life and love.

Redemption and Creation

As for the problem of the mutual relationship between creation and redemption, we can say that Schema I did not specify this relationship, as a result of the intervention of the Fathers³⁸³⁹. The second schema in number 50 expressed this reference in such a way that redemption contains within itself a creation. The original text reads: “Arctissime igitur historia hominum historia salutis implicatur, et in praesenti ac definitiva oeconomia ordo redemptionis in se ordinem creationis includit.” In number 51, we still have confirmation of the “Imprimis, cum ordo redemptionis ordinem creationis comprehendat...” However, after the renewed interventions of the Council Fathers⁴⁰, the next editions of the text,⁴¹ followed by the official text *Gaudium et Spes*, take a more cautious stance, choosing a compromise solution. The final text of *Gaudium et Spes* says nothing *expressis verbis* about the mutual relationship between redemption and creation. It speaks only of one and the same God the Creator and Redeemer, of the dignity of all created things (GS 41.10).

in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 342; C. Rada Senosią in: AS, vol. III, p. VII, 62; V. M. Costantini, in: AS, vol. IV, p. VI, 464.

³⁸ Cf. K. Wojtyła, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 303; *Directiones pro futura elaboratione textus*, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 200; R. Gonzales Moralejo, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 388; P. von Streng, in: AS, vol. III, p. V, 371.

³⁹ Cf. *Schema II*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. I, 469.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Conferentia Episcoporum Linguae Germanicae et Scandinaviae*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 906; K. Wojtyła, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 661. F. Franje, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 734; J.B. Evangelisti, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 717; M. Wehr, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 873; P.J. Schmitt, in: AS, vol. IV, p. III, 118; S. Hien Nguyen Van Hoa, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 800; H. Jenny, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 774; *Pluies Patres Conciliares Galliae*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. II, 917.

⁴¹ Cf. *Scheme III*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. VI, 465; *Scheme IV*, in: AS, vol. IV, p. VII, 265.

Summary

Analysing the whole process of the development of the doctrine of redemption in *Gaudium et Spes*, we can conclude that the Council responded to the demands expressed before the beginning of the doctrine. It remained faithful to the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas, while preserving the essential content of his doctrine, although it expressed it in a new language. The Council was able to positively explain the doctrine of the mystery of redemption, without arguing with various contemporary theological tendencies. Redemption is shown as the work of Jesus Christ through His salvific Incarnation and the redemptive paschal mystery of death, resurrection, ascension and exile of the Holy Spirit. Redemption freed man from the bondage of Satan and sin, became a new covenant with the Father, reconciled delusions with God and with himself, merited life and revealed the mystery of love. Redemption is a great event in the history of salvation, which begins with the work of Creation. From the history of the various editions of *Gaudium et Spes*, from the interventions of the Council Fathers and from the solutions to the theological problems relating to the whole reality of the modern world, we can conclude that the Pastoral Constitution on the Church points to the relationship between creation and redemption, speaking of creation in the perspective of redemption and defining redemption as the renewal of creation in Christ.

The Contribution of the Greek Patristic Idea to the Teaching of “*Lumen Gentium*” on the Nature of the Church*

Introduction to the Problem and the Method of the Problem

The dogmatic Constitution on the Church, beginning with the words *Lumen Gentium*, is the central document of the Second Vatican Council. Sixteen Council documents are closely related to the *Lumen Gentium*. They derive from it and are based on it¹.

Post-Trident theology, like the Tridentine Council, was apologetic. The polemic-juridical attitude is expressed in the definition of the Church derived from Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, which embraces the Church as a visible supernatural society based on faith, sacraments and power. This one-sided, minimalistic concept of the Church was maintained at the First Vatican Council. It was also expressed in the later enunciations of the magisterium of the Church, as in the encyclical of Pius XII *Mystici Corporis Christi*², for example, the new, more complete view of the Church, expressed in the *Lumen Gentium*, is connected with the recognition of the one-sidedness of the apologetic and legal view and harks back to the sources³. The dogmatic Constitution on the Church refers

* STV 35(1997)1.

¹ Cf. V. Grenade, *Konstytucja dogmatyczna “Lumen gentium” soboru watykańskiego*, *CoTh* 36(1966), 49f.

² Cf. T. Gogolewski, *Nauka o mistycznym Ciele Chrystusa w świetle nowej konstytucji dogmatycznej o Kościele*, *CoTh* 36(1966), 96.100. (The article states that it is Y. Congar who pointed out that the Encyclical of Pius XII did not depart much from the apologetic-institutional concept of the Church adopted at the First Vatican Council and did not cover all aspects of the mystery of the Church).

³ It should be noted that the direction of the Council’s work on the Constitution is largely due to Cardinal L. Suenens, who on 4 XII 1962 during the first session of the Council – referring

not only to the statements of the magisterium of the Church, but also to the Holy Scriptures and to the Fathers of the Church, both Eastern and Western⁴.

Numerous Polish theological studies take up the issues included in the *Lumen Gentium*. So far, however, a detailed comparison of the content of the Constitution itself with the documents quoted in the footnotes has not been addressed⁵. This article is devoted to the analysis of the statements of the Greek Fathers, to which the Constitution refers by teaching about the nature of the Church⁶.

The nature of the Church is expressed in the *Lumen Gentium* by numerous images and new expressions, referring to Scripture and the patristic heritage. Of these, the expressions “the mystery of the Church” and “the new people of God” deserve special attention. The Council used them as titles of the first two chapters of the Constitutions.

The text of the first two chapters of the *Lumen Gentium* has thirty-six footnotes. In seven of these footnotes (19% for all footnotes in the first two chapters), the Constitution refers, among other things, to Greek patristic thought, and in five (14% for all footnotes in these chapters) it refers only to Greek patristic thought. In total, in twelve footnotes to Chapters I and II, the Constitution refers to the ten Greek Fathers of the Church and to the anonymous work of the patristic epoch *Didache*.

In the individual, differently edited footnotes to the chapters concerning the nature of the Church, the Constitution most often refers – as in the entire

to the thoughts of John XXIII expressed in his radio address on September 11, IX – proposed a reorganisation of the previous work on the document; he postulated that first we present *Ecclesia ad intra*, or the nature of the Church, and then *Ecclesia ad extra*, or the relations of the Church with the world. At the beginning of 1963, the ecclesiological subcommittee adopted a project of Belgian origin, in which, among others, G. Philips was involved. Cf. A. Kubiś, *Wprowadzenie do “Lumen gentium” – konstytucji dogmatycznej o Kościele*, in: *Idee przewodnie soborowej konstytucji o Kościele*, S. Grzybek (ed.), Kraków 1971, 33f.

⁴ Cf. T. Gogolewski, art. cit., 94.99ff; A. Kubiś, art. cit., 43.

⁵ This gap is being filled by masters theses prepared recently under the guidance of T. Gogolewski at the Academy of Catholic Theology, specialising in apologetic studies: K. Polak, *Dziedzictwo łacińskich Ojców Kościoła w konstytucji “Lumen gentium,”* Warsaw 1991; R. Garbarek, *Soborowy obraz Kościoła w świetle dokumentów magisterium cytowanych w konstytucji “Lumen gentium,”* Warsaw 1992; P. Jeliński, *Wkład greckiej myśli patrystycznej do ujęcia Kościoła w konstytucji “Lumen gentium,”* P. Binkowski, *Wkład przedsoborowej myśli teologicznej do obrazu Kościoła w konstytucji “Lumen gentium,”* Warsaw 1993.

⁶ This article is part of the work listed in the above footnote, which has been worked out to form an autonomous whole.

document – to the patristic collection of J. P. Migne⁷. It also uses the *Sources chrétiennes*⁸ collection and the collection of F.X. Funk⁹ and W.W. Harvey¹⁰.

An analytical and comparative method was used in this paper. Not only are the statements of the Fathers of the Church quoted¹¹, but they were also compared with the text of the Council document¹². The work became a small anthology. The patristic footnotes to the chapter on the mystery of the Church (part II) and to the chapter on the new people of God (part III) were analysed separately. In the end (part IV) there is a summary in the chronological aspect of the development of the patristic era, starting with *Didache* and ending with John of Damascus.

The Church as a Mystery

In Chapter I of the *Lumen Gentium* (1-8), only four numbers (2, 4, 6, 7) contain footnotes referring to Greek patristics. The first of these numbers (LG 2) speaks of God the Father's saving plan for mankind¹³. The second (LG 4) presents the work of the Holy Spirit in the realisation of this goal, defined by the Council as the mystery of the Church¹⁴. In this perspective, the Church is a dynamic,

⁷ Patrologiae cursus completus. Series graeca, Paris 1857ff. (quote PG).

⁸ Paris 1947 nn. (quote SCh).

⁹ *Paires apostolici*, vol. 1, Tybingae 1901 (quote Funk).

¹⁰ *Irenaei (...) libri V adversus haereses*, Cantabrigiae 1857 – this collection could not be reached for independent reasons; it was not necessary in substance, because the Constitution, referring to Irenaeus, also refers to PG and possibly SCh.

¹¹ The quoted patristic texts were translated from the original by the author of the article. The only exception are fragments from Irenaeus and Origen because the texts have not been preserved in the original language – they have been translated from Latin. For comparison, existing Polish translations are given in the relevant footnotes.

¹² *Fragments of the Constitution are quoted in favour of*: Konstytucja dogmatyczna o Kościele, in: Sobór watykański II. Konstytucje, dekryty, deklaracje. Tekst łańskie-polski, Poznań 1968 s. 146-257.

¹³ Since the work is analytical in its basic assumption, the synthesis of the doctrine of the Church as a mystery and as God's people was not given – it can be found in numerous studies. It was limited only to those constitutional numbers in which the Council refers to Greek patristic thought. This also applies to the next chapter of the work.

¹⁴ Cf. L. Zimny, *Tajemnica Kościoła*, AK 57(1965)340-341, 270ff; H. Bogacki, *Misterium Kościoła pielgrzymującego*, in: *Kościół w świetle soboru*, H. Bogacki, S. Moysa (ed.), Poznań 1968, 54; V. Warnach, *Kościół jako tajemnica*, in: *Nowy obraz Kościoła po soborze watykańskim II*, B. Lambert (ed.), Warsaw 1968, 26ff; K. Wojtyła, *Wstęp ogólny*, in: *Sobór watykański II*, op. cit., 48ff;

complex reality that cannot be closed in a strict conceptual definition¹⁵. This explains why the Council used biblical images: the flock, cattle, farmland, buildings, blue Jerusalem, mother, bride (LG 6), and the extensive image of the Church as the Body of Christ (LG 7)¹⁶.

In order to establish the relationship between the Council's teaching of the mystery of the Church and Greek patristic thought, the seven texts of the Fathers of the Church to which the Constitution refers in this chapter should be compared.

LG 2. "And believers in Christ (Father) decided to gather in the Holy Church, which from the beginning of the world shown by types, miraculously (was) prepared in the history of the nation of Israel and in the Old Covenant."

Cyril of Alexandria (footnote 1 to Chapter I of the Constitution): "The description (Abraham's tithing to Melchizedek) contains a typical sense. Namely, Christ was again (here) described under the veil. His origin is not counted among those who, by law, were called to the office of priest, for he was born of the tribe of Judah, whom Moses did not appoint as a priest. He took tithes from the sons of Levi, that is, from the priesthood of the (Old) Law. He took it from Melchizedek and then also from Aaron. For himself (Aaron) also took tithing from the sons of Levi, presenting (thus) the figure of Christ, as we have just said."¹⁷

The work *Glaphyra in Genesim* is a systematic commentary on the Book of Genesis. It is counted among the exegetical works of Cyril Alexandria. In the quoted text he states that Christ, as High Priest of the New Testament, once took the tithe from Melchizedek, to whom Abraham gave it. Then he also took

A. Zuberbier, *Inspiracje soborowe w eklezjologii*, in: *Myśl posoborowa w Polsce*, J. Myśkow (ed.), Warsaw 1970, 113f; J. Brudź, *Misterium Kościoła*, in: *Idee przewodnie* op. cit., 46ff; A. Słomkowski, *Prawda o Duchu Świętym na II soborze watykańskim*, AK 65(1973)384, 62ff; Y. Congar, *Kościół jako sakrament zbawienia*, Warsaw 1980, 25ff; A. Skowronek, *Powtórka z soboru. W ćwierćwiecze drugiego soboru watykańskiego*, Kraków 1992, 5ff.

¹⁵ Cf. T. Gogolewski, art. cit., 95 n.; J. Puyo, *Życie dla prawdy. Rozmowy z ojcem Congarem*, Warsaw 1982, 120; A. Skowronek, op. cit., 7.

¹⁶ Cf. H. Bogacki, art. cit., 69ff; A. Zuberbier, art. cit., 115; A. Zuberbier, *Teologia dzisiaj*, Katowice 1975, 246f.329; J. Brudź, art. cit., 54ff; A. Luneau, M. Bobiehon, *Kościół ludem Bożym. Od owczarni do ludu Przymierza*, Warsaw 1980, 174f; H. Langkammer, *Nauka św. Pawła o Kościele*, in: *Kościół w świetle Biblii*, Lublin 1984, 85ff; J. Imbach, *Wielkie tematy soboru*, Warsaw 1985, 22; L. Balter, *Holy Universal Church*, "Communio" 9(1989)1, 9ff; M.J. Alves, *People of God. Body of Christ*, *ibid.*, 18ff.

¹⁷ *Glaphyra in Genesim* 2, 10: PG vol. 69 col. 109. Scheme (*Sacrosanctum Oecumenicum Concilium Vaticanum Secundum. Schema constitutionis de Ecclesia*, Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1964) as well as the Constitution refer to the Latin column (col. 110).

it from the priests of the Old Law or sons of Levi, for Aaron, as the High Priest of the Old Covenant, taking tithes from the sons of Levi, typified Christ.

This inspired the *Lumen Gentium*, which already refers this text to the preparation of the Church in the Old Testament.

LG 2. They "(Holy Church) established in the last days, was revealed by the pouring out of the Spirit, and in the end of the ages will reach its glorious end. And then, as we read it from the holy fathers, all the righteous, beginning with Adam, 'from Abel the righteous to the last one chosen,' will be gathered together in the universal Church with the Father."¹⁸

John of Damascus (footnote 2 to Chapter I of the Constitution): "It teaches us the Symbol of Belief: 'And in one, holy, universal and apostolic church of God.' The universal Church cannot be merely apostolic. For the omnipotent authority of the head, which is Christ, could save the whole world through the apostles. It is therefore a holy, God's, universal church, an assembly of holy fathers, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, evangelists, martyrs, to which have been attached believers according to all peoples. For they have seen that of the entire human race, under heaven, they have the same faith as Christians. For without the Holy Spirit, the common and multilingual crowd cannot say a single sentence of the true faith. For again, I say, therefore, that it is universal everywhere, and so it is called, that the different and wild of the whole world multilingual peoples agree on one, peaceful and saving faith and knowledge of God."¹⁹

John of Damascus, the last Father of the Church, explains in the quoted text *Adversus iconoclastas* the characteristics of the Church according to the Symbol of Faith. Among other things, the universality of the Church is expressed in the fact that it is a congregation of the holy fathers of the Old Testament, as well as of New Covenant characters, with all the faithful peoples in agreement. This universality is the work of the Holy Spirit, without which there can be no harmony in matters of faith.

John of Damascus' commentary does not refer the Church's congregation to eschatological times, as the text of LG 2 does.

LG 4. "By the power of the Gospel (Spirit) keeps the Church in constant youth, constantly renews her and leads her to perfect union with the Bridegroom."

Irenaeus (footnote 3): the "(Faith) which we have received from the Church (and which we hold) and which is always, thanks to the Spirit of God, as if

¹⁸ The quotation in LG 2 is from Gregory the Great. Cf. K. Polak, op. cit., 9.

¹⁹ *Adversus iconoclastas* II: PG vol. 96 col. 1357. The diagram shows the Latin col. (1358), which in the Constitution was amended to the Greek col.

a wonderful drink in a noble vessel is young and makes the vessel in which it is found young.”^{20 21}

The greatest theologian of the second century – Irenaeus – shows that it is thanks to the Holy Spirit that the deposit of faith received from the Church is young and makes the Church herself young.

The relevant text of LG 4, which speaks of the role of the Holy Spirit and refers to the text of Irenaeus, presents the Spirit of God as the guarantor of the youth of the Church and its renewer. The Council did not limit itself to Irenaeus’ thought, but extended it. While Irenaeus spoke only of the constant youth of faith, transmitted by the Church, the Constitution speaks of the youth of the Church herself. The Holy Spirit is the author of this youth, both according to Irenaeus and the Council document.

LG 4: “Thus the whole Church turns out to be ‘a people united by the unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.’”²¹

John of Damascus (footnote 4): “So we believe in one holy, universal and apostolic Church of God, in which we are taught by catechesis. We also know the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and we are baptised in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. We also participate in the saving Body and Blood of the Son of God who, for our sake, became a man of our Father’s predilection and died for us.”²²

The text of John of Damascus was taken from the same commentary on the symbol of faith, to which the Council referred in footnote 2 to Chapter I of *Lumen Gentium*²³, the Greek Father of the Church states the importance of the Church’s faith in the mystery of the Holy Trinity and its close connection not only with the basic sacrament of Christian initiation, which is baptism, but also (indirectly) with the sacrament of the Eucharist.

The Trinitarian dimension of the Church’s mystery, as described in LG 2–4, is therefore a common heritage of both Latin patristics (apart from Cyprian and Gregory the Great, it is cited in footnotes 1, 2 and 4 of Augustine and 1 of Hilary of Poitiers) and Greek patristics (Cyrillic Alexandria, Irenaeus and John of Damascus).

²⁰ *Adversus haereses* III, 24, 1: PG vol. 7 col. 966; SCh vol. 34, p. 398. Cf. A. Bober, *Światła ekumeny. Antologia patrystyczna*, Kraków 1965, 48 (in the translation, the subject of the sentence is the truth).

²¹ The quotation in LG 4 is from Cyprian. Cf. K. Polak, *op. cit.*, 10.

²² *Adversus iconoclastas* 12: PG vol. 96 col. 1357. Both the schema and the Constitution refer to the Latin column (1358).

²³ Cf. footnote 19.

LG 6. "The church is also often called God's 'building' (1Cor 3:9). (...) The building is given different names: the house of God (1 Tim 3:15) (...); the dwelling of God in the Spirit (Eph 2:19-22); the tabernacle of God with men (Revelation 21:3); and above all, the 'temple' of the feast, which the holy fathers glorify as represented by the stone shrines and which is not unreasonably compared in the liturgy to the holy city, to the new Jerusalem."

Origen (footnote 5): "So I think that the Church is a temple built of living stones (...)"²⁴

The most fertile of the Fathers of the Church, Origen, in the commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew compares the Church to a temple built of living stones.

For example, *Lumen Gentium* includes Origen (next to Tertullian and liturgical prayers) among the witnesses of the early Christian tradition of developing the New Testamentary image of the Church as a building of God.

LG 7. "And so that in him (in Christ) we may continually renew ourselves (cf. Eph 4:23), he gave us his Spirit, who, being one and the same in the Head and in the members, so animates, unites and moves the whole body that the work of the Holy Fathers could be compared to the function which the principle of life, or soul, performs in the human body."

John Chrysostom (footnote 8): "What is unity of spirit? Just as there is one spirit in the body that embraces everything and does one thing (body), consisting of different members, so here too (in the Church). For this purpose, the Spirit was given to unite people of different nationalities and customs. For an old man and a young man, a poor man and a rich man, a child and an adult, a woman and a man and every soul become one thing, and this more than if it were one body. For from this (bodily) union that (spiritual) one is much greater and more complete is the perfection of that union. For the connection of the soul (with the body) is the more perfect, the simpler (and resulting) it is from a single form. But how do we keep it? In the bond of peace."²⁵

Didymus the Blind (footnote 8): "For the Father had begun, having likened (to himself in creation), but had created (the Son) the Only-Begotten, and the Spirit of God sanctified (all) and with his sanctification perfected, enlightened, strengthened, enlivened. It all exists in all things (created things) and in each of them. Everyone has a share in His goodness and contains Him. However,

²⁴ *In Matthaicum commentarius* 16, 21: PG vol. 13 col. 1444. Both the schema and the Constitution refer to the Latin column (1443). Cf. M. Michalski, *Antologia literatury patrystycznej*, vol. 1, Warsaw 1975, 386.

²⁵ *In epistulam ad Ephesios homilia* 9, 3: PG vol. 62 col. 72.

it is not divided, nor does it pass (from one to the other) and is not subject to change. He always gives himself to everyone in the same way, not in part, keeping his own purity, unblemished by the bodies. In a divine way, everything illuminates and multiplies everywhere holiness, love, peace, wisdom, joy, security and all goodness.”²⁶

“He (the Holy Spirit) sanctifies (us) and revives, and makes us partakers of heavenly light. He guards everyone’s perseverance in agreement. His voice was in the prophets and apostles. (He) strengthened the martyrs to resist the tyrannical cruelty. He renews and frees us as the Lord, and as the Spirit of adoption for sons makes us sons of God. He by the light (of baptism) casts away groups of demons and humiliates the enemy (Satan). He opens for us the gates of heaven and introduces us to the vestibule of salvation, making us partakers of the life and singing of angels. He’s a road for us (*exactly*: the path that leads to God Himself and to the Father in heaven.”²⁷

The LG 7 continues to discuss the biblical images of the Church, paying special attention to the image of the Church as the Body of Christ. This image is complemented by the comparison of the role of the Holy Spirit in the Church with the function of the soul in the body, which is often present in tradition (Augustine, Thomas) and in the teaching of the magisterium (Leo XIII, Pius XII).

This fragment of the Constitution refers to the extensive argumentation of John Chrysostom in his homily to the letter of St. Paul to the Ephesians and to the work of Didymus the Blind, dedicated to the Holy Trinity. Both explain in detail what is the unity in the Church, modelled on the unity of soul and body. The council therefore returns to patristic symbolism, breaking the tendency of Post-Trident theology which saw in the Holy Spirit the so-called Uncreated Soul of the Church (*Anima Increata, in contrast to grace, described as anima creata*)²⁸.

²⁶ *De Trinitate* 2, 1: PG t. 39 kol. 449 n.

²⁷ *Ibid.* col. 452.

²⁸ Cf. S. Tromp, *De Spiritu Sancto anima Corporis Mystici, t. I. Testimonia selecta e Patribus Graecis, Series theological*, vol. 1, Rome 1948.

Church as a New People of God

Chapter II of the *Lumen Gentium* (9-17) describes the Church as a new people of God²⁹. The four numbers of this chapter (11, 13, 16, 17) refer to the Greek Fathers of the Church. God's people participate in the saving work of Christ through the sacraments of baptism and other sacraments (LG 11). All men are called to this tribe (LG 13). The Constitution discusses, among other things, his attitude toward those who are merely assigned to him and not incarnated with him (LG 16)³⁰. Finally, the Council document stresses the missionary character of the Church (LG 17).

The basis for determining the share of the Greek patristic heritage in this chapter of the Constitution are the nine patristic texts.

LG 11. "By the sacrament of confirmation, the (faithful) are even more closely bound to the Church, receive the special power of the Holy Spirit, and thus are even more strongly bound, as true witnesses to Christ, to spread and defend faith by word and deed."

²⁹ Cf. A. Skowronek, *Soborowa wizja Kościoła*, CoTh 37(1967)I, 10ff; H. Bogacki, art. cit., 54ff; J.J. Greehy, *Lud Boży*, in: *Kościół w obliczu reformy*, D. Flanagan (ed.), Warsaw 1969, 16ff; S. Grzybek, *Lud Boży w świetle konstytucji "Lumen gentium"*, in: *Guiding ideas*, op. cit., 81f; A.L. Szafranski, *Pojęcie Kościoła jako ludu Bożego*, AK 64(1972)381-382, 113 (the article contains valuable information that this concept was included in the Constitution thanks to Congar); A. Zuberier, op. cit., 245ff; J. Imbach, op. cit., 22; V. Messori, *Raport o stanie wiary*, Warsaw 1986, 40f; K. Wojtyła, *U podstaw odnowy. Studium o realizacji Vaticanum II*, Kraków 1988, 105ff; M.J. Alves, art. cit., 16ff; R. Winling, *Teologia współczesna 1945-1980*, Kraków 1990, 155. It is worth mentioning that I. Różycki (and after him T. Gogolewski) proposed to speak about the new people of God. This term, better than the formulation of *new God's people*, reflects the conciliar idea that the Church is created by the power of the sacrament of baptism and by the clergy and laity. The concept proposed by I. Różycki and T. Gogolewski has not been accepted. The term used to describe *God's people*, although it does not have a nationalistic meaning, as does the expression of *God's people*, is often associated only with the laity. From a philological point of view, both translations of the Latin *populus Dei* are correct.

³⁰ Cf. E. Florkowski, *Wprowadzenie do konstytucji dogmatycznej o Kościele*, in: *Sobór Watykański II*, op. cit., 136 (the author, contrary to the original, refers the last sentence of the first paragraph of LG 14 to the Church of Christ, also omits the *Catholic* word for the Polish translation); A. Luneau, M. Bobichon, op. cit., 189; Cz. Bartnik, *Kościół Jezusa Chrystusa*, Wrocław 1982, 171ff; E. Ozorowski, *Kościół. Zarys eklezjologii katolickiej*, Wrocław 1984, 82f; R. Winling, op. cit., 160ff.

Cyril of Jerusalem (footnote 5 to Chapter II of the Constitution): “If you abide in faith (by baptism), you are blessed; if you have given up by unbelief, cast out unbelief from that day on and become strongly convinced.”³¹

There is always a guardian standing by you (*literally* a guardian, a guard), Paraclete. He cares about you as his soldier, about your entrances and your exits, and about those waiting for you. He will also give you various gifts of charisms if you do not sadden Him because of your sins, for it is written: “And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with whom you were sealed for the day of redemption” (Eph 4:30). So what does it mean, darlings, to keep mercy? Be ready to accept grace and, having received it, do not abandon.”³²

The third and fourth centuries abounded in Christological and pneumatic problems³³. Cyril Jerusalem, a participant in the Constantinople Council of 381, which dealt with the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, describes his concern for believers in the relevant passage of his catechesis on the Holy Spirit. The author speaks about the Holy Spirit in the context of the sacrament of baptism, while the Constitution refers to his words for confirmation. The dependence of LG 11 on the thoughts of Cyril of Jerusalem is therefore not strict.

LG 13. “Among all the peoples of the earth, then, there is rooted one People of God, since of all the nations he takes on his own people, citizens of the Kingdom, not earthly, but heavenly in character. For all the faithful scattered throughout the world have communion with each other in the Holy Spirit and thus the inhabitant of Rome knows that the Indians are members of the same organism as he is.”

John Chrysostom (footnote 9 to Chapter II of the Constitution): “Which means: ‘To gather together those who are close by and those who are far away’ (J 11:52; cf. Eph 2:17). He created one body. He who is in Rome recognises that Indians are part of his (body), someone equal in this congregation. The Christ is the head of all of them.”³⁴

This passage in the Constitutions on the vocation of all people to the new people of God shows the interrelationship between the citizens of this people. A small passage from the homily of John Chrysostom is quoted exceptionally in the text of LG 13 itself. There is therefore a complete convergence of the text

³¹ *Catechesis XVII. De Spiritu Sancto* II, 35: PG vol. 33 col. 1009. Cf. *Cyril of Jerusalem. Catechesis* (Scriptures by Old Christian Writers / Quotations PSP/1. 9, team edition, translated by W. Kania), Warsaw 1973, 280.

³² *Catechesis XVII*, op. cit. col. 1012. Cf. Cyril of Jerusalem, op. cit., 280f.

³³ Cf. J. Kelly, *The beginnings of Christian doctrine*, Warsaw 1988, 90ff.191ff.211ff.

³⁴ *In Ioannem homilia* 65(64), 1: PG vol. 59 col. 361f.

of the Constitutions with that of Chrysostom. In addition, the Latin text of the Constitutions did not contain the Latin translation of the PG, but was made for the use of the Greek text of the Constitutions. This is a small but meaningful confirmation that the Council's experts reached directly to the Greek text.

LG 13. "It is the mark of universality that adorns the People of God that is the gift of the Lord Himself; through this gift, the Catholic Church effectively and continuously strives to unite all humanity and all its goods with Christ the Head in the unity of his Spirit."

Irenaeus (footnote 10): "He is Jesus Himself, our Lord, who suffered for us and rose again for us, and will come again in the glory of the Father for the resurrection of all the bodies, and for the presentation of salvation, and for the judgement of (His) just judgement to shine before all who are subject to Him. One (is) so, as we have shown, God the Father and one Christ Jesus, our Lord, who has gone through the whole order of salvation and has reunited everything within himself (cf. Eph 1:10). In this 'all' he is also man, God's creation. For this reason, he also reunited man in himself, from the Invisible to the Visible, from the Inconceivable to the Conceived, from the Impatient to the Patient, from the Word to the Human. He has reunited everything within himself. How, then, is the Word of God the first among (beings) above heaven and spiritual and invisible (cf. Col 1:16), so also among the visible and the fleshly (beings) is the first (It), taking precedence for itself (cf. Col 1:18). However, by making himself the Head of the Church (cf. Eph 1:22), he attracts everything to himself at the right time (cf. J 12:32)."³⁵³⁶

Irenaeus (footnote 10): "Luke (3:23) shows, therefore, that the genealogy, which goes from the birth of our Lord to Adam, contains seventy-two generations, linking the end to the beginning and emphasizing that he is the one who has united all the nations from (the times of) Adam, and all the languages, and all the human race, including Adam himself, in a new way (cf. Eph 1:10). Hence and Adam himself was called by Paul, the type who was to come (Rom 5:14), because the Word, the Creator of all, formed in advance what was to be accomplished in him, (i.e.) the order of salvation of the human race through the Son of God. God first formed the fleshly man (Adam) to be saved by the spiritual man (Christ). For since there was a saviour in advance (i.e. the Word), it was necessary for him to become also the one who was to be saved (i.e. Adam), so that (Christ) would not be the Saviour in vain."

³⁵ *Adversus haereses* III, 16, 6: PG vol. 7 col. 925; Sch vol. 34, 292.

³⁶ *Adversus haereses* III, 22, 3: PG vol. 7 col. 958; Sch vol. 34, 378. Cf. A. Bober, op. cit., 47f.

The texts of Irenaeus point to the role of Jesus Christ as Head of the Church in the unification of all people of all times. The Excerpt from LG 13 presents the universality of God's people as a gift from Christ, making the Catholic Church strive to unite all humanity with Jesus in the unity of the Spirit. The document enriches Irenaeus' thought by emphasizing the role of the Catholic Church in the realization of the sign of universality that Christ bestowed on his Church.

LG 13. "Therefore, in the ecclesiastic community, there are legitimately particular Churches which benefit from their own tradition; however, the primacy of the Holy See, which leads the entire congregation of love, remains intact (...)"

Ignatius of Antioch (footnote 11): "Ignatius, also called Theophorus, (...) (to the Church), which also presides in a place inhabited by Romans, worthy of God, worthy of honour, worthy of recognition as blessed, worthy of praise, worthy of prosperity, worthy of holiness, and leading in love, having the law of Christ (*possible translation*: performing the authority of Christ), bearing the name of the Father."³⁷

Ignatius is a witness to the oldest patristic tradition. Therefore, in the historical and theological consideration of the primacy of the Holy See, its statements have a special value.

The Constitution affirms the primacy of the Holy See over particular Churches. The expression that it *leads the congregation of love* was taken from Ignatius. However, he lacks the term *primacy*, which is of later origin.

LG 16. "Nor does it deny the Divine Providence necessary for salvation to those who, without any fault of their own, have not yet come to a clear knowledge of God, and who are trying, not without God's grace, to lead an honest life. For whatever is in them of goodness and truth, the Church treats it as a preparation for the Gospel."

Eusebius of Caesarea (footnote 20): "It seems to me that this lecture will lead properly to a better understanding of the preparation for the Gospel (tes Evangelikes apodeikseos) and then to a better understanding of the more difficult teachings. (It will be so) if what belongs to (the) preparation opens for us (first) the way, as a beginning and easier introduction, more suitable for the Gentiles who have recently joined (to us). Then to those who have gone through these

³⁷ *Epistula ad Romanos*. Praefatio: Funk, 252. Cf. *The scriptures of the Apostolic Fathers. The Teachings of the Twelve Apostles. Barnabas. Clementine of Rome. Ignatius of Antioch. Polycarp. Hermas*, in: POK, vol. 1, J. Sajdak (ed.), Poznań 1924, 226; Sz. Pieszczoł, *Patrologia. Wprowadzenie w studium Ojców Kościoła*, Poznań 1964, 59; M. Michalski, op. cit., vol. 1, 24; *Pierwsi świadkowie. Wybór najstarszych pism chrześcijańskich*, in: *Ojcowie żywi*, vol. 8, M. Starowieyski (ed.), Kraków 1988, 156; *Ojcowie Apostolscy*, in: PSP, vol. 45, Warsaw 1990, 80.

beginnings and have already attained the ability to accept the more difficult (truths), we will pass on the exact knowledge (truths) of the mysteries of the perfect and all-inclusive economy (salvation) accomplished by Jesus Christ, our Lord (and) God. We will begin this preparation (tes Proparaskeues) with a presentation of what can be accepted both by the Gentiles and by all those who learn more about our customs and institutions."^{38 39}

LG 16 refers entirely to those who are not God's people, but are ordered to them. The passage in question concerns those who have not yet come to knowledge of God at all, but who seek to lead an honest life by fulfilling the good and the truth to the best of their ability.

In order to define these efforts, which the Gentiles made *not without God's grace*, as the Constitution expresses it, it used the term *evangelical preparation*, which is the title of the work of Eusebius. The author understood this *preparation* as an initial instruction of the pagans, introducing them to the mysteries of Christianity.

The text of Eusebius, to which the Constitution refers, is therefore only an inspiration to the Constitution. From the initial teaching of the catechumens, the Council extends this term to all (*any*) manifestations of good and truth outside Christianity or even any religion, seeing them as an objective preparation for the acceptance of the Good News by the Gentiles.

LG 17. "But if everyone can baptise those who believe, it is the priest's job to build up the Mystical Body through the Eucharistic sacrifice by fulfilling the words of God recorded in the Prophet: 'From sunrise to sunset my name is great among the nations and they consecrate and make a pure sacrifice to my name in every place' (Mal 1:11)."

Didache (footnote 22): "In (day of) the Lord, while gathering, break the bread and do thanksgiving after previous confession of your sins, so that your sacrifice may be pure. But whoever has a dispute with his companion should not gather with you until they have both come to terms, so that your sacrifice may not be insulted. For this is how you said, In every place and time 'they will offer me a pure sacrifice, because I am a great king, you say, and my name is great among the nations' (Ml 7:77)."⁴⁰

³⁸ *Praeparatio evangélica* 1, 1: PG vol. 21 col. 28. The diagram shows the Latin col. (27), which in the Constitution was amended to the Greek col.

³⁹ In the Latin text the *mystical* term does not appear.

⁴⁰ *Didache 14: Funk*, p. 32. Cf. *Pisma Ojców Apostolskich*, op. cit., 38; *Sz. Pieszczochoch*, op. cit., 45 (*only 14:1*); *M. Michalski*, op. cit., vol. 1, 20; *Pierwsi świadkowie*, op. cit., 50f; *Ojcowie Apostolscy*, op. cit., 64.

Justin (footnote 22): “Hence, God speaks of the sacrifices you once made, as I have said (above), through Malachi, one of the twelve (prophets): I have no predilection in you,’ says the Lord, ‘and I will not accept your sacrifices at your hands, for from sunrise to sunset (*literally*, sunsets). My name (is) surrounded by glory among the nations, and in every place is offered (is) incense to my name, and sacrifice is pure, because my name (is) great among the nations, says the Lord, and you insult them’ (Ml 1:10-12). He announces the sacrifices made to him everywhere from us Gentiles, the Eucharistic bread and the Eucharistic cup, when he says that we glorify his name and that you insult it.”⁴¹

Irenaeus (footnote 22): “When he also commanded his disciples to sacrifice the first fruits of his creatures to God, not as if he needed them, but as if they were not themselves useless or ungrateful, he took this bread which he (is) made of created (matter) and which he did by speaking: ‘This is my body’ (Mt 26:26). Similarly (he took) the cup, which is (also) of the created (matter), (destined) for us, and taught the new sacrifice of the New Testament. The Church has received it from the apostles, and God, who gives us food, offers it throughout the world as the first fruits of his gifts in the New Testament, as announced by Malachi, one of the twelve prophets, in such words: I have no predilection *in* you, says the Almighty Lord, and I will not accept any sacrifices at your hands. For from sunrise to sunset my Name is worshipped among the nations and in every place offered incense to my Name and pure sacrifice. For my name is great among the nations, says the Almighty Lord. (1:10-11)”.

LG 17 instructs us about God’s duty to preach the Gospel to all people of God, so that every human being may have the opportunity to make a personal decision in religious matters. On such a broad backdrop, the cited fragment resembles the function of the ministerial priests who, unlike the lay faithful, build the Church in a special way through the Eucharist, fulfilling the prophecy of Malachi.

Didache, mentioned in this context, is the oldest Christian source, which the noun *Eucharist* (*he eucharistia*) (9,1-3) refers to the Lord’s Supper^{42 43}. *Didache* 14 uses a verb form to describe mass and, following the book of Malachi, describes it as a sacrifice. Justin is the apologist who testifies to the Eucharistic

⁴¹ *Dialogus cum Tryphone Jitdaeo* 41: PG vol. 6 col. 564. Cf. Justin. *Apologia. Dialog z żydem Tryfonem*, in: POK vol. 4, J. Sajdak, (ed.), Poznań 1926, 167.

⁴² *Adversus haereses* IV, 17, 5: PG vol. 7 col. 1023f. Cf. A. Bober, op. cit., 49.

⁴³ Zob. J. Gliściński, *Eucharystia w nauczaniu Ojców Kościoła*, HD 56(1987)2, 88; F. Louvel, *Słowniczek*, in: *Pierwsi świadkowie*, op. cit., 457.

life of the second century⁴⁴. Irenaeus, on the other hand, emphasises in the Eucharist the novelty in relation to the sacrifices of the Old Covenant⁴⁵. All three Fathers of the Church clearly refer the breaking of Eucharistic bread to the prophecy of Malachi, but they do not speak directly about the role of the priest, as the Constitution does.

Chronological View of the Problem⁴⁶

The analysis shows that the first chapter of the LG includes the thoughts of the six Greek Fathers, starting from the turn of the second and third centuries (Irenaeus, Origen), through the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth century (Didymus the Blind, John Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria), and ending with the first half of the 8th century, i.e. the late period of patristics (John of Damascus, quoted twice). Of these, Didymus the Blind and Cyril of Alexandria are mentioned only in this chapter of the LG.

In chapter II of the LG, Greek patristic art is represented by one anonymous work and six Fathers, starting with the oldest surviving *Didache* (late 1st century), Ignatius of Antioch (early 2nd century), Justin (mid-2nd century), Irenaeus (second half of the 2nd century, quoted again and twice), through Eusebius of Caesarea (early 4th century) and ending with Jerusalem Cyril and John Chrysostom (4th century).

In pre-conciliar theology, the legal dimension of the Church was over-emphasised. Meanwhile, in Chapter I of the LG, the nature of the Church is described as God's dynamic intention, expressed in the biblical images of the Church, which were not remembered before the Council. In the analysed patristic fragments there is no term for *the mystery of the Church*, which appeared for the first time in *Didache*, but in an unclear, difficult to specify sense. Irenaeus' beliefs (LG 4, footnote 3) that the Church is young through the Holy Spirit was used, even though the author refers the author of this youth only to faith in the Church. Thanks to Origen (LG 6:5), the patristic reading of the biblical images of the Church (and of the Bible in general), previously forgotten, is valued. Based on Didymus the Blind and John Chrysostom (LG 7, footnote 8), the

⁴⁴ Cf. J. Gliściński, art. cit., 88f.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 89f.

⁴⁶ The chronological notation used in this part of the work is subordinated to the order of the chapters of the *Lumen Gentium* Constitution. Therefore, the contribution of Greek patristic thought to Chapter I and to Chapter II of the CC was discussed separately.

Constitution recognised the action of the Holy Spirit in the Body of Christ as analogous to the role of the soul in the body, without calling it the Soul of the Church. In reference to the Cyril of Alexandria (LG 2, footnote 1), the Church has been historically and personally captured, seeing its origins already in the Old Testament. Finally, John of Damascus (LG 2, footnote 2) helped to understand the universality of the Church, although the Constitution refers the words of this Father not to the present but to the eschatological reality. Similarly, the Constitution extended the Trinitarian aspect to the whole Church, which is related to faith (LG 4:4).

In the chapter on the new people of God, the Constitution uses the *Didache* of Justin and Irenaeus (LG 17, footnote 22) to present the role of the priest celebrating the Eucharist in the building up of this people. It is significant that these patristic inspirations are expressed in the terminology of foreign patristics itself: the Church as the mystical Body of Christ, not the Body of Christ.⁴⁷ This tendency to use patristic content by the Council using later concepts is also evident in the quotation of Ignatius of Antioch (LG 13, footnote 11). The Council refers to it in the context of the primacy of the Holy See, even though the term *primacy* is alien to this author. Irenaeus (LG 13:10), on the other hand, helped the Constitution to appreciate the desire of the people of God to unite all men and women with Christ the Head in the Holy Spirit in the aspect of the universality of the Church. In this way, the pre-conciliar understanding of unification as merely an admission to the Catholic Church or a return to it of separated brothers and sisters was overcome. An example of the associative dependence of only the text of the Constitutions on the content cited in the notes is the passage from Eusebius of Caesarea (LG 16:20), from which the LG took only the title of his work. Cyril of Jerusalem (LG 11, footnote 5) speaks of the role of the Holy Spirit in relation to the sacrament of baptism, and the Constitution on Confirmation. The Constitution treated the words of John Chrysostom (LG 13:9), which refer to the relationship between the members of the Church's organism, in a different way. He quotes them in the text itself, but only in a footnote, which from a methodological point of view should be considered the most correct way of using patristic sources.

Patristics enriched the Council's vision of the nature of the Church. The dogmatic Constitution on the Church reinterpreted Greek patristic ecclesiology. The *Lumen Gentium* treats patristics as a source to which it returns, although from a methodological point of view the Constitution refers to patristics

⁴⁷ It's about *Didache* 11, 11.

in a differentiated way. It should be added, however, that given the teaching of the entire *Lumen Gentium* (on the nature of the Church, on the servile character of the priesthood in its three degrees, on the sanctity of the individual states in the Church, on the role of the Mother of God in the mystery of Christ and the Church), the least patristic inspiration can be felt precisely in relation to the nature of the Church as a mystery and of the people of God⁴⁸⁴⁹.

Summary

The nature of the Church was expressed in Dogmatic Constitution on the Church "Lumen gentium" by numerous pictures and new expressions. They refer to the Bible and patristics. It is necessary to place special attention on two expressions. These are: the mystery of the Church and the new people of God. The Second Vatican Council used these expressions to name two of titles of chapters of *Lumen gentium*.

In this article, the speeches of the Greek Fathers of the Church are detailed analysed. The Council document refers to them in glosses only. 8 numbers – 4 in each chapter – contain references to Greek patristics. Totally, in 12 glosses to chapter I and II the Constitution refers to 10 Greek Fathers of the Church and to the anonymous patristic text of *Didache*. In the final part of this work the development of the patristic period was summarized in a chronological aspect. It began with *Didache*, then Irenaeus and John Chrysostom, and finally John of Damascus. In comparison to the whole Constitution with reference to the nature of the Church (as the mystery and new people of God) there is very little patristic inspiration.

In this article, speeches of the Fathers of the Church were not only analysed, but also compared to council texts. Thanks to this, we see it as a short anthology of patristic ideas.

⁴⁸ Cf. T. Gogolewski, art. cit., 97f.

⁴⁹ Cf. P. Jeliński, op. cit., 2 (on Chapter VIII of the Constitutions), 73 (on the other seven chapters of the LG).

Part VI –
Varia

Department of Theology of the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK) as a Dynamic Scientific Centre*

Let me start by remarking that in the first decades of our university's existence, the boundaries between its departments divided students and employees incomparably to a much lesser extent than at present. It is enough to recall that for many years the chronicle published in almost every issue of the STV recorded the most important events that took place at all three departments at that time, not only at the Theological Department.

This common sense of unity of our *Alma Mater*, much deeper than at present, resulted not only from the fact that its three departments – theological, philosophical and legal – were created from one (though a double, Warsaw and Kraków) Theological Department. First of all, ATK was a small university, the number of its students could not exceed the limits, which were set externally by the state authorities. The small size favoured the feeling that we were one community of professors and students.

The pressure of reality, as well as the gradual weakening of the communist system, made the university slowly but steadily expand and develop. Ultimately, the Theological Department of ATK turned out to be so large that a large part of it – church history, art history and patrology, and thus the disciplines deeply related to theology – in 1987 were transferred to the newly created Department of Church Historical and Social Sciences. In my opinion (and not only mine), the negative effects of this separation are felt in both our departments to this day.

I mention this fact because it is impossible to refer to these three disciplines in this, unfortunately cursory, study. I will omit, however, because this is a subject discussed by other authors in this issue of the STV, the history of biblical studies, catechetics, homiletics, pastoral theology and missiology that is developing brilliantly in our department.

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Dogmatic Theology

Coryphaeus of dogmatic theology at ATK was Rev. Ignacy Różycki (1911-1983), who at the time of the liquidation of theological faculties (1954) was a professor at the Jagiellonian University. I cannot say how one should interpret the information given in the Catholic Encyclopedia (volume 17 col. 499), that he worked in ATK only until 1957. When I was a student at ATK, I participated in his lectures on dogmatic theology in the 1968/69 academic year. In the pages of the journal ATK "Studia Theologica Varsaviensia" he published his articles, sometimes very extensive (e.g. the problem of internal non-contradiction and usefulness of the Scheeben's doctrine of grace of adoption as son, STV vol. 4, 1966 No. 2 pp. 233-268, vol.5, 1967 no. 1 pp. 73-150). At the Theological Department of ATK, he was the supervisor of doctoral students (e.g. in the seventies, excellent doctoral dissertations under his guidance were written and defended by Jerzy Kotara, Tadeusz Dionizy Łukaszuk and Engelbert Gorywoda). It is true that the Rev. Różycki never moved to Warsaw, however – according to my knowledge – he tried to attend the lectures diligently.

John Paul II always gratefully mentioned him as his professor. He was the supervisor of the master's thesis of the Rev. Karol Wojtyła (entitled *The Concept of the Centre of the Unification of the Soul with God in the Context of the Doctrine of the Saint John of the Cross*). From October 27, 1965, he was a Council expert; he was involved in the work on the Declaration on Religious Freedom and the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. Later, the Rev. Różycki, in a sense, passed a report on his involvement, in a lecture given at ATK on May 17, 1966, entitled *My experience resulting from the conciliar and scientific contacts during my stay abroad*. The History of Dogmas Department was directed by Rev. Henryk Bogacki SJ (1924-1993), who concentrated his research on ecclesiology, but he rendered merit to Polish theology primarily as an extremely energetic director of the ATK publishing house. He saved the quarterly "Collectanea Theologica" for Polish theology, when it ceased to be issued, and for several decades (1966-1990) he was its editor-in-chief, but thanks to his extraordinary energy and organizational talent, the ATK publishing house provided Polish researchers with hundreds of priceless scientific publications, among others within such series as "Pisma starochrześcijańskich pisarzy," "Studia antiquitatis christianae," "Textus et studia theologiae in Polonia excultae spectantia," "Opera philosophorum medii aevi," "Studia teologiczno-dogmatyczne," "Polskie studia ascetyczne," "Studia z bibliistyki," "Zeszyty misjologiczne," "Posoborowe ustawodawstwo kościelne," "Muzyka religijna w Polsce," "Studia z historii Kościoła w Polsce," "Bibliografia historii Kościoła w Polsce," "Polska bibliografia nauk kościelnych," "Z zagadnień filozofii przyrodznawstwa i filozofii przyrody."

In the 1970s, the circles of dogmatic theologians at ATK were led by Rev. Andrzej Zuberbier (1922-2000). In September 1971, just after his post-doctoral 'habilitation', he was elected the first chairman of the Dogmatic Section of Polish Theologians. As he performed this function well he was elected twice more for subsequent terms. As a younger colleague from the same university, I was elected secretary of this section and to a greater or lesser extent participated in the preparation of subsequent symposia held by the section during his chairmanship. These symposia were indeed considered real events. Already their themes – just as I can recall some of them now – confirm the intellectual sophistication of our chairman: *Theological Hermeneutics*, *Contemporary trends in Christology*, *In search of new models of the lecture on God*, *Polish Theology – does it have its specificity?* Indeed, Zuberbier was able to take care of the best lecturers, and he valued the interdisciplinarity, both intra-theological and that understood more broadly. He was a theologian, whose articles were often published in "Tygodnik powszechny," "Znak" or "Więź."

From 1970, dogmatics at ATK were taught by Rev. Edward Ozorowski, the future archbishop of Białystok, an ecclesiologist who later moved to the Research on Family Institute. Also in 1970, Rev. Jacek Salij began to teach dogmatics at ATK, trying not to hide his enthusiasm to St. Thomas Aquinas' thought.

In the years 1971-1993, a group of dogmatic theologians at ATK including Rev. Alfons Skowronek, deeply aware of what is currently happening in German theology, a theologian with vivid ecumenical interests. In 1972, Rev. Lucjan Balter joined the group (1936-2010), an expert particularly in the field of ecclesiology, Mariology, Josephology and eschatology, the editor-in-chief of the Polish edition of "Concilium", and later "Communio", yet these journals were published outside ATK.

Moral Theology

Moral theology was characterized by the fact that academic staff dealing with this discipline underwent a generational exchange during the first years of existence of ATK. Rev. Władysław Wicher (1888-1969), author of *Fundamentals of Moral Theology*, published after leaving our university, left ATK in 1957. Rev. Stanisław Huet, author of the highly popular two-volume work entitled *The sacrament of penance in the light of theology and psycho-hygiene*, died in 1961. The last veteran from the time when theology was taught at universities, Rev. Walenty Urmanowicz (1898-1969), died eight years later.

Thus, the main trends in moral theology in ATK were henceforth set by young researchers such as: Rev. Stanisław Olejnik (born in 1920), who tried

to practice moral theology in a personalist spirit, which is best demonstrated by the very title of his opus vitae: *In response to the gift and calling of God, outline of moral theology*. Here it is worth remembering that Rev. Stanisław Olejnik was a member of the International Theological Commission in Rome in 1968-73.

To other moral theologians, who started their scientific activity at the Faculty of Theology of ATK in the late sixties, one should include Rev. Bogusław Inlender (1923-2006), a scholar particularly sensitive to the methodological problems associated with this discipline; Rev. Jan Pryszmont (1919-2007), focusing his research activity on the moralists of the Orthodox Church; Rev. Helmut Juros (born 1933), who before decided to concentrate mainly on organizing at ATK a study of Catholic social science and political science, was especially interested in the so-called “independent ethics” – the result of this search is, among others his work entitled *Moral Theology or Theological Ethics? A Study on the Metatheology of Morality*. Thanks to the latter, the theologians working at ATK developed intense relationships with German moralists. During spring 1972, our university was visited by such eminent representatives of German theology as Franz Bockle from Bonn (with a lecture entitled “Proprium of Christian ethics”), J.G. Ziegler from Mainz (with a lecture entitled “Is there a Christian-specific ethics?”) and Bernard Haring with a whole series of lectures. Of course, in response to these visits, our theologians in turn travelled with their lectures to German universities. The priests Helmut Juros, Jan Pryszmont and the prematurely deceased Tadeusz Sikorski participated particularly often in this academic exchange.

Fundamental Theology

Initially, this discipline at ATK definitely took the form of apologetics, to the extent that the term Warsaw School of Apologetics was created, whose creator and head was Rev. Wincenty Kwiatkowski (1892-1972), author of the monumental *Total Apologetics*. The following episode from my own biography may confirm the fact that great importance was attached at the Faculty of Theology of the ATK to this shape of apologetics as somewhat to the department’s hallmark. I started studies at this department in 1968 after obtaining a BA in theology at another university, but I did not have the degree of Master of Theology necessary to do my PhD thesis, therefore, in order to obtain it I started studying at ATK. Here my undergraduate degree, of course, had been approved, but I had to complete the *ex universa theologia* examination in the field of apologetics.

There was no other discipline at the Theological Department, which would be so univocally focused (also after his death) around one master, Rev.

Kwiatkowski, initially Dean of the department, and in the years 1956-1965 its rector. The following professors belonged to the Warsaw School of Apologetics: above all, the closest collaborator of Rev. Kwiatkowski, Ryszard Paciorkowski (1908-1981) who, starting from his initial interests in the apologetics of the ancient Church, later focused on working on his magnum opus entitled *Examples of paranormal healings in modern Christianity*; Rev. Władysław Hładowski (1913-2004), author of the *Outline of Apologetics*; Rev. Tadeusz Gogolewski (1921-2003), who devoted much of his attention to popularizing apologetic of the Western Church (J.S. Drey, R. Latourelle, H. Bouillard, A.M. Javier); Rev. Wojciech Tabaczyński (born 1923), researcher of Easter Christophanies and revelations of Virgin Mary; Józef Myśków (1927-1988), author of a book on religious awareness of Jesus of Nazareth.

Disciplines that Existed at the Theological Department before 1987

In 1987, the history of the Church, history of art and patrology were transferred to the newly created Department of Church Historical and Social Sciences from the Theological Faculty of the ATK. As for the history of the Church, whose leading representative in our department was Rev. prof. Hieronim Eugeniusz Wyczawski (1918-1983), it is enough to mention the most important accomplishments of our historians, the monumental 8-volume *Dictionary of Polish Catholic Theologians*, vol. 1-7: Warsaw 1981-1983; vol.8: Warsaw 1995.

However, the faculty of history of art was directed by Rev. prof. Janusz Pasierb (1929-1993), poet, essayist, researcher extremely sensitive both to the theological dimension of works of art and artistic trends, as to their general cultural context. He enjoyed great authority in literary and artistic circles. His younger colleagues were prof. Zbigniew Bania (born 1946), researcher of architectural history, and Rev. Stanisław Kobielus (born 1939), author of, among others, book entitled *Man and the Garden of Eden in the religious culture of the Middle Ages*. Patrology was developing dynamically in our department, whose leading representatives were Rev. prof. Emil Stanula (1935-1999) and Rev. prof. Wincenty Myszor (born in 1941). They initiated the publishing series of the "Writings of Old-Christian Writers" and by 1987, that is until they left our department, they managed to publish as many as 43 volumes of this series. Rev. Stanula particularly dealt with the theology of Saint Hilary of Poitiers, and the works of this Doctor of the Church translated by him – *On the Holy Trinity*, *Commentary on the Gospel of Saint Matthew* and the *Treaty on Mysteries* – were

published after his death. However, during his entire stay at our department Rev. Myszor worked intensively on the ancient Gnostic texts; translations of the Gnostic texts prepared by him, along with the comments were published regularly in the STV in 1971-1987. In addition, he is considered the most outstanding Polish expert in the works of St. Irenaeus from Lyon.

Scientific Character of the Theological Department of ATK

Today, it is easy to overlook the fact that in Poland there were only two theological departments (at the ATK and KUL, because the scientific relations with the ChAT were minimal), and their significance for Polish theology was significantly different than at present. The professors of both universities were practically doomed to maintain intense mutual relations if only due to the necessity of the presence of a reviewer from another university during every defence of doctorate and postdoctoral dissertations. Also, when symposia were organized, speakers were almost always first sought among the professors of the fraternal department. This fact must be remembered if one wants to present the importance of this faculty to the scientific status of Polish theology. It is obvious that it goes beyond the significance of the scientific achievements of the professors mentioned here, even if it is considerable and truly outstanding. After all, at least some habilitation and doctoral dissertations, and sometimes also master's theses, which were prepared at the theological department of ATK, are scientifically outstanding, and sometimes even priceless.

The symposia organized in this Department surely contributed to the development of theological thought in Poland. It is impossible to list them all. It is also worth noting that the most prominent theologians also visited our Department, and their lectures always gathered crowds of listeners. For example, on June 1, 1966 our department was visited by Yves Congar, who presented the lecture entitled *Fundamentals of theology of the laity*. On May 16, 1970 we hosted Karl Rahner with a lecture entitled *The starting point of modern theology*, while on May 24 and 25, several lectures were presented by Bernard Haring, the then famous expert in moral theology, and on October 13, 1975 our guest was Jean-Herve Nicolas, a dogmatist from Freiburg. Of course, it is impossible to list all the symposia and guests. In a word, we all tried to make it obvious for our students that a theological department would be inauthentic place if it did not try to be a dynamic scientific centre.

Department of Theology of The Academy of Catholic Theology: a dynamic scientific Centre.

Beginnings and Development Of the Warsaw Apologetic School*

Sources and literature on the subject: W. Kwiatkowski, *Subject of total apologetics*, Warsaw 1937; *Methods in Total Apologetics*, Warsaw 1938; *Modern Views on the Structure (Ontic and Intentional) of Religious Experience*, "Polonia Sacra" 5 (1952), 224-237; *Subject of Scientific Apologetics*, "Collectanea Theologica" 30 (1959), 10-19; R. Paciorkowski, *Internal Structure of Modern Apologetics*, "Collectanea Theologica" (1954), 10-40; St. Nagy, *Main Directions of Research in Contemporary Catholic Apologetics*, "Theological and Canonical Yearbooks" 7 (1960), 119-136; W. Hładowski, *Structure of Apologetics*, "Theological and Canonical Yearbooks" 11 (1964), 33-53.

In the introduction to the above-mentioned topic, I would like to explain what I mean by the term "school" and "apologetic school" in the scientific sense. I use the term "school" in the scientific sense to refer to a team (a collection, a system, an arrangement) of sentences, critically tested, which includes an attempt to solve one of the main issues in a specific field of knowledge and acquires for itself numerous supporters and spreaders for a longer time. Therefore, by the term "school of apologetics" in the scientific sense I mean a team (a collection, a system, an arrangement) of critically verified sentences that provides us with an attempt to solve one of the main problems of apologetics and gains for itself numerous supporters and spreaders for a longer time until this attempt is replaced by another system of sentences. Such a major issue in modern apologetics, which was attempted by the Warsaw School of Apologetics, centered mainly on the team Chair of Apologetics. At the Faculty of Theology of the Catholic Academy of Theology, there is the question of the internal structure or internal organization of modern apologetics in one scientific system, as a field of knowledge

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already independent and separate from other closest to it, i.e. theology and religiosity. From the view of the development of the history of science, we know that every science is mature or independent and separate from others, when it has its own material and formal object. Moreover, the larger and closer the unity occurs in the material and formal object in a given field of knowledge, i.e. the greater the logical cohesion in the structure of the material and formal object, the greater its independence and distinctness marked among other sciences. Therefore, the question is whether since the mid-18th century the development of apologetics has already gone so far that we are now able to determine its separate material and formal object with the most advanced logical unity or cohesiveness to which it is entitled. The treaties *de revelatione* and *de ecclesia*, distinguished in theology in the mid-18th century, constituted in the apologetics at the time only a seemingly entire whole, alternatively an associative whole.

1. *The implicative integration of a material object in contemporary apologetics.* Having worked in the field of apologetic research for fifty years (1914-1964), I have witnessed not only great passive but also active transformations that took place in its material subject regarding transformations made in the auxiliary areas: religious and biblical.

Research into the history of religion that developed in the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century led researchers to a purely evolutionary assumption that Christianity is nothing more than the last level of natural human development in the field of religion. Such a radical-evolutionist approach, however, could not be carried out without violating the historical sources of the Christian religion. Therefore, a need arose to revise the existing comparative method in studies on the history of religions. This change was made by an outstanding religion. In 1929, professor Pinard de la Boullaye, an expert professor, published a two-volume work entitled *L'etude comparee des religions*, in which he established six principles (priority, organic unity, uniformity, dependence, originality and transcendence; recognized by the critics up to the present day) that should guide any critical comparative method in the history of religion. These principles (especially the fifth and sixth ones), far from a priori evolutionism, open up opportunities for religions that transcend the framework of any evolution. By enabling verification of the character of the original and relative transcendence of religion, this method has overturned the exaggerated position of religious evolutionism, according to which lower religious forms inherently lead to higher ones and vice versa, higher religious forms arise only from lower ones.

Another equally significant turn in religious research, especially in the field of religious psychology, has been triggered starting from the moment professor

K. Girgensohn published his work *Der Seelische Aufbau des religiösen Erlebens* in 1921. After his death, the second edition, enlarged and supplemented, was published by his student W. Gruehn in 1930. Girgensohn's famous work, based solely on the experimental method used for religious experience, showed that its structure was not psychologically homogeneous as it had been until then in the rationalist and Protestant circles, which supported Luther's dogmatic stance on the act of faith as an act of trust. There was a return to a Catholic approach to an act of faith based on acts of reason and will (DBUR 1789). Girgensohn's experimental research has established beyond any doubt that a religious experience (act of faith) consists of an intellectual and self-function in terms of its psychological structure, with the intellectual function taking the leading role in the religious experience, and again feelings enter into this role as a resonance of the self-function. Girgensohn's momentous research has wiped out the previous position of biblical and philosophical rationalism, according to which Christian faith or the very experience of this faith is something exclusively emotional or irrational and subjective. From now on, every religious experience becomes an experience in which reason appears as a cognitive and guiding factor in relation to religious reality.

Furthermore, the above experimental research has shown a certain characteristic feature of a religious experience, namely that whoever is a religious believer and is aware of his or her religion or beliefs wants them to be true. This is because no-one wants to experience a false religion or a false world view. On this basis, apologies of different religions are created as a natural basis and apologetics as a science with critical value of these apologies is consistently created.

Breakthrough religious works of Pinard, Girgensohn and Gruehn have influenced the current approach to the material object in modern apologetics in the sense that it excludes from the scope of this object that which was a component part of what was known as the *demonstratio religiosa*, which was a substitute for religious research spreading extreme evolutionism and irrationality. It seems that the *demonstratio religiosa*, which in the old construction of apologetics entered as the first part of a material object, loses all theoretical bases in apologetics, because it can and must be replaced by history and the psychology of religion, developed on critical bases. Then, Girgensohn's experimental studies showed that the material subject of apologetics should be, by nature, apologia of religion, and in our case, apologia of the Christian religion, the oldest and most classical, come from Jesus himself.

By limiting the scope of apologetics to the examination of the apology of the Christian religion and further tightening this scope to the first oldest and classical apologia of Christianity, a new type of apologetics with its own material object is being created.

The material object of the new type of apologetics is the apologia that Jesus Himself carried out in relation to His own functional and genetic claims, together with their justification, i.e. motivation, both in a personalistic and a dynamic manner. This material object of apologetics, which is the apologia of Jesus himself, has an eminently historical character and, as a result, opens a broad discussion on the sources with a group of biblical scholars who are engaged in the study of the sources of the life and work of Jesus. At the moment, there are four schools of biblical rationalism, each one providing a different solution to the two-stage apology of Jesus.

According to the historical-critical school (Harnack, Goguel, Cullmann), it should be said that Jesus reached his messianic consciousness by way of its gradual development (the prophet, the Son of God, the Messiah). The above-mentioned line of psychological development proposed by this school, guided by the M and Q pre-synoptic sources, is not supported by these sources and is therefore one-sided. Instead of developing this consciousness, Jesus' pedagogical development can and must be accepted, i.e. Jesus gradually and slowly reveals to the unprepared environment his claims, which from the very beginning were messianic. Among the supporters of the historical-critical school there is a change of views in the direction that brings them closer to the traditional position. According to Cullmann who is a modern representative of this school, it must be said that Jesus made claims of the prophet, and considered himself a suffering servant of YHWH. In addition, Jesus used the phrase "the Son of Man" instead of the title of "the Messiah." Cullmann believes that some of these titles were within the reach of the consciousness of Jesus without mentioning their evolution.

According to the biblical school of eschatology, Jesus was the Messiah only by vocation (*in spe*), i.e. He considered Himself to be destined to hold the dignity of a Messianic. Jesus hid His Messianic destiny among His disciples, and only Judas revealed Jesus' Messianic mystery. The position of this school is a classic example of the use of an exaggerated methodological postulate to get to know historical personalities in sources only and exclusively in the light of the historical environment, which in this case shared the eschatological ideology. This postulate, however, removes the difference between the ideology of the individual and the ideology of the environment and consequently the question of the influence of one ideology on another is distorted.

While the above-mentioned schools recognized in the two-throw apologia of historical Jesus only the first projection, and partially that is his declaratory consciousness, the other two schools completely reject both projections, in the apologia of the historical Jesus.

The historical-religious school (Bousset, Conzelmann), following the M and Q sources in which it sees numerous editorially related fragments concerning the activity of Jesus, present a thesis that is even contradictory to the previous school. The school maintains that Jesus of Nazareth was not the Messiah and did not make any claims to be the Messiah; only the community, on the basis of their faith or the Easter experience believed in the Messianism of Jesus. The sources M and Q are not historical papers but only documents of the faith of the disciples in Jesus, and the authentic tradition of Jesus is not Messianic. Suffice to say, however, that this school introduces an eminently psychological or subjective interpretation into the sources in order to fill the gaps in the sources and does not distinguish between the faith of the disciples in Jesus and their testimony or Jesus' testimony.

Finally, according to the Historical-Morphological School, the two-stage apologia of Jesus is still undergoing further changes due to a completely different approach to the question of sources. According to this direction, the gospels are collective works that consist of small and separate literary units. The Evangelists, their authors, were not just collectors of ready-made material from the oral tradition but had an objective in the composition of the material. Their actual work was limited to the editorial connection of both individual and group fragments without disturbing their original form or only barely. To the positive achievements of this school we should refer the new approach to the synoptic gospels as kerygmatic works, i.e. as works which transmit apostolic oral catechesis in writing. Referring to the question of the apology of Jesus himself contained in the gospels, this direction maintains that we know nothing about the apology of the historical Jesus, we know only at most the apology of the kerygmatic Jesus, either as preaching the kerygma of the kingdom of God or as preaching the kerygma of the community.

The last two schools look with different eyes at the gospel as sources to write the life and work of Jesus. According to the historical-religious school, these sources are so deeply rooted in a layer of faith that no historian can get beyond the layer of faith. This agnosticism of the historical-religious school is maintained, albeit in a slightly different editorial office, by the historical-morphological school when, due to the kerygmatic character of the gospel, it claims that beyond the threshold of the kerygmatic Jesus it is impossible on a literary level to get to know the historical Jesus and his own apology. Thus, in light of the last historical-morphological direction, in the present research on gospels the problem of the material object in modern apologetics also needed to change, namely how one can move from the plane of kerygmatic Jesus to the plane of the historical Jesus and his own apology. Without getting involved in the

solution of this problem, which exceeds the framework of the discussed topic, it is still appropriate to mention the further implied integration of the material object in apologetics. The apologia of the historical Jesus was not limited to his individual person, but also included his person in the social sense. Such a total structure of a material object in modern apologetics as opposed to its integral structure, based on the ratio of the implications of various parts of this object, is the most far-reaching logical cohesiveness of this object.

In previous apologetic works, the material object contained two issues that had been present there, associatively or externally connected, under the characteristic name: *demonstratio Christiana* and *demonstratio catholica*.

The combination of one part with the other was only causal in the sense that the Jesus mentioned in the first part was regarded as the creator and founder of the Church, which is discussed in the second part of the material object in apologetics, the so-called *demonstratio catholica*. However, biblical studies of recent times have shown that there must be an implicit correlate between the Messiah and his communion or between Christ and his Church; this is because already in the very teaching of Jesus the Messiah appears together (in the sense of correlated implications) with the idea of God's substitutionary dominion over his people, while in the letters of St. Paul the correlated implications of Christ, the Church are increasingly more clearly marked in the anthropological symbol of the Church xxxx and in the sacramental symbol xxxx and in the famous thesis of St. Paul *The Church*. The Church is the fullness of Christ xxxxx (Eph 1:22; 3:19; 4:13). Modern apologetics sees its material object in a total sense, i.e. its material object is *Christus totus*, i.e. the whole of Christ including its Church. This kind of total approach to a material object in modern apologetics in accordance with historical biblical sources implies the need for the last integration of a material object in apologetics, which, as we have pointed out above, consists in considering the total Christ as motivating one's claim to be an absolute religious value, that is, the Sanctum. Built by Jesus in this way, the full apologia of himself, which is the material object of total apologetics, is twofold. In the first, Jesus Christ makes His absolute functional and genetic claims, and in the second, He motivates them in a personalistic and dynamic manner, especially by the miracle of His Resurrection.

Such a total structure of a material object in modern apologetics as opposed to its integral structure is based on an implied integration of various parts of this object. The object is the most far-reaching logical cohesiveness of the object.

It seems that in this way, I made an attempt to integrate a three-stage material object in the apologetics of the previous one: 1) there is no need for the

theoretical inclusion of the parts about religion due to the proper development of religious studies at the present time; 2) the two remaining parts (about Christ and about the Church) are merged on the basis of the existing correlation implication between them; 3) there is a content implication between the declaration of Jesus and his motivation in the two-view apology of Jesus himself.

What remains to be discussed is an attempt at implied integration in the formal object of modern apologetics.

2. *The implicative integration of a formal subject in modern apologetics.* When it comes to the formal object, that is, the point of view from which apologetics captures the oldest, classical apologia of Jesus himself, it will be the axiological approach, that is, the critical value of this apologia. Depending on the three different types of modern apologetics (intellectual, voluntary and total), their axiological approach will also differ.

a) Intellectual apologetics, represented by the Dominican theologian Gardeil, assumes that credibility is an indispensable condition of dogmatic faith or Catholic dogma and a formal object of apologetics. Such an intellectual solution of the formal object in apologetics, although it gave uniformity to the apologetic material, cannot suffice nowadays.

This is because credibility is an eminently cognitive element, which does not exhaust comprehensively the construction of religious reality, and which it intends to lead others to.

b) In order to bring man's age closer to religion, voluntary apologetics carries out the analysis of its psychological side (reason, will, feelings) and even shares the Cantanes' assumption that nothing can enter into man if he does not find an equivalent in himself. Based on an analysis of the votive part of a man, Blondel came to the conclusion that the principle of intellectual and moral autonomy in a man leads to the adoption of his heteronomy or dependence on a higher and transcendent reality. However, the attempt at voluntarist apologetics called a new one, i.e. to bring man closer to the Christian religion as a value worthy of desire, does not achieve its goal. Then the apologist will state that the Christian religion is an optional religion, and not a necessary religion to be accepted, and will therefore deviate from the historical reality of that religion. Finally, taking into account the Cantanesian assumption, voluntary apologetics is not able to protect itself against naturalism, i.e. it is not able to draw a demarcation line between natural order and supernatural order.

c) The exuberant intellectualism and exaggerated voluntarism, to which the previous two approaches to the formal object (goal) of apologetics lead, gave rise to the need for another solution to the problem that would on the one hand avoid the above-mentioned exaggeration and on the other took into account the

unity and the whole of the psychological subject. The beginnings of such a formal object in modern apologetics date back to the second half of the 19th century. He presented it in the form of a harmony between so-called internal fact, that is, the awareness of a certain spiritual vacuum, one's own inadequacy, hope for help from above, and the external fact, that is, the living word of the Church's teaching authority as a postulate of internal fact. At the end of the 19th century, Blondel, the creator of the philosophy of insufficiency (integral realism), set about building modern apologetics based on the method of immanence based on Kant's contemporary and dominant philosophy. The method of immanence in Blondel's case ultimately boils down to a rather characteristic observation, namely that we feel in ourselves, in the religious and moral field, the need for a certain, unspecified surplus. Here, he notices Blondel's established harmony *a priori*, from which a certain whole (*totum*, integrity, plenary) is created, where the supernatural element, despite its immanence in a man, retains its heteronomical character. The vital psychological-metaphysical synthesis, which in Blondel's case is a formal object of apologetics, does not differ significantly from the vital psychological-historical synthesis in Dechamps' case. In these two approaches, there is neither a function for individual psychological factors in this synthesis nor any characteristic point of view when it is performed in apologetics. These deficiencies are to be eliminated by Poulpique's work of 1912, which sets the formal subject of apologetics as the preparation not only of the intellect, but also of the will, as the decisive factor, because it determines the genesis of faith. In this respect, Poulpique considers it necessary, on the one hand, to purge the will from internal opposition to faith and, on the other hand, to point out the harmony between the content of the Christian religion and the deepest aspirations of a man seeking a rational response to the protological and eschatological issues of concern to his consciousness. From here comes the desire for religious reality. In this way, Poulpique creates the so-called integral apologetics that examines the Christian religion in the light of human needs and the various aspirations of human consciousness. This type of apologetics is based on a broader than intellectual basis because it takes into account the moral values of the Christian religion. The solution given by Poulpique, although it further raises the question of the organization of scientific apologetics, is not yet sufficient, since it does not lead to the historical reality of the Christian religion as an absolute necessity but presents it as an optional religion.

It would not be an exaggeration if we understood intellectual and voluntary apologetics as part of a whole called total apologetics. The values of truth and goodness, which were the formal object of intellectual and voluntary apologetics, are further consolidated here in a higher synthesis called *sanctum*, as

an absolute religious value, and form the formal object of total apologetics. According to the empirical approach, total apologetics is a critical and systematic cognition, from the axiological point of view, of the self-defense of Jesus Christ as the highest religious value (*Sanctum*). In other words, total apologetics, by critically analyzing the apology of Jesus himself, comes to the conclusion that *Christ totus* is a Sanctum or absolute religious value (truth), in relation to which the whole psychological reality of a man (*homo totus*) is involved in taking a specific position.

Below is presented a set of critically stated sentences, which includes an attempt to solve one of the main issues in modern apologetics, i.e. its internal organization into independent science.

The above approach to the structure of apologetics (*Christus totus – homo totus*) was discussed in my monographic works on the subject of total apologetics (1937) and on its methods (1938). Based on these works I conducted lectures on apologetics and discussions at apologetic seminars, which I resumed after the outbreak of the war with an increasing interest among listeners, and appearing relevant publications on the new rebuilding of traditional apologetics further deepened these interests. Discussions, interests, lectures, publications took on a more organized character after the establishment of the team chair of apologetics in 1956 with its religious and apologetic departments at the Faculty of Theology of the Academy of Catholic Theology. Since then, the theory of total apologetics has been discussed favorably at apologetic congresses and at numerous theological universities in Poland.

To conclude, I would like to extend my gratitude to all my colleagues and supporters who actively participated in the scientific discussions of the apologetic seminary and thus contributed to the clarification of many thoughts in total apologetics. On this occasion, I openly express my sincere desire for a theory of total apologetics, which has already developed into the Warsaw apologetic school with its reach in numerous theological universities, to soon transform into an apologetic scientific trend paving the way for new deeper solutions.

Freedom and Truth in “Veritatis Splendor” (VS)*

Preliminary Approach to the Problem

The Error of Freedom and the Crisis of Truth

The question of freedom in the light of the VS encyclical can be summarized in three points: the nature of freedom, the relation of freedom to truth, evaluation of erroneous hypotheses about freedom and its relation to truth.

One can also reduce this whole issue to one question, namely to the question about the nature of freedom, as the relation of freedom to truth belongs to the field of personal freedom. Such an approach would be possible were it not for the fact that it is the crisis in the very approach to truth as a source of particular difficulties. In connection with this fact, the problem raised in the Encyclical, which is the subject of this dissertation, has the following form: firstly, it is a complex – in its structure – fact of the absolutization of freedom, which is in a special way associated with the crisis concerning the issue of truth; secondly – we are dealing with a hypothesis, which assumes the breakdown of the unity of human nature, opposing – in accordance with the principle of antinomy – freedom and nature; thirdly, we are dealing with a weakening of the relationship between freedom and normative truth, which is considered the measure (standard) of action. This applies mainly to the truth contained in God’s law. The problem of freedom, considered in these three aspects, however, has a common denominator: it is a falsification of freedom resulting from the rejection of the truth. This rejection of truth operates on three levels: epistemological, so it is not important whether freedom is true or not, and what is its essence at all, and it is not sure if there is anything inside it that could be called the essence: maybe we are dealing with pure “existence,” empty and nonsensical. Truth is also rejected on the metaphysical or ontological level: freedom in such

* STV 32(1994)1.

a case has no connection with being, with what we call a substance or nature, and therefore with something that would be understood as a subject of freedom. There is then no possibility of determining freedom by relation to a person or human nature; such a freedom would exist “in itself” and not in the nature of being, while “existence” would only take place in the imagination, because it would be deprived of its connection with being. Finally, the truth is rejected on the ethical level, and thus at the place of origin of the personal act. In this way, it ceases to be light and a normative principle for the will that makes the decision. In this assumption, the decision *must be* understood as a phenomenon that explains and justifies itself. Acting in the name of such liberty, someone would have the right to say (travestying Pilate’s statement) “*what I have done – I have done.*” Such a philosophy of action (and morality) revealed in Pilate’s attitude is closely related to a sceptical, perhaps even cynical approach to the truth (to the Truth) expressed in a question that is not expected to be answered because one does not believe in its existence: “what is truth?”

Premises for Solving the Problem

The author of the VS encyclical refers to both revealed and natural truth. It is always an objective truth which comes from God and through the gift of Him is granted to humans. Truth is already given within the created being, and moreover it is manifested through the Word and His Incarnation, which is directed towards man, to enable him to fully participate in the Truth, that is in Christ. With all the inevitable metaphysical way of thinking about truth, the basic subject of the encyclical is Personal Truth, Jesus Christ, which is the answer to the question of man.

Creation began to exist at the command of the omnipotent Word, “through which everything has become created” and which “over everything exercises power by the word of its power,” that is why the inner truth of being is simultaneously a command, a law, a norm. In the very voice of truth, there is the imperative of “become!,” “Be yourself!” “become *what you are!*” is included. The supernatural revelation also implies the law that is the truth of the new Creation, participation in the life and love of Jesus Christ. In every situation, truth is understood as the power to control action through the inner light that allows one to distinguish good from evil. Apart from this difference (between good and evil), the action would develop beyond the anthropological truth, beyond morality, beyond any rational sense. John Paul II systematically refers to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, which especially in GS 17 presented a fundamental lecture on freedom. In this paragraph, it was stated firstly – the

link between the nature of freedom and the truth of creation. Freedom is the *eximium signum* of God's image. This *eximium* is more than "special;" it means "unique, unusual." Someone rightly said that "freedom does not come from the earth."¹ In this conciliar text, the anthropological and ethical nature of freedom was also emphasized, further – which is very important – transcendent orientation of the created personal freedom towards God. The logic of freedom reveals the inner truth that man's destiny is being in God, being one with Him, in communion with Him. This is implied by the following expression: *ordinatio ad Deum*. This is the inner truth of freedom, given as a goal, a calling and a norm. John Paul II will develop and emphasize this aspect of freedom. The Council also showed the duty of systematic work on freedom. The conciliar text *explicite* states that it formulates the science of true freedom. At the same time, everything that was said about the essence of freedom points to its relation to the truth seen in the metaphysical, personalistic, moral and ascetic-spiritual aspects. The above-mentioned paragraph of GS 17 does not, of course, ignore the wrong tendency to interpret freedom in the sense of unhampered freedom, not respecting the distinction between good and evil. The Pastoral Constitution speaks about false autonomy in number 41, and the proper autonomy of temporal things is specified in number 36. The problem of autonomy of temporal things also applies to freedom because it concerns the value and meaning of human action, which in its entirety, including the sphere of the world (in the temporal sphere), should be subordinated to the Law of God, whose synthesis is the commandment of love (GS 38).

This activity is regulated not only by the general rule of love but also by specific orders that can be understood as categorial (cf. GS 39). We are touching this issue here because of the context of the problem discussed. At the foundations of VS is the teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the subject of the integral vocation of man, consistently developed in all the most important documents of the last Popes, especially John Paul II.

Absolutization of Freedom. A Deeper Approach

The movement towards freedom characterizes all human history; it is a reaction to the experience of a lack of freedom in one form or another, but mainly in the socio-political sphere. It is interesting for our question how the intellectual and

¹ R. Tremblay, *La liberte selon saint Irenee de Lyon*, in: *In libertatem vocati estis. Miscellanea Bernhard Hiaring* (Studia Moralia XV), Rome 1977, 444.

moral movement developed towards intra-personal autonomy. This concerns mainly the last centuries of our civilization. The development of this idea is concisely described by F. Bockle².

The analysis of this claim process – or the pursuit of moral autonomy – was begun by Bockle referring to Kant, who by emphasizing the role of the subject emphasized the importance of freedom. Kant defined autonomy as the right to self-determination of a human being as a rational subject. This definition has established firmly its position in post-Kantian philosophy, which negatively addresses everything that has the characteristics of “heteronomy.” Since autonomy is understood as “binding oneself – the *subject* – by means of the *right to reasonable* self-determination,” the subject is undoubtedly bound by himself, but at the same time he is consistently closed in himself. Kantism means a big breakthrough in philosophy, a transition from the autonomy of nature to the autonomy of the subject. Transcendental freedom in the Kantian sense is associated only with the subjective order of knowledge. The philosophy of Fichte is also the philosophy of the subject who is able to know himself. Yes, this self-knowledge of the subject is the basis for the interpretation of being: the world must be understood as the product of the absolute “I.” Reason is pure, absolute action, this reason establishes laws for the world. This philosophy accepts the existence of the basic, collective conscience of humanity. In this assumption, world history tends to fulfil moral obligation at the level of the great universal “I” in which individual individuals participate. The next stage is Hegelianism. Hegel attempts to reconcile the ideas of Fichte with the specific shape of history and social life. He analyses the subject’s relation to the object and consciousness to reality. The consciousness in the observed object sees only itself, this is its own reflection. The subject and object are interrelated and mutually co-define each other. In the context of dialectics, the Spirit enters the process of thinking with human individuals. Hegel’s position is critical with regard to the concept of absolute idea in the theories of Kant and Fichte. According to Hegel, it is not the subject which is absolute, but the idea itself. Hegel rejects the dualism of what is legal and what is moral. He completely subjects all morality to the (legal) order that is realized in the state. Despite this, he tries to save the autonomy of the

² F. Bockle, *Der neuzeitliche Autonomieanspruch. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsklarung*, in: *In libertatem...*, op. cit., 57-77. More extensive presentation of the historical and philosophical background of the discussed issue can be found in the work of A. Szostek, *Natura – rozum – wolność*, Rome 1990. See also an article by the same author: *Człowiek jako autokreator. Antropologiczne podstawy odrzucenia encykliki “Humanae Vitae,”* in: *Dar ludzkiego życia – Humanae vitae donum*, Lublin 1991, 111-127.

subject, basing it on "divine freedom that permeates the world." Hegel considers the individual in the context of history, which he in turn understands as "freedom which *is coming to itself*": human history is the history of this freedom. Marks broke with the idea of the "spirit of the world" and entrusted to man the task of freeing his own consciousness. From now on, man is in some sense the subject of history in which man's self-liberation is to take place; unfortunately, according to the dialectical principle, present in this philosophy, man is also an object – understood in a total sense – of the social process. Autonomy shifts from a subject understood individually to a subject that is considered collectively and historically, or rather to the historical and social process itself, which happens according to the principle of internal necessity, which also absorbs the energy of human activity: man has to freely submit to objective necessity of social process. Autonomy again concerns some over-personal and non-personal entity. An interesting breakthrough in ethics is the philosophy of values, more precisely (according to Buckle) the theory of the autonomy of values. Scheler and Hartmann opposed formalism in ethics and modified the concept of autonomy: they opposed the ethics of an autonomous subject and the autonomy of ethics, that is the concept of a priori values. Values have their own independent, material (objective) "a priori." The obligation arises with the immediate evidence of the view of values. This type of obligation claim of value is autonomous. The autonomy of a person – in this ethical theory – is the result of an openness to value. The philosophy of values was undoubtedly a step towards personalist ethics. Much attention is paid by Buckle to a new, quite peculiar example of autonomy, which has been placed in the social "praxis." The concept of this autonomy has been expressed by a rather complex definition: "autonomy is basically located in the socially mediating praxis of entities acting in a communicative way."³ In this theory, the practice itself is understood as an expression of normative truth: here lies its autonomy. Bockle is aware of the methodological difficulties of validating this *Sprachpraxis* in terms of its normative force. The essence of this validation would lie in the mutual acceptance of operating entities in recognition of mutual claims. The mere fact of the universal acceptance of a particular way of acting obtains the status of a norm (*pragmatische Universalien qua Normen*). So the very fact of a specific action no longer requires a norm outside of itself. In this hypothesis, which places the norm in the praxis itself, it is assumed that not only everyone behaves in the same way but that they are also aware of the universal acceptance of this model of behaviour. This allows the proponents

³ Art. cit., 71

of this hypothesis to reflect on the intersubjective validity of norms. "Recognition of the basic norm is constitutive for the comprehensible nature of communication and thus for every self-understanding in general," writes Bockle, and believes that in this model of thinking, the obligation is explained in some way. Turning his attention to theology, Bockle focuses on the subject of "theonomical autonomy," a concept that he himself is a supporter. The concept of this "theonomical autonomy" is based on the assumption that man is a created being and therefore – in the final perspective – dependent on God. This dependence finds expression in the attitude of faith and conversion to which the Gospel calls. This dependence on God has 'only' a transcendental character and therefore does not cover the entire sphere of spiritual and moral life. The activity which man develops in the sphere of categorial values is autonomous and therefore moral decisions made in this field "are *evaluated* according to their own *structure* of values *within the framework of normative ethics*."⁴

It is hard to resist the impression that this vision of ethics is based on some splitting of a human being: one half of a human being serves God, while the other half serves man himself. Faith and ethics do not intertwine internally. It is a vision alien to Catholic thought and the VS encyclical refers to it critically.

Presented above briefly the process of striving for autonomy brings about a reflection of a more general nature. Above all, in this process, one can see human thinking distances itself from the objective truth. Man ceases to focus his attention on what is, which exists independently of the mind, and turns to the creations of his own mind. This is accompanied – as an inevitable consequence – (paradoxically) by the process of a conscious loss of freedom, finding its finale in a state when a person realizes the necessity of being non-free. A man who, on the basis of Kant's philosophy, is still granted autonomy, is gradually and definitively deprived of it, and the latter is then granted to various total units, understood as an idea or as an objective historical and social process.

As a tragedy one can consider the fact that such philosophical theories were not merely of a purely theoretical nature but that they had also attempted to implement their assumptions in the ordinary life of man also through terror and violence. The man who was persuaded to believe that he is free was unexpectedly trapped and enslaved by a Moloch who took control of everything that was supposed to be a sign of human autonomy. A man who could not believe in the possibility of knowing the essence of things and thus understand the difference between him and the world of things, was soon included in this world of things and treated as a "thing of history" and as an element of nature.

⁴ B. Haring, *Liberie fedeli in Christo. Teologia morale per preti e laici*, vol. 1, Roma 1979.

Surely the sources of this process go further. Certainly Descartes and perhaps Ockham is responsible for initiating the philosophy of the human subject under the guise of stressing the role of the conscious subject. However, the philosophies of the materialist and positivist type have also contributed to the development of this phenomenon which systematically cut off the human mind from the realm of objective truth. These philosophers tried to propose to man a "knowledge" through which he would be able to become independent from faith in God and follow a purely rational recognition of the rules governing life and the world. The abandonment of metaphysics and the loss of the ability to think at the level of wisdom made it impossible for a man who had only scientific knowledge to understand his own place among the beings of this world. The border between man and the world has blurred, the sense of the relationship between man and God was lost, as well as the sense of the created nature of human existence. There is some mysterious but deep and real bond between two phenomena that cannot be considered completely parallel and independent of each other: it is a phenomenon of gradual loss of trust in the Truth which has its origin in God and is received in accordance with the principles of faith – and the second phenomenon – the loss of the ability to recognize the objective truth and sense of reality. The second phenomenon is the consequence of the first. Longing for freedom cannot be suppressed. However, when freedom cuts away from the root of the truth, it feels somehow forced to feed itself with a lie. The aspiration to autonomy as a perfect form of freedom freeing us from the depths of the human soul was doomed to false realizations and implementations, to irrational absolutization and identification of this absolute was either with some "spirit of the world," or with the sum of historical and social processes, with the very subjective consciousness or finally with a pragmatic form of the social ethos in the aspect regarded in the aspect of a collective agreement of consciences.

Nothing is here itself and nothing is in its proper place: because either God is the world or the world is God, or man is a mixture of divine and cosmic elements, or he is completely lost in an impersonal existential background. In this confusion of everything, freedom simply dies or at least cannot be identified as an inner and dynamic property of a person.

Regardless of the complex *itinerary* of searching for a lost paradise of freedom, the pernicious process of man's effective failure to meet real freedom takes place within the human being. This is in accordance with the logic and dynamics of sin, which has been grafted in the human heart by the escape movement, the "Adam impulse" fleeing from God, sheltered in the shadow of created reality. This escape movement is a movement towards nothingness, although this path is accompanied by various myths and pseudo-absolutes, ready to convince

man that he is going in the right direction. There is a myth of unrestricted freedom, which in the absence of self-criticism can be an argument for someone to convince him that he is the only master of his own. Meanwhile, under the disguise of this myth, all the more destructive enslavement and subjugation of a man through the elements of the world, which already fully control human action, is taking place. Nor is there any doubt that the process of moving away from God is, at the same time, unavoidably the process of losing one's personality.

The created "I" separated from the reference to the Absolute "You" loses the necessary point of its support in the transcendent reality, which adequately explains it. As a result, the person is reduced to the world. A break with the truth leads to a break with transcendence, and vice versa.

In reference to VS 41, it must be stated that there is a very profound difference between obedience to the truth inscribed in created reality and the situation when man – apart from the truth – surrenders to created things. In the latter situation, one of the parties is definitely a master: but it is certainly not a human being who performs this function.

Only consent to the loss of one's moral personality can lead one to accepting the concept of a collective-communicative conscience. This is an example of conscious consent to sociological moral determinism. The human conscience is reduced to the act of adoration for the magic of statistical numbers (for statistical multiplicity), which grows to the rank of an absolute. It is some kind of "socialization" of consciences in the sense of a collective alienation of consciences in the spirit of Hegel and Marks. The statistic "praxis" replaces the truth, the moral norm and, finally, God. In this hypothesis people are only responsible for themselves: the social consensus solves all moral problems. It is in the name of freedom elevated to the highest rank that Bernhard Huring adopts in his textbook *Liberie fedeli in Christo* the concept of "mutual connection of consciences." This idea of mutual co-relation fulfils the role of the highest authority, even distancing itself towards the Church's Magisterium. "Apart from God, conscience is the highest authority for everyone" (p. 339), hence there is no need to refer to the Church's teaching, which presents only dry formulas and sclerotic laws (*ibidem*). Conscience, on the other hand, "achieves its fullness *in reciprocity with the consciences of others.*" This community of consciences has only a horizontal dimension. Huring is inclined to recognize the authority of prophets, saints and people with mature consciences and with appropriate competence. However, he does not give us a recipe on how to check this, since in this community one cannot rely on objective criteria. It may appear that "reciprocity of consciences" will connect – as in the time of the prophet Elijah – four hundred false prophets, and the prophet of the True God will be left alone.

What if these false prophets are not only perfectly organized but still armed with modern propaganda? According to Huring's philosophy, the individual should submit to the majority of "mature consciences." What should one do when this entity is the Pope? Huring's concepts are largely dependent on existentialist philosophy. It is in the spirit of this philosophy that he claims that the essence of the moral answer that we owe to God is freedom and creativity. This, however, reduces the essence of the response to the elements of psychological experience.

Huring considers the Christian religion only in terms of freedom. These assumptions contain a dilemma that cannot be overcome because if man freely and creatively decided to refuse to answer God, how should one assess the essence of this act, if it is freedom that determines its value? The absolutization of freedom must lead to questioning the very foundations of ethics. Freedom is not a value in itself. It can be considered a value, if there exists a higher value than it, which determines its truthfulness⁵. If Huring accepts, following Tillich, that man is free so radically that he is even free with regard to his own freedom, he is free even from his own freedom, until he is free from his humanity, then it is impossible to demonstrate at what moment, by acting in a way free, he commits sin. However, the criteria of good and evil do not follow from freedom alone. At the same time, the author claims that personal sin exists only because there is freedom. Does that not mean that freedom is the source of sin, and not man? But how can freedom be a source of evil when, according to Huring, it is the highest form of good?

Radical monotheism and the radical character of the answer in the spirit of Barth and Tillich finally transforms into radical liberalism that implements a cult of personality ideology. Obedience to God is so arbitrary that it is completely non-binding. The false antinomy between freedom and duty leads to the obligation losing its moral value and deforms becoming a pretentious law of partnership with God, that is, the dialogue of two independent beings⁶.

Explanation of the Essence of Freedom and Its Relation to the Truth

Freedom as a Characteristic of the Human Being.

It is a relatively new trend in theology that the term "liberty" (*libertas*) is used instead of the term will *volunte*. This does not mean, at the very least, the intention of resigning from treating the will as a reality, although not substantial, but as

⁵ J. Bajda, *Powolanie chrześcijańskie jako zasada teologii moralnej*, Warsaw 1984, 110f.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

an essential and intrinsic property of this substance, who we call a person. The source of this property lies in the spiritual side of human existence, and because of this spiritual fundament, the will is internally penetrating the mind as cognitive power, simply because the spirit is intrinsically undivided. Will moves the mind, and the mind illumines the will, and in this way they create a unity that cannot be broken both at the source of the act and in its internal structure.

Will is responsible for the activity of a person as a person, it is the basis of its acts. However, the will as dynamism is located deeper, it lies in what can be called the root of the ontic identity of being. One should refer to the very act of existence, thanks to which being not only is, but it is also itself, in a way that is proportional to its very nature. One can talk here about the law of the identity of being with itself. Based on this law, being with all its essence expresses the “will” of being itself, the will of duration, the will to confirm itself, which at the level of personal existence manifests itself as a kind of moral imperative experienced in the depths of its consciousness. Being, therefore, wants to be in harmony with itself, it opposes its own annihilation.

This inner regularity of being is more understandable when seen in the light of the truth of creation. For the created being does not exist by virtue of itself, it exists as a donated one, it exists in a way “on command,” as a result of obedience to the will of the Creator. The being created is the incarnate form of obedience, and therefore the moment of dependence: dependence on the Truth of Creation is built on the very structure of the will (of freedom!).

It can be, therefore, said that being exists because it is a definite word of metaphysical truth. In relation to man, it is the truth of being a created person, created thanks to intelligent freedom. This truth would not be fully understood if Revelation failed to add a very important thing: that the created being exists not only due to the principle of conformity with its metaphysical truth, but also because it is God’s Image, and therefore conforming to its Original and Source (Prototype).

2. The Truth of Freedom: the Vocation to Love

Therefore, man cannot only be considered a derivative of truth (because he comes from God), but he is also a being directed – with himself – to the Cause and the Ultimate Truth of his existence, which is his adequate goal. Freedom created was called the “unique and unusual” sign of this Image, which exists *a Deo* and *ad Deum*.

The vocation to God considered as Absolute Love can be understood from such a way of existence. All this tells us why apart from this relation to God a created person cannot be himself, and even – strictly speaking – cannot just exist.

Freedom as a trait of personal being is regarded this way by the Second Vatican Council. This vision will be shared by the author of the Encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*, especially emphasizing this dimension of vocation. Thinking about man in the light of the mystery of creation and vocation, how can one not acknowledge the fact that the basic, internal movement of created freedom is directed towards God? How can one not recognize, following the Second Vatican Council, that the essence of freedom is the internal *ordinatio ad Deum* (GS 17)? How strongly it harmonizes with the statement formulated in GS 24, proclaiming that "man is the *only creature on earth who was wanted by God, because of man himself*"! Freedom exists only because man was created as a subject of love and therefore he is in a perfect way himself when he loves in a perfect and free way the Absolute Love. This philosophy of freedom develops the commented text of GS. Freedom exists for Love to have its source in man: to be a source, not just an empty vessel filled from the outside, this is the moment thanks to which the created Image comes closest to the Original, not only in the sense of similarity, but above all in the sense of a meeting. Man becomes a source of love when God is present in him as the Source of Love, and man lives completely hidden in God. The similarity of man to God consists not only in the fact that man also can love, but rather that in the fact that love that comes from man Love, which has its source in God is present.

Such a nature of freedom determines man's way of life, the direction of his calling. This is expressed in the biblical *ut quaerat Deum* to seek God. This is what the conciliar text expresses. Man searches not because he lost God, because this circumstance concerns only the history of sin, but because this is the essence of will. Everything that takes the form of decision, choice, desire, tends toward union with God. Under this condition, the action of a person is carried out in the face of God. Searching for God is not a longing caused by separation, it is not a wandering in the darkness under the influence of the vague premonition of the presence of Supreme Being, but still unknown (as in Steinbeck's or Frankel's writings). It is confirmed, beyond any doubt, by the following definition of the will: *ei inhaerendo*. This means that we are already in a certain way united with God, we are already rooted in Him like an arrow strongly directed to the goal, we "hold on" to Him with all the power of will: of course, it is Him, in fact, who maintains us close to Him with his omnipotence and love.

Even when we are searching, we are already – to some extent – with God.

This search and abiding continuous existing in God, according to the Council, happens *sponte et libere*, and thus by an authentic choice, as a work of personal will, though supported by grace. Will speaks in this act in a basic way that finds its own natural and logical continuation in a series of decisions that are – and should be – a confirmation of this fundamental attitude. We do not go deeper into this issue because it is discussed separately. The conciliar text, used by John Paul II at the key point of the Encyclical, does not forget about the personalistic structure of the will, about conscious and free action, which consists in the fact that man acts as moved from within and not triggered by external factors. There is only one possibility of explaining this character of human action, which does not find its equivalent in the whole visible world: the only power able to move the will from within is the truth present in the mind which by the power of its spirituality (immateriality) is present within the will and which shapes its essence. Knowing, introducing the truth into the mind shapes the essence of every deed that could not be human or free if it were not done in the light of the truth about good and in the light of the truth of the act in which the person's pursuit of the good through the choice is realized. Only the known good can be chosen, and if it is not chosen, it is not the object of the act and it does not improve the person. There is no need to remind the reader that everything on this subject was investigated masterfully and presented in Karol Wojtyła's book *Osoba i czyn*⁷.

It is worth returning to this book while studying the teaching of the VS encyclical. This is not a trivial topic: after all, in man's action the human being is synthesized in a way that emphasizes ontical and dynamic unity. And in man, as a subject of moral action, in a certain way, the whole created world

⁷ Karol Wojtyła in the book *Osoba i czyn*, Kraków 1969 on p. 143, analysing the act of choice, writes, "what is essential is a significant reference of the will to the truth that penetrates the intentionality of desire and creates as if one internal principle (...). To choose is to make the decisions with regard to objects presented to the will in the intentional order in accordance with the principle of truth." And further: "Understanding the nature of choice consists in bringing the dynamism – which is appropriate to will – to truth as a principle of desire. This principle lies within the very will and determines the essence of choosing." On p. 144 he writes: "This reference to truth is not something external: it, in all its originality proper to choice (...), comes from the will and belongs to its proper dynamics. Although 'wanting' is not the same as 'getting to know' but 'wanting' is assigned to the truth. The dynamics of want is open to knowledge and is consistent with it: here is the source of the entire originality of choice. Thanks to this, the will responds to the motives, and is not subject to their determination." While on p. 145 he states that: "The relation to the truth constitutes the rooting of an intentional act in a person." In fact, the whole book should be quoted as a philosophical commentary on *Veritatis Splendor*.

is synthesized the truth of which will not be uttered completely, if a man in action, in shaping his own history, betrays the truth of his humanity. The world will not be compatible with itself, it will lose its purpose if man fails to realize his destiny revealed in the truth of Creation. A subject like this one cannot be exhausted in one paper. It is worth at least briefly signalling some thoughts that would merit further reflection.

The transcendent source of the bond that exists between freedom and truth is the unbreakable bond between the Wisdom and the Will (Providence) of God Himself, and therefore the supreme unity in the light of which and according to which man has been created. Man was conceived by God as a person, and thus as the highest unity in the created world, more precisely: in the visible world (VS 99). The author of the VS encyclical exceptionally clearly and strongly emphasizes the idea that the essence of freedom is obedience to the Law of God, that is, the truth that is contained in it, and which is given to man as the internal equipment of his being. Our civilization must have gone quite far from the truth, since we have to repeat this elementary principle so many times that we finally break the barriers of prejudice, emotional resistance and traumatic reactions caused by long-lasting propaganda that glorifies freedom "as such," empty freedom, freedom "oriented towards nothing."

Much could be said about the devastation that took place in our ethos of freedom under the pressure of the philosophy of sin. Freedom shares the fate of man: it is wounded, enslaved, it is dead. It is also redeemed, re-donated, recovered in Christ. Much has been said about this in the encyclical. John Paul II would not be himself if he did not say that Christ is our freedom and that he is the highest figure of the personal synthesis of freedom just when he has sacrificed himself totally for us in the drama of His sacrifice of the Cross. When is the Son freer, if not in the hands of his Father? That is why Christ is the Truth that sets us free, he is the Source and the Fullness of freedom: he is also in the Church and through the Church. But just as it was with Christ, the church must also be a sign that will be opposed.

Moral Law Vs. Conscience in the *Veritatis Splendor**

The emergence of what may be referred to as the “new humanism” caused, as if by reflection, a crisis of classic Christian morality, undermined in its very essence. This new humanism is founded on considering human freedom as the only and absolutely most important value which has to be first acknowledged and respected. According to this way of thought, a human stops considering him- or herself a person who is given in a natural, timeless way, who is completely constituted, but to the contrary – he or she starts to increasingly better understand that he or she may define him- or herself on his or her own because he or she is called to create him- or herself¹.

Placing the main emphasis on freedom and on the necessity to take into consideration a particular situation, deprives ethics of the objective basis of moral value and shifts it to the position of extreme subjectivism. Therefore, there is clear reluctance towards formulating common and unchanging moral principles. This is followed by adopting an existential way of perceiving human nature, which continuously undergoes changes and creates itself². In this concept, human nature is relative and changeable and cannot be considered objective. Nature understood this way also cannot be the basis for deriving the existence of objective, commonly applicable norms and principles. Transferring these thoughts to the ground of human calling, it is necessary to, in consequence, say that the calling addressed to human by God – an individual and direct calling – takes place, generally, irrespectively of the objective moral order. Every person individually and in every situation stands before a free decision and action³, which are required

* STV 32(1994)1.

¹ Cf. T. Styczeń, *Prawda o człowieku miarą jego afirmacji*, “Communio” 4(1982)10, 111ff.

² Cf. S. Rosik, *Wezwania i wybory moralne. Refleksje teologicznomoralne*, Lublin 1992, 25.

³ This concept of a human is related to by B. Häring, *Frei in Christus*, vol. 1., Freiburg im Breisgau 1979, 352ff.

from him or her by the current situation. Conscience, in turn, based on the situation and internal intuition, and not based on objective moral law, judges what should be considered as senseful and good⁴.

An inevitable result of such a state of affairs is an attempt to deify a human by proposing to him or her such a philosophy in which he or she creates him- or herself on his or her own, in both, his or her ontological being as well as in the system of ethical values. This kind of anthropological orientation, consciously eliminating the existence of objective and absolutely applicable ethical norms, is based only on provisional ethics and promises salvation for the price of the appropriation of human conscience and human dignity. These and other thought directions are based on the incorrect interpretation of conscience, and by introducing separation between freedom and law; they lead to moving away from the stand of the Church and of its Magisterium in the basic issues of defining Christian morality. Therefore, it is justified to become familiar with John Paul II's teaching on matters of conscience and moral law.

God as the Creator of Moral Law

Veritatis splendor which recalls the basic issues of the moral teaching of the Church, attempts to emphasize what is significant in that teaching. Undoubtedly, a significant problem in defining authentic Christian morality is acknowledging, or not, God as the Author of moral law. The fundamental statement of the Encyclical on this matter is the following: "Moral law has God as its author, and (...) man, by the use of reason, participates in the eternal law, which it is not for him to establish" (VS 36).

The aim of the above statement is recalling the whole Tradition of the Church, that moral order is not the work of our independent autonomy imposing moral law. The content of that law results from the essence of our being but does not exist independently of our will. We do not give moral law to ourselves, but we discover them⁵. True moral autonomy, compliant with the Catholic doctrine consists in the fact that human freedom and God's law meet and mutually

⁴ According to T. Styczeń: "A very meaningful example of that is the language of certain moralists which discuss conscience. The judgment of conscience (Gewissensurteil) is being replaced by a truth-creating decision of the conscience. Gewissensentscheidung completely absorbs the functions assigned to Gewissensurteil," art. cit., 112.

⁵ Many people know the famous saying of one of Sartre's characters: "I am doomed to have no other law but mine. (...) I must blaze my trail. For I, Zeus, am a man, and every man must find

interpenetrate. Natural law, i.e. the participation of intelligent creation in the eternal law of God means the general subordination of the reason – and of the moral commandments resulting from it – to God’s Wisdom (cf. VS 35). The Encyclical confirms, against any relativisms, the universal and permanent nature of the ordinances of moral law which express the original truth about the good of a person and show the way of the authentic implementation of freedom. The Encyclical aims at reminding those who define Christian morality, about the dependence of reason on God’s Wisdom and about the necessity of God’s Revelation in becoming aware of moral truths, also those which belong to the natural order (cf. VS 36). This reminding is caused by the existence of certain theories which proclaim complete sovereignty of reason in the area of moral norms. In the light of these theories, these norms would be the expression of a law “which man in an autonomous manner lays down for himself and which has its source exclusively in human reason” (VS 36)⁶.

In the light of the Encyclical, the autonomy of morality cannot mean its complete sovereignty and ignoring any authorities. Every person has to be aware of his or her own fallibility, of the limited capability of his or her cognition, including also the understanding of the deepest origins of good and evil. What is rational is taking into consideration the limitations of one’s own possibilities and subordinating to an authority. The basis for such an attitude is the conviction that it is not human who decides on what is good or evil, but humans hold guard of what is good and is – due to various reasons – not recognized as good by everyone⁷.

Therefore, the possible moral ordinances included in the Revelation, and not understandable fully in the scope of natural cognition, do not infringe on human autonomy. On the one hand, moral life requires creative thinking and the intelligence which is the characteristic of a person, on the other hand, however, reason draws its truth and its authority from the eternal law of God (cf. VS 40).

out his own way,” *Dramaty (...) Muchy, dramat w trzech aktach (Drama: The Flies)*, translated from French into English by S. Gilbert, translated into Polish by: J. Lisowski, Warszawa 1956, 102.

⁶ The concept of creative reason as the guiding idea of the new moral theology has received much attention from A. Szostek, who, moreover, indicates theologians who, in assumptions, especially anthropological ones, have followed such a trend. Cf. *Natura-rozum-wolność. Filozoficzna analiza koncepcji twórczego rozumu we współczesnej teologii moralnej*, Rome 1990, 81-244.

⁷ “Unlike the classic understanding of philosophical anthropology, the anthropologies according to which the image of human or human nature constitute the correlate of the self-understanding of an individual or of a social group, simply eliminate the need and necessity of referring it to transcendent truth, i.e. any further validation (verification).” T. Styczeń, art. cit., 110.

The legitimate autonomy of practical reason means that a human has his or her own law within him- or herself, however, this is law received from the Creator. Such autonomy of reason does not mean that reason itself may create values and moral norms. Similarly, true and legitimate human moral autonomy does not imply the rejection of moral law, the natural and the revealed one. Autonomy understood this way does not lead to the denial of the participation of practical reason in the Wisdom of the Creator and Divine Legislator and does not indicate the freedom of creating moral norms depending on the historical circumstances or the needs of various societies and cultures⁸.

By emphasizing the legitimate human moral autonomy, the Encyclical very clearly demonstrates that humans – due to the fact that moral law comes from God and has always its source in Him – cannot perform free self-design. A human cannot grant sense to him- or herself as well as to the surrounding world⁹. By adopting self-design as the basic criterion for the sense and the moral value of an act, it would be necessary to say that a human must on his or her own make a free decision regarding who he or she will be and how he or she will direct the history of him- or herself and of the world. In accordance with such an assumption, the personal human subject is called to create, not discover, the truth about him- or herself and to be also able to, on his or her own, reach the moral assessment of particular situations¹⁰.

According to the Encyclical, for humans, obedience to God's law guarantees remaining in truth and it fully corresponds to human dignity. While referring to God's moral law, the Encyclical represents the stand of the unity of the creation and the Covenant. For God is the creator of the natural and the revealed law. For God, everything is unity, there is one eternal plan of God which is the basis of all the history of the world. "The different ways in which God, acting in history, cares for the world and for mankind are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they support each other and intersect" (VS 45). This happens because their common source and aim is the eternal plan, full of wisdom and love, whereby God directs and governs the whole world and the paths of the

⁸ "If by the autonomy of earthly affairs we mean that created things and societies themselves enjoy their own laws and values which must be gradually deciphered, put to use, and regulated by men, then it is entirely right to demand that autonomy. (...) But if the expression, the independence of temporal affairs, is taken to mean that created things do not depend on God, and that man can use them without any reference to their Creator, anyone who acknowledges God will see how false such a meaning is. For without the Creator the creature would disappear." GS 36.

⁹ Cf. A. Szostek, op. cit., 151.

¹⁰ Cf. Ibid., 154.

human community. The Encyclical performs a certain synthesis which unifies the imperatives of the moral realm: the natural moral law reproduces the idea of creation, which established the purposefulness of human nature, whereas the “new law” of Christ reproduces the idea of salvation and demonstrates God’s will. This “new Law,” which is the fulfillment of God’s law in Jesus Christ and in His Spirit, in the act of eternal love, calls humans to co-participate in its divine life through perfection of the highest degree. The obliging power of these laws derives from the eternal law which is God, communicating His calling to the human conscience¹¹.

Conscience as the Condition of Human Freedom

The implementation of moral good assumes human freedom. “Authentic freedom is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man. For God has willed that man remain “under the control of his own decisions, so that he can seek his Creator spontaneously, and come freely to utter blissful perfection through loyalty to Him. Hence man’s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice that is personally motivated and prompted from within, not under blind internal impulse nor by mere external pressure” (GS 17). A human is called to free and morally good action, above all, through his or her conscience.

John Paul II realizes the fact that the bond between human freedom and God’s law finds its realization in conscience, and the fact that the relationship between freedom and law is closely related with the concept of conscience. In order to present the essence of conscience, the Encyclical refers to the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, where the following was said: “In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged” (GS 16).

The Church’s teaching about conscience indicates several significant elements. Conscience is, above all, the act of a person who stands before a moral decision and must make this decision. Conscience appears as a voice calling a human to choose good in freedom and in the awareness of full responsibility towards God. In Conscience, the encounter between God and human is fulfilled

¹¹ Cf. S. Rosik, *op. cit.*, 41ff.

and conscience becomes a place of dialogue. The voice of conscience further presents the call to that dialogue, the beginning of which is given to a human in the act of creation and a person's task is to personally undertake that dialogue and conduct it¹².

The Encyclical strongly highlights that the dignity of conscience and therefore the dignity of a human being, results, above all, from the fact that conscience discovers moral law which has been written in the human heart by God (cf. Rom 2:14-15). By referring to the words of St. Paul, the Encyclical states that conscience places humans before law, and it becomes a witness in that human's case; a witness of faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the law. Therefore, conscience allows a human to become familiar with the postulates of the wisdom and love of God. Thanks to this, it, in an obliging way, presents to a human the path which he or she should take, granting sense to his or her life. Therefore a human does not only have to rely on his or her own guesses and speculations which are subject to mistakes and failures. Conscience does not enclose a human in being alone, but it makes him or her able – without the fear of undertaking a risk of making a mistake – to become familiar with God's will expressed in law, to which human should show obedience¹³.

The nature of the judgment of conscience is imperative. A human should act in accordance with it. It is the assessment of a concrete situation, however, based on a rational conviction that one has to love and do good and avoid evil (cf. VS, no. 59). Conscience is able to connect people in the search for truth and in resolving – on the way to this truth – moral problems, both, unitary and collective ones. However, the condition is, on the one hand, faithfulness to conscience, and on the other – the rectitude of the conscience which is obedience to the voice of conscience which has been shaped in accordance with the principles of the objective moral norm. The Encyclical highlights that thanks to conscience, (natural) law is applied to a particular case. “The judgment of conscience states ‘in an ultimate way’ whether a certain particular kind of behavior is in conformity with the law; it formulates the proximate norm of the morality of a voluntary act, ‘applying the objective law to a particular case’” (VS 59).

In order not to lose its dignity and, at the same time, freedom, conscience must appropriately read the content and value of moral law. The Encyclical reminds us that natural moral law derives from the very essence of God, and it is discovered and familiarized with based on the very nature of things and the

¹² Cf. W. Poplatek, *Godność sumienia na podstawie Konstytucji II Soboru Watykańskiego o Kościele w świecie współczesnym*, “*Analecta Cracoviensia*” 2(1970), 249-254.

¹³ Cf. S. Rosik, *Sumienie – głos Boga w człowieku*, “*Katecheta*” 15(1971), 49-59.

essence of a human being. By proceeding in accordance with the ordinance of conscience we experience that this law becomes our own, personal law, and not an external imposed imperative. However, always, the judgment of the conscience does not “establish the law; rather it bears witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical reason with reference to the supreme good” (VS 60).

In relation to that we can say that conscience is a voice calling a human to discover the truth about him- or herself¹⁴, truth which demonstrates the attitude of the acts which have been performed or are to be performed towards who the human really should be. By fulfilling an act, human fulfills him- or herself in that act, for he, as human, as a person, becomes good or evil. The function of conscience consists in defining true good in an act. The freedom, which is guaranteed to conscience here, always includes the dependence on truth. The measure of the maturity and responsibility of the judgments of conscience will not be the pursuit to set it free from objective truth, which ultimately leads to the autonomy of its decisions, but intense searching for truth and being directed by truth in action¹⁵.

The judgment of conscience does not establish the law, but only certifies the authority of natural law and practical reason in reference to objective good. Conscience cannot be considered as autonomous and the sole source of establishing what is good and what is evil (cf. VS 60). The Encyclical definitely rejects any kind of creative interpretation of conscience (cf. VS 54). The Encyclical does not mention particular representatives of such a thought direction, but it is generally said that, according to some theologians, it is not possible to, in case of all cases, apply general moral norms because the particular reality is so rich that actually every person is left with making a personal decision regarding how he or she should proceed. The existing general norms “are not so much a binding objective criterion for judgments of conscience, but a general perspective which helps man tentatively to put order into his personal and social life” (VS 55).

The creative nature of conscience results, above all – according to some opinions – from the fact of connecting conscience with the whole sphere of psyche and feelings, human historicity and his or her influence on the social and cultural environment. All this becomes a constitutive element of human nature.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Szostek, *Sumienie a prawda i wolność*, “W drodze” 110(1982)10, 48.

¹⁵ By rejecting the objectively binding moral order, one has to, due to necessity, refer only to a purely personal, subjective criterion of good and evil. A personal and internal conviction not only shows, but ultimately determines the good and evil of an act, without the need to refer to a different instance, to an objective norm. The decisions of conscience then become fully creative acts. Cf. S. Olejnik, *Dar-Wezwanie-Odpowiedź. Teologia moralna*, vol. 3, Warsaw 1988, 125ff.

Absolutely important – especially detailed ethical norms – must be considered impossible. The principles of moral action, functioning in societies, have got a sense only as an expression of the experience of the history of people's coexistence until now. Therefore, they have only got the nature of advice, tips, however, never of absolutely binding norms.

Due to necessity, these kinds of assumptions must lead to adopting the position of *ethical situationism*¹⁶. According to this system, the determining and ultimate norm of action is actually not an order which is objective, defined by the law of nature and known in a sure way based on that law, but some internal judgment and the light of reason of every individual human, through which he or she is made aware what he or she is supposed to do when being in a particular situation. The final decision of a human is not an application of objective law to a particular case, but it is direct light and judgment. This judgment, in reference to its objective rightness and veracity, is not, ultimately, measured using any objective norm, but using personal conviction.

The assumption for the above statements is the notion of “existential nature,” which actually is changeable, maybe besides only a few elements which belong in it to “metaphysical nature.” Similarly, natural law should be considered changeable because only through the autonomous making of particular decisions may a person achieve moral perfection (cf. VS 55). Only when every person is able to, in his or her conscience, judge, not according to objective laws but via individual and personal conviction, what he or she should do in the current situation, will he or she protect him- or herself and free people from numerous ethical conflicts which would otherwise be impossible to resolve.

Creative interpretation of conscience has its far-reaching consequences in building ethics and moral theology. Humans may do all they can in order to be able to implement their free design. He or she is actually not bound by anything. He or she is not bound by his or her own nature because the only thing which is constant in humans are the choices which are prior in reference to any acts. The personal human subject is autonomous towards bio-physiological laws, towards metaphysics, and even towards faith. A human is simply called to create the truth about him- or herself and conscience would be the final instance judging what is good or evil. Taking into consideration especially so-called pastoral cases, one could justify certain solutions which are contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, or even reach the conviction that the negative norm is not in all cases binding for conscience.

¹⁶ This problem is discussed very broadly by S. Rosik, *Sytuacjonizm etyczny a chrześcijańska roztropność. Studium teologiczno-moralne*, Poznań 1986.

Deciding on What is Good or Evil Does Not Belong to Human

The rich heritage of moral reflection elaborated by the Magisterium of the Church, especially in the last century, and referring to various areas of human life, must, today, face the challenge of a new situation which became shaped in the womb of society and of the Christian community itself. Out of the inspiration of the Second Vatican Council, the great and praise-deserving effort of renewing moral theology (OT 16) was undertaken, at the same time, however, there has been a spread – also in Catholic moral theology – of various kind of doubts and reservations towards the moral teaching of the Church; with time it was becoming increasingly more obvious that these are not signs of partial and interim criticism towards concrete moral norms, but an attempt of a global and systematic questioning of the whole heritage of the moral doctrine based on certain anthropologic and ethical concepts.

The Encyclical draws attention to the existence of a moral crisis and to the fact that Christians themselves take various stands towards traditional morality. This is undoubtedly contributed to by certain theologians who reject traditional teaching about natural law, about the commonness and unchanging validity of its ordinances. What is also being questioned is the right of the Magisterium to resolve moral issues and to provide reliable teaching about the absolutely obligatory requirements of God's commandments. Many also claim that it is possible to love God and your neighbor, without being obliged – always and in all circumstances – to observe the norms proclaimed by the Church. Another thing that is being questioned is the existence of an internal and inseparable connection between faith and morality; this is even done by proclaiming the possibility of certain forms of pluralism which are irreconcilable with the Church's communion.

While establishing relationships of moral law towards conscience, the Encyclical asks itself a question which is of fundamental significance for ethics, namely, does human have the power to establish law referring to him- or herself. This question may be answered by referring to facts. From the point of view of experience it has to be noticed that a human, who, as a person, is someone so worthy that he or she should be affirmed for him- or herself, does not stop being someone only very fragile. In order to secure the dignity of a human person, ethics and moral theology have to, on one hand, become familiar with the conditions which are necessary for a human to start existing, and on the other hand, in turn, become familiar with the elements which, in a necessary way, define his or her being-identity, i.e. his or her ontic-axiological structure.

Becoming familiar with both of these will allow ethics to form normative protections, going below which is absolutely impossible¹⁷.

By adopting such an anthropology, the Encyclical recalls the words of the Second Vatican Council: “the highest norm of human life is the divine law-eternal, objective and universal-whereby God orders, directs and governs the entire universe and all the ways of the human community by a plan conceived in wisdom and love” (DH 3). Conscience, in turn, formulates the moral duty in the light of that law of God. The universal nature of God’s law and of the obligation is not abolished but confirmed by the fact that reason defines their application to a particular situation (VS 59).

These truths and such an anthropology are adopted by the Encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*. This anthropology, without resigning from examining human in the aspect of the fragility of his or her existence, simultaneously defines the content-elements which are necessary for the identity of the human phenomenon. Based on this anthropology, ethics and moral theology are able to formulate – besides the absolutely important main moral principle – also absolutely important detailed norms of action. For human they define the field of life in truth and they are a safeguard of his or her identity. For Catholics, in turn, the Magisterium of the Church is helpful in discovering truth and moral good. “For the Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the truth. It is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which have their origins in human nature itself” (DH 14).

Acknowledging the absolute nature of moral norms is of fundamental significance for an individual and for the shaping of his or her conscience in the light of the Truth. Human’s orientation in moral matters, despite all the individuality of each person, takes place only within the Church community. “The Church’s firmness in defending the universal and unchanging moral norms is not demeaning at all. Its only purpose is to serve man’s true freedom. Because there can be no freedom apart from or in opposition to the truth, the categorical (...) defense of the absolutely essential demands of man’s personal dignity must be considered the way and the condition for the very existence of freedom” (VS 96).

¹⁷ Cf. T. Styczeń, art. cit., 109ff.

Passover of Border Situations. Experience of Liturgy in Labor Camp Literature*

Among many statements in 1995 concerning the celebration of traces of memory of people saved from the ravages of two totalitarian regimes, there appeared – articulated in various ways – attempts to outline a broad perspective on comparing the situation of victims of the Nazi and Stalinist systems. Among them the statement of Elie Wiesel was especially interesting, included in the interview “Kiedy życie było zbrodnią.”¹ Wiesel’s statement suggests the incomparability of the evil of both systems and the scale of human suffering². When asked about the interpretation of the Holocaust he replies: “If someone tries to explain the Holocaust from the point of view of theology, then I cannot accept such an explanation.” There is no response, there should be no response. “The Holocaust should remain an eternal question for mankind.”³ An incomparable and eternal inquiry. Mystery and silence. This is a very characteristic approach to the mystery of extermination on the part of Jewish philosophical and theological thought. It achieves in some radical factions, the total negation of the possibility of speaking about God after Auschwitz, or even a radical negation

* STV 36(1998)l.

¹ E. Wiesel, *Kiedy życie było zbrodnią. Z (...) rozmawia J. B. Warman*, “Gazeta Wyborcza,” No. 23, 27.01.1995, 13.

² To the question: “Was Oświęcim something unprecedented? Or is it possible to compare the Nazi system of extermination camps with, for example, Gulag?” Wiesel responds: “No. Gulag is obviously one of the greatest tragedies of our century, if only because of the number of victims. But when Stalin wanted to murder someone – a personal enemy, a political opponent, a Trotskyist – he did not, however, kill his family. He could have sent the wife of such a man to the camp, but his children were sent to an orphanage and could survive. The Holocaust was the first and only time in history, when BEING itself was considered a crime. So I think it was something unique.” Ibid.

³ Ibid.

of the legitimacy of the existence of ethics in our time⁴. Is the reality described as “theology after Auschwitz” possible at all, but also is the “theology after the Gulag” also possible? The answer to this second question can be found in the analysis of memoirs. It is not only a record of facts, but also a peculiar *locus theologicus*⁵. Amongst these types of literary events, it is worth highlighting the significant phenomenon of our passing age, which is labor camp literature⁶. As a position that determines our view, one should adopt the status of man, the enemy closed in a world of labor camps, in order to understand the senses of the phenomenon of man’s transition from what seemed to be his definitive detention and enslavement.

Border Situations as Anti-reality and an Attempt to Annihilate Man

When talking about Stalinist labor camps and the entire process of “lagerisation” of human life (from arrest, through transit prisons, investigating prisons, deportations, labor camps, to extreme conditions of so-called “repatriation”) one can use the category of “borderline situations” inspired by existentialist philosophy⁷. One of the fundamental existentialist theses is that existence exists in the context of multiple facts⁸. Such a context of existence creates an existential situation. There is a situation that is common to all people, which is associated mainly with another existence, nothingness, death, being as such, and also the Absolute Being. Some situations are an absolute limit to human adaptability and defenses, and furthermore, they are absolutely unavoidable, they

⁴ Cf. e.g. J. Wils, *Vom Verstummen Gottes in der Moral. Reflexion auf die Umbrüche der Ethik*, (speech presented on 29.08.1995 in Freising during the 2nd Congress of the European Society for Catholic Theology).

⁵ Cf. J. Szymik, *W poszukiwaniu teologicznej głębi literatury* Katowice 1994.

⁶ Cf. E. Czaplejewicz, *Polska literatura łagrowa*, Warszawa 1992.

⁷ Undoubtedly, attention should be paid to the vagueness of the terms “existential” and “existence,” despite the high frequency of their use. Above all, these terms should not be identified with philosophical or artistic existentialism, especially one, its chosen faction. Their reality has a much deeper meaning. The philosophical aspect of the term “existential” emphasizes a certain manner of being, the attitude of the subject’s involvement with all his existence in the cognitive situation.

⁸ These are facts such as: the potency of existence, biopsychic nature of man, subjective-self structure, past, fixed axiological attitude, things in the world, non-objective transcendence (existence of the other, nothingness, death, being as such, the Absolute).

literally constitute “border situations”⁹ Jaspers lists four such situations: fight, guilt, suffering and death. Border experience, which is – according to Jaspers and other existentialists – a speculative concept, acquires a special, concrete verification in the camp conditions of the Stalinist system. Hence, in the space of the camps, accepting responsibility of a special weight, threat of death, great suffering and struggle takes place. Probably also nowhere else could the words of Jaspers sound more authentically and realistically-saturated with the reality of the drama of human being: “To experience border situations and to exist – this is one and the same.”¹⁰ The labor camp is above all a specific space and time, radically reversing the relation of man to space-time. Here the location is made within the boundaries that are final and which cannot be crossed or bypassed. Such an impression, triggered from the outward perspective, by way of prisoners deported to his area, later became fixed. “We were gathered together in a small group, and then we moved towards the labor camp, we know that somewhere here, to the left, before entering the camp, there is a cemetery of ours, they are already outside the zone. Yes, only the one who dies, can go beyond its limits with impunity. But in vain, the eyes slide over the clumps of blueberries and heathers, in vain looking for some plaques, or at least any mounds. Smooth, indifferent, lying on its back, tundra – and nothing else.”¹¹ Crossing the border of the camp and, at the same time, the border of the whole of reality founded on totalitarianism seems to be impossible both in the perspective of time and space. With regard to time, only death seems to be the only way to overcome this situation, while in terms of space it is difficult even to imagine any fairly realistic project, which could have been possible to implement in such extreme conditions. Escape is actually impossible. It remains for the prisoners, therefore, to continue to live in the camp and face the fourfold extreme reality: fight,

⁹ Cf. H. Pizskalski, *Problem sytuacji granicznych w ujęciu Karla Jaspersa*, “Analecta Cracoviensia” 10 (1973), 10-102. Karl Jaspers himself describes the concept that interests us in this way: “As a ‘boundary’ I consider such situations, which consist, for example, in the fact that I am always involved in a certain situation, that I cannot live without a fight and without suffering, that I inevitably accept my own guilt, and that I must die. They do not transform, but only change in their manifestations; and if they are brought to our condition (*Dasein*), they are ultimate. We cannot reach over them; in our condition, we cannot see anything beyond them. They are like a wall that resists, which we bounce off. It is not in our power to change them, but only to illuminate them without explanation or partly to derive them from something that is different from them. They are all related to our condition.” K. Jaspers, *Philosophie*, vol. 2, Springer 1932, 203.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 204.

¹¹ B. Obertyńska, *W domu niewoli*, Warszawa 1991, 144.

guilt, suffering and death. This reality, full of indescribable horror and ugliness, was supposed to constitute, in the opinion of the creators and performers of the system, a peculiar “redeeming,” “soteric” reality. At the core of the camp soteriology was the reality of human labor, slave labor, which in the camps, was strenuously positioned in opposition to morality. This statement requires some explanation. A characteristic feature of anti-labor in the labor camps and in exile was the strict dependence of nutritional norms on the work performed. It was this absolute dependence that made work a determined form of struggle for survival. “The work went far beyond our strength, and yet we tried to do it best, in part to avoid threats and insults from overseers and decurions, but mainly because we wanted to get as much food as possible. Because the size of our daily food portions depended entirely on the amount of work we did. The policy of the camp authorities consisted in constantly keeping us in a state of semi-hunger, and at the same time we were promised more food if we worked better. In this way, hunger forced us to work harder.”¹² In the end, hunger and work, existing in close coexistence and conditioning, despite their externality towards man, made him as if he were the author of self-enslavement. The work so enslaved in its structure became an instrument of the struggle. The struggle was introduced in a way at the very core of the structure of human labor, constituting the basis of human efforts, social relations, and also increasing the burden of human existence.

In this context, there was a utopian and sinister program of camp soteriology expressed in the language of indoctrination. “Behind the gate (...) we were awaited by a new and much more acute torment, this time in the form of a long speech made by a thick, red-eyed political commissar who showed off by it – in front of a crowd of prisoners staggering on their feet. (...) There was everything in this excellent oratory show. And the fact that we had the unprecedented honor of participating in the nationwide construction of a new port, which in honor of one of Lenin’s greatest and most faithful fellow-workers (...) will be called Mołotowski. It was also about the creative role of work, which in the gloom of history turned a monkey into a human being and which, being an instrument of exploitation of man by man, evolved – within a communist system – as Stalin greatly put it brilliantly, into the matter of honor, in the matter of bravery... and lit up with the full splendor of humanism.(...) And about the trust placed in us by the Soviet party and power (...) And that our

¹² J. Gliksman, *Powiedz Zachodowi...* in: *Polacy w ZSRR 1939 – 1942*, W. Czapska (ed.), Warszawa 1991, 133.

fate rests in our hands, and that we can wash away our crimes with efficient work (...). And that on the Soviet land no one can live at the expense of others and that all of us here have to observe a hard but fair rule: whoever does not work, he does not eat.”¹³

In this way, human work became a factor both able to save a man from death, and capable – which seemed almost impossible – to save him from the indelible guilt of crime, the guilt of being an enemy. Here, however, one has to think about who the enemy, in fact, was. Polish camp literature can provide here a whole catalog of specifications – a “spy” Czapski was considered an enemy (because of the city plan purchased in Paris), communist Broniewski was considered the enemy of the communist state, the teenage author of the memories of an “Enemy of Comrade Stalin” was also considered an enemy, the enemy was a Polish postal officer, since the land on which he worked was annexed by Soviet Russia, the enemy was Grubiński, the author of a play about Lenin, the enemy was G. Lipińska, who “kept in touch” with the Englishman Adam Smith, though he lived several centuries earlier¹⁴. This catalog would be terribly grotesque, if its consequence would not be a deportation to the Gulag and loss of life. So one can ask what was the common denominator of guilt of all these people? What exactly was the decisive criterion for being an enemy? The common denominator of the cases indicated suggests the only answer: BEING A HUMAN. Hence, it can be seen that the purpose of the main effort of the labor camp was not to annihilate nations, their culture, spiritual wealth, biological existence – although all this, carried out consistently in the Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz, is a shocking and paralyzing perspective! This effort was directed at radical and final anthropological aberration. At definitive dehumanization. After all, in the case of these millions of cases, people subjected to the process of lagerisation, the stake was not to annihilate them. The whole complex system of interrogations, the entire series of simulated legal acts for many months was to lead to the recognition of fictitious guilt!

Its goal was to lead the MAN himself to destroy himself, by virtue of hypocrisy, by the power of self-destruction. The essence of this system was that MAN would recognize his guilt of BEING HUMAN. “The specificity of these conditions (Gulag conditions) was an attempt to narrow the entire richness

¹³ M. Kumorek, *Z kresów do peczorskich łagrów*, Warszawa 1990, 181.

¹⁴ Cf. J. Czapski, *Na nieludzkiej ziemi*, Warszawa 1990; W. Grubiński, *Między młotem a sierpem*, Warszawa 1990; G. Lipińska, *Jeśli zapomnę o nich...*, Paris 1988; I. Wasilewska, *Za winy niepopelnione*, Rome 1945; cf. also P. Bortkiewicz, *Zachowanie wartości moralnych w sytuacjach granicznych. Studium na podstawie polskiej literatury łagrowej*, Łódź 1994, 43-48.

of human existence to a narrow frame of occasional interrogation, which resulted in attempting to force a man to accept guilt for the crime he did not commit. The man who, in the result of such interrogations, was sent to the labor camps, was to live in such a sense of guilt, in fact making a self-enslavement, and ultimately losing the sense of his own existence.”¹⁵

ANTI-HUMAN in ANTI-WORLD. This is not only a problem of the de-heroization of human life, dehumanization of death and dying brought to the level of the disintegration of matter, but it is a question of the re-realization of the world and of man. Yes, unbelievable! And yet it was in this perspective that the phenomenon of saving a man in the anti-world took place.

Passover with Christ as a Way out of the Anti-world

Human life in the labor camps questioned both the fact and the value of human life. An illusory proposition was the suggestion of a constant fight with each other for one's own survival, with despair and nothingness. But even saved in such a way existence was radically and permanently threatened by death – dehumanized and meaningless. In such a proposed survival model, of course, there could be no room for religion and normative moral principles. This project was, however, a suggestion that absolutely did not guarantee the survival of the Gulag prisoners. The prisoners themselves experienced this fact. Hence the necessity of an alternative solution that would provide survival not on the basis of consent obtained from ominous power, but on the principle of conscious and free (as far as possible) human action, appeared. In this place, however, the following question arises, so characteristic of the entire camp literature: “Are criteria and requirements of ‘normal’ ethics still valid (obligatory) in the structures of evil? Normal, i.e. universally-human, engraved on stone tablets? Answers are – as you know – very diverse, often extremely oppositional. No, says

¹⁵ P. Bortkiewicz, op. cit., 51. The effort focused on breaking humanity was disproportionate. Incommensurable, because he did not verify or falsify anything. It was already condemned to annihilation. The only thing was to make the VICTIM stand on the same side as her/his EXECUTIONER. That he/she would leave the side of being in the truth and stand on the side of hypocrisy, creating the anti-world, in which, as J. Strzelecki wrote: “boundless freedom took here the form of a boundless tyranny, freed from all higher rights over it, the supporters of total equalization of beliefs referred to this equality; brotherhood has been revealed in its most trivial potency, expressed in hatred of those who will be denied the title of brother.” J. Strzelecki, *Niegodność i godność człowieka w wieku XX*, in: *Zagadnienie godności człowieka*, J. Czerkowski (ed.), Lublin 1994, 143.

Herling-Grudziński, though at some point his voice will shake. Yes – as will respond with their own story and with their own choices Adolf Popławski and Grażyna Lipińska. In every labor camp – and in every, even the most extreme situation – you can meet people who will confirm this ‘yes’¹⁶. The decisive value of human life is truth and freedom, integrally joined together. A man existing in extreme conditions possessed a high self-awareness of the drama of his situation and his own drama, his deeds “(gr. drama = act, deed). It meant that the human person exists, but at the same time, he becomes himself. As a result, a conviction appeared that human existence is dramatic in its nature, that is, still unresolved, problematic. The fundamental task that arose at that moment was to base this dynamism on Strength, Values, and perhaps above all, the Person who could be entrusted with one’s exit and passage – exodus and Passover. In Christian thought this question, and at the same time the heart of human drama and its definitive meaning, is readable through the person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, it can be said that from the moment of the Incarnation event, “human drama has become the drama of God himself.”¹⁷ The drama category first and foremost depicts the encounter of divine and human freedom in the history of salvation¹⁸. The area of camp reality in this context became a peculiar and absolutely unconquerable barrier for “the possibility of a paschal transformation of suffering from within”¹⁹ – Passover. Interiorized. Christianity made it possible to see the unique presence of Christ in this human drama. “Christ... through his own redeeming suffering, is present within every human suffering, and he can inside it act with the power of his Spirit of Truth, the Spirit of the Consolator.”²⁰ This signifies a salvific reality regarded as an immeasurable, unlimited blessing from God. This in turn is the essence of the liturgy, revealing theophany, manifestation of God²¹.

The action of the Spirit of the Paraclete (consolator) was revealed in the basic manifestation of human trust, prayer. It was an act of man, which took

¹⁶ I. Sławińska, *My i Oni w polskiej literaturze lagrowej*, “Ethos” 5(1992)1, 196.

¹⁷ W. Hryniewicz, *Bóg ludzkiego dramatu – Bóg nadziei. Rozważania chrystologiczno-eschatologiczne*, “Znak” 44(1992)2, 40.

¹⁸ *Oikonomia* is a theological category defining the action of God in the human home (*oikos*) and in the whole earth inhabited by him (*oikoumene*). In this action man and his personal drama of misery and confusion are involved. In this way the reality of the drama is created, that can be called “theodrama.” Cf. H. Urs von Balthasar, *Theodramatik*, 4 vol., Einsiedeln 1972-1983.

¹⁹ W. Hryniewicz, *Pascha Chrystusa w dziejach człowieka i wszechświata*, Lublin 1991, 291.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 290.

²¹ Cf. B. Nadolski, *Słowo Boże i sakramenty święte*, in: *Katechizm Kościoła Katolickiego. Wprowadzenie*, M. Rusecki, M. Pudełko (ed.), Lublin 1995, 150f.

place in situations of sudden and radical threat to his life²², it was also an initiation of hope in situations of a threat to existence, despair and inertia of the will. Significant is the mention of prayer, which along with singing allowed us to overcome the shock of deportation and allowed us to keep the distance from the reality of enslavement. "The mood is terrible. Everyone is silent with their heads down, and it is only this song that has made them raise their heads proudly upwards: O Lord, who are in the sky, take out a just hand, from the Vistula, Nemen, Warta, Bug, we are calling You today for the Polish roof and Polish weapons. This supplicatory song has a consoling function. It makes us believe that the Polish roof awaits us, that there is a weapon intended for our hands. The strength flowing from the national community is still within us. Poles are always closer to each other in misfortune and poverty than in normal life"²³.

Finally, the prayer allowed us to experience, so far as one can say, not so much the state of religious ecstasy, but rather the discovery of the will to act and fight – the realization of signs of trust²⁴. Camp literature includes the testimony of various prayers as such signs²⁵. Prayers created in various circumstances of life confirm not only to the phenomenon of prayer, its universality, but also its, so to say, obligatory character. It is concisely mentioned in the memoirs of M. Byrska, who quotes her mother's recommendation: "Do not forget that God watches over you and you have to ask Him for protection."²⁶ What is significant here is the expression "you have to" that conceals the normative element. Such interpretation is confirmed by the memories themselves, in which prayer is regarded as an act of obligation, carried out despite difficulties, obstacles or even persecutions²⁷. The most significant act of trusting God in the conditions

²² Cf. F. Kułacz, "Charaktery mieliśmy jak zwierzęta" in: *Wspomnienia Sybiraków*, J. Przewłocki (ed.), Warszawa 1990, 13.

²³ J. Markiewicz, "Sud'ba, bratok" in: *Wspomnienia Sybiraków*, vol. 4, J. Przewłocki (ed.), Warszawa 1991, 140f.

²⁴ Cf. G. Lipińska, op. cit., 126.

²⁵ See, for example, a fragment of the text of the litany prayer: "(...) In danger, in depression, in doubt, in need, in temptation, in sickness – we beg, support us, Lord! Give our daily bread to us, Lord! Give us strength of courage and perseverance, Your grace and mercy, Hope in You, Your patience, give it to us!" *Nabożeństwo za Polskę. Litania Wojenna za Ojczyznę*, in: *Z teki*, op. cit., 13.

²⁶ M. Byrska, *Ucieczka z zesłania*, Lublin 1987, 23.

²⁷ Cf. A. Popławski, *12 lat lagru*, Paris 1987, 88-89. The text of the prayer includes, among others the following words: "O God's heroes and God's martyrs, God of all suffering, tormenting in severe captivity, give us strength to survive, moral, spiritual and physical, so that we do not break down, do not succumb, do not go astray and that we always act as it should be." *Ibid.*, 88.

of human existence was the Eucharistic sacrifice. In spite of extremely inconvenient, often impossible conditions, Holy Mass was held in almost every stage of the lagerisation process²⁸. Of course, especially many records refer to holy masses held in the final period of deportations, during the departure of Poland from the territory of the Soviet Union. The celebrations of the Eucharist were then often associated with the wider pastoral ministry of the priests or field bishop J. Gawlina. He himself wrote in his notes: "The first service at the Yangtaha celebrated in the open air immediately caught my heart. The generals have always been a good example. The soldier sang with all his soul, received sermons with open heart, and received the holy sacraments. I have given the Sacrament of Confirmation to almost 5,500 soldiers within ten weeks, from the borders of Turkmenistan to the borders of China."²⁹ This "mass" participation in the Eucharist must be discerned. It is confirmed by the priests' memoirs: "Behind the Poles, the Orthodox also queue up for the sacrament of confession." I stood up and explained to them that I was a Catholic priest that I had no right to confess Orthodox Christians. Then they with great regret, almost crying, reacted: "There's no difference, there is one God – they will also confess us..." Holy Mass in such an unholy place (*Bezbożnik*). It would seem a paradox, but is a reality³⁰. A special place in the memory of priests recalling their memories of masses celebrated for the first time for a long time³¹ and masses celebrated on Christmas night ("Midnight Masses")³². These last ones seem to be a kind of synthesis of discovering God's presence in history and humanity and discovering the necessary character of believing in this presence. The existential context emphasized the dimension of the liturgical anamnesis understood as a revision and realization of the entire history of salvation³³. "Immediately after these lofty moments, I started a Midnight Mass at the same Christmas Eve table." The whole decoration of the altar on the bunk consisted of two candles, and the only canonicals available and was a modest stole. It was without a doubt the most intense moment in our prison life. It is difficult to describe the experiences and

²⁸ Cf. J. Hermanowicz, *Chiny – Sybir – Moskwa. Wspomnienia misjonarza z łagrów sowieckich*, London 1966, 160, M. Łęczycka, *Zsyłka. Lata 1940-1946 w Kazachstanie*, Wrocław 1989, 140-145.

²⁹ J. Gawlina, *Zamiast*, VIII.

³⁰ R. Grabski, *Gdyby nie Opatrzność Boża...* Paris 1985, 38. *Bezbożnik* is also the name of the village. See also the account of priest Bohatkiewicz; *ibid.*, 96.

³¹ Cf. *ibid.*, 30.

³² Cf. *ibid.*, 96.

³³ Cf. B. Nadolski, *Liturgika*, vol. 4, Poznań 1992, 15.

emotions of that day. A joyful “Gloria in excelsis Deo” poured a new grace into the hearts as always, provided that people would accept the second part of the angel’s greetings of ‘good will.’ We do not miss this will today”³⁴.

An analytical look at the content of the recorded experiences and the texts of the prayers themselves allow to see the structural elements of the authentic act of celebrating the Paschal mystery, a source of hope and vital force. The elements of the celebration of the liturgy, especially the Eucharist, in the dimension of the de-realization of the world and the de-humanization of the human being, constituted the implementation – by virtue of Christ – irreplaceable spiritual values. By virtue of these values the man in the labor camps was able to free himself from the existence purposely reduced to biologism, turpism and nihilism. Liberation was inspired with the spirit of the Passover of Christ. However, it should be remembered that not only the aesthetic dimension was significant here, but a concrete ethical foundation – the discovery of a new dimension of humanity in Christ free from fear and hatred³⁵. Through the experience of the liturgy, the man in the camps – through absolute and unconditional trust in God – tried to trust in humanity represented by himself.

³⁴ S. Czapiewski, *Przez zakratowane okienka. Wspomnienia syberyjskie (dokończenie)*, “Przegląd Powszechny” 106:1989 no. 12 p. 388. See also the poem of Z. Broncel: “Christ came down to hell, the hand of the priest and the Word of the Savior of the heavens is chasing him – and in his hands the body and blood of the Lord – Kyrie and Gloria, the Gospel and Sanctus, Elevation and Holy Communion... The holy wafer visited the secondary catacombs. (...) “Holy God” – these words – in a subdued way – hover in the sky, Trust in God proclaim, ask for perseverance, pity, for salvation, Faith stops the rivers, mountains from the places it moves, It will ask for strength, freedom, family unity, return to homes. Because your will is born of your faith, by the will of yours a miracle will be born. And what today is considered a delusional dream turns into a deed of life.” Z. Broncel, *Msza święta w baraku*, in: *Z teki*, op. cit., 16.

³⁵ Cf. W. Hryniewicz, *Nasza Pascha z Chrystusem*, Lublin 1987, 374.

Imitating Christ – A Catechetical Idea*

“It is not necessary (...) to search for a “new program”. The program already exists: the same as always contained in the Gospel and living Tradition. It is in fact focused on Christ Himself, whom we are to meet, love and imitate in order to live a Trinitarian life and change history with Him until fullness in the heavenly Jerusalem is reached. The program does not change despite the passage of time or the evolution of cultures. However, it takes into account both the epoch and culture so that a real dialogue and agreement can begin.”¹ This is the way John Paul II describes the tasks of the ministry of the word, even more broadly, of the entire evangelization in the new millennium of the Christian era. The program is focused on Christ, and also through Christ, it will penetrate catechesis. The issue of Christocentric catechesis demands deepening, as it is strongly emphasized in the catechetical documents. In the introduction to this study, I would like to refer, for example, to two of them that are most representative: the *Catechesi tradendae*, which sets new routes for catechesis, and the Polish Catechetical Directory, which outlines the concept of Polish catechesis.

In the exhortation *Catechesi tradendae*, John Paul II notes that the subject of catechesis is the mystery of Christ: “To catechize means, in a way, to lead someone to examine this mystery in all its aspects.”² Therefore, catechesis transmits the teachings of only Christ³. This teaching is inseparably connected with the saving works of Jesus.⁴ The general purpose of catechesis is also Christocentric, because it consists in “bringing someone not only to meet with Jesus, but to unite and even deepen intimacy with Him.”⁵ In this

* STV 40(2002)2.

¹ John Paul II, *Novo millennio ineunte*, 29.

² John Paul II, *Catechesi tradendae*, 5. Further abbreviation CT.

³ CT 6.

⁴ CT 9.

⁵ CT 5.

way, Christocentrism is defined in the document at two levels: objective and subjective⁶.

The newly issued Polish Catechetical Directory confirms this double dimensionality of Christocentrism, namely both its subjective and objective relation. The fact that the “ultimate goal of catechesis, which is subordinated to all the rest, is not only to meet Jesus, but also to unite and even deepen intimacy with Him” is implied by theocentricism, ecclesiocentrism and Christian personalism of catechesis⁷. The other part of the documents discusses catechesis as the proclamation of Christ in the Church.

Christocentrism is here included in all the richness of the message and work of Christ. Jesus Christ is the driving force of history. Also, He is the One who acts in catechesis⁸. At the same time, the Directory formulates a very important principle: Christocentrism does not mean that the Person of Christ is always the starting point of catechesis; however, catechesis should always lead to Christ. Not only does Christocentrism express the principle of fidelity to God who fully embraced Himself in Christ, but also to man⁹, “because it allows faith to join life and affirms the existential dimension, because thanks to Christ, one can actually know who a man is and what his or her destiny is.”¹⁰

Christocentric catechesis can be described as catechesis of Christ and catechesis with Christ. This means that it can represent two types of Christ’s preaching: biblical and doctrinal catechesis. Obviously, the biblical and theological dimension permeate, but it is necessary to show an idea that integrates both levels. It seems that such integration can take place within the framework of the already known concept of imitating Christ.

It is important to mention the catechetical dimension of the call to imitate Christ when compared to what Biblical theology and Christology have to say about this idea. In other words, the starting point for considerations is to analyze the term imitate and its place in the biblical tradition, as well as the correct approach to Christology. Thus, this article will discuss the problem

⁶ R. Murawski, *Katecheza jako głoszenie Chrystusa*, AK 129 (1997), 68-69. Cf. also: J. Bagrowicz, *Chrystocentryzm eklezjalny w katechezie*, in: *Jezus Chrystus – centrum katechizacji*, S. Kulpaczyński (ed.), Lublin 2000, 44.

⁷ Conference of the Polish Episcopate, *Catechetical Directory of the Catholic Church in Poland*, Warsaw 2001, 21. Further abbreviation PDK.

⁸ PDK 73. It is worth emphasizing and analyzing the link between the PDK point and the concept of Christocentrism of catechesis presented by R. Murowski in the quoted article *Katecheza jako głoszenie Chrystusa*.

⁹ The principle of fidelity to God and man is discussed in PDK 31.

¹⁰ PDK73.

of imitating God and the whole Christ as well as the existential relationship between the disciple and Christ so that the implications of the idea of imitating Christ can be shown – as conclusions – through the prism of the specific tasks of catechesis.

An Idea to Imitate God

According to J. Kudasiewicz, the main problems of the old-test theology to imitate God is the lack of technical terms referring to both imitation and the fact that understanding God in the Old Testament as Saint excludes imitation of Him by people.¹¹ The idea of imitation was expressed in the Old Testament by such terms like path, wandering, stepping.¹² The term to go for, however, referred both to following God and to idolatry, as well as to the relationship between the disciple – the servant and the teacher¹³. To follow God meant to show Him your submissiveness, attachment and obedience¹⁴, serve Yahweh¹⁵, follow the path set by His commandments.

The Old Testament uses the idea of imitating God in the context of the path, hence the notorious references to the time of Israel's journey through the desert. God was close to His people, and thus imitating Him, or following Him, was considered natural. In the prophets' books, the metaphor of God as the Betrothed and Shepherd often refers to this thread of the history of salvation. When recalling the image of God – Shepherd, the Old Testament reaches a very ancient expression to go before God¹⁶. The problem that is worth considering regards God's holiness. In the Hebrew Bible, the holiness of God is, on the one hand, a separation of God from all impurity¹⁷, while on the other hand, it connects His sublimity with the proximity of the world.

In this way, by analogy, holiness becomes *a trait of creatures: people, places and things*, which belong to God, in which God reveals Himself and which are

¹¹ J. Kudasiewicz, *Poznawanie Boga Ojca*, vol. 1, Kielce 2000, 325-326.

¹² *Ibid.*, 327.

¹³ X. Leon-Dufour, *Słownik Nowego Testamentu*, Poznań 1998, 416.

¹⁴ J. Kudasiewicz, *Naśladowanie Chrystusa*, in: *Słownik teologiczny*, A Zuberbier (ed.), Katowice 1998, 325.

¹⁵ C. Augrain, *Naśladować*, w: *Słownik teologii biblijnej*, X. Leon – Dufour (ed.), Poznań-Warsaw 1985, 527.

¹⁶ J. Kudasiewicz, *Poznawanie...*, op. cit., 326-332.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 333.

devoted to God. “This holiness flowing from God is also a call – a call to holiness, expressed both in the worship of God and in moral behavior: in things that make us approach God.”¹⁸ Perhaps, it would be better to speak about the sanctification of creatures in this case, thanks to the closeness of God who is the only source of holiness.¹⁹

An Idea to Imitate the Whole Christ

Jesus’ call to imitate is one of the ways of indirect Christology. Jesus, like many other teachers in Israel at the time, gathers disciples around Him. There is, however, too much difference between the fixed student-teacher scheme and the community that Jesus initiates. These are people that come to Him and ask to join the circle of disciples. Nevertheless, it is Jesus who chooses whom He wants.²⁰ Jesus’ disciples are not to become teachers after a time – they will always remain the disciples of the one Teacher-Christ. Jesus’ disciples create a community that shares the fate of both good and bad destiny. Whoever consents to imitating Christ must leave everything and risk their life.²¹ To imitate Christ means to become His disciple and follow Him. Based on the Old Test’s idea of the path, as an expression of imitation of God, Jesus’ declaration should be understood as: He is the Path. Saint Paul will add that those who follow Him walk in Him (Colossians 2, 6, Flp 3, 12).²²

We come to a very important moment for reflections on imitating Christ. He appears as the Path, and so the idea of imitation is at the same time strongly connected with the revelation of Christ. The revelation as Who? We would respond immediately – as God and as a human being. This is the only correct answer. What does it mean for this issue in question? Just as in the case of the holiness of God, a question arises, namely, what does it mean to imitate Christ as God? Apparently, such a separation of the issue is not entirely justified, though. The Christian exodus, stepping onto the Path, which is Christ, involves imitating the whole Christ, following Him into the Divine realm. When considering

¹⁸ M. Wojciechowski, *Jezus jako Święty w pismach Nowego Testamentu*, “Rozprawy i studia biblijne”, vol. 2, Warsaw 1996, 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

²⁰ K. Romaniuk, *O naśladowaniu Jezusa (Mt 8:18-22; Lk 9:57-60)*, “Collectanea Theologica” 1 (1990), 11.

²¹ W. Kasper, *Bóg Jezusa Chrystusa*, Wrocław 1996, 215.

²² J. Kudasiewicz, *Naśladowanie...*, op. cit., 325-326.

Jesus only as a human pattern, and not being interested in His divine existence, diminishes the idea of imitation.²³

Obviously, Christ is a model in the idea of imitation, which cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, He is the model first, as it is a measure of being for man, and from this follows the example of human life in which man can seek attitudes and types of behavior to put on Christ (Rom 13:14).²⁴ To imitate Christ – God and man – means to enter onto His path and let Him lead us. Just like God, He opens the path to us. By imitating Him, we approach the community of God.²⁵ That is why, Saint Gregory of Nyssa will not hesitate to say that Christianity is the imitation of the divine nature.²⁶

The Existential Relationship of Disciples with Christ in the Idea of Imitation

The above remarks on the necessity and the essence of imitating the whole Christ show the necessity of a summary that directly concerns human existence. Such an attempt was made by H.U. von Balthasar. When reflecting on who a Christian is, he noticed that the “Christian’s being lasts as long as they maintain a connection with the nature of Christ; they die when the Christian loses this relationship.”²⁷

In other words, the relationship with Christ that underlies the idea of imitation is a prerequisite for being a Christian. This existence of a Christian, which can be described as the intensity of imitation, contains three stages of the path²⁸:

- First, it is a call to give witness. To give witness is to go with Jesus.
- However, Jesus calls to go not only with Him, but also follow Him.

The follower is admitted into the Master’s inner world on this path and enters into a spiritual relationship with Him.

– But this is not the end. For to be with Christ, by entering the circle of the Paschal Mystery, they can become a being in Christ.

²³ J. Ratzinger, *Nowa pieśń dla Pana*, Kraków 1999, 16

²⁴ S. Góralczyk, *Jezus Chrystus normą moralności chrześcijańskiej*, “Communio” 2(1997), 111; cf. also J. Kudasiewicz, *Naśladowanie...*, op. cit., 326.

²⁵ J. Ratzinger, op. cit., 35.

²⁶ Grzegorz z Nyssy, *Co znaczy być chrześcijaninem*, 19, w: Grzegorz z Nyssy, *O naśladowaniu Boga. Pisma ascetyczne*, ed. J. Naurnowicz, “Biblioteka Ojców Kościoła”, vol. 15, Kraków 2001, 49.

²⁷ H. U. von Balthasar, *Kim jest chrześcijanin*, “Problemy teologiczne” vol. 6, Kraków 1999, 47.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 48-49.

Christ's call to imitate is directed both to disciples and all believers. In Luke's description, the addressees of this call are not only disciples, but also all people: the imitation of Christ thus covers all humanity of all times.²⁹ In contrast, as described by Matthew and Mark, it is the disciples who are the special addressees of this call. Jesus calls them to follow Him, and this means staying in closeness with Him, being with Him, accepting Him the way He is.³⁰ The call to imitate is presented in a gradual fashion. It is characterized by certain pedagogy. First, Christ calls to take the initial steps to enter the sphere of intimacy, sharing the fate with Him. When the disciples want to share this fate as a glorious fate, as a share in His triumph, Jesus calls for renunciation and shows that this closeness actually means carrying the cross. They learn about the necessity of sacrifice after the first steps. The value and necessity of sacrifice on the path of imitating Christ will reveal His cross and His Passion.³¹

In the Gospel of John and the texts of Paul, which refer to the discussed idea, imitating Christ after the resurrection means to be obedient like Christ in the Paschal Mystery. It also means not so much to follow Him, but to be in Him.³²

And what then is the specificity of the one who is the follower of Christ? The followers are supposed to be not spectators but companions on the Jesus' path and so they are to take part in His existence. The companions become a community of disciples, and their loyalty to Jesus is not only human attachment, but above all faith. On the other hand, it implies obedience up to the final consequences.³³ Imitation means not only to follow the example. Reducing the idea of imitating Christ only to the moral sphere would be a serious mistake. The imitation of Christ has deep Christological roots, which result in moral consequences. It is not man who sets a certain model of perfection, based on Jesus' preliminary instructions. It is Him, the Way, who is the creator of the whole Path.³⁴ To imitate Jesus is to be ready for self-denial and the cross, submit to the authority of the Kingdom of God, which is only in Jesus

²⁹ F. Grygiewicz, *Ewangelia według św. Łukasza. Wstęp – przekład z oryginału – komentarz*, w: *Pismo Święte Nowego Testamentu*, ed. E. Dąbrowski, F. Grygiewicz, vol. 3, 3, Poznań-Warszawa 1974, 194.

³⁰ C.M. Martini, *Być z Jezusem*, Kraków 1997, 76.

³¹ C. Augrain, *Naśladować*, op. cit., 527-528.

³² J. Kudasiewicz, *Naśladowanie...*, op. cit., 325-326; X. Leon-Dufour, *Słownik Nowego Testamentu*, op. cit., 417.

³³ H.U. von Balthasar, op. cit., 51-52.

³⁴ J. Ratzinger, op. cit., 34-35.

and claims the right to every man,³⁵ and at the same time to the entire life of every human being.³⁶

Catechetical Implications of the Idea to Imitate Christ

Considerations on following Christ were to lead to catechetical conclusions. It seems that this idea is able to enrich reflections on the fulfillment of specific tasks of catechesis described in the Church documents³⁷.

In the development of faith, the idea of imitating Christ is associated with a better understanding and adherence to Christ, God and man. When properly understood, the considerations on the subject of who Christ is and who we consider the Son of Man are not to delve into insignificant or irrelevant problems, but they touch the very foundations of our human existence

The idea of imitating Christ also implies adherence to Christ through the liturgy. To be in Christ means to immerse yourself in His Paschal Mystery which He realizes in the liturgy of the Church.³⁸ Thanks to the liturgy, the idea of imitation does not remain yesterday, but it becomes today that goes back to tomorrow and all eternity. Imitating Christ and the liturgy both need each other. In the moral formation, the correctly understood idea of imitating Christ protects us from the naturalistic understanding of moral life and gives it an eschatological dimension. For to imitate Jesus is to find in Him the final criterion and the concrete norm, the pattern and the gate of eternity. Teaching prayers is strongly related to what was emphasized in the catechesis of Christ undertaken in the process of educating His disciples. To make it more precise, Christ allowed His disciples moments of familiarity to experience closeness with the Father in prayers. Once again, it is worth repeating that “the prayer is the center of Jesus, so the participation in His prayer becomes a precondition to both know and understand Jesus.”³⁹

By calling for imitation, Jesus simultaneously gathers His followers in the Church. In this way, imitating Christ is to be a community of followers. Since

³⁵ K. Rahner, H. Vorgrimler, *Mały słownik teologiczny*, Warsaw 1987, col. 261.

³⁶ Cf. S. Góralczyk, art. cit., l 08.

³⁷ Congregation for the Clergy, *Dyrektorium ogólne o katechizacji*, Rome 1997, n. 85-86; PDK 24-29.

³⁸ KKK 1085.

³⁹ J. Ratzinger, *Tajemnica Jezusa Chrystusa*, Kielce 1994, 23.

the neighbor is the mirror of Christ,⁴⁰ to imitate Him means to build ties with brothers and to actively show neighbor's love. Finally, imitating Christ introduces us to His mission. As noted above, the first layer of His follower's existence, the first stage of His path involves being a witness. On this witness, the community of being with Christ and staying in Christ is built.

Therefore, does imitating Christ mean to speak constantly of Him? Christocentrism is not a methodological principle, but a great inspiration for catechesis.⁴¹ To imitate Christ means to be faithful to Christ and to serve both truth and life. Christ in such catechesis will always be the starting point although He may even remain unrecognized on the way for some time⁴². The idea to imitate Christ is a sort of summarizing what is important for the Christocentrism of catechesis.

We can find some elements of Christ's catechesis and catechesis with Christ in it. This idea fully shows what it means that Christ is the Path. This path is special for every person and catechesis must apply to it. Following this path, some will recognize the features of Christ and can listen to Him and speak to Him directly; while others, in a dialogue with the Stranger, go toward their Emmaus to recognize Him when breaking Bread.

⁴⁰ S. Góralczyk, art. cit., 113.

⁴¹ PDK 73.

⁴² R. Murawski, art. cit., 71- 72.

The Problem of Democracy against the Background of the Theory of Origin and Authority in the Social Doctrine of the Church Fathers and St. Thomas Aquinas*

Introduction

In order to understand the concept of origin and authority as well as the problem of democracy in a tradition that took shape in Antiquity and the Christian Middle Ages, becoming a permanent part of the general social doctrine of the Church, one should refer to the Holy Bible and works of the main representatives of the theological and philosophical thought of Christianity, namely, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. One should also refer to the characteristics of political systems made by Aristotle in *Politics*.

At the same time, it is essential to understand the reasoning contained in the abovementioned sources without imposing any foreign conceptual categories that, despite being broadly described by contemporary philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, etc., turn out to be insufficient for expressing the thinking contained in the works of previous eras.

Typically, a serious obstacle in noticing the occurrence of certain issues, let alone their correct analysis, is the lack of knowledge of the concepts and methods of philosophy and theology that were used in the Christian Antiquity and later in the Middle Ages. Hence, historians are missing the proper sense of many statements that testify to the existence of at least theoretical problems that are nowadays commonly perceived as the discovery of modern thinkers. This obviously results in an incomplete and often thoroughly misconstrued assessment of the reasons followed by secular rulers and high officials of the

* STV 43(2005)2.

Church, when they engaged in political disputes of their time, to recall the most well-known examples: the dispute between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry IV and the conflict between King Bolesław the Bold and Bishop Stanisław of Szczepanów that ended tragically, tension between the Church and the nation and secular authority in England after being conquered by William, forcing John the Lackland to issue *The Great Charter of the Liberties* (1215).

This article aims primarily at showing the theoretical background of decisions as well as political and social activities undertaken in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Although it was not widely known in those days, it pervaded into the culture in which the Christian religion was ubiquitous, and no-one dared to openly question its position. From this perspective, it can be said that the appearance of two great philosophical and theological syntheses of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas was not as much an efficient cause as a result and evidence of the changes in culture that Christianity made in the human mind. This, however, does not mean that the explicit denunciation of certain theses does not shape the views of future generations. On the contrary, it seems that modern political thinking has gained some originality, emancipating itself from the general context of classical philosophy and Christian theology. Let us refer to the abovementioned sources without touching on the issues of this emancipation, which, according to the author, contributed to the detachment of theory and political practice from its natural goal, which is the good of human society, without excluding anyone.

The Issue of Authority in the Old and New Testament

The Old Testament emphasizes that all authority originates from God. According to the descriptions of the Old Testament contained in historical books, rulers of the chosen people are subject to the special protection of God (e.g. the throne of David). Here, we can also find cases of God's precepts directed to pagan rulers (Jonah in Nineveh; see J 1:1-2.3:1-10). At the same time, the history of the chosen people described in the Old Testament shows that legitimate authority is not limited in its form to royalty; these descriptions also include Patriarchs and Judges¹.

A significant addition to the understanding of the essence of authority can be found in the New Testament, where it is generally understood as ministry (Mt 10:24-28, Mk 10:41-45, Lk 22:25ff). As something natural, inscribed in created

¹ Cz. Strzeszewski, *Katolicka nauka społeczna*, Lublin 1994, 175.

reality, and considering that God, the Creator exercises providential rule over its creation, authority does not mean a voluntary activity, but takes into account the well-being of all fellow men. Furthermore, Christ is shown as a King exercising authority, yet in a different way than the rulers of this world, a King who, due to his human nature, is a humble and submissive subject. He accepts political power, which is manifested by obedience to state laws, for example in the doctrine of rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar's (Mt 22:15-21)². Saint Paul describes it even clearer in the following words: "Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be commended. For the one in authority is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do not bear the sword for no reason. They are God's servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, who give their full time to governing. Give to everyone what you owe them: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honour, then honour." (Rom 13:1-7).

This text does not serve as an acceptance of any particular authority that may be unjust, but as a reference to the very essence of social authority. It assumes that all authority comes from God, the Creator and is inscribed in the plans of Providence and the rule of God over the world, which is overridden by political authority that normalizes social life. As a result of this reality, authority as such demands respect in one's conscience. The last sentences of the cited text point to the objective of authority that is justice which intends to give each what he/she deserves. It is therefore considered in the perspective of faith and morality and it is generally shown as a moral reality that reevaluates itself on the social level³.

It seems that neither the Old Testament nor the New Testament covered the issue of democracy. However, the general principles of authority and the interpretation of its origin contained therein obviously refer also to this particular form of authority.

² Ibid., 180.

³ Cf. M. Krapiec, *O ludzka polityke*, Warsaw 1996, 110-115.

The Problem of Authority among the Church Fathers

The primacy of justice and the common good when exercising authority was strongly emphasized by some of the Church Fathers. An example here can be the attitude of Saint John Chrysostom (347-407), who ordered the church door be locked before Empress Eudoxia after she had appropriated a vineyard that belonged to a widow. On the other hand, Saint Gregory the Great (Pope Gregory I) (540-604) punished himself for failing to take care of his subjects after a beggar was found dead in Rome that was under his authority.

The problem of authority was also the subject of Saint Augustine's (354-430) scientific research, becoming one of the central issues of his social philosophy⁴. Augustine was by no means a supporter of democracy and probably never even compared various system types. Nonetheless, he recognized the social dimension of human functioning and therefore he demanded that all Christians engage in the activities of state institutions that served the community⁵. The Bishop of Hippo maintains the classic view that the source of this reality, that is authority, is God and that the authority itself is good as it is primarily the domain of God⁶.

It goes without saying that God has no faults, being the Fullness of Good, and he exercises authority over his creation. He also allows some creatures to participate in the rule. In the works of Saint Augustine, men who have been created in the image and likeness of the Creator and are rational subjects endowed with freedom of choice and appear as members of God's rule over the world (cf. Gen 1:26ff). This perspective shows that every human being has their own particular dignity. If one used it to interpret the social thought of the Bishop of Hippo and the whole Christian tradition, it would have to be concluded that in some way it makes room for the wide participation of citizens in public life, despite the fact that in some historical conditions of Christian antiquity and the Middle Ages, there were no democracies. It seems that Augustine's words should be understood in the following spirit: "(...) we say that they [ed. – the

⁴ They are briefly discussed by Cz. Strzeszewski, *Katolicka nauka społeczna*, op. cit., pp. 185-186 and id., *Filozofia społeczna A.*, in: *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 1, Lublin 2000, 409-410; and W. Kornatowski, *Introduction*, IV, in: Saint Augustine, *O państwie Bożym*, Warsaw 1977. More on the social philosophy of Saint Augustine: E. Gilson, *Wprowadzenie do filozofii św. Augustyna*, Warsaw 1953, 227-244; W. Kornatowski, *Spółeczno-polityczna myśl św. Augustyna*, Warsaw 1965.

⁵ *De civitate Dei*, XIX, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 19.

rulers] are happy if they rule justly; if they are not lifted up amid the praises (...), but remember that they are men; if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by using it for the greatest possible extension of His worship; if they fear, love, worship God; if more than their own they love that kingdom in which they are not afraid to have partners.”⁷

Subjects are not treated as slaves but as “partners” in the political structure, and the ruler is equal to them in humanity, having specific authority.

St. Augustine and the other Church Fathers did not deal directly with the problem of choosing the most appropriate system, hence separate considerations of the subjects’ participation in the rule over the state did not appear in their works even theoretically. St. Augustine was interested in the reasons for the existence of authority as such. Thus, on the one hand, he pointed to God as the one to whom authority belongs in an absolute way and who establishes every other authority, and on the other hand he indicated the objective of all authorities, that is the objective good.

For human societies, order and peace are so good and objective allowing all members of the state community to grow in general prosperity, while in the Christian perspective, justice itself is not enough to achieve these goods. There is a need to implement the rules of social conduct resulting from the commandment to love God and one’s neighbour. State authority is supposed to take care of its subjects, it is a social service, its orders should originate “not from a love of power, but from a sense of the duty they owe to others — not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.” Those who are the object of care should be obedient, because the initiation of quarrels and rebellion leads to anarchy, in which the good of the whole community is lost⁸.

As can be seen, Saint Augustine does not perceive authority as subordinating the good of subjects to the state interest, or the emperor as an absolute in which the state interest is realized. The ruler is understood as the servant of all, and privileges resulting from the rule are objectively justified in social service, in the service of the common good. The ruler is also a member of the directed community, he is also a man and he has no right as a man to rise above others.

While formulating the principles of authority, the Bishop of Hippo did not describe a utopian place that does not exist, but pointed to the foundation of political institutions. He knew perfectly well that real forms of rule and people standing behind them do not always fulfil their duties, abusing privileges. He

⁷ Ibid., V, 24.

⁸ Ibid., XIX, 14; cf. *ibid.*, XIX, 15.16 and *Confessiones*, III, 7, 13.

also drew attention to unjust state laws, which require officials to perform unlawful acts⁹. Despite all reservations, guided by the principle of a greater good, that is social peace, he urged all people to subordinate to legal authority, even if it is not the best, patiently enduring its requirements as a merit for the Kingdom of God¹⁰. Patience cannot explain tolerance for what opposes a true religion, beguiling people into ungodliness and wickedness. Authority, originating from God, even authority assigned to the objectives of the “earthly state,” should lead subjects to God through the establishment of fair rights and building social peace. If, however, the opening leads away from obedience to God, it opposes the very essence of authority and it should inevitably face resistance of Christians. Today, that resistance, as pointed out by Augustine, would be called passive resistance. It does not call for an armed uprising, but rather for abandonment of wrong laws and making peaceful efforts to change them. It also brings forward martyrs who, with their radical testimonies for the Christian religion, “confessing, professing, and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness, put to shame the law by which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation.”¹¹

The Issue of Authority from the Perspective of Saint Thomas Aquinas

The aforementioned views of Saint Augustine gained a permanent place in the social doctrine of the Church and the philosophy imbued with Christian spirit, similarly to the theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) which is the most important achievement and a special testimony to the political thought of the Middle Ages¹². The Doctor of the Church, also known as Doctor Angelicus, supplemented the basis of this doctrine with concepts derived from the texts

⁹ In *De civitate Dei*, XIX, 6 Augustine gives an example of the senselessness and wickedness of torture provided for by law in order to verify testimonies. He points out that torture is applied even in the case of those people who were not ascertained to commit a crime, assuming that they will admit guilt as a result of the experienced pain. Meanwhile, it is often the case that innocent men are tortured and make false confessions to free themselves from pain, and stronger culprits can at times avoid a punishment because they endure the torture without confessing.

¹⁰ *De civitate Dei*, V, 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 19; cf. *ibid.*, XIX, 17 and II, 19. Cf. Cz. Strzeszewski, *op. cit.*, 185f.

¹² An excellent and accessible elaboration of the discussed issues can be found in E. Gilson, *Tomizm*, Warsaw 1998, 350-380. See also the general historical and multifaceted description of the problem of authority in M. Gogacz, *Mądrość buduje państwo, Niepokalanów* 1993, 181-191.

of Aristotle of Stagira (384-322). It was a new element fitting a thousand-year-old Christian tradition, as people in earlier centuries probably did not trust the philosopher's thoughts, regardless of whether he explained the matters of God or humans. Therefore, his social theory was not used.

The works of the Stagirite, especially the *Politics*, introduced the concept of a tri-division of all possible state systems, along with the notions of republic and democracy into the intellectual culture of the Middle Ages. Aristotle divided political systems into those which were ruled by a unit (1); those with a small group of rulers, for example several people (2); and those ruled by the general public (3). Each of the mentioned types can take a just form the one in which the authority cares for the common good of its subjects, or are a twisted form in which the authority cares only for its own private interest. If an individual rules, we have either monarchy or tyranny; if a small group rules: aristocracy or oligarchy; if the general public rules: republic (*politeia*) or democracy¹³.

The word "democracy" in the terminology of Aristotle, and later Saint Thomas, means a degraded system. Doctor Angelicus adds that this is also a form of tyranny, in which the poor majority oppress the rich minority, staying in a symbiotic relationship. Democracy viewed in this light has more similarities with what we observed in the so-called "real socialism" than with what we want to call a democratic system. In the terminology of Aristotle and Thomas, just rule, which is nowadays associated with the notion of true democracy that cares for the common good of all citizens, not only the ruling class, is called "politeia" or "republic" ("Commonwealth")¹⁴. In the 20th century, Pius XII pointed to this form of authority, defining it as a democracy of self-consciousness and aspirations of a nation whose members are aware of their national identity, their rights and duties and their dignity as human beings. He opposed such a democracy with the so-called "mass democracy" which is characterized by a lack of awareness of the purpose and therefore it is susceptible to all kinds of manipulations¹⁵.

Therefore, as can be seen, the republican system or the system of healthy democracy requires a high level of awareness of all citizens, otherwise it turns into a tyranny of the majority. Saint Thomas was aware of this fact and that is why he chose monarchy as the best and least risky system. Even then, when it turns into tyranny, an individual tyrant is unable to harm more of his subjects than the leading group or majority of the society. In addition, only a few

¹³ Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 4.5.

¹⁴ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *De regno ad regem Cypri*, I, 1-2.

¹⁵ AAS 37 (1945), 10-23.

individuals, as stated by Aquinas, are characterized by real virtue, so it is difficult to expect a group of people to keep a high moral level and rule for the good of the whole community¹⁶.

St. Thomas knew the history of the Jewish nation, Greece, Rome and the history of Christianity, and understood that specific social factors determine the formation of such a system in a given time and place. He also knew that artificial interference in the historical processes which he considered in the context of Divine Providence that sometimes permit human errors, may be unlikely to succeed in the existing situation, even though the intervention is aimed at establishing a good systemic form. For this reason, he did not recommend persistent striving to establish monarchy at all times and instances. Political activity should be therefore, according to him, aimed at avoiding tyranny in all its forms: one-man rule, oligarchy or degraded democracy¹⁷.

Although in general Doctor Angelicus opposed strength solutions believing that they destroyed the natural order of societies that require authority (that is why it is proclaimed to this very day that it originates from God), he allowed repudiation of allegiance to authority that turned into tyranny. He believed that “if a community has the right to make a king for itself, it is not unjust for them to overthrow or restrict him when he abuses royal authority in a tyrannous way.” Aquinas states that the removal of a tyrant is an act of justice, even if the community previously promised their loyalty to him. The tyrant himself gives up his duties of exercising legitimate authority that originate only from God¹⁸.

It should be noted that in this approach there is no contradiction between the origin of authority from God and the choice or removal of the ruler by the community. Authority comes from God as a natural factor that organizes the society. In this respect, there is no organized community, and thus no political community, without assigning authority. In the second case, it regards a particular authority that a man has the right and the duty to choose, as he was chosen by God to be the world’s host (see Gen 1:26-28). He must not destroy the wealth of nature entrusted to him, and he must not destroy other human beings, for example by tyrannizing them or by destroying the social order which, after all, results from natural relations occurring between people. Freedom in the use of authority (its abuse) as well as the introduction of anarchy in social life (lowering the influence of authority), destroy the right proportions in relations forming the order of the political community. According to Saint Thomas and

¹⁶ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *De regno ad regem Cypri*, I, 4-5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Quotation in: J. Salija, *Dzieła wybrane*, Poznań 1984.

Saint Augustine, the influence of a human being is to direct the authority given to him by the Creator, giving the right to decide and to make decisions, is rooted in the rational and free nature of human beings. This influence cannot, however, destroy the very nature of authority if it is not to turn against men¹⁹.

The views of Saint Thomas do not legitimize absolute monarchy. The most surprising concept of monarchy, which he presents in his *Summa Theologiae*, is not a monarchy in the present conceptual categories: “Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people (...). The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. (...) Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.”²⁰

Conclusion

The modern social doctrine of the Catholic Church supports all of the above-mentioned views with the exception that it treats some of its elements as the so-called “signs of the times” in which the creators of these views lived and wrote. Therefore, we cannot say that they became somehow time-barred. They have entered the tradition of the social doctrine of the Church. Similarly, one cannot reasonably claim that the basic theses of the socio-political theories of Saint Augustine or Saint Thomas Aquinas are obsolete in philosophical terms. At the most, one can disagree with them or try to correct them. Nevertheless, it seems that there are no better analyses of the nature of authority and its origin from God.

¹⁹ Cf. KKK 1897-1904; Cz. Strzeszewski, op. cit., 502-507.

²⁰ Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, 105, 1, c.: transl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, [Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/17897/pg17897.html> (accessed 28 June 2019)].

Considering these issues from the perspective of historical applications of the theories, especially the one coined by St. Thomas, it is impossible not to notice the significant analogies of the reflections of Doctor Angelicus and the idea of a “nobles’ democracy” implemented in the First Polish Republic three hundred years later. It is also difficult to believe that after the creation of the scientific community of the Jagiellonian University in the fifteenth century, they did not affect the minds of Polish politicians at a time when the foundations of this democracy were formed. Moreover, it seems that these considerations were widely applied in the centuries-old process of crystallizing other modern and contemporary democratic system.

The Church and Its Authority in Ecumenical Spirituality*

Spirituality develops as a community in the space of the Church of believers who, by experiencing God, strive for full communion with Him. The development of sanctity implies an ecumenical attitude. However, the most important issues in ecumenical spirituality are the unity, holiness and apostolicity of the Church as a witness, namely its authority. Of particular importance is the successor of St. Peter, that is, every Pope. If the Christian's development on the path of holiness takes place in the Church and through the Church, the most basic questions are those asked by Cashmore and Puls. They discuss the characteristics of the Church that would be the only one in the whole world and the problem of the quality of life of those who desire so much to build the Church in this modern world¹.

Spiritual Dimension of Church Authority

When referring to the interpretation that we can find in the GS containing the teachings of Pope Leo XIII (Encyclic *Sapientiae christianae* of January 1, 1890, 22) and Pope Pius XII (Encyclic *Mystici Corporis* of June 29, 1943 and *Humani generis* of August 12, 1950), we can read the following statement: "Christ, the only Mediator, has established His holy Church, a community of faith, hope and love here on this earth as a visible organism. He constantly keeps it alive, spreading both the truth and grace through it onto everyone. In turn, when considering the Mystical Body of Christ and the community equipped with the hierarchical organs, being both a visible association and spiritual community, the Church

* STV 51(2013)2.

¹ Cf. *Spiritual ecumenism*, R. Ladous, in: *Dictionary of ecumenical movement*, L. Lossky, J.M. Banino, J.S. Pobe, T.T. Stransky, G. Waiwright (ed.), London 1991, 948.

of the earth and the Church rich in heavenly gifts cannot be perceived as two separate things. On the contrary, they form one complex reality that fuses with both the divine and human elements.”²

Therefore, the issue of unity applies to a wide range of subjects, among which an open question about the authority of the Church transmitting the truth remains unanswered. It should be emphasized that this authority is also seen as a guarantor of an authentic message that concerns both the internal and external spectrum of human development. When referring to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, we can find the following explanation: “Faith is first the personal adherence of man to God.” At the same time and in an inseparable way, it is a voluntary acknowledgment of the whole truth that God has revealed.”³ It is extremely interesting to mention the Church’s teaching in the context of another statement a few articles later, namely: “Faith is a personal act, a free response of man to the initiative of God who reveals Himself. Faith is not an isolated act, though. No one can believe alone, just as no one can live alone. No one has given their faith to themselves, just as no one has given life to themselves. Believers have received faith from others, and thus they should give it to others.”⁴

The communal dimension of faith leads to an important issue of authority in the transmission of the truth revealed by God. Thus, the Church called into existence by Jesus Christ is both the extension and continuation of His mission, but also a guarantee of the truth. Therefore, the Church’s teaching expresses this fact in the following words: “Salvation comes from God Himself; however, for we receive the life of faith through the Church, it is our Mother.”⁵

In this context, the statement contained in *Unitatis Redintegratio* is very specific: “Everyone confesses that they are the disciples of the Lord although they have divergent beliefs and follow different paths as if Christ Himself was separated.”⁶ The breakdown of Christianity that the Catholic Church describes as a scandal that undermines the will of Christ, at the same time, makes man ask a question about its authority. It is important to stress that for the spiritual development of man in individual Christian beliefs, this is a crucial issue, because it is about faithfulness to the truth. This is also referred to in the *Venice Document* (1976): “The heart of the Christian faith is the confession of Christ

² KOK 8.

³ KKK 150.

⁴ Ibid., 166.

⁵ Ibid., 169.

⁶ UR 1.

as Lord. God has entrusted to Him every authority in heaven and on earth. As the Lord of the Church, He grants the Holy Spirit to build communion between people and God as well as between people themselves.”⁷

Reaching for encyclopedic publications, many meanings of the word authority can be found: “Authority (Latin: *auctoritas* influence, significance, power).”⁸ However, the unifying person of God and His authority is defined as follows: “In absolute order, absolute authority (God) is distinguished as the main element of the transcendental existential relationship, in which man and his authoritarian functions occupy a distinguished but not absolute position.”⁹ Perz, after general discussion on the origin of the concept of authority and its significance in human relations, gives the following expression that refers to the person of God: “God’s authority is the only absolute authority, because He reveals the fullness of religious truth and directs to the fullness of goodness.”¹⁰ Howland Sanks, using a descriptive method, points to authority as an absolute requirement of the communal character of Christianity.

When referring to the Gospel (see Lk 22:24-27, J 13:1-17), the subservient dimension personified in Jesus Christ is indicated. Of particular importance in this regard is the statement of Jesus Christ (Mt 28:18-29, J 16:12-15), which reveals the nature of His authority with the Father in the Holy Spirit. When considering the above-mentioned words of Jesus Christ, they define the authority of the Church as follows: “Authority in the early church was understood as something more than a mere sociological necessity; it was spiritual authority.”¹¹ In turn, one Anglican-Catholic document entitled *The Gift of Authority*, which addresses the problem of defining authority, refers to the person of God as the author of life in all its universality. The triune God in total freedom and full of authority called life as a being, and in spite of the malice of human sin restores hope and a new life for all. As the fully perfect authority, He is at the same time the author of life in communion with Him, leading to this goal through the constant transformation of creation. In this respect, the action of the Holy Spirit, being the author of reconciliation and union with God and another human being, plays a special role. The authoritative work of God finds

⁷ *Authority in the Church. I The Venice Statement*, 1976, 1.

⁸ *Autorytet*, Z. Chlewiński, S. Majdański, in: *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 1, F. Gryglewicz, R. Łukaszyka, Z. Sułowskiego (ed.), Lublin 1995, 1162.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Autorytet*, A. Perz, in: *Encyklopedia chrześcijaństwa*, G. Ambrosio (ed.), Kielce 2000, 68.

¹¹ *Authority*, T. Howland Sanks, in: *The new dictionary of theology*, J. A. Komonchak, M. Collins, D. Lane (ed.), Dublin 1987, 74.

its fullness in the Incarnate Word, i.e. in Jesus Christ: “The authority of Jesus Christ is that of the ‘faithful witness,’ the ‘Amen’ (cf. Rev 1:5; 3:14) in whom all the promises of God find their ‘Yes.’”¹²

Based on the above statements, it is clear that the Person of God remains the supreme authority for all Christian denominations that refer to Him. It should be claimed, therefore, that all other sources of authority have a relative character, i.e. based on the absolute authority of God manifesting Himself. The reference of each of the Christian Churches to Jesus Christ, who is “the reflection of His glory and being” (Heb 1:3), seeks confirmation of His own authority. The legitimation of authority in the Church is carried out with the help of the authority of Jesus Christ, who, as Head, constitutes the whole organism of the Mystical Body¹³.

In his rationale for this thesis, Kantyka mentions the “Explanations” to the document *Authority in the Church I*, quoting the following statement: “The person and work of Jesus Christ, which were proclaimed by the Apostles, shown and read in the new test letters and solidly inspired by the Holy Spirit, are the basic norms of Christian faith and life. Also, they are the sources of authority.”¹⁴

Authority of Jesus Christ and the Authority of the Church as the Basis for Spiritual Development

The internal development of Christianity can be carried out on the path of love which, as Pope Benedict XVI claims, is in the truth¹⁵. The message of sanctifying

¹² *The gift of authority. Authority in the Church III*, 1999, 7.

¹³ Cf. P. Kantyka, *Autorytet w Kościele. Dialog katolicko-anglikański na forum światowym*, Lublin 2004, 13.

¹⁴ *The gift of authority. Authority in the Church I*, 1999, 14.

¹⁵ Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate* (abbr. CV), Rome 2009. The Pope addresses this issue in the following way, stressing the meaning of love: “Love in the Truth, of which Jesus Christ became a witness through His earthly life, and especially through His death and resurrection, constitutes the essential driving force of the true development of every human being and of all mankind. Love ‘caritas’ is an extraordinary force that encourages people to be courageous and self-sacrificing in the field of both justice and peace. It is a force that has its origins in God – eternal Love and absolute Truth. Everyone finds their good by undertaking a plan that God has for them to fully realize it: in this plan they find the truth, and by accepting it, they can become free (see J 8:22). That is why, defending the truth, proposing it with humility and conviction and witnessing it in life constitute a demanding and irreplaceable form of love. For love is ‘happy with the truth’ (1Cor 13: 6). All people experience an inner impulse to love in an authentic way: both love and truth never leave them completely, because they constitute a vocation inserted by God into the heart and mind of every human being. Jesus Christ cleanses and releases from

truth and the development of love both take place in the space of the Church which plays a central role. This truth about the Church, which is presented by the Second Vatican Council, by using the term “somehow a sacrament,”¹⁶ comes to the fore in *Lumen Gentium* and reads as follows: “The mystery of the Holy Church is revealed in its assumption. For the Lord Jesus began His Church by proclaiming the joyful news, namely the coming of the Kingdom of God promised for ages in Scripture ...”¹⁷ It is worth emphasizing one more fragment of the Council teaching, extremely important from the point of view of the subject in question: “Christ, the only Mediator, established His Holy Church, a community of faith, hope and love here on this earth as a visible organism. He constantly keeps it alive, spreading the truth and grace through it onto all.”¹⁸

The Church’s credibility, in its foundations, depends on the credibility and thus the authority of Jesus Christ. It seems to be a fundamental matter because it is in this space that the anti-spiritual and thus anti-ecumenical process of appropriation of both the person of Jesus Christ and the message of His truth occur. Also, in this space there is the most serious danger of manipulating the truth that is directly opposed to the Christian attitude of love¹⁹. Christocentrism as the principal direction of ecumenical spirituality leaves no doubt. Jesus Christ points to Himself as the source of the Old Testament authority (see Mt 5:17). Reading the Gospel allows us to specify the following main points that indicate the authority of Christ: the vocation of the disciples (see Mt 5:20.22.28.32.34.39.44, Mk 1:22, Lk 4:32); He receives authority in heaven and earth resulting from His relationship with the Father (see Mt 11:27; 17:5; Mk 9:7; Lk 9:35; J 3:11); obedience of the spirits that recognize and confirm Him (see Mk 1:25.27; 9:25); power and authority against sins (see Mk 2:5); He heals and revives with His authority (see Lk 4:39, 5:24); His authority allows for behavior that arouses social opposition, but at the same time, is fully ecumenical and results from concern for man (see Mk 2:15-17, Lk 5:33-35; 6:6-11).

He holds authority and, through the power of this authority, passes it on to His disciples (see Mt 10:1.5-8, 28:19, J 2:21-23).

our human limitations the search for love and truth and reveals to us in full the initiative of love and the project of real life that God has prepared for us. In Christ, *love in the truth* becomes the Face of His Person, and for us, a call to love our brothers in the truth of His project. For He is the Truth (see J 14:6).” Ibid.

¹⁶ LG 1.

¹⁷ LG 5.

¹⁸ LG 8.

¹⁹ Cf. CV 2.

The authority of Jesus Christ, who is Head of the Mystical Body, or the Church, is the basis of an evangelizing and sanctifying mission toward the world, which should be recognized in a universalistic way in terms of both time and space. In this way, the Catechism of the Catholic Church expresses this truth in the following words: “It is the task of the Son to realize in full the times of the Father’s saving plan; this is the motive of His message. For the Lord Jesus began His Church by proclaiming the joyful news, namely, the coming of the Kingdom of God promised for centuries in the Holy Scriptures. To fulfill the will of the Father, Christ began the heavenly Kingdom on earth. The Church is the Kingdom of Christ already present in the mystery. The already mentioned *Venetian document*, referring to the Holy Spirit and Its role in the Church, points to the evangelization and missionary message of the Church from its very beginning: ‘Through the gift of the Spirit, the apostolic community could know God’s salvific action in the words and deeds of Jesus and recognize His mission to proclaim to all people the good news of salvation.’”²⁰

Highlighting the person and the role of the Holy Spirit toward the Church brings believers into the entire space of the Trinitarian unity of God. His message, constituting the Church throughout its centuries of existence, has also built the authority of the community of believers since the apostolic times. The Holy Spirit’s assistance allows the Church to remain faithful to the revealed revelation, to exercise the sacraments, which are the source and at the same time the sanctifying means, and to remain in communion with the visible head of the Church, being the successor of Saint Peter²¹.

Therefore, the community of believers use the entire deposit of faith, and thus become the authority itself in fulfilling the missionary and evangelizing order. This truth was also emphasized by the *Venetian document* in the following words: “Living together in the Body of Christ gives the community and each of its members what they need to fulfill their responsibility.

In this way, they are able to reveal the authority of Christ through them.”²² These words, derived from the document of ecumenical reconciliation, are a reflection of the conciliar teaching of the Catholic Church: “Yes, the Church is the only flock of God and a sign raised among nations that pilgrimizes in hope up to the end designated in the upper homeland by giving peaceful evangelization to all mankind.”²³

²⁰ *Authority in the Church | The Venice Statement*, 2.

²¹ Cf. P. Kantyka, *op. cit.*, 15.

²² *Authority in the Church | The Venice Statement*, 3.

²³ UR 2

Fundamental Significance of Credibility Criteria

The analysis of the issue still raises questions about the criteria of the Church's credibility. It should be stressed that for Christian believers who identify themselves with their own confessional communities, it is their community that is both the carrier and communicator, as well as the proper authority, of the truth transmitted. At the same time, each community emphasizes the value of the sanctifying path it offers to its faithful believers. This issue undoubtedly belongs to the fundamental problems that do not allow for the actualization of the prayer of Jesus Christ, found in the Gospel, and which is the starting point, and also the target, of ecumenical spirituality (see J 17:21). As pointed out by the conciliar doctrine and the history of the Church, we had been dealing with different divisions since the very beginning. These accents can be found, e.g. in 1Cor 1, 1ff; 11:22²⁴. The constitution of the Church of the first centuries was shaken by numerous divisions formed on the basis of Gnosticism, Montanism, Manicheism, and Monarchism. They led to the crystallization of clear doctrine and the teaching of the Church. This is how the schools and theological faculties in Alexandria and Antioch developed. The First Ecumenical Councils in Nice (325), Constantinople (381) and Ephesus (431) brought a clearly written profession of faith, and also became a response to theological controversies which very clearly struck the unity of the Church²⁵.

The Catholic Church, in its interpretation, clearly emphasizes what applies to those who identify with it. It points out that the work of the Holy Spirit is realized through the pursuit of the truth, living in the community of faith and in the ministry. It is He who endows the Church with hierarchical and charismatic gifts²⁶. When referring to the biblical images, they describe the nature of the Church, point to the constitutive role of the sacraments with particular emphasis on baptism, show the role of the hierarchical structure headed by each Peter to finally say: "This is the only Church of Christ that we profess in the symbol of faith as one, holy, catholic and apostolic, which our Savior, after His resurrection, entrusted to Peter (J 21:17). He commissioned him and the other Apostles that they would promote and guide it (see Mt 18:18ff). It was founded to last forever as a pillar and foundation of the truth (1Tim 3:15). This Church, established and organized in this world as a community, continues

²⁴ Cf. UR 3.

²⁵ Cf. M. Banaszak, *Historia Kościoła Katolickiego*, vol. 1, Warsaw 1989, 52-164; *Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych*, vol. 1, A. Baron, H. Pietras (ed.), Kraków 2001, 21-189.

²⁶ Cf. LG 4.

in the Catholic Church. It is ruled by the successor of Peter and the bishops remaining in its community (*communio*)...²⁷

The above-mentioned fragment of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council clearly defines the criteria of the credibility and authority of the Catholic Church. This problem found its place in the teaching of John Paul II, published in the Encyclical *Ut unum sint*. The Pope stresses that for two centuries of the Catholic Church, it was this Church that preserved the unity of all the goods with which God desired to equip it. If there are tears and shattering, they are the result of human mistakes and weaknesses, but they do not reflect the entire deposit of faith²⁸. This statement is further elaborated on in the Catechesis of John Paul II. In one of them he states: "On the other hand, the Church was established and received its structure from the One who founded it – Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God. By virtue of His own authority, Christ built the Church by choosing twelve men and making them the Apostles to continue His work in His name. From among the twelve, He chose one, the Apostle Peter, to whom He said: *Simon (...), I prayed for you (...). You, on your part, confirm your brothers* (Lk 22:31-32)."²⁹ At the same time, it is emphasized that the critical criterion for building the church is intimacy with Jesus Christ. This is a guarantee of the right path resulting from opening to the Holy Spirit. The gift of unity comes from above, and therefore it is impossible to tighten either its definition or description to purely naturalistic criteria, which is why it is an extremely complicated and impossible problem to grasp with only the natural possibilities of the human mind. There must be a permanent reference to the Source and His authority³⁰.

It is extremely important and practical to refer to theoretical and fundamental theology, which allows us to outline and define the criteria for determining the so-called "Ecclesiasticism." Bartnik refers to the Church's teaching contained in the conciliar documents, and so systematizes it as follows: salvific realm, legitimate authority, proper autonomy, own personality, and the name of the Church³¹.

The ecumenical directorate, which gives the foundation of the practical dimension of building the path that leads to the church's spiritual and physical

²⁷ LG 8.

²⁸ Cf. Joh Paul II, *Ut unum sint* (abbr. UUS), Rome 1995, 11.

²⁹ John Paul II, *Jedność przez zwycięża podziały of 30.8.1995*, in: *Ib., Dzieła zebrane. Katechezy*, 2, Kraków 2007, 800- 801.

³⁰ John Paul II, *Działalność ekumeniczna 2.8.1995*, in: *Ib., Dzieła...*, op.cit., 792-794.

³¹ Cf. Cz. Bartnik, *Dogmatyka*, vol. 2, Lublin 2003, 67-68.

unity, mentions three unifying elements referred to as knots, and they include: the knot of faith, the knot of sacramental life, the knot of hierarchical service³².

The above criteria may not directly describe the spiritual dimension of ecumenism, but they are extremely important since they allow the ecumenical dimension of the sanctifying path of the Christian to be spelled out. In this way, they also determine the position of the Church toward other churches as well as religious communities. We can therefore see that the whole ecclesial dimension, which is extremely significant, does not blur in action that seeks a compromise. The Church's credibility gives certainty to those who live in the Church. They have a certain and clear purpose on the sanctifying path, and all means to do so. In the face of those who are members of other Churches and Communities, quality of the relationship is specified³³.

Pneumatological Dimension as a Level of Unity

All this leads to the determination of the ecclesiastical status of the Churches as a community in the Holy Spirit. As already mentioned, His person is the Inspirer of the entire ecumenical work, as well as the development of sanctifying life. Holiness, to be authentic, needs to be realized in the way of love of both God and neighbor (see Mt 22:37-40). These two dimensions must be compatible so that Christianity can become a testimony that sanctifies and realizes the idea of Jesus Christ concerning the building of the Kingdom of God³⁴. The operation of the Holy Spirit and the results of the mystery of His exile are the principles of the whole space which we define as an ecumenical spirituality, based on love.

³² *Dyrektorium w sprawie realizacji zasad i norm dotyczących ekumenizmu*, Papieska Rada do spraw jedności chrześcijan, in: *Ut unum. Dokumenty Kościoła katolickiego na temat ekumenizmu 1982-1998*, S.C. Napiórkowski, K. Leśniewski, J. Leśniewska (ed.), Lublin 2000, 34-35.

³³ Cf. W. Steele, *Ecumenism for Catholics*, Derbyshire 2003, 15. The author addresses the problem as follows: "This richer understanding of Church as Communion meant that the Catholic Church could develop a different understanding of the place of other Christian communities. If we recognized Baptism of a given denomination, we were in a position to recognize that this denomination as such could be partly in communion with the Catholic Church, sharing in the mystery of the one Church of Christ with some, perhaps many, of what in the Catholic view are essential characteristics of this one Church," Ibid.; *The Search for Christian Unity*, Directory Catholic Bishop's Conference of England and Wales, London 2002, 46-59.; UUS 82-96.

³⁴ Cf. W. Kasper, *Sakrament jedności*, Kielce 2005, 57-58.

He is the author of both the sanctified and sanctifying community, where the entire spiritual structure based on the theological virtues of faith, hope and love develops in the believers. He is the one who grants favors and charisms, enriches believers and the Church to constitute *communio* with God and man and His community of faith³⁵. Adoption of the whole pneumatological dimension, which, according to the Council, becomes concretized as “the soul of the body Christ”³⁶ and the ontological unity of Christ, the hypostatic union³⁷, makes it possible to determine the ecclesial status of the Churches and Christian Communities. Therefore, *Unitatis redintegratio* emphasizes that the faith and baptism of those who have separated themselves from full Unity with the Catholic Church gives them a “due Christian name.”³⁸ Next, the Council Fathers notice: “In addition, among the elements or goods, thanks to which the Church itself is built and enlivened, some and many of them can exist outside the visible area of the Catholic Church: the written word of God, life in grace, faith, passion, love and other internal gifts of The Holy Spirit and the visible elements: everything that comes from Christ and leads to Him rightly belongs to the only Church of Christ.”³⁹

The World Council of Churches giving its opinion on this subject in 1950 in Toronto stated: “The recognition of the ecclesial character of other Churches and Communities means appreciating their church-creative elements.”⁴⁰ It should be noted that ecumenical development must be compatible with the spiritual development of believers and their Churches and communities. Only in this way will it not be reduced to the theoretical or only pragmatic dimension. Therefore, appropriate recognition of the authority of the Church, which belongs to the theological basis and at the same time is an instrument of holiness in the life of a Christian, appears as a necessity. It is also the road to union with Jesus Christ through opening up to the Holy Spirit.

³⁵ Cf. LG 4.

³⁶ LG 7.

³⁷ LG 8.

³⁸ UR 3.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ S. Napierała, *Jedność Kościoła a jedność chrześcijan*, in: W. Hryniewicz, J.S. Gajek, S. Koza (ed.), *Ku chrześcijaństwu jutra*, Lublin 1997, 59.

From Reistic to Personalist Theology*

I wish to present my concept of a dogma and all the work in this subject. However, this is not an easy task, since one needs to be able to rise beyond one's own thinking and work and to present one's own meta-theological reflection. This is not just a theological method but a real methodology.

Usually, our scientific thinking and work is perceived by us in a slightly different way than by others, although not necessarily better. Authors tend to be uncritical towards their own work just as a mother would be towards her child. There is also the concept of *Wirkungsgeschichte* raised by Hans Georg Gadamer that stands for a question whether a given concept or a given achievement is deeply embedded in history, in the environment; whether it has prospective followers and impact or whether it turns out to be dead at the moment of birth. Not only the man himself, but also his thoughts and work are subject to some outside verification, which is capricious at one time, yet very just at the other.

Theology of Reism

Like probably nearly all fields of science referring to ancient Greek thought, from the very beginning and until today, theology has been concerned not about the personal world but the world of things. Even God, who is called a person, in theology is actually presented as a thing and in reism using terms such as: light, beginning, mover, force, infinity, omnipotence... Indeed, at the beginning I was also (like others) a simple receiver of a dogmatic and fundamental theology standing for the discipline of reism, personal nature, one that imitates secular science about things. Furthermore, catechisms, textbooks, lectures and studies were also of such a nature. Therefore, I thought that at the time, I had knowledge

* STV 52(2014)1.

analogous to logic, mathematics or astronomy similar to a huge and perpetual building, where only a few new elements were being given by individual theologians: small bricks on various themes bound to last forever. Meanwhile, even in the exact sciences, new theories emerge from time to time and sometimes there are turnarounds in mathematics, cosmology, physics, medicine and other areas. Therefore, theology must evolve; it cannot be limited solely to ancient Greek thought.

Theology and Faith

In the study of the concept of theology it is necessary to remember that theology and faith are strongly related to each other yet have fundamental differences, and therefore, theology is not faith. Meanwhile, some theologians, perhaps subconsciously, confuse theory with faith. Equally, scientific theology is generally associated with a self-contained, colloquial theology especially by ordinary believers; they all consider themselves theologians (at least to some extent) and judge theologians from the position of their alleged superiority. For example, a person might say, "I think that there is no hell" or "In my opinion, the Roman primacy is the usurpation of the Roman bishop." In addition, we might argue that even an atheist has his or her own 'personal' theology, which means antitheology, i.e. a theology that fights against ecclesial theology.

Scientific theology differs from ordinary presumptions and emotional judgments mainly because of the applied method and systemic approach. The method logically derives from all cognitive, revealed and natural sources, analyzes sentences and examines their functions and range. On the other hand, the system makes theorems more consistent and relevant; it puts them in a higher part and interprets them properly with a reference to reality.

As a result, faith is God's revealing to man in a personal way and faith realizing itself fully when man perceives God's interference and cooperates with Him in a conscious life. And this divine-human nature is unaffected, unchanging, most powerful (*actus fidei firmissimus*) and saving. On the other hand, theology as a human scientific elaboration of this faith is temporal, largely changeable, aspect-oriented and sometimes fallible. It is often mistakenly said that theology forms the truths of faith. This is not the case. The dogmas of faith are formed by faith, and theology only formulates them intellectually. When theology formulates some dogma in its own way, we do not believe in this formula but in what it expresses in faith. In other words, we do not believe in a theological opinion, but we believe in reality that is expressed in that opinion. This faith is already a relationship to God of an entire person, and not just the mind.

Towards a more Complete Theological Concept

Generally, theological concepts are adopted from great schools, old and modern alike, such as Augustinism, Thomism, Scotism, Christian existentialism, Phenomenology and others. Most theologians stop at this point, not having any ambition to complement these concepts or to create a new one. However, some theologians sometimes create their own theological concepts, like their own style in art or literature during their long-term practice of the subject. That is why I warn young theologians against writing didactic textbooks at the beginning of their academic career. At the end of your life you will be ashamed of the fact that you have written a work of a school-like nature, shallow and in many points wrong, and, above all, someone else's and immature. It is a paradox that it is more difficult to write a textbook than a monograph, yet meanwhile, textbooks are generally not considered as scientific achievements.

Intellectual Basis

Theology came to me from intellectual grounds, thought, philosophy. The sphere of the heart, devotion, and church functionality came later. Theology grew mainly from the issue of God, His existence and all His mystery. As I can see in reflexive publications, many theologians begin with considering rather the revealed and detailed truths, and only after do they perceive general and intellectual problems, going beyond the supernatural faith itself. Today, I give most value to theology which uses mainly the philosophy in the form of a great system; although I know that systems have become unfashionable in western countries.

Towards Systematic Theology

A true dogmatic theology should be systematic. Forms of non-systematic theology, such as kerygmatic, narrative, hermeneutical, linguistic and entirely historical theology do not have such a scientific value. They can only be helpful in systematic theology. Great theologians are usually associated with great mental and philosophical systems, namely, St. Justin and St. Irenaeus of Lyons are associated with stoicism, Origen and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite with Neoplatonism, St. Augustine with the third Platonic school and stoicism, St. Thomas Aquinas with Aristotelianism, Bl. Jan Duns Scotus with Augustinianism and

partially with Aristotelianism, Karl Rahner with Neo-Kantianism and existentialism, Hans Urs von Balthasar with the philosophy of beauty and Neo-Gnosticism, Hans Georg Gadamer and Wolfhart Pannenberg with post idealistic historicism, John Paul II with Thomism enriched with Phenomenology, Benedict XVI with Augustinian personalism, etc.

Today, many theologians are moving away from great systems towards pragmatism, psychologism and sociologism. Many of them believe that the proliferation of schemes introduces skepticism into theology and fragmentation in faith. Some consider one or the other system to be blameworthy, such as P. Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionism. However, I think that the multitude of systems enriches the Christian theology because all our cognition of religious mysteries is only aspect-oriented. Such pluralism in the church is desirable. However, one theologian should follow a single system, because eclecticism is of low value. Other systems may serve only as an aid to certain concepts, solutions or innovations.

Of course, all systems in the Church should be based on the same foundations of faith but only one leading system ensures consistency, legibility and correctness. Some say that, for example the sentence "The Word made flesh" (J1:14) is equally understood in each system, which is not true. The very concepts of "God," "man," "the Word," "flesh," "to make" are dependent in their meanings on the system, not to mention whole passages of the Bible. Thus, the system ensures cohesion, logic, unambiguity, consistency, depth of approach and consistent reference to practice. In short, both theological concept and theological creation without a system, even if embraced and implicit, may not have a greater value or any value whatsoever.

Emergence of Personalism

After John Paul II had read my work *Personalism*, he asked in his letter, "Is personalism a system or does it use systems, such as Thomism or phenomenology?" (Castel Gandolfo, 5 August 1995). This is an important issue. Can personalism not be created as an original system?

Personalism is a system in itself. In philosophy, there were several outside Poland, though in a rather idealistic approach, in the spirit of an idealistic philosophy. However, there is no personalism applied in theology. I think that in Poland there is a need to create realistic personalism and refer it to theology also. Thus, it would be a philosophical-theological system with a universal range. The term personalism has two basic meanings that are usually confused

in Poland. A distinction can be made between anthropological personalism and personalism as a system. Anthropological personalism is simply a science concerned with man as a person. This science is either embedded in a separate system (even Marxism considers itself humanism) or all reality is reduced only to a human being, as in the case of extreme forms of existentialism, Józef Bańko's recentivism and other, or any systemic thought is set aside in general. In this approach, the personalist is any Catholic theologian and everyone who accepts that every human is a person and who examine the phenomenon of a human person.

However, anthropological personalism itself, without being connected to the whole system, remains undefined, amorphous and ambiguous depending on the general direction. Therefore, there is a need for personalism as a system that also deals with the phenomenon of a man as a person, but this phenomenon, given directly to every human being, takes all reality as a starting point and support for the vision and constitutes a concept of existence. It is called universalistic personalism. In fact, it is a philosophical system but also a fundamentally creative one for theology as a whole.

Formation of the Theology of Personalism

Personalistic theory stems undoubtedly from a person's experience of the world in relation to Divine Persons and is rooted in the individual person. However, it is not personal and relative in Catholicism, which is mainly due to the identity of each person's nature, the ability of objective perceptions and, above all, the fact he or she is rooted in a community (*communio personarum*). Although there is a temptation to create a theology that would be detached from the community of believers, a proper Catholic theology is present primarily in the community, that is, the Church. The Church, however, does not deny the individual form of theology, but rather postulates, makes it objective and authenticates it. Thus, a creative correlation is formed between the individual form of theology and the ecclesial form. As a result, Catholic theology is not only individual or exclusively social.

The phenomenon of a person, which cannot be expressed completely, appears as a kind of a being and existence, and at the same time, as the very core of reality and the key to the understanding and interpretation of reality. So far, philosophical theories have been based on either recognizing only the body in a human being, thus giving rise to materialism, or only appreciating the soul, which provided the basis for the formation of idealism. Personalism sees

the whole person as a being that is a union of the body and the soul, but also grows beyond them, creating an over-synthesis of the body and the soul; to put it more vividly, it is like a rainbow of being above the physical and the spiritual reality. Today, Thomists generally identify a person with a soul, although St. Thomas himself did not and even though in the fourth and fifth centuries the Church still distinguished between the soul and the person of Jesus Christ, against the Priscillianists. A person, both individual and social, recapitulates in himself (herself) all reality, he (she) reflects it, summarizes, interprets, lives it, it develops creativity in it and makes sense, and consequently is the only subject of religious life, including theology in the world. Everything else in the world is apersonal, although the person is in an actual relationship with it (see: my *Personalizm*, Lublin 1995, Warsaw 2000, *Szkice do systemu personalizmu*, Lublin 200, and others).

Systematic Universality

The system undoubtedly provides a universal perspective and a coherent method at the same time. You can practically do theology to a certain extent and be a so-called 'expert' in, for example, Christology, Mariology, Sacramentology, etc. but it is even better if the work is connected, even subconsciously and implicitly to a system. It is critical that the basic Protestant hermeneutic principle is applied in theology, which means that every biblical book must be translated in the context of the whole Bible, and this whole is to be interpreted in the light of each individual book. That is why Karl Rahner was right, who on the one hand deliberately did not write textbooks, and, moreover, did not limit himself to only a few special sections of theology, as he dealt with all of theology. Thus, the modern linguistic principle seems right that some text detached from the proper whole does not make sense, and therefore a theological sentence, which is detached from the entire system, at least accepted implicitly, does not make any sense.

Integrality

I think that today, personalism gives one of the best perspectives for interpreting the Christian being, mainly by creating an over-synthesis over the physical and spiritual sides, as well as the temporal and saving reality. Christianity is neither just the physical nor only a doctrine, nor is it just the spirit. Let us

take the example of the interpretation of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. There are only two positions in theology on this matter. According to the first, the Resurrection was a subjective, internal and psychological phenomenon of faith of Jesus' disciples; according to the other, it was an empirical-historical event of a physical nature that is materially verifiable. Both these interpretations that exist in theology are wrong. They lack the dimension of personal existence that is neither only carnal nor only spiritual or religious, but over-synthesized. Thus, the Resurrection of Jesus must be explained as a realistic event, even more realistic than the body, yet occurring in the Person of Jesus and in His communication with His disciples or other people.

This approach can be adopted to explain other dilemmas. Sin is not only a matter of the body or just the human psyche, but a matter of a given person and his or her mystery. Jesus performed the salvific process not only physically or only through consciousness and will, but through His entire Person. This work is not actually implemented until a man accepts the work of Jesus in his or her whole person, both materially and spiritually. Without this perception on the part of a human being, the work of Redemption would not be real. St. Augustine said that everyone who was baptized really gave birth to Jesus Christ. Baptism as a sacrament is not only a phenomenon of water or the power of the sound of words but it is an empirical sign through which (as Divine Revelation promised) the Divine Persons give themselves to the human person. Similarly, you can explain all theological problems in personal terms (see: *Metodologia teologiczna*, Lublin 1998, *Dogmatyka katolicka*, 2 vol., Lublin 1999-2003, and others).

Theology of Earthly Realities

Universalistic theology of personalism is not limited to God and man in the redeeming and salvific aspects, but also strives to grasp all reality in its aspect (at least secondarily). This is a theology of earthly realities. It is a theology that transcends the area of Revelation itself *ad intra* and concludes from it some content or cognitive and intellectual lights for temporal reality, which is usually considered non-religious. Such conclusions from the Revelation can be abundant. They do not share the level of secular science and do not invalidate their real cognitions; on the contrary, they can be supported by secular science and they create some firmament, some transcending vault, some high rainbow over cognitions and temporal sciences. For example, the truth about God's creation of the world results in a different view of the world and life on it; the truth about

the creation and redemption of a man results in relevant social and political conclusions, such as dignity, equality, freedom and others; the truth about eternal life of a human being results in an appropriate morality and practice, etc. These conclusions, even if not always clear and absolute, are strongly connected with so-called natural theology. Therefore, theology as a whole, both supernatural and natural, is neither closed *in sola anima* nor is it a desertion from the world of thought and science, nor a blank escape from atheism; instead, it throws (even if only a secondary) light on all temporality. Over time, it is recognized in the form of a theology of different areas, from which the light of theology is to be removed and hence, a theology of the world, matter, history, nation, culture, society, politics, family, work, literature, arts, sport, a woman, etc. I have been dealing with almost all of these branches of concluding theology, sometimes referring to it as “external theology” (I wrote many works on these subjects). In this sense, Catholic theology is universal. Admittedly, there were (and still are) attempts to expel theology beyond all temporality in the direction of abstraction or psychology. Just the influence of moral theology or Christian ethics on temporality is allowed but the influence of Christian thought on all reality, as it used to be at origins of Christianity, is needed to be rebuilt. Perhaps, this can be best done by means of personalist theology, which neither mixes nor equates the temporal and saving orders, nor does it break them up, but rather binds them into a higher whole.

Praxeological Dimension

After centuries of theoretical theology, the times of practical theology are coming; theology (as William Ockham wanted) that is considered to be the only proper theology is the practical, applicable theology connected to empiricism. In turn, only faith concerns transcendence. This is the case not only in America today, where there is a complete intellectual and theoretical desert in theology but also in Western Europe and even in Germany, where until now systematic theology has been practiced. How does personalism solve this? Theoretical theology is inseparable from practical theology. Theory and praxis strictly correlate in theology. In the meantime, we know how theology students, especially seminarians, who are should fulfill their priest's ministry in the future, complain about the treatise on the Holy Trinity that it is difficult theology, actually unnecessary, and has nothing to do with pastoral work. According to personalism, however, there is no more a praxeological treatise than the treaty of the Trinity. Trinitology defines the entire Christian *praxis*. Of course,

it is not the point that theoretical theology is a set of rules or a vademecum for practical activities. Here, the role of the creative medium is the individual who transposes the theoretical sentence into practice, and the practice complements the theory in some aspect. Hence, it follows that a one-dimensional approach i.e. the omission of theoretical theology in favor of praxeological theology, or vice versa: the omission of praxeological theology in favor of the theoretical one is a dangerous thing for Christianity.

Of course, we need to catch up with the theological praxeology we have neglected under the influence of ancient Greek philosophy, which still lives in some directions, for example in Thomistic theology. The praxeological usefulness and usability also belong to the truth, the good and the beauty of theology. Following 1 Tm 4:8, “piety is useful for everything,” it must be said that theology is useful for everything at some level. It is necessary for strengthening faith, for realizing salvation, for personal life, for spiritual life, for broadening the horizons of our thought, for achieving universal visions of reality, for building a better society, for shaping a true material and spiritual culture, etc. Christian thought must be useful and helpful for shaping a more perfect society, country and nation, for saving the homeland in difficult times, for the reconstruction of the morality of society and for the great construction of a prophetic, universal world. Catholic theology is not shameful, narrow and it does not resemble a hidden parish. If Christian theology had not contributed to these matters and if the Church had not had the appropriate reflex for temporal use, then there would be no need for such a theology and such a Church in this world, it would only be some idealistic banter. It is precisely the Catholic personalistic theology that serves primarily the salvific reality, but it must serve a secondarily temporal reality because man himself is still temporal, and temporality and saving communicate in the unity of the person.

There is nothing ontically more perfect than a person and nothing more perfect than a person can be even thought of. Personal existence, three-person, and somehow socio-personal is the essence of God Himself. This is why personalistic theology appears to be a new theology for our time.

Penance in the Perspective of *the Theology of the Body**

The relation between the issues of penance and *the theology of the body* results not only from the time convergence of two documents: the exhortation *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* (1984) and the Wednesday catechesis devoted to the ethical sense of the sacrament of matrimony (1979-1984). The common time of the creation of these documents is a sign of the perspicacity of John Paul II who, in the beginning of the 80s of the previous century, saw the necessity for a new way of speaking about both, the Catholic theology of marriage and human sexuality as well as about broadly understood penance, including sacramental confession.

The novelty of the papal catechesis on *the theology of the body* consisted in the fact that, presenting the biblical grounds for God's covenant with people, John Paul II was not afraid of the language of reason, which reads the language of the human body¹. This perspective is particularly visible in the second part of the catechesis, where biblical-personalistic reasoning is proposed in the context of the marriage vows. It is juxtaposed, on one hand – with the lust of the flesh, and on the other – with the content of the *Song of Songs*. All this leads to a beautiful contemplation regarding the prayer of a husband and wife.

In this context, the language of liturgy becomes the *body language* of the husband and wife, and the sacramental sign – the most effective inspiration for their conversion and penance. By receiving the sacrament of matrimony, the husband and wife open themselves “to the encounter of a great ‘mysterium’ in order to transfer the light of that ‘mysterium’, the light of truth and beauty expressed in the language of liturgy, into the ‘body language,’ translating it to the ‘praxis’ language of love, fidelity and conjugal honesty: to the ethos

* STV 52(2014)2.

¹ Cf. I. Mroczkowski, *Teologia ciała według Jana Pawła II*, “Pastores” 55(2012)2, 39f.

of hope, which is rooted in the ‘redemption of the body’ (Rom 8:23). On this path, marriage life becomes liturgy, in a certain sense.”²

From this liturgy we cannot exclude any of the meanings of penance which function in everyday pastoral language: *the virtue of penance, penitential practices* (prayer, fasting and almsgiving) and the *sacrament of penance*. In *Reconciliatio et paenitentia* John Paul II very precisely defines various meanings of this term. Penance is here both, “the internal transformation of the heart occurring thanks to the influence of the Word of God and in the perspective of the kingdom of God” (cf. Mt 4:17; Mk 1:15), and “the transformation of life in accordance with the transformation of the heart,” which becomes fulfilled in penitential practices (cf. Lk 3:8). As a consequence, penance takes the form of ascetism, “of everyday effort of a human, supported by God’s grace, to lose one’s life for Christ (cf. Mt 16:24-26; Mk 8:34-36; Lk 9:23-25); in order to put off the old man and put on the new one (cf. Eph 4:23 et seq.) in order to overcome in one’s self what is of the flesh so that what is spiritual, prevails (cf. 1Cor 3:1-20).”³

Penance which, in the understanding of John Paul II, is conversion, which goes from the heart to actions, i.e. to the concrete situations of Christian life, becomes the basic topic of *the theology of the body*, by anchoring it in the human heart. In the Wednesday catechesis John Paul II devoted much contemplation to this conversion, in the context of both: the lust of the flesh and his call for purity. This refers to the marital ethos and to marital spirituality, which, by the way, cannot be imagined without the sacrament of penance. In the present article we are going to indicate three significant elements which connect penance with the theology of the body: (1) integrity of life in *the body*, although not *according to the body* (2) the theological understanding of lust and (3) the issue of guilt and of confessing sins. This way we want to confirm the integrity of penance as a virtue, of penitential practices and of the sacrament of penance.

Life in the Flesh vs. Life according to the flesh

The papal *theology of the body* revealed the richness of the biblical understanding of the body, which has nothing to do with Manichaeism, i.e. with accusing the human heart of lust which cannot be overcome. This is important in times when Christian penance is being exposed to criticism. According to critics,

² John Paul II, *Mężczyznę i niewiastę stworzył ich. Odkupienie ciała a sakramentalność małżeństwa*, Città del Vaticano 1986, 457.

³ John Paul II, *Reconciliatio et paenitentia*, 4.

it should break free not only from traces of Manichaeism, but also from any effort of moral formation, especially in the area of human sexuality. For several dozen years the criticism is being strengthened by the false hermeneutics of masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche), who have questioned the ability of the human heart to oppose to lust in general⁴.

Many critics of Christian ascetism have used St. Paul's critical attitude towards the body as their argument. Studies related to St. Paul's thought, which had been being carried out for a long time, demonstrated that his description of the human body cannot be treated as a study of nature, nor – what is more important – be isolated from evaluation assuming the biblical truth on the creation and redemption of the human body. John Paul II writes in a straightforward way that “Paul's description of the body corresponds (...) to the spiritual attitude of ‘honor’ for the human body, honor which the body deserves due to the ‘holiness’ (cf. 1Tes 4:3-8), originating from the mysteries of creation and redemption. This description is equally distant from the Manichaean contempt for the body as well as from various manifestations of the naturalist ‘worship of the body’.”⁵

St. Paul, who was raised in a Jewish family inhabiting the diaspora, underlined his association with Judaism, although he used the terminology taken from philosophic-spiritual trends which were contemporary to him. While remaining a Jew, he used Greek notions: *sarx*, *soma* and *pneuma*, in order to convey the Christian message. By *pneuma* Paul expresses the openness of a person to the Holy Spirit. On one hand the human spirit is not radically separated from the Holy Spirit, and on the other, the Holy Spirit induces a person not only to prayer (cf. Rom 8:26-27), but also to love resulting in effects which have been listed in Gal 5 and 1Cor 13. They may be treated as the fruit of penance. Opposing *sarx* against *pneuma* in a person is, therefore, senseful only as far as *sarx* determines what is heavenly, what is due to God and open to Him.

Sarx and *pneuma* indicate two ways of human existence – the bodily one, which is enclosed in matter and human psyche, and the heavenly one, which is open to the Holy Spirit. This does not mean that there are two spheres, substances or human qualities which are impossible to cross. A person is one holistic being who is able to believe in Jesus Christ. Faith opens him or her to the action of the Holy Spirit, effectuating God's image and resemblance in that person. The tension between life *in the body (in the world)* and life in Christ should be

⁴ Cf. John Paul II, *Mężczyznę...*, op. cit., 185f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 220.

explained by the fact that Paul never discusses natural life in the body without faith in Jesus Christ, which inspires to conversion⁶.

Besides the word *sarx*, Paul also uses *soma* to define the body. The meaning of this word is close to the notion of *a person*. This however does not refer to a person understood in an individualist way, closed within him- or herself. *Soma* expresses relationships towards both, one's own self, as well as others. The community sense of the word *soma* is expressed in the ability to harmonious cooperation of various parts of the organism. St. Paul is the author of the theology of *Christ's Body*, which is complemented by the Church, as the Mystic Body of Christ. Participation in Christ's Body consists in living the Body of the Lord, transforming one's own body in such a way so that this body becomes similar to the spiritual body, offered by the Lord⁷.

Here we can find the source of Christian penance, as continuous conversion, spiritual renewal and being capable of the Christian ability to look at one's self through the eyes of the Savior. Penance, as the internal transformation of the heart under the influence of God's Word and in the perspective of God's kingdom, assumes maintaining one's own body in holiness and *honor* (cf. 1 Tes 4:4). Only then Christian existence which, after all, occurs *in the body*, does not lead to sin. This has been precisely captured in the Epistle to the Galatians: "I no longer live, but Christ lives in me. The life I now live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God" (Gal 2:20). Here Paul is not describing what is happening with his body in the material sense. He is writing about a person living in the world and subjected to the challenges of this world⁸.

Life *in the body* has to, therefore, be perceived as the possibility to serve God, people and the community. The positive role of the body in such service cannot obscure the risk of treating the body as an object, i.e. living *according to the body*. In Paul's texts this last formula also takes the form of being *bodily*. It is that way in 1Cor 3:1-3 where Paul is writing to the Corinthians that they were and they are *bodily*, which manifests itself in their jealousy and quarreling. Their life *according to the body* takes on reprehensible sense.

In 2Cor 5:16 Paul states that "from now on we regard no one from a worldly point of view (i.e. according to the body – translator's note). Though we once regarded Christ in this way, we do so no longer." The apostle opposes to those

⁶ Cf. I. Mroczkowski, *Osoba i cielesność. Moralne aspekty teologii ciała*, Warsaw 2008, 129-136.

⁷ Cf. *Ibid.*, 271.

⁸ Cf. A. Sand, *Der Begriff „Fleisch“ in den Paulinischen Hauptbriefen*, Regensburg 1967, 166.

who take pride in what is seen (what is external – translator’s note) (cf. 2Cor 5:12b), those who preach themselves (cf. 2Cor 4:5), those who wage war as the world does (according to the body – translator’s note) (cf. 2Cor 10:3). The apostle defends himself from those who accuse him of acting in a worldly way – *according to the body*. He writes the following: “though we live in the world (i.e. the body – translator’s note), we do not wage war as the world does (i.e. according to the body – translator’s note). The weapons we fight with are not the weapons of the world. On the contrary, they have divine power to demolish strongholds” (2Cor 10:3-4). Worldly conduct and fighting using worldly methods are those of a person who does not submit to conversion. This conduct and these methods should change in case of persons who belong to Christ (cf. 2Cor 10:7)⁹. It is impossible to imagine such a transformation without constant conversion which manifests itself in both, the virtue of penance and in its particular acts.

Therefore, using Paul’s formulas of life *in the body* and life *according to the body* for the purpose of demonstrating the connection between the *theology of the body* and the virtue of penance, one can say that “it is in the heart where the struggle between ‘life according to the body’ and ‘life according to the Spirit’ takes place. (...) In human’s current condition, with the hereditary sinfulness, the body alone shows its weakness, insufficiency and it succumbs, if it is not internally strengthened to fulfill ‘what the Spirit wills.’”¹⁰. Acting *according to the body* is that of a person who trusts him- or herself and the world more than God. By forgetting about the dependence on the Creator, a worldly person makes him- or herself – and frequently his or her bodily needs – the only criterion of conduct.

It is not surprising, therefore, that such a person associates penance with needless mortification, psychologically suspicious ascetism, resentment. The *theology of the body* reveals the most important sources of spiritual power of a human who wants to remain on the path of constant conversion. This person’s everyday spiritual sensitivity cannot forget that it is the Holy Spirit who *has poured out God’s love into our hearts* (cf. Rom 5:5) and our body is *a temple of the Holy Spirit* (cf. 1 Cor 6:19). The human body was created by God from the dust of the ground, but the Son of God accepted it and used it to carry out the work of salvation. God’s Word coming from the Father became a real inspiration of our transformation, because we all have been saved not due to Platonic love, but by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

⁹ Cf. I. Mroczkowski, *Osoba...*, op. cit., 140f.

¹⁰ Cf. Jan Paweł II, *Mężczyznę...*, op. cit., 206.

Penance And Lust

Christian hope, which is the nourishment for Christian penance, cannot omit these impulses of human nature which induce human to sin. Omitting them would not only deny the realism of human nature, but it would also expose Christian penance to ineffectiveness. In the fragment 5:16 of the Epistle to the Galatians, St. Paul encourages to act *according to the Spirit* and not to fulfill the *desires of the body*. It is necessary to “put off your old self, which is being corrupted by its deceitful desires (...) and to put on the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph 4:22-24).

A person grafted in Jesus Christ is no longer a slave of lust, but this does not mean that such a person is not exposed to its influence. We find a testimony of a struggle between a bodily person and a freed one in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans¹¹. The author thanks God that through Jesus Christ He gave people the possibility to overcome the sin which inhabits them. It is not enough to just become familiar with the law; it is necessary to *remain in Christ*.

In the New Testament the word *lust* (*epithymia*)¹² does not only signify bodily, or simply sexual desire. St. Mark mentions *the worries of this life, the deceitfulness of wealth and the desires for other things* (Mk 4:19). We can find a synthetic utterance on threefold lust in St. John's first Epistle: “For everything in the world—the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life—comes not from the Father but from the world. The world and its desires pass away, but whoever does the will of God lives forever” (1J 2:16-17).

John's words do not deny the spirit of St. Paul's Epistles. Both his *sarks*, as well as *soma* do not define some part of human, but they express religious references which cannot be identified with sensuality in the ontological sense¹³. The human heart, and not his or her body, is the place where the struggle between life *according to the body* and life *according to the Spirit* takes place. In the history of theology it happened that the area of this struggle was placed in sensuality and carnality. All the gnosticizing and neoplatonic interpretations too broadly identified human bodily imperfection with imperfection towards

¹¹ Cf. L. Cerfaux, *Une lecture de l'Épître aux Romains*, Tournai 1947; S. Lyonnet, *La storia della salvezza nella Lettera ai Romani*, Napoli 1966, 97-166.

¹² Cf. K. Büchsel, *Epithymia*, in: *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, vol. 4, 593-602.

¹³ Cf. K. Rahner, *Zum theologischen Begriff der Konkupiscenz*, in: Id., *Schriften zur Theologie*, vol. 1, Einsiedeln 1958, 385, footnote 1.

God. Until today it is a matter of dispute, to what extent St. Augustin's thought succumbed to that influence¹⁴.

The Council of Trent ruled the following: "And referring to lust, which the Apostle sometimes refers to as 'sin' (Rom 6:12 et seq.), the Holy Council declares that the Catholic Church never understood in such a way as if in the reborn (people) it was a real and proper sin, but (it is called that way) because it is a remnant of sin and it induces to sin."¹⁵ This utterance may be fully understood after in-depth interpretation of lust in the context of the adequate notion of the subject of human action. One of the theologians who undertook this task was K. Rahner who differentiated lust in a broad, a narrow and a theological sense¹⁶.

In the broad sense, lust is realized as conscious reactivity of our body. Biological-mental reactions of the organism manifest themselves almost spontaneously in the form of reflexes which should be subjected to the processing of the subject of action. Here we can recall Wojtyła's perspective on human reflexes. He treated them as the area of the earliest improvements, including among them instinct reactions which become visible in human urges¹⁷.

When that reactive dynamics of the body is included in the self-determination of a person, we encounter lust in a narrower sense. It is based on the dynamics of nature and it directs a person towards particular good. In awareness it usually takes the form of a spontaneous act¹⁸. It is most frequently expressed in a person's *feeling*. According to Wojtyła, *being able to feel* is the most elementary manifestation of human psyche and, at the same time, the most psychical reflex of the human somatic realm. It develops and becomes expressed through a richness of human feelings, moods and emotions. The lust (understood in the narrower sense) related to them may be used for both, good and bad.

The integration of the rich world of feelings in the structure of a person, is the great art of life. Therefore we talk about human internal difficulty during the synthesis of human self-agency and subjectivity. Difficulty is proof of the tension between the maturity of the human subject and his or her bonds with the world which are anchored in carnality. Human, as a person, always stands before the task of extracting all the possibilities from his or her nature.

¹⁴ Cf. X. Léon-Dufour, *Grâce e libre arbitre chez S. Augustin*, "Recherches de Science Religieuse" 33(1946), 129-163.

¹⁵ BF, V, 50.

¹⁶ K. Rahner, art. cit., 388-400.

¹⁷ Cf. K. Wojtyła, *Osoba, czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, Lublin 2000, 254.

¹⁸ Cf. K. Rahner, art. cit., 389.

Rahner claims that there is always tension between who a person is and who he or she should be. A person will never fulfill his or her nature fully on Earth¹⁹. In human there is a lot of what is impersonal, submerged in the darkness of instincts and subconsciousness. This dualism between nature – understood as fulfilling all the possibilities of a human being – and the personal implementation of the subject of action (agent) is referred to by Rahner as lust in the theological sense²⁰. The biblical description of sin mentions lust as a result of sin. Shame and fear became its manifestation (cf. Gen 3:7-8).

John Paul II points out that the biblical-theological meaning of lust cannot be identified with the meaning we come across in contemporary psychological approaches. The biblical lust indicates the condition of the human spirit. Along with sin, “the flesh desires what is contrary to the Spirit, and the Spirit what is contrary to the flesh” (Gal 5:17). The result of this is a lack of personal integrity which has been concisely defined by St. John as *the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life* (cf. 1J 2:16). John Paul II compares these areas of lust to those which were described by the hereinabove mentioned masters of suspicion: Freud, Nietzsche and Marx. “The judgement and accusation of the human heart, in the Nietzschean hermeneutics, in a certain sense, corresponds to all that has been referred to in the biblical language as «the pride of life,» in Marx’s hermeneutics – to what has been referred to as «the lust of the eyes,» and in Freud’s hermeneutics – to what has been referred to as the «the lust of the flesh.»”²¹

This convergence should not surprise us. In the history of ethics and morality, the most frequently mentioned dimensions of human existence which required penance, were greed, impurity and pride. Greed was most frequently treated by controlling egoism, impurity – by the virtue of purity, whereas pride was confronted with the individual and the social truth referring to a human. Moreover, we cannot forget that the convergence between the biblical truth referring to lust and the contemporary hermeneutics of evil is not full. It is possible to compare its areas, but their anthropological setting is different, not to mention the ways of dealing with lust. In the Bible, “lust does not constitute the basic and, in a certain sense, the only and final criterion of anthropology ad ethics.”²²

In this context, the Christian understanding of penance assumes not only the criticism of the reductionist statements of the masters of suspicion, but it

¹⁹ Cf. Ibid., 393.

²⁰ Cf. Ibid., 400.

²¹ John Paul II, *Mężczyzna...*, op. cit., 184.

²² Ibid.

enters into dispute with the post-modern escape from moral-spiritual effort, on which the virtue of penance is developed. In the Christian understanding, penance is a positive response to the call to fulfill the image and resemblance to God in human. Even if the human body *desires what is contrary to the Spirit*, it never loses its connection with the human spiritual center. In the center of personal subjectivity, reason becomes opened to faith, freedom is nourished with hope, and the thirst of love meets God, who is love. Therefore, it is impossible to imagine Christian penance without faith and prayer which accompanies it, without hope which brings the conviction that a human is capable of more than is suggested by his or her bodily lust, and without love which – in the penitential sense – is accompanied by the practice of mercy. In this sense, the basic structure of the virtue of penance is based on faith, hope and love which are accompanied by three penitential practices: prayer, fasting and almsgiving.

Guilt and Confession of Sins

The connection between the theology of the body and penance, identified in overcoming lust, cannot ignore the problem of a person's guilt and responsibility. By nature, the human is called to take responsibility for both, his or her own identity as well as for others. Only in the perspective of guilt as an obligation may we ask about the sense of guilt as a trespass. Ricoeur puts it the following way: "guilt is not the synonym of a trespass. (...) guilt – when considered separately – may be traced in various directions: towards ethical-legal reflection on the relationship of punishability to responsibility; towards an ethical-religious reflection on delicate and scrupulous conscience; and finally – towards a mental-religious reflection on the hell of a blamed and sentenced awareness."²³

All the directions of analyzing guilt listed by Ricoeur may be explicated theologically. The human, as a being created in God's image and resemblance, is to the same extent called to the implementation of his or her own freedom as well as he or she is aware of the gravity of that obligation. Every time we move away from God because of our sin results in the fact that our *obligation* (as *debitum*) becomes infeasible without Christ. People uncritically search for ways of self-justification, the example of which is the contemporary culture of self-justifications and – as a consequence – acceptance of sin.

²³ P. Ricoeur, *Symbolika zła*, Warsaw 1986, 96.

Exit from a situation of guilt can be neither a denial of the theological dimension of guilt, nor an attempt to reduce guilt to morbid states of consciousness. From the Christian perspective of redemption, so important for understanding penance, especially in its sacramental act of confession, human guilt fits between the redeemed condition of a person and the fearful way of its implementation, resulting from the consequences of birth-sin. Guilt, as *debitum*, is an existential experience of a redeemed person who, believing Jesus Christ, not only undertakes some indeterminate option of transforming his or her life, but wants to give a new form to his or her life. This giving of a form is, according to St. Paul, a new existence in Christ, which engages both, a Christian's conscience, as well as living theological virtues and sacraments. Only in this sense, the human *debitum*, what a human owes to God, to him- or herself and to other people, has a chance to be implemented²⁴.

The sense of obligation understood this way places a person before the choice which is carried out in the same way through the basic decision of choosing God as well as specific choices of the human conscience. From a Christian point of view, conscience appears to be the existential ability to responsibly undertake obligation. In this sense it may be compared to the most hidden center and sanctuary of a person, in which this person remains alone with God²⁵. The voice of God, resounding in that sanctuary, may be recognized by the human mind collaborating with human emotional intelligence.

In the conscience, which is subject to the process of development and education, a person may realize the insufficiency of fulfilling his or her own obligation. Jesus mentioned the fruit by which one can recognize the nature of a tree (cf. Mt 7:17-19). St. Paul lists catalogues of virtues and faults (cf. Rom 6:20-23.7:4 et seq.; Gal 5:19-22). If, therefore, guilt is some *fulfilled internality of sin*²⁶, then the good fruit, moral skills and moral ascetism constitute milestones of Christian penance. They cannot, however, be treated in the quantitative sense, or, the more so, an external one. There should be a readiness for conversion which facilitates confessing sins. The same way as guilt is the fulfilled internality of sin, penance requires admitting sin and confessing it before God. This is a moment of a degree of internalizing sin which touches the grace of forgiveness. The psalmists of the Old Testament knew perfectly well the power of such a confession: "For I know my transgressions, and my sin is always before me. Against you, you only, have I sinned and done what is evil in your sight" (Ps 50:5-6).

²⁴ Cf. I. Mroczkowski, *Osoba...*, op. cit., 196f.

²⁵ Cf. GS 16.

²⁶ Cf. P. Ricoeur, op. cit., 136.

The confession of sins is a moment of connection between two elements which are important for Christian penance: the ability to assess the gravity of sin through conscience and becoming opened to new life. This way it is possible to avoid the curse of blamed awareness which becomes easily transformed in either scrupulosity or rebellion. New life in Christ is nourished by Jesus's obedience which became *love to the end*. The essence of penance, which builds Christian identity this way, is not so much trusting one's own self, but "clothing one's self with Christ" (cf. Rom 13:14).

In such a view of penance, there is no confusion of the neurotic sense of guilt with the obedience to orders and prohibitions. In the history of moral theology it appeared that the fight against sin was limited to exercising orders and prohibitions. Sometimes the psychological conditions for human development were omitted and attention was not always paid to a false sense of guilt. The effects of that included false conscience, perfectionism or reducing penance to obeying regulations. Penance was accompanied by excessive pessimism and succumbing to false sense of guilt.

Finally, Christian penance, which is indispensable for fulfilling what has become the obligation of a Christian, consists in not so much fulfilling the law, but in carrying out love. Christian conscience is not only a judge, but also a witness of God's voice and a guardian of human existence. Human fate becomes the path of a repentant person who confesses his or her sins and, promising to be better, expresses hope for the forgiveness of his or her trespass. The psalmist had put it perfectly: "Then I acknowledged my sin to you and did not cover up my iniquity. I said, 'I will confess my transgressions to the Lord.' And you forgave the guilt of my sin" (Ps 31:5). In consequence, experiencing guilt does not lead to a self-propelled reel of fear. God's grace bestows a person more than his or her sin impoverished him or her (cf. Rom 5:20).

This way the confession of sins, the Christian manifestation of which is sacramental confession, crowns the path of penance. It includes both, the virtue of penance which, from the perspective of the *theology of the body*, consists in living *in the body*, although not *according to the body*. It does not omit the realism of the threefold lust, opposing it with concrete forms of ascetism (penitential practices) and it finds freshness of the spirit in the Christian sacrament of penance. This way, the Christian practice of *penance*, as a virtue, of penitential practices and of the sacramental confession of sins, confirms the realism of the *theology of the body*.